Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In November 2014, the plaintiff purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from a dealership, with the defendant bank financing the purchase. The sales contract inaccurately reflected the downpayment as $19,100 in cash instead of $1,000 in cash and $18,100 in trade-in value. The plaintiff later discovered issues with the RV and filed a lawsuit in February 2017, alleging violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA) due to the incorrect downpayment disclosure.The Superior Court of Fresno County reviewed the case and concluded that the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied, rather than the one-year statute for statutory penalties. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff against the dealership for violating the ASFA, and the dealership's liability was extended to the bank under the Federal Trade Commission’s holder rule. The court entered judgment requiring the bank to accept the return of the RV and pay the plaintiff $42,263.64.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the rescission and restitution remedy under the ASFA is a penalty. The court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture applied. The court noted that the ASFA imposes strict liability without regard to actual damages or fault, and the legislative history indicated the remedy was intended as a penalty. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pompey v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

Ultra Deep Picasso Pte. Limited (Ultra Deep) is a contractor specializing in undersea vessel operations for marine construction. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd. (Dynamic) subcontracted Ultra Deep for a project related to a contract with Saudi Aramco. Ultra Deep completed work worth over ten million dollars but alleged that Dynamic failed to pay, breaching their agreement. Ultra Deep filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas, seeking breach of contract damages and a maritime attachment and garnishment of Dynamic’s funds allegedly held by Riyad Bank.The district court granted Ultra Deep an ex parte order for attachment of Dynamic’s assets at Riyad Bank. Dynamic responded with motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and to compel arbitration, which were denied. Dynamic and Riyad Bank then moved to vacate the attachment order, arguing that Ultra Deep failed to show Dynamic had property in the Southern District of Texas. The magistrate judge held a hearing and found that Ultra Deep did not present evidence that Dynamic’s property was within the district. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, vacated the attachment order, and dismissed the case with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that for a valid Rule B attachment, the property must be found within the district. It concluded that a bank account is located where its funds can be withdrawn. Since Ultra Deep failed to show that Dynamic’s property was within the Southern District of Texas, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate the attachment order and dismiss the case. View "Ultra Deep Picasso v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over a real estate transaction between Francesco Scotti and Matthew Mimiaga concerning a property at 300 Benefit Street in Providence, Rhode Island. In 2015, Scotti sold the property to Mimiaga, who financed the purchase through a promissory note. As part of the transaction, Scotti was granted an option to repurchase the property within five years for $900,000. Scotti claimed he exercised this option by mailing a handwritten letter to Mimiaga on June 1, 2020, but Mimiaga denied receiving it. Scotti also alleged that Mimiaga requested extensions to stay on the property due to COVID-19 and other issues, which he granted.The Superior Court granted summary judgment in favor of Mimiaga, ruling that the option agreement lacked separate consideration, Scotti did not properly exercise the option, and there was no express or implied waiver of the option's terms. The court found no evidence that Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter and concluded that Scotti did not act timely to repurchase the property.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and vacated the Superior Court's judgment. The Supreme Court held that the option agreement was supported by consideration as stated in the written document. It also found that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether Mimiaga received the June 1, 2020 letter, invoking the presumption that mailed notices are received. Additionally, the court determined that whether time was of the essence and whether there was an implied waiver of the option's terms were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "Scotti v. Mimiaga" on Justia Law

