Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court granting summary judgment to Family Tree Corporation and JD4, LLC (collectively, Family Tree) and dismissing Skyco Resources, LLP's complaint asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, conversion, and fraud/intentional misrepresentation, holding that the district court erred in part.Skyco entered into an agreement with Family Tree for the purchase of mineral interests owned by Family Tree. Before closing, however, Skyco wrote a letter giving notice of its termination of the agreement and demanding a return of its earnest money. Because Skyco failed to comply with the agreement's termination provision Family Tree refused to return the earnest money. Skyco then sued for return of the earnest money. The district court granted summary judgment to Family Tree. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in granting summary judgment for Family Tree on Skyco's claim for return of its earnest money; and (2) properly granted summary judgment for Family Tree on Skyco's remaining claims. View "Skyco Resources, LLP v. Family Tree Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court against Northern Rental Corporation and Steve Willis in this action stemming from the alleged breach of a lease agreement, holding that the circuit court erred in determining damages.In 2019, Northern and Willis defaulted on their lease agreement with Peska Properties, Inc. Peska Properties subsequently entered into a lease with Mills Aftermarket Accessories, Inc. to fill Willis/Northern's remaining lease term plus an additional term. Thereafter, Peska Properties brought this action against Willis/Northern requesting unpaid rent, repayment of Northern's build-out loan, payment of Mills's build-out costs, and attorney fees. The circuit court determined that Willis/Northern owed Peska Properties $68,730. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court's award was an error of law because it failed to meet the goal of a damage award. On remand, the court was directed to recalculate the build-out allowance damages. View "Peska Properties, Inc. v. Northern Rental Corp." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the district court determining that a settlement agreement signed by the parties constituted a binding contract and granting Plaintiff's motion to enforce the agreement, holding that issues of fact regarding the formation of the settlement agreement existed.Plaintiff bought this complaint against Defendant for unjust enrichment and partition of real estate. Plaintiff filed with the court a settlement agreement, signed by both parties, stating that the parties were previously in a personal and business relationship and seeking to resolve all issues arising from that relationship. Plaintiff then filed a motion to enforce that agreement and a declaration that the agreement was valid. The court approved the settlement agreement and entered judgment for Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) if a party raises a factual issue that goes to the validity of a settlement agreement’s formation, an evidentiary hearing will generally be necessary on a motion to enforce the settlement, even if the written agreement otherwise appears to be a fully integrated contract; and (2) because no such hearing was held in this case the judgment must be vacated. View "Doe v. Lozano" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals affirming the determination of the circuit court that the security agreement between Harvey Haynes, the debtor, covered future advances made by Farmers Tobacco Warehouse (Farmers) so as to have priority over the security interest claimed by Versailles Farm Home and Garden, LLC (Versailles) in Haynes' 2013 tobacco crop, holding that there was no error.In 2014, Versailles brought this action against Haynes to collect on the balance due under the agreement. Versailles joined Farmers as a party to assert its claim against Farmers for conversion to the extent Farmers retained any proceeds in excess of the amount Haynes owed. Farmers admitted selling a portion of Haynes' 2013 tobacco crop and retaining the proceeds but denied doing so in violation of Versailles' security interest. The trial court granted Versailles' motion for summary judgment against Haynes and then granted Farmers' motion for summary judgment as to its cross-claim against Haynes asserting a first and superior lien in Haynes' 2013 tobacco crop. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err. View "Versailles Farm Home & Garden, LLC v. Haynes" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals that a real property contract entered into by Henry Gray and William, Mary and Frank Stewart in this case was unenforceable under the statute of frauds but held that this decision did not apply equally to William, Mary and Frank.Henry entered into a real estate contract with Frank, his brother William, and William's wife, Mary. Later, Henry filed a complaint against Frank, William and Mary alleging breach of contract and requesting specific performance and damages. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Henry and awarded $19,286 in damages. The court of appeals reversed in part. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the contract at issue did not satisfy the statute of frauds; (2) the trial court's findings of fact may not serve as a basis to reverse the court of appeals' decision as to William and Mary; and (3) the court of appeals did not err when it reversed the trial court's damage award. View "Gray v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Russo contracted to build four airport firefighting trucks for the city. The contract provided that Russo would pay the city’s attorney fees in the event of litigation involving the trucks. Under a performance bond, Specialty agreed to be liable to the city for any losses if Russo failed to perform the contract. The city accepted and paid for two trucks, but subsequently terminated the contract and refused to pay for the remaining two trucks before they were delivered. Alleging problems with the first two trucks and Russo’s failure to timely deliver the other two, the city made a claim under the performance bond, then sued Russo for breach of contract and sought enforcement of the performance bond against Russo and Specialty, demanding the return of the payments it had made for the first two trucks. Russo sued the city for breach of contract. The city won judgments on all claims; a jury awarded the city $1. B.