Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute between two long-time friends and business associates, where the plaintiff invested $3 million in Digipac LLC, controlled by the defendant, based on an oral agreement. The agreement promised the plaintiff an exit opportunity from the investment either if Remark Holdings, Inc.'s share price hit $50 or after five years based on the value of Digipac's Remark holdings. The plaintiff made the investment in two installments in 2012 and 2013. In 2014, the defendant unilaterally amended the LLC agreement, which included a merger clause stating that it superseded all prior agreements.The plaintiff filed a lawsuit in the Supreme Court for breach of contract and promissory estoppel, seeking $11.6 million. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the oral agreement was superseded by the amended LLC agreement. The Supreme Court granted the motion, finding the oral agreement unenforceable and the promissory estoppel claim unreasonable. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the plaintiff was bound by the amended LLC agreement and its merger clause, which nullified the oral agreement. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claim, noting that it was duplicative of the breach of contract claim.The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the Appellate Division's decision. The court held that the amended LLC agreement, governed by Delaware law, unambiguously nullified the prior oral agreement through its merger clause. The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments that the defendant acted in a personal capacity and that the agreements involved different subject matters. The court also dismissed the promissory estoppel claim, as the amended LLC agreement governed the promise at issue. The court emphasized the importance of scrutinizing LLC agreements and protecting contractual rights in closely held LLCs. View "Behler v Kai-Shing Tao" on Justia Law

Jared Peterka, a neighbor and tenant of John and Irene Janda, assumed the lease of their farmland in 2012. The lease was renewed every three years, and in 2019, a right of first refusal for Peterka to purchase the land was added. In October 2018, the Jandas established a living trust and conveyed the property into it, with their daughters as residuary beneficiaries. In June 2021, the Jandas and Peterka executed an option to purchase the property. Shortly after, guardianship proceedings were initiated, and the Jandas were found incapacitated. The guardians rescinded the option to purchase.Peterka filed a complaint for declaratory judgment to validate the option to purchase. The Defendants counterclaimed, arguing the option was the result of undue influence and that the Jandas lacked capacity. After a four-day bench trial, the District Court of Traill County found the option to purchase was facially valid and not a product of undue influence. However, it ruled the option was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas' lack of capacity and dismissed Peterka’s complaint.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. Peterka argued the district court erred in its findings on capacity. The Supreme Court clarified that the capacity to enter into a contract and the capacity under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 are distinct. The court found the district court did not misstate the law and its findings were supported by evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the option to purchase was voidable under N.D.C.C. § 14-01-02 due to the Jandas being of unsound mind but not entirely without understanding. View "Peterka v. Janda" on Justia Law

In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

Sterling Senechal submitted a claim to Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company for water damage caused by a broken water heater. Allstate issued three payments totaling $12,410.48. After a dispute over the loss amount, an appraisal determined the actual cash value to be $58,396.58, which Allstate paid minus the deductible and prior payments. Senechal then filed a lawsuit alleging breach of contract, violations of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), bad faith claims under Chapter 541 of the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing. Allstate removed the case to federal court and paid what it calculated as the maximum potential interest owed.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of Allstate on all claims. Senechal conceded the breach of contract claim but opposed summary judgment on the other claims. The district court ruled that Allstate's payment of the appraisal award and interest defeated Senechal's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the summary judgment on Senechal's bad faith claims under Chapter 541 and common law, citing the Texas Supreme Court's decision in Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, which held that payment of an appraisal award and interest precludes recovery for bad faith claims unless there is an independent injury. However, the court vacated the summary judgment on Senechal's TPPCA claims, noting that payment of an appraisal award and interest does not automatically absolve an insurer of TPPCA liability. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Allstate's initial payment "roughly corresponds" with the appraisal award and whether Allstate is liable under the TPPCA. View "Senechal v. Allstate" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, New England Property Services Group, LLC (NEPSG), appealed from a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, NGM Insurance Company (NGM). NEPSG had been assigned the insurance claim benefits by the policyholders, Stephen and Betty Callahan, for storm-related damage to their residence. NGM initially covered some damages but denied others, leading to a series of inspections and disagreements over the loss amount. Eventually, an appraisal process was conducted, resulting in an award that NEPSG found unsatisfactory due to updated labor costs published after the award was signed.The Superior Court granted summary judgment to NGM, finding that NEPSG was not entitled to a modification of the appraisal award or a second appraisal. The court also found that NEPSG failed to establish its claims for breach of contract, bad faith, unjust enrichment, and tortious interference with contractual relations. NEPSG argued that the award should be modified due to a miscalculation of labor costs and that NGM acted in bad faith by using unlicensed appraisers, among other claims.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the appraisal award was akin to an arbitration award and thus subject to limited judicial review. NEPSG's request for modification based on post-award labor cost updates was not supported by admissible evidence. The court also found no basis for a second appraisal or for NEPSG's claims of breach of contract and bad faith, as NGM had fulfilled its contractual obligations and there was no evidence of bad faith. Additionally, the court rejected NEPSG's claims of unjust enrichment and tortious interference, finding no inequitable benefit retained by NGM and no evidence of intentional harm to NEPSG's contract with the policyholders. View "New England Property Services Group, LLC v. NGM Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Charles S. Keegan filed a complaint against the Estate of Phyllis C. Bradbury and its representatives, as well as Craig J. and Melissa M. Holmes, alleging that he had a right of first refusal to purchase a property at 1 Lower High Street in Eastport. Keegan based his claim on a purchase and sale agreement for a different property, which he argued included a provision granting him this right. The agreement's Section 26 stated that the buyer "would like the Right of First Refusal on the sale of abutting lot if ever sold."The Superior Court of Washington County dismissed Keegan's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The court found that the language in Section 26 was precatory and did not create an enforceable right of first refusal. Keegan's initial appeal was dismissed as interlocutory. Subsequently, the Holmeses filed a motion to dismiss, which the Superior Court granted, relying on the previous dismissal as the law of the case. This resulted in a final judgment against Keegan, who then appealed.The Maine Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The court held that the language in Section 26 of the purchase and sale agreement was clear and did not create an enforceable right of first refusal. The phrase "would like" was deemed precatory, expressing a wish rather than a binding obligation. Consequently, Keegan's complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as there was no enforceable right of first refusal, no breach of contract, and no basis for rescission or equitable relief. View "Keegan v. Estate of Bradfury" on Justia Law

