Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Banner Bank (“Banner”) provided a multimillion-dollar loan to James and Loree Smith and their business entities. As collateral, James Smith pledged several properties. Banner later contracted to release Loree Smith from all actions associated with the loan. When the loan entered default, Banner named Loree in this diversity action to foreclose on the collateral, notwithstanding the release. Loree brought a successful breach of contract counterclaim and recovered attorneys’ fees through Utah’s bad-faith fee-shifting statute. Banner appealed, arguing that every prong of the bad-faith statute was not met and the fee award was unreasonable. Finding that the judgment was final, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals exercised jurisdiction, but did not reach any of Banner’s specific statutory arguments. The Court reversed the fee award because it found Section 78B-5-825 was a procedural attorneys’ fees statute, so it could not be used to recover fees when a federal court sat in diversity. View "Banner Bank v. Smith, et al." on Justia Law

The district court found that Southern Coal had breached a contract with Drummond to transfer and store coal and awarded Drummond $6,860,000. Drummond appealed, arguing that the district court erred in finding a price escalation clause in the contract unenforceable. Southern Coal argued that Drummond’s actions excused Southern Coal’s obligation to pay Drummond under the contract. Both parties challenged the district’s court determination not to award attorneys’ fees to either party.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of $6,860,000. The district court correctly found that Southern Coal was not excused from performing under the contract and that the price escalation clause was unenforceable. Southern’s anticipatory repudiation argument lacked merit. The “root” of the Agreement was that Drummond would provide throughput services to Southern Coal. At no point did Drummond indicate that it would not perform that obligation. The district court correctly found the Agreement ambiguous and declined to reform the contract with respect to the price benchmarking clause. The court remanded for the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party, Drummond. View "Southern Coal Corp. v. Drummond Coal Sales, Inc." on Justia Law

Couch falsely represented that he was not HIV positive. Jackson issued Couch a $500,000 life insurance policy. At the time, HIV-positive individuals had a greatly diminished life expectancy, resulting in high demand for HIV-positive insureds willing to engage in viatical settlements. Couch worked with a brokerage, which, months later, found a purchaser, Crum. The premiums were paid through the broker's premium reserve fund until after the two-year contestability period policy expired. Crum paid the premium for eight more years, letting the policy lapse in 2009. In 2016, Crum learned that Couch had died in 2005 and made a claim.Jackson sought a declaration that, under Georgia law, the policy was void as an illegal human life wagering contract. The district court found that Couch took out the policy with the intent to sell it to one without an insurable interest and that the policy was unenforceable as an illegal human life wagering contract under Georgia law. Crum argued that an illegal human life wagering contract involves the knowing, direct involvement of an identified third-party beneficiary at the time of its procurement. The Eleventh Circuit certified, to the Georgia Supreme Court, the question: whether a life insurance policy is void if it is procured by an individual on his own life for the sole purpose of selling the policy to a third party without an insurable interest in the insured, but without the complicity of the ultimate purchaser at the time of procurement. View "Jackson National Life Insurance Co. v. Crum" on Justia Law

