Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2017, Ramos settled his lawsuits against Cook County Jail correctional officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged a failure to protect Ramos from another inmate and the use of excessive force. The settlement agreements contained an identical 262-word sentence—labeled a general release—that released Cook County and its employees from all claims. Months later, Ramos filed another section 1983 lawsuit against two Cook County police officers based on a 2016 arrest that occurred after the events that lead to the first two lawsuits but prior to the execution of the settlement agreements.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants. “While the rambling, 262- word sentence is no model of clarity,” it unambiguously released Ramos’s claims arising out of the 2016 arrest. Three phrases signal that Ramos released all foreseeable claims against Cook County “and its agents, employees and former employees,” including those stemming from his 2016 arrest when he signed the settlement agreements in 2017. View "Ramos v. Piech" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court awarding $8 million in punitive damages against the board of trustees (the board) of the petroleum storage tank insurance fund (the fund) on the City of Harrisonville's claim of fraud and ordering post-judgment interest to accrue from the date it entered judgment, holding that that the city's claim of fraud against the board was barred by sovereign immunity.When it was not paid funds to which it claimed it was entitled, the city sued the fund, asserting claims for negligent misrepresentation. In 2011, a jury returned a verdict for the city. The Supreme Court reversed only the award of punitive damages against the fund. On remand, the city filed a second amended petition that, for the first time, named the board as a defendant. Relying on the jury verdict from 2011, the circuit court entered judgment against the board for $8 million in punitive damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court misapplied the law in entering judgment against the board because the board was a state agency entitled to sovereign immunity. View "City of Harrisonville v. Bd. of Trustees of MO Petroleum Storage Tank Insurance Fund" on Justia Law

FeeDx and HayDay Farms, Inc. entered into an Exclusive Distribution and Processing Agreement (EDPA). HayDay’s President also entered into a Consulting Agreement with FeeDx through Nippon Agricultural Holgins, Inc. The agreements provided for arbitration. The EDPA also made HayDay and Nippon jointly and severally liable. Neither HayDay nor FeeDx performed its side of the agreement. The parties entered a Settlement Agreement, which modified, but did not replace, the EDPA. After the Settlement Agreement did not see fruition, the parties went to arbitration. An arbitration tribunal made awards against FeeDx, and HayDay and Nippon petitioned to confirm the award. FeeDx sought to vacate the award, arguing that it exceeded the tribunal’s powers under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”). The district court vacated $7 million from the award that reflected HayDay’s unpaid installments under the Settlement Agreement, but confirmed the rest of the award.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the district court’s order confirming in part an arbitration award of more than $21 million entered against FeeDx. The panel held that arbitration awards that, as here, involve at least one foreign party are governed by the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (“Convention”), which Congress incorporated into federal law under the FAA. 9 U.S.C. Section 203 provides federal district courts subject matter jurisdiction over actions or proceedings falling under the Convention. The panel held that the parties’ failure to assert federal question jurisdiction did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction where HayDay and Nippon’s state court petition established Section 203 jurisdiction. View "HAYDAY FARMS, INC., ET AL V. FEEDX HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals determining that Karen Michael held an equitable lien on David Miller's Ram Sensors, Inc. stock shares securing David's current obligation to pay monthly spousal support to Karen, holding that an equitable lien did not exist on the stock to secure the current obligation.When Karen and David divorced, the separation agreement incorporated into their final judgment entry of divorce provided that David would pay Karen $15,000 per month in spousal support for twenty years. Karen agreed to relinquish all rights she may have had in Ram Sensors, and David agreed to secure his spousal support obligations. Later, Karen filed a postdecree pleading against David and Cody seeking a declaration that David's ownership of the Ram Sensors stock secured his obligations under the divorce decree and requesting that the court order Cody Miller, the parties' son, to transfer David's stock to her. The court granted partial summary judgment to Karen, concluding that she held a perfected lien in the Ram Sensors stock and an equitable lien on the stock. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals misconstrued the separation agreement and erred when it recognized an equitable lien securing David's current support obligation. View "Michael v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the court of appeals affirming the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiffs and holding that eight of nine restrictive covenants governing Plaintiffs' lots within the parties' residential subdivision were extinguished by operation of North Carolina's Real Property Marketable Title Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. 