In 1957, Congress enacted the Price-Anderson Act (PAA) to amend the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, providing indemnity for contractors and others involved in nuclear activities. The PAA mandated that the government indemnify contractors and other "persons indemnified" for public liability arising from nuclear incidents. In 1962, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) entered into an indemnity agreement with Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, which processed uranium for the government. Cotter Corporation later purchased radioactive materials from Mallinckrodt and was sued in 2012 by plaintiffs alleging harm from these materials.The United States Court of Federal Claims dismissed Cotter's claim for indemnification under the PAA and the indemnity agreement, ruling that Cotter was not entitled to indemnification because its activities did not arise out of or in connection with the contractual activities of Mallinckrodt. The court also dismissed Cotter's contract claim, concluding that Cotter lacked standing as a third-party beneficiary and failed to state a claim for breach of contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the Claims Court's decision. The Federal Circuit held that Cotter's liability for the nuclear incident plausibly arose out of or in connection with the contractual activities of Mallinckrodt, as the materials causing the incident were produced under the contract. The court also found that Cotter sufficiently alleged it was an intended third-party beneficiary of the indemnity agreement and that the government breached the contract by not indemnifying Cotter. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COTTER CORP., N.S.L. v. US " on Justia Law

Following a wildfire near their home, plaintiffs Hovik Gharibian and Caroline Minasian submitted a claim to their property insurer, Wawanesa General Insurance Company. Wawanesa paid the plaintiffs over $20,000 for professional cleaning services that were never used. Dissatisfied with the resolution, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Wawanesa for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Wawanesa’s motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs' insurance policy did not provide coverage for the claimed loss. The court determined that there was no evidence of "physical loss" as required by the policy. Plaintiffs appealed the decision.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a "direct physical loss to property" as required by their insurance policy. The court referenced the California Supreme Court's decision in Another Planet Entertainment, LLC v. Vigilant Ins. Co., which clarified that "direct physical loss" requires a distinct, demonstrable, physical alteration to property. The court found that the wildfire debris did not cause such an alteration and could be easily cleaned or removed. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that Wawanesa did not breach the insurance policy since the plaintiffs' claim was not covered. All remaining arguments were deemed moot. View "Gharibian v. Wawanesa Gen. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Joseph Mirelez submitted a claim under his homeowner’s insurance policy with State Farm Lloyds for wind damage to his property. Disputes arose regarding the amount of loss and repair costs, leading Mirelez to invoke the appraisal process. In January 2023, an agreement on the loss amount was reached, but coverage issues persisted. Mirelez filed a lawsuit in state court in May 2023, alleging breach of contract, violations of the Texas Prompt Payment of Claims Act (TPPCA), various bad faith claims under the Texas Insurance Code, and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. State Farm removed the case to federal court, citing diversity jurisdiction, and subsequently paid the appraisal award amount, minus the deductible and prior payments, plus interest.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm on all claims. Mirelez conceded that summary judgment was appropriate for his breach of contract and TPPCA claims but contested the dismissal of his statutory and common law bad faith claims. The district court concluded that State Farm had paid all benefits owed under the policy and that Mirelez was not entitled to any additional damages under the Texas Insurance Code.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that under Texas Supreme Court precedent, specifically Ortiz v. State Farm Lloyds, payment of an appraisal award forecloses an insurer’s liability for breach of contract and bad faith claims unless the insured suffered an independent injury. Since Mirelez only sought policy benefits that had already been paid and did not allege any independent injury, his extracontractual bad faith claims were barred. View "Mirelez v. State Farm" on Justia Law

Huntsman International, LLC, a chemical company, sued Praxair, Inc. for breach of contract, alleging that Praxair failed to supply sufficient hydrogen and carbon monoxide to Huntsman's Geismar, Louisiana plant. This failure allegedly caused Huntsman to lose sales of methylene diphenyl diisocyanate (MDI) and aniline, resulting in lost profits. Huntsman also sought cover damages for the additional costs incurred to purchase industrial gas from another supplier.The case proceeded to a three-week jury trial in the Parish of Orleans Civil Court, where the jury awarded Huntsman $88,117,405 in lost profits and $4,991,473 in cover damages. Praxair's motion for a new trial was denied. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, affirmed the trial court's judgment, with two judges dissenting in part on the award of lost profits.The Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed the case and found that the jury abused its discretion by awarding lost profits not established with reasonable certainty. The court noted that the only expert witness, Rebecca Szelc, calculated lost profits to be $37,522,291 using a detailed methodology based on monthly production and sales data. The jury, however, used an alternative method suggested by Huntsman's counsel, which averaged the profit margins of the top-third most profitable transactions, resulting in a higher figure.The Supreme Court held that the jury's method was not supported by the evidence and relied on speculation. Consequently, the court amended the award, reducing the lost profits to $37,522,291, as calculated by Szelc. The judgment was thus amended in part. View "HUNTSMAN INTERNATIONAL, L.L.C. VS. PRAXAIR, INC." on Justia Law