Wye sued Iraq. The district court denied Iraq’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and entered judgment in Wye’s favor years later. An intervening Fourth Circuit ruling rejected Iraq’s contention that none of the exceptions in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. 1602, applied to Wye’s breach of contract claims; because Wye alleged that it had engaged in acts inside the U.S. under the contract, the lawsuit could proceed under the second clause of the FSIA’s commercial activities exception, which abrogates foreign sovereign immunity with respect to claims that are “based upon . . . an act performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere.”The D.C. Circuit vacated. Iraq’s participation in the trial did not implicitly waive its sovereign immunity. The law of the case doctrine does not require adherence to the Fourth Circuit’s conclusions. The D.C. Circuit concluded that section 1605(a)(2) does not apply to this case. A plausible basis for sustaining the district court’s jurisdictional ruling can be found in the commercial activity exception’s third clause, abrogating immunity if the action is “based upon . . . an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.” The district court is best positioned to determine whether Iraq’s breach of contract caused “direct effects” in the U.S. View "Wye Oak Technology, Inc. v. Republic of Iraq" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals rendering judgment that delivery of the grantor's fractional share in the pipeline occurred in the gathering pipeline rather than the transportation pipeline, holding that the court of appeals did not err.A deed conveying the mineral estate in this case reserved a nonparticipating royalty interest in kind, meaning that the grantor retained ownership of a fractional share of all minerals in place. The deed required delivery of the grantor's fractional share "free of cost in the pipe line, if any, otherwise free of cost at the mouth of the well or mine[.]" The parties agreed that the royalty did not include production and postproduction costs incurred before delivery into the existing gas pipeline but disagreed about the pipeline's location under the terms of the deed. The trial court concluded that delivery occurred in the transportation pipeline. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that delivery occurs in the gathering pipeline. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the court of appeals correctly interpreted the deed in this case. View "Nettye Engler Energy, LP v. Bluestone Natural Resources II, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court that overruled Community First Bank's motion for summary judgment, sustaining First Central Bank McCook's motion for summary judgments and dismissing Community First's breach of contract claims, holding that genuine issues of fact existed precluding summary judgment.On appeal, Community First argued that the district court erred in determining that the contract between Community First and First Central was a participation agreement that did not create a debtor-creditor relationship between the two banks. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding (1) the contract between the parties was ambiguous; and (2) a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding the provisions of the contract between the parties. View "Community First Bank v. First Central Bank McCook" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals vacating the order of the district court entering judgment on an arbitrator's award, holding that the court of appeals erred in finding the award ambiguous and ordering a remand to the arbitrator for further clarification.Signal 88, LLC brought this contract action against Lyconic, LLC. The district court ordered the dispute to be submitted to arbitration. The arbitrator issued a decision, after which Lyconic applied for an order confirming the arbitration award. The district court confirmed the award but, in the process, modified it. The court of appeals vacated the judgment, determining that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred in modifying rather than confirming the award; and (2) the court of appeals erred in finding that the arbitrator's award was ambiguous. View "Signal 88, LLC v. Lyconic, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals affirming the district court's judgment concluding that Tennis Sanitation, LLC breached the contract between the parties and that, as a result of the breach, Vermillion State Bank suffered $1.92 million in damages, holding that the court of appeals did not err.Tennis repudiated an alleged oral contract it negotiated with Vermillion for its purchase of certain assets, including garbage trucks and customer routes, of a trash collection business in bankruptcy. After Tennis's repudiation, Vermillion sold the assets to another company at a significantly lower price. Vermillion then sued Tennis for breach of contract. The district court entered judgment for Vermillion. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that hybrid contract involving goods and non-goods should be interpreted based on the predominant purpose of the contract. View "Vermillion State Bank v. Tennis Sanitation, LLC" on Justia Law

A contract by a public agency that exceeds the agency's statutory powers is void and will not support an award of attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (a).The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's award of fees, concluding that section 1717 does not apply to a void contract. In LAFCO I, the court had concluded that LAFCO was not authorized by statute to make the indemnity agreement. The court explained that, where a public agency is not authorized to make an agreement, the agreement is void and the public agency may neither enforce nor be liable on the contract. It follows that the public agency is not liable for attorney fees based on section 1717. The court rejected Central Coast's contention that the doctrine of in pari delicto applies to allow enforcement of the contract. View "San Luis Obispo Local Agency Formation Commission v. Central Coast Development Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased tickets for Defendant’s commercial flights from Miami to Venezuela. Plaintiffs allege that their ticket prices reflected the “fully-paid contract” and that Defendant failed to sufficiently disclose any other fees required for passage. When checking in for their flights at the airport, however, Defendant informed Plaintiffs that they had to pay an additional $80 “Exit Fee” before being allowed to board their flights. Plaintiffs filed a breach of contract putative class action.The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim because it related to the price of the airline ticket and the Act’s preemption provision identifies actions relating to price as preempted. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, first holding that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged facts that would establish diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim seeks merely to enforce the parties’ private agreements regarding the cost of passage and does not invoke state laws or regulations to alter the agreed-upon price. The statute, 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), provides: “[A] State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier..” The suit falls within the category of cases protected from preemption by Supreme Court precedent. View "Cavalieri v. Avior Airlines C.A." on Justia Law