47B-1 to 47B-9, holding that the eight covenants were extinguished by operation of law.At issue on appeal was whether the court of appeals correctly determined that the Act's thirteenth enumerated exception did not apply to save all of the nine restrictive covenants in question. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals correctly held that all but one of the restrictive covenants, as applied to Plaintiffs' property, were to be extinguished under the Act; and (2) a plain reading of section 47B-3(13) exempts from extinguishment only those covenants that actually require that a property be used residentially within the confines of a general or uniform scheme of development. View "C Investments 2, LLC v. Auger" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief in this case concerning a premarital agreement to resolve disputes by binding arbitration under religious law, holding that the trial court was statutorily required to hear and determine Wife's challenges to the agreement's validity and enforceability before referring the parties' disputes to arbitration.When the parties in this case married they signed an "Islamic Pre-Nuptial Agreement" providing that "[a]ny conflict which may arise between the husband and the wife will be resolved according to the Qur'an, Sunnah, and Islamic Law in a Muslim court, or in [its] absence by a Fiqh Panel." When Wife sued for divorce, Husband moved to enforce the agreement. After a hearing on whether the reference to Islamic law was sufficiently ambiguous to render the agreement unenforceable the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate under the agreement. Wife moved for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court erred in compelling the parties to arbitrate. View "In re Mariam Ayad" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded this matter for a new trial, holding that the district court erred in proceeding to a trial without a jury on Plaintiff's causes of action for breach of contract, breach of guaranty, and unjust enrichment.Plaintiff's brought this complaint against Defendants for, among other causes of action, forcible entry and detainer. The district court granted relief on the forcible entry and detainer claim, ordering restitution. After a bench trial, the district court heard the remaining causes of action and awarded damages to Plaintiff. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) Plaintiff's remaining causes of action were legal in nature, and the issues of fact that arose thereunder entitled Defendants to a jury trial unless waived; and (2) there was no waiver of Defendants' right to a jury trial. View "132 Ventures, LLC v. Active Spine Physical Therapy, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court awarding Defendant an additional $9,000 in attorney fees and $162 in costs in a second appeal after the first appeal resulted in an award of attorney fees and costs for Defendant totaling $26,413, holding that there was no error and that the award of attorney fees was proper.Plaintiff sued for unlawful detainer, breach of lease, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendant but denied Defendant's request for attorney fees. The court of appeals reversed the ruling on attorney fees. On remand, the district court awarded Defendant attorney fees and costs totaling $26,413. The court of appeals affirmed. On remand, the district court awarded Defendant additional attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court affirmed and granted Defendant's request for attorney fees incurrent on appeal, holding that Defendant was properly awarded his attorney fees in the district court and that Defendant was entitled to reasonable attorney fees that he incurred in defending against this appeal. View "Gardiner v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this action to foreclose a materialmen's lien to recover for material and labor Ed Suvada expended in renovating a cabin for George and Christine Muller, holding that their was no error.Suvada brought this action to foreclose his materialmen's lien on the Muller property and also alleged breach of contract. The Mullers counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and fraud. A jury awarded Suvada damages on his materialmen's lien claim and in favor of the Mullers on both of their claims but awarded damages only on the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion. View "Suvada v. Muller" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the judgment of the trial court granting a directed verdict on a bad faith claim, holding that Wittmer v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (Ky. 1993), established the applicable legal standard for both common law and statutory bad-faith claims.Cincinnati Insurance Company (CIC) brought a declaratory judgment action disputing coverage under a commercial general liability policy insuring K-2 Catering, LLC for claims Haley Belt made stemming from an accident that occurred during an event hosted by K-2's member-managers at their residence. Ultimately, judgment was entered declaring coverage under the policy. While the action was pending, Belt brought a separate action against K-2 and CIC, alleging bad faith and negligence in the settlement of her claims under K-2's policy. The negligence claims were settled and, after a jury trial, the jury returned a verdict against CIC. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court erred when it failed to grant CIC a directed verdict on the bad faith claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to apply the Wittmer standard and grant a directed verdict for CIC. View "Belt v. Cincinnati Insurance Co." on Justia Law