Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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Plaintiff and defendant were business associates who sought to purchase three restaurants known as Jib Jab. Plaintiff, with a background in investing, initiated negotiations and sought a partner with restaurant experience, leading to an oral agreement with defendant. Plaintiff was to handle acquisition terms and financing, while defendant would manage operations. No written partnership agreement was executed. Both parties made several unsuccessful attempts to secure financing, including SBA loans, but neither was willing to personally guarantee the loan, and plaintiff refused to pay off defendant’s unrelated SBA debts. Eventually, defendant proceeded alone, secured financing, and purchased Jib Jab through an entity he formed, without plaintiff’s involvement.Plaintiff filed suit in the Superior Court, Mecklenburg County, alleging the formation of a common law partnership and asserting direct and derivative claims against defendant and the purchasing entity, including breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, misappropriation of business opportunity, and requests for judicial dissolution and accounting. Defendants moved for partial judgment on the pleadings, resulting in dismissal of all derivative claims, certain direct claims, and claims for constructive trust. The remaining claims were plaintiff’s direct claims for breach of partnership agreement, breach of fiduciary duty, tortious interference, and claims for judicial dissolution and accounting.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reviewed the Business Court’s orders. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of derivative claims, holding that North Carolina law does not permit derivative actions by a general partner on behalf of a general partnership. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of conclusory tortious interference claims and upheld the Business Court’s decision to strike portions of plaintiff’s affidavit and disregard an unsworn expert report. Finally, the Supreme Court modified and affirmed summary judgment for defendants, holding that no partnership existed due to lack of agreement on material terms, and that plaintiff failed to show he could have completed the purchase but for defendant’s actions. View "Cutter v. Vojnovic" on Justia Law

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William Plott suffered severe, lifelong disabilities as a result of a vaccine administered in infancy. His family sought compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, filing a petition in the United States Court of Federal Claims. A special master determined that Plott’s parents were entitled to monetary relief for his care and ordered the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to pay a lump sum and to purchase an annuity from Wilcac Life Insurance Company, with annual payments to be made to Plott’s estate. After Plott’s death, his estate sought a final annuity payment, which Wilcac refused to pay, prompting the estate to sue both HHS and Wilcac.The estate initially filed suit in the Hamilton County, Ohio, Court of Common Pleas. Wilcac removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. HHS moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and the district court granted this motion, dismissing HHS from the case. Wilcac then argued that HHS was a necessary and indispensable party under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19, and the district court agreed, dismissing the entire case without prejudice because HHS could not be joined without defeating subject matter jurisdiction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the district court’s application of Rule 19. The appellate court held that the district court erred by applying a bright-line rule that all parties to a contract are necessary and indispensable under Rule 19. Instead, the court emphasized that Rule 19 requires a pragmatic, case-specific analysis. The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the lower court to conduct a proper Rule 19 analysis based on the specific facts of the case. View "Estate of William Plott v. Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

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A woman and her long-term partner jointly purchased a duplex in Florida, signing both a promissory note and a mortgage as joint obligors and joint tenants with rights of survivorship. The note required monthly payments and a $100,000 balloon payment. After making all monthly payments, they failed to pay the balloon payment when due. The partner died shortly thereafter, and the woman became the sole owner of the property. The lender sent a default notice, and the woman entered into a forbearance agreement but did not pay the balloon payment. The lender filed a creditor’s claim against the deceased partner’s estate, which was rejected, leading the lender to sue the estate for the unpaid amount.The District Court of Fremont County, Wyoming, found the estate liable for the full balloon payment and associated costs, and also found the woman jointly liable as a co-obligor. The estate then sought contribution from the woman, arguing she should pay her share of the debt. After a bench trial, the district court determined that both the woman and the estate were each responsible for 50% of the balloon payment and related fees, applying Florida’s doctrine of equitable contribution. The court rejected the woman’s arguments that she should not be liable due to alleged inequitable conduct by the estate or because the deceased partner had intended to pay the balloon payment himself.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wyoming reviewed the district court’s application of Florida law and its equitable determinations. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s decision, holding that the woman was jointly liable for 50% of the balloon payment and associated costs. The court found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s application of the doctrine of equitable contribution, its rejection of the unclean hands defense, or its allocation of attorneys’ fees and costs. View "Hutton v. Dykes" on Justia Law

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Daniel Flickinger, a litigator at Wainwright, Pope & McMeekin, P.C. (WPM), posted conservative commentary on his personal social media, including a controversial post about George Floyd. Lawrence Tracy King, a partner at King Simmons Ford & Spree, P.C., sent a screenshot of Flickinger’s post—paired with a professional photo from WPM’s website—to WPM partners, expressing concern about the post’s impact on the firm’s reputation. The WPM partners, after reviewing Flickinger’s social media activity and discussing with King, asked Flickinger to resign, which he did. Flickinger alleged that the screenshot misrepresented his post as being made in his professional capacity and falsely associated his views with WPM.Flickinger sued King and the King law firm for defamation, invasion of privacy, and tortious interference with a business relationship. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all claims, but the Supreme Court of Alabama previously reinstated the tortious interference claim, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, the King defendants moved for summary judgment, submitting affidavits from WPM partners stating their decision to terminate Flickinger was based solely on their independent review of his public posts, not on King’s actions. Flickinger sought to compel production of King’s cell phone records and to continue the summary judgment hearing, but the circuit court denied both motions and granted summary judgment for the King defendants, finding no genuine issue of material fact on causation.The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed summary judgment for the King law firm, holding King’s actions were outside the scope of his employment and did not benefit the firm. However, the Court reversed summary judgment for King, finding genuine issues of material fact regarding causation and justification. The case was remanded for further proceedings against King, while the denial of Flickinger’s discovery and continuance motions was affirmed. View "Flickinger v. King" on Justia Law

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Bradley Lewis, acting on behalf of iWTNS, Inc. and Leveraged, LLC, entered into a contract with MotionMobs, LLC to develop a mobile-phone application intended to help users contact legal counsel during police stops. The contract specified a timeline and an hourly billing rate. Disputes arose regarding payment and the quality of the delivered product, leading MotionMobs to file a breach-of-contract suit against Lewis and the companies in the Jefferson Circuit Court. During litigation, Lewis and MotionMobs’ CEO exchanged text messages discussing a possible settlement, with Lewis proposing a payment schedule and MotionMobs responding with additional terms.The Jefferson Circuit Court reviewed MotionMobs’ motion to enforce the text-message exchange as a binding settlement agreement. The court found that the parties had entered into a valid agreement based on the text messages and ordered them to execute a written agreement reflecting those terms. The defendants sought relief from this order, which was denied, and MotionMobs moved to hold them in contempt for noncompliance. After procedural developments, including an initial dismissal of an appeal for lack of a final order, the circuit court entered a final judgment, prompting a timely appeal by the defendants.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo, focusing on whether the text-message exchange constituted a binding settlement agreement. The Court held that the exchange did not create an enforceable contract because MotionMobs’ response was a counteroffer containing indefinite terms that were never accepted by the defendants. The Court emphasized that a valid contract requires definite material terms and mutual assent, which were lacking in this instance. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Alabama reversed the circuit court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "iWTNS, Inc. v. MotionMobs, LLC" on Justia Law

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After a storm damaged a warehouse owned by Distribution, Inc., D&M Roofing and Siding, Inc. performed a free inspection and damage report. The parties entered into a written agreement stating that D&M would perform repair work approved by Distribution’s insurer, with the contract price to equal the total claim amount agreed to by the insurer. The agreement included a cancellation fee provision, stating that if Distribution did not engage D&M to complete the building after insurance approval, Distribution would pay D&M a fee equal to 20% of the proceeds paid by the insurer for work done by D&M. Distribution ultimately hired a different contractor for the repairs, and D&M sued for breach of contract and unjust enrichment.The District Court for Lancaster County first found the contract enforceable and that Distribution had breached it, but determined D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision because D&M had performed no repair work. The court also granted summary judgment to Distribution on the unjust enrichment claim. In subsequent summary judgment proceedings, D&M attempted to pursue an alternative theory of damages, but the district court refused to consider it, relying on D&M’s earlier concession that its damages were limited to those under the cancellation fee provision. The district court later issued a final order dismissing D&M’s claims in full.On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that D&M was not entitled to damages under the cancellation fee provision, as the contract unambiguously limited the fee to work actually performed by D&M. The court further held that D&M was precluded from seeking other damages due to its earlier concession, applying the invited error doctrine. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "D & M Roofing & Siding, Inc. v. Distribution, Inc." on Justia Law

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A waste hauling company operating in Kansas City brought suit against a mobile waste compaction business and its franchisor. The waste hauler owns containers that are leased to customers, who sometimes contract separately with the compaction company to compress waste inside those containers. The hauler alleged that the compaction company’s activities damaged its containers and interfered with its business relationships. The hauler sought various forms of relief, including damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and nominal damages, but ultimately disavowed any claim for actual monetary damages, citing a lack of evidence to support such damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri denied the hauler’s request for a temporary restraining order, finding no irreparable harm. During discovery, the hauler admitted it could not identify or quantify any actual damages and stipulated it was not seeking damages outside Kansas City. The district court granted the compaction company’s motion to strike the hauler’s jury demand, holding that the hauler had not presented evidence of compensatory damages, that nominal damages were unavailable under Missouri law for the claims asserted, and that the remaining claims were equitable in nature. After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for the compaction company and its franchisor, finding the hauler failed to prove essential elements of its claims, including actual damages and direct benefit conferred for unjust enrichment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the hauler was not entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment because it failed to present evidence of compensatory damages and nominal damages were not available for its claims under Missouri law. The court also affirmed judgment for the compaction company on the trespass to chattels and unjust enrichment claims, finding the hauler failed to prove dispossession, damages, or a direct benefit conferred. View "Allied Services v. Smash My Trash, LLC" on Justia Law

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A state-operated university in South Dakota, facing increased demand for student housing, entered into a series of lease agreements with a local housing commission beginning in 2000. The commission constructed and financed two apartment buildings, leasing them to the university with an option for the university to purchase the property. The original 2000 lease included a provision for a reserve account, funded by any excess between actual debt service and lease payments, which would be disbursed to the university if it exercised its purchase option. Over the years, the parties executed new leases in 2011, 2014, and 2017, each with different terms and none referencing the reserve account provision from the 2000 lease. In 2020, the university notified the commission of its intent to purchase the property, leading to disputes over the purchase price and whether the university was entitled to a credit from a reserve account that no longer existed.The Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, Lake County, South Dakota, granted partial summary judgment in favor of the university, holding that all the leases should be read as a single, continuous contract, thereby extending the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease into subsequent agreements. The court also interpreted the purchase price provision to refer to the original construction mortgage, not any refinanced debt, and determined the university was entitled to a refund after calculating the buy-out amount. The commission’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and final judgment was entered for the university.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reversed and remanded. It held that the leases were separate agreements, not a single continuous contract, and that the reserve account obligation from the 2000 lease did not carry forward. The court further held that the buy-out price should be based on the balance of the mortgage existing at the time the purchase option was exercised, including any refinanced debt, not just the original mortgage. The circuit court’s judgment was vacated. View "S.D. Board Of Regents v. Madison Housing" on Justia Law

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Several individuals and an LLC, who own oil and gas interests in West Virginia, leased their mineral rights to EQT, a group of related energy companies. The leases, numbering nearly 3,843, required EQT to pay royalties to the lessors. During the period from January 1, 2012, to February 28, 2021, EQT extracted “wet gas” from the wells, which contains valuable natural gas liquids (NGLs) like propane and butane. EQT sold the wet gas at the wellhead to its own affiliates and paid royalties to the lessors based on the energy content (BTU) of the wet gas, not on the value of the NGLs. EQT then separated and sold the NGLs to third parties but did not pay additional royalties for these sales. In 2021, EQT notified lessors it would begin calculating royalties based on the separate value of NGLs and residue gas.The plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, alleging breach of contract and fraudulent concealment, and sought class certification. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding EQT’s affiliates were its alter egos, and certified classes for both claims, later dividing the class into three subclasses based on lease