Sage Acquisitions LLC ("Sage") entered into contracts with the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") to provide management and marketing services for properties in HUD's Real Estate Owned ("REO") disposition program. Sage was awarded three contracts for different geographic areas. Sage filed claims with the HUD contracting officer for settlement costs due to the termination for convenience of the contracts, equitable adjustments for reduced property assignments, and damages for scope reduction. Sage also claimed damages for HUD's alleged breach of a contractual option provision and a related bridge contract.The Civilian Board of Contract Appeals ("Board") denied Sage's claims. The Board held that the contracts were Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity ("IDIQ") contracts, not requirements contracts, and that HUD had met its obligations by ordering the guaranteed minimum quantities. The Board also found that HUD did not breach the contracts by issuing six-month task orders instead of one-year orders and that HUD did not breach the bridge contract by using REO alternatives.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the Board's decision. The court held that the contracts were indeed IDIQ contracts, as they explicitly stated and included guaranteed minimums. The court found that the language in the contracts did not confer exclusivity to Sage, and HUD's reservation of the right to work with other contractors was incompatible with a requirements contract. The court also held that HUD's issuance of six-month task orders was permissible under the contract terms. Finally, the court concluded that HUD did not breach the bridge contract, as Sage was aware of HUD's use of REO alternatives, and HUD's actions were based on legitimate business purposes. View "SAGE ACQUISITIONS LLC v. HUD " on Justia Law

Hexagon US Federal, Inc. ("HexFed") leased a portion of a building from Intergraph Unimproved Properties, LLC in 2015. The lease included two bays with different terms and renewal options. In 2016, the lease was amended to provide a five-year term for both bays. CBS Holdings, LLC later acquired the building and the lease. A dispute arose over whether HexFed had validly renewed the lease, leading HexFed to file a lawsuit against CBS Holdings for breach of the lease agreement.The Madison Circuit Court held a bench trial and ruled in favor of HexFed, finding that CBS Holdings had waived its right to argue that the lease for one of the bays had expired after 12 months. The court also reformed the lease to correct a mutual mistake, establishing that the maximum monthly rent for the bay did not expire after one year. The court declared that HexFed had properly exercised its renewal option and awarded HexFed costs and attorneys' fees.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The court held that CBS Holdings had waived its argument about the lease term by accepting rent without objection and by executing a lease amendment without changing the lease term. The court also upheld the reformation of the lease, finding clear evidence of a mutual mistake. Additionally, the court agreed that HexFed had validly renewed the lease by providing timely written notice, despite an error in the rent calculation. Finally, the court affirmed the award of costs and attorneys' fees to HexFed, as it was forced to file the action to enforce the lease. View "CBS Holdings, LLC v. Hexagon US Federal, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, First United Pentecostal Church in DeQuincy, Louisiana, sustained significant damage from Hurricanes Laura and Delta. The church was insured by Church Mutual Insurance Company (CM), which covered several buildings on the property. After the hurricanes, First United submitted a claim to CM, but CM delayed the inspection and payment process. CM eventually made two payments totaling $191,832.28, which the church used for repairs. Dissatisfied with the amount and timing of the payments, First United filed a lawsuit against CM, alleging breach of contract and violations of Louisiana insurance statutes.The United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana held a bench trial and found in favor of First United. The court concluded that CM had acted in bad faith by failing to make timely payments and awarded First United $1,101,122.87 in unpaid losses, along with statutory penalties, attorney fees, and costs, bringing the total award to $2,073,838.96. The court later amended the judgment to $2,052,335.09 after correcting some errors. CM's motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law were denied, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decisions on several points, including the denial of CM's motion to exclude First United's expert, Kermith Sonnier, and the use of Sonnier's estimate to calculate damages. However, the appellate court reversed the district court's imposition of statutory penalties, attorney fees, and costs, finding that CM's actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or without probable cause. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "First United v. Church Mutual Insurance" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants marketed fraudulent franchise opportunities to foreign nationals seeking to invest in the United States to obtain residency visas. The complaint included claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state-law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and malpractice. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants misrepresented the nature of the investment opportunities, leading the plaintiffs to believe they were purchasing franchises that would qualify them for E-2 or EB-5 visas. Instead, they received licenses that did not meet visa requirements, resulting in financial losses and visa application issues.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas dismissed the case for failure to state a claim. The court found that the plaintiffs did not adequately allege a cognizable enterprise under RICO and failed to meet the heightened pleading standards for fraud under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The district court also denied the plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, citing undue delay and the plaintiffs' failure to provide a proposed amended complaint or additional facts that would cure the deficiencies.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the plaintiffs failed to plead a RICO enterprise, as the complaint did not provide sufficient factual detail to support the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise. The court also upheld the dismissal of the fraud and fraudulent inducement claims, finding that the plaintiffs did not meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b). Additionally, the court found no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint and the dismissal of claims against certain defendants for failure to effect timely service of process. View "Crosswell v. Rodriguez" on Justia Law

In 2005, Full Circle Villagebrook GP, LLC formed a partnership with Protech 2004-D, LLC and AMTAX Holdings 436, LLC to develop and operate an affordable housing project in Illinois. Full Circle, as the General Partner, held a minor ownership stake but had an option to buy out the Limited Partners after 15 years, based on the property's fair market value. The partnership agreement specified that the appraiser for this valuation must be selected from the approved lists of LaSalle Bank or Deutsche Bank Berkshire Mortgage (DBBM). When Full Circle attempted to exercise this option in 2020, it selected an appraiser from the approved lists of the successor banks to LaSalle and DBBM, as the original banks no longer existed.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the Limited Partners and Alden Torch Financial, LLC. The court held that Full Circle did not comply with the partnership agreement's terms, as it did not select an appraiser from the lists of the named banks, nor did it seek the Investor Limited Partner's approval for an alternative appraiser. Consequently, the court denied Full Circle's claims for breach of contract and tortious interference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court agreed that the contract's language was unambiguous and required strict compliance with the specified method for selecting an appraiser. Since Full Circle did not adhere to these terms, it failed to validly exercise its option, and no binding contract was formed. Therefore, the Limited Partners were not in breach, and Full Circle's claims were properly dismissed. View "Full Circle Villagebrook GP, LLC v. Protech 2004-D, LLC" on Justia Law

A Guatemalan company, HSR, engaged another Guatemalan company, AICSA, to design and construct a hydroelectric power plant. The project faced opposition from the local indigenous community, leading to work suspension and eventual contract termination by HSR. HSR initiated arbitration seeking payments and damages from AICSA, which counterclaimed for its own damages and sought to include its subcontractor, Novacom, in the arbitration.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially denied AICSA's motion to vacate the arbitration award, citing Eleventh Circuit precedent. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in an en banc decision, later reversed this, holding that Chapter 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provides grounds for vacatur in cases governed by the New York Convention. The case was remanded to the District Court, which ultimately confirmed the arbitration award, leading to AICSA's appeal.The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed the case and affirmed the District Court's decision. The court held that the arbitration tribunal did not exceed its authority in three key areas: requiring AICSA to maintain or renew advance payment bonds, denying AICSA's claim that HSR breached anti-corruption provisions, and refusing to join Novacom to the arbitration. The court emphasized that the tribunal's decisions were based on interpretations of the contract, even if those interpretations were arguably erroneous. The court's review was limited to whether the tribunal interpreted the contract, not whether it did so correctly. View "Hidroelectrica Santa Rita S.A. v. Corporacion AIC, SA" on Justia Law

Alvin Johnson pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute cocaine under a plea agreement. The agreement included a stipulation regarding the drug quantity and its base offense level but allowed the Government to make a sentencing recommendation. Johnson was initially sentenced to 128 months in prison, classified as a career offender based on prior convictions. He later successfully challenged one of these convictions, leading to a recalculated Guidelines range of 57-71 months.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina initially sentenced Johnson to 128 months. Upon remand, after Johnson's successful challenge to his career offender status, the Probation Office recalculated his Guidelines range to 57-71 months. The Government then moved for an upward departure or variance, arguing that Johnson's criminal history warranted a higher sentence. The district court agreed and sentenced Johnson to 120 months.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the Government breached the plea agreement by seeking a sentence above the recalculated Guidelines range. The court found that the plea agreement did not restrict the Government from recommending a higher sentence and that the Government had reserved the right to make a sentencing recommendation. The court held that the Government did not breach the plea agreement and affirmed the 120-month sentence. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law