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Specialty’s application for attorney fees, rejecting Specialty’s argument that, despite losing on contract liability, it is entitled to fees as the prevailing party because the jury awarded the city only nominal damages rather than the $3.4 million that the city sought. The trial court had discretion to find that neither party prevailed. View "City of Los Angeles Department of Airports v. U.S. Specialty Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Meemic Insurance Company filed a subrogation claim against Angela Jones, seeking to recover from Jones money it had paid to CitiMortgage, Inc., the mortgagee of a residential house owned by Jones and insured by Meemic, after fire damaged the property. In September 2015, Jones was living at the house when it was damaged by a fire. Meemic paid her $2,500 in partial payment of the claim for insurance benefits. During Meemic’s ensuing investigation, Jones admitted that at the time she secured the policy in 2014, she did not reside at the house but, instead, rented it to a third party. Meemic claimed that Jones’s failure to disclose in the initial policy that her home was being rented to others constituted a material misrepresentation. On the basis of the misrepresentation, Meemic rescinded and voided the insurance policy from its inception and returned Jones’s policy payments. After rescinding the policy, Meemic paid $53,356.49 to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract of the policy. Jones filed an action against Meemic, claiming breach of contract and sought to recover under the insurance policy. Meemic moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had properly rescinded the policy given Jones’s misrepresentation in the initial policy. The motion was ultimately granted, and Jones' complaint was dismissed with prejudice. In 2018, Meemic filed the underlying action against Jones seeking to recover the $2,500 advance payment made to Jones and the $53,356.49 it had paid to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract. Jones moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was relieved from any obligations under the insurance policy because Meemic had rescinded the insurance policy; Meemic opposed the motion and filed a countermotion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Meemic, and Meemic appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court held: an insurer who rescinds a homeowner’s insurance policy that contains a mortgage clause may seek subrogation from the insured under its rescinded policy for the amount paid to the mortgagee under the lienholder contract. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed because it erred by concluding that Meemic’s rescission of the risk contract precluded it from denying payment to Jones and then asserting rights under the subrogation provision of the lienholder contract. View "Meemic Insurance Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two sisters, and a family friend own a large farm in north Louisiana. The farm sits atop the storied Haynesville Shale. A bank’s landman who was managing the sisters’ interests extended a mineral lease for only a tenth of the farm. The landman had misread the extension, which covered the whole farm. Within months, advances in drilling technology would open up the Haynesville Shale. Lease bonuses soared. But the faulty extension clouded the sisters’ farm.   Plaintiffs sued the bank for breach of contract. The district court found the landman violated the standards of his profession by extending the entire lease. But the court ruled this was a “mistake in judgment” under the bank’s contract with the sisters, shielding the bank from liability. It also ruled the mistake was not gross fault, which a Louisiana contract cannot exculpate.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Then court explained that the landman did not make a mistake in judgment, but a mistake pure and simple. He misread the extension. The contract’s exculpatory clause does not cover this kind of error, and so the court reversed the dismissal of the sisters’ claims. The court remanded as to damages. The extension stuck the sisters with a lower royalty rate than they would have gotten otherwise. But the parties’ experts disagree over whether the differing rates would make any economic difference. The district court did not resolve this technical, fact-bound question. View "Franklin v. Regions Bank" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in favor of Seneca Mortgage Services after finding that Neal Bruder breached the parties' consulting agreement by failing to pay the consultant's fee, holding that there was no error.The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, finding that Seneca's recovery of the fee would sanction the requirement of an illegal act as a condition of the loan Seneca obtained to Bruder. The Supreme Court granted transfer, vacated the court of appeals' opinion, and affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding (1) the record lacked support for the conclusion that Bruder was required, or even asked, to commit an illegal act; and (2) the parties' agreement provided for the consultant's fee to be paid regardless of whether a particular financing offer was accepted. View "Bruder v. Seneca Mortgage Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff's complaint against Harvard University for breach of contract and other related claims, holding that the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff's breach of contract claim.The day before Plaintiff was about to graduate from Harvard three female Harvard students accused him of sexual assault. Following a disciplinary hearing, Harvard withheld Plaintiff's undergraduate degree. Plaintiff sued, and the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) at the pleadings stage, Plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, stated a plausible breach of contract claim; and (2) the district court properly dismissed the remaining counts of Plaintiff's complaint. View "Sonoiki v. Harvard University" on Justia Law