Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In this case, Four Thirteen, LLC filed a complaint against three corporate entities and several individuals, including Joshua Wearmouth, Larry Stephens, Edmond X. Moriniere, Ronald G. Meyers, and David C. Norton. The complaint alleged that Wearmouth and Stephens solicited funds from Four Thirteen for a business venture involving Brazilian carbon credits, which turned out to be fraudulent. Four Thirteen claimed that the corporate entities did not own the carbon credits and that Wearmouth and Stephens made numerous misrepresentations. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and other related allegations.The District Court of Laramie County reviewed the case and rejected the affidavits of non-involvement filed by Moriniere, Meyers, and Norton, who sought dismissal from the suit. The court found that there were factual issues regarding their involvement in the alleged fraud. Additionally, the district court imposed discovery sanctions and entered a default judgment against all defendants, including the individual appellants, for failing to comply with discovery orders.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision regarding the affidavits of non-involvement. The Supreme Court determined that the district court correctly found that there were factual disputes about the involvement of Moriniere, Meyers, and Norton, which precluded their dismissal from the case.However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to impose discovery sanctions against the individual appellants. The Supreme Court found that the appellants were not given proper notice that they were subject to sanctions under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) and that there was no evidence they violated any prior discovery order. The court held that the sanctions against the individual appellants were not justified and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Stephensv. Four Thirteen, LLC" on Justia Law

John A. Daugherty, an attorney, filed a breach-of-contract claim against his former client, Molly Chew Baker, in the Jefferson Circuit Court. Daugherty and Molly had an agreement where Daugherty would help Molly collect alimony arrears from her ex-husband, Christopher, on a contingency-fee basis. Daugherty later agreed to represent Molly in additional matters related to her divorce, including a petition to modify alimony payments filed by Christopher. Molly eventually terminated Daugherty's services, and Daugherty sought to recover his fees through the court.The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Daugherty's complaint, concluding that the contingency-fee arrangement in the contract was against public policy under Rule 1.5(d)(1) of the Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct, which prohibits contingency fees in domestic relations matters involving alimony or support. The court also noted that the contract did not provide for compensation in the event of a settlement, which occurred when Molly and Christopher jointly dismissed their respective petitions.Daugherty appealed to the Supreme Court of Alabama, arguing that the contingency-fee arrangement was permissible under an exception for collecting alimony arrears after a completed divorce. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision, noting that Daugherty's representation extended beyond collecting arrears to include ongoing alimony matters, which did not fall under the exception. Additionally, Daugherty's claim for quantum meruit was not properly pleaded in the lower court and was inconsistent with his breach-of-contract claim. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court's judgment was correct and affirmed the dismissal of Daugherty's complaint. View "Daugherty v. Baker" on Justia Law

CorpCar Services Houston, Ltd. (CorpCar) entered into a franchise license agreement with Carey Licensing, Inc., and Carey International, Inc. (collectively Carey) to operate a chauffeur-driven service under the Carey brand in Houston, Texas. In 2015, CorpCar was found liable for punitive damages for creating a racially hostile work environment, which led Carey to terminate the franchise agreement in 2016. CorpCar argued that the termination was wrongful because it did not materially breach the agreement and, even if it had, Carey did not provide an opportunity to cure the violation as required by the agreement.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia granted summary judgment to Carey, finding that CorpCar’s breach was incurable as a matter of law and that CorpCar had an opportunity to cure but failed to do so. The court also denied CorpCar’s cross-motion for summary judgment, concluding that issues of material fact remained for the jury to decide.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and agreed with the lower court that CorpCar’s breach was material. However, the appellate court disagreed with the finding that the breach was incurable as a matter of law. The court held that the language of the franchise agreement was clear and precluded the application of the incurable breach doctrine. The court also found that there was a dispute of material fact as to whether Carey repudiated the franchise agreement, effectively denying CorpCar an opportunity to cure.The appellate court reversed the grant of summary judgment to Carey and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court instructed that a jury must decide whether Carey repudiated the agreement, whether CorpCar had cured or could have cured its breach, and whether affording an opportunity to cure would have been futile. The denial of CorpCar’s cross-motion for summary judgment was affirmed. View "CorpCar Services Houston, LTD v. Carey Licensing, Inc." on Justia Law

Casey and Janae Ruppert entered into a contract to purchase ranch property from Judith Merrill. Before closing, Merrill indicated she would not proceed with the sale. The Rupperts filed a complaint seeking specific performance and damages. The district court found Merrill breached the contract and denied her affirmative defenses. It awarded the Rupperts damages and attorneys’ fees but declined to order specific performance. The Rupperts appealed the denial of specific performance, and Merrill cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees award.The District Court of Laramie County found Merrill breached the contract but declined to order specific performance, citing Merrill’s personal circumstances and misunderstandings about the contract. It awarded the Rupperts $22,342 in damages and granted their motion for attorneys’ fees without explanation, awarding $55,258.50 in fees and $3,082.60 in costs.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and found the district court abused its discretion by denying specific performance. The court noted the district court’s findings contradicted its decision, as it found the contract valid, the price reasonable, and no undue influence or unconscionability. The Supreme Court held that specific performance was the appropriate remedy given the circumstances and the equities involved.Regarding attorneys’ fees, the Supreme Court agreed with both parties that the district court erred by awarding fees without explanation. The Supreme Court independently assessed the reasonableness of the fees, concluding that the rates charged were excessive for the local market. It reduced the hourly rate to $250, resulting in a total fee award of $28,425.00, plus the previously awarded costs of $3,082.60.The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court’s orders denying specific performance and awarding attorneys’ fees, remanding the case for entry of an order consistent with its opinion. View "Merrill v. Ruppert" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a group of textbook authors, entered into publishing agreements with McGraw Hill, which included provisions for royalty payments based on the net receipts from sales of their textbooks. The agreements also stipulated that McGraw Hill would publish the textbooks at its own expense. The authors alleged that McGraw Hill breached these agreements by reducing royalty payments for textbooks sold through its online platform, Connect, which also includes additional course materials.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the authors' breach-of-contract claims, ruling that the contract definitions of "net receipts" unambiguously limited royalties to sales of the textbooks themselves, excluding other products sold through Connect. The court also found that McGraw Hill's reduction of royalties did not violate the contracts' requirement to publish the textbooks at its own expense, reasoning that Connect was more than just a publishing platform.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed with the district court's interpretation of the "net receipts" clauses, affirming that the authors were only entitled to royalties based on the sales of their textbooks, not on additional content sold through Connect. However, the appellate court found merit in the authors' claim that McGraw Hill breached the "own expense" clause. The court concluded that the complaint plausibly alleged that McGraw Hill's new royalty calculation method effectively shifted some of the publishing expenses to the authors, contrary to the agreements.The Second Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of the breach-of-contract claims related to the "own expense" clause and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Flynn v. McGraw Hill LLC" on Justia Law

Several states challenged Executive Order 14026, which mandated a $15 minimum wage for federal contractors, and the Department of Labor (DOL) rule implementing it. The states argued that the executive order and the DOL rule violated the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act (FPASA) and the major questions doctrine, and that the DOL rule violated the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the states' complaint and denied their request for a preliminary injunction. The district court concluded that the wage mandate did not violate the FPASA, the major questions doctrine did not apply, and the rule was not subject to arbitrary-or-capricious review under the APA because the DOL had to adopt the policy by executive order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal of the complaint, vacated the denial of the preliminary injunction, and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the minimum wage mandate exceeded the authority granted to the President and DOL under the FPASA because the FPASA’s purpose statement does not authorize the President to impose a wage mandate without other operative language in the FPASA. The court also held that the major questions doctrine did not apply because the executive order was not a transformative expansion of authority. Finally, the court found that the DOL acted arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to consider alternatives to the $15 per hour minimum wage mandate, thus violating the APA. View "STATE OF NEBRASKA V. SU" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

VFS Leasing Co. ("VFS") leased trucks to Time Definite Leasing, LLC ("TDL"), which insured the trucks with Markel American Insurance Company ("Markel American"). Markel American issued joint checks to VFS and TDL for insurance claims, but TDL cashed the checks without VFS's endorsement and kept the proceeds. VFS sued Markel American for breach of contract, claiming it was owed the funds from the joint checks.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of VFS, holding that Markel American breached the insurance contract by failing to ensure VFS received the funds. The court found that under Florida's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Markel American's obligation was not discharged because the checks were not properly endorsed by both co-payees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether Markel American's obligation to VFS was discharged when the drawee bank improperly accepted the joint checks. The court concluded that under Florida Statute § 673.4141(3), a drawer's obligation is discharged when a bank accepts a jointly issued check, regardless of whether both co-payees endorsed it. The court noted that while VFS could pursue a conversion claim against the bank, Markel American's obligation was discharged upon the bank's acceptance of the checks.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of VFS and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VFS Leasing Co. v. Markel Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In 2016, a suicide bombing occurred at the U.S. military base in Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. The bomber, an Afghan national employed by a subcontractor of Fluor Corporation, detonated an explosive vest, injuring Specialist Winston Tyler Hencely, among others. Hencely sued Fluor, alleging negligence in supervision, entrustment, and retention of the bomber, and breach of contract with the U.S. Government.The U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina granted judgment to Fluor on all claims. The court found that federal law preempted Hencely’s tort claims and that he was not a third-party beneficiary entitled to enforce the Government’s contract with Fluor. Hencely appealed these decisions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that the Federal Tort Claims Act’s combatant activities exception preempted Hencely’s state-law tort claims. The court concluded that Fluor was integrated into combatant activities and that the military retained command authority over Fluor’s supervision of Local Nationals at Bagram Airfield. The court also held that Hencely was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the contract between Fluor and the U.S. Government, as the contract did not express an intent to benefit individual soldiers or confer upon them the right to enforce its provisions.Thus, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, precluding Hencely’s tort claims and denying his breach of contract claim. View "Hencely v. Fluor Corporation" on Justia Law

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about collateral and property interests. Disputes arose over the interpretation and execution of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce the settlement by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, rejecting the Govind Parties' interpretations.The trial court found that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from challenging the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The court concluded that the Govind Parties' current position that the agreement was unenforceable was inconsistent with their earlier position that it was enforceable. The court also found that the Govind Parties had not taken their initial position due to ignorance, fraud, or mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the elements of judicial estoppel were met: the Govind Parties had taken two totally inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, and the trial court had accepted their initial position that the settlement was enforceable. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's application of judicial estoppel and upheld the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. The court also denied Prashant and Mita's motion to dismiss the appeal based on the disentitlement doctrine, finding insufficient evidence of non-compliance with trial court orders by the Govind Parties. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law