Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Jack and Erin Skufca, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for construction defects and fraud, alleging that less than a year after they moved in, the home developed mold issues that caused their minor children to be ill. The petition listed Jack and Erin as plaintiffs individually, as well as Erin as next friend of the couple's children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the minor children sued based on the contract and were subject to its terms, including the arbitration clause. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Skufca" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued Sisyphian for (1) failure to pay minimum wage, (2) failure to pay overtime wages, (3) failure to pay wages for missed meal periods, (4) failure to pay wages for missed rest breaks, (5) waiting time penalties (6) failure to provide accurate wage statements and (7) unfair competition. In reliance on the arbitration clause in the Entertainment Agreement, the trial court granted Sisyphian’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff’s claims. The arbitrator concluded that Plaintiff’s complaint contained a viable prayer for attorney fees for the claims on which she prevailed. Plaintiff filed a petition to confirm the final arbitration award. Following the entry of judgment for Plaintiff in the amount of $105,109.75, Sisyphian appealed. Sisyphian argued that the trial court erred in confirming the final arbitration award because, in reconsidering its initial attorney fees order, the arbitrator exceeded his powers   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that because Plaintiff’s petition to confirm was procedurally proper because no party sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s petition, and because Sisyphian’s filings seeking to vacate or correct the arbitration award were not timely filed, the trial court, in this case, was obligated to confirm the final arbitration award. Further, because Sisyphian forfeited its right to seek to vacate or correct the final arbitration award before the trial court, the court may not consider its arguments to do so on appeal. View "Darby v. Sisyphian, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Defendant's motion to suppress statements he had made during two separately recorded interrogations of him by police officers, holding that the trial court properly denied Defendant's motion to suppress.The two interrogations at issue occurred on the same day. As to the first interrogation, Defendant claimed that the police failed to advise him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Defendant further claimed that the second interrogation was tainted by the alleged illegality of the first interrogation. The trial court denied the motion to suppress and, following a jury trial, convicted Defendant of manslaughter in the first degree with a firearm. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Miranda warnings were not required for the first interrogation because it was not custodial; and (2) the failure to provide the warnings did not taint the second interrogation. View "State v. Brandon" on Justia Law

A building owner operates a building in Los Angeles with retail space on the ground floor and office space, storage units, and parking on the roof. In 2012, the owner contracted with Western Waterproofing Company, Inc. to remove the roof parking surface and recoat it. The owner filed the first suit on theories of breach of an express warranty against product failure and breaches of implied warranties. The owner alleged the entire coating was beginning to fail and demanded the company remove and replace it all rather than merely undertake a leak-by-leak repair. After a jury found the company that coated the roof was not at fault, the building owner sued a second time when more leaks appeared. The trial court rightly found claim preclusion barred the new lawsuit and granted summary judgment for the company.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court held that the owner should have brought all claims about the company’s installation in its first suit. The owner neither alleged nor presented evidence of a new or latent way the company’s work could have harmed the owner. The court explained that the second suit simply tried to relitigate a resolution the owner disliked and would prefer to escape. Claim preclusion bars this repetitive attack on finality. View "5th AND LA v. Western Waterproofing Co., Inc." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial justice awarding attorneys' fees to Plaintiff in this divorce action, holding that there was no error.Plaintiff filed a complaint for divorce, and Defendant filed a counterclaim for divorce. As to attorneys' fees, the trial justice found that Plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees pursuant to the parties' postnuptial agreement's fee-shifting provision, as well as R.I. Gen. Laws 15-5-16. Defendant appealed, challenging the award of attorneys' fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the trial justice had both a statutory and contractual basis to award Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs and did not abuse his discretion in making the award. View "McCollum v. McCollum" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Security State Bank (SSB) on Plaintiff's claims and SSB's breach of contract counterclaim, holding that there was no error.When Plaintiff defaulted on several agricultural loans she had obtained from SSB, SSB foreclosed on some of the collateral Plaintiff pledged to secure those loans. Plaintiff then brought this action, alleging, among other things, negligent lending and negligent advising. SSB counterclaimed, alleging, among other things, breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of SSB on all claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this Court declines to recognize new causes of action for negligent lending or negligence advising; (2) there were no questions of material fact barring summary judgment on Plaintiff's breach of good faith and fair dealing claim; and (3) the district court did not err in finding that equitable defenses did not preclude entering summary judgment in favor of SSB on his counterclaim for breach of contract. View "Wilcox v. Security State Bank" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a black woman who worked for Lincare, Incorporated. She sued her former employer under Title VII, claiming that she suffered from a racially hostile work environment and that Lincare both failed to address the situation and retaliated against her when she complained. She also sued for breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Lincare. On appeal, Plaintiff contended that summary judgment was improper on her Title VII claims for a hostile work environment and unlawful retaliation.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that even assuming that Plaintiff suffered from severe or pervasive harassment, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII because it took prompt remedial action. Aside from one remark, Plaintiff could not remember any use of the N-word in the office after she made her reports to HR. Nor does she identify a single racially insensitive comment that occurred after the offending parties received final warnings. In short, Lincare “acted swiftly in taking remedial measures, and the harassment ceased.” Because of its prompt and effective response, Lincare cannot be liable under Title VII for creating a hostile work environment.   Further, the court explained, there is no evidence that Plaintiff’s working conditions were impacted, only that the plan opened up the possibility of further action (which never occurred). An employment decision is not an adverse action if it does not objectively worsen the employee’s working conditions. View "Hudson v. Lincare, Inc." on Justia Law

Ed Davis sued the City of Montevallo ("the City") claiming that the City was in breach of contract because, in terminating his employment with the City, it failed to follow certain discharge procedures set out in an employee handbook it had issued to him. The City responded by arguing it was not required to follow the handbook's procedures because Davis was an at-will employee. After entertaining motions for summary judgment from both sides, the trial court ruled in favor of the City. Davis appealed. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the City. "The Handbook was an offer for a unilateral contract, which Davis accepted by continuing his employment with the City. Because the Handbook constitutes a unilateral contract, we reverse the trial court's denial of Davis's motion for partial summary judgment and direct the trial court on remand to determine whether, in fact, the City violated the Handbook's terms." View "Davis v. Montevallo" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and reinstated the judgment of the trial court dismissing all of Petitioner's claims against Respondents for breach of contract, fraud, and related torts, holding that the discovery rule did not defer accrual of Petitioner's cause of action until it knew that Respondents caused its injury.The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner on the grounds that Respondents' claims were time-barred. The appellate court reversed, concluding that the discovery rule deferred accrual of Respondents' cause of action until it knew that Petitioner caused its injury. The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the dismissal of all claims, holding that summary judgment was appropriate because, at the time of the breach of contract at issue, Respondent learned of facts that, if pursued, would have led to the discovery of Petitioner's alleged misrepresentations. View "Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Investment Services of Nev. v. Triex Texas Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

This dispute involves three construction projects (the “Projects”) in Galveston County, Texas. Defendants, Binnacle Development, Lone Trail Development, and SSLT, are land developers. Each developer contracted with R. Hassell Properties, Inc. to complete paving and infrastructure projects in Galveston County Municipal Utility District (“MUD”) No. 31. The three Hassell contracts were form MUD contracts created by MUD attorneys. Each contract stated that it was “for Galveston County Municipal Utility District No. 31.” Hanover subsequently sued the developers in federal court to recover the contract balances on the Projects. The liquidated-damages clause would, if enforced, amount to an offset of $900,000. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court concluded that because no district is a party to the contracts at issue, the economic disincentive provision from the Water Code does not apply. On the second issue, the district court found that the damages clauses in the contracts constitute an unenforceable penalty. The court granted summary judgment for Hanover.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that Section 49.271 allows “economic disincentive” clauses only in contracts where a district is a contracting party. Because no district is party to the Hassell contracts, they cannot incorporate “economic disincentive” clauses permitted under the Texas Water Code. The court also wrote it would not disturb the district court’s finding that the clause is an unenforceable penalty under Texas law. View "Hanover Ins v. Binnacle Development" on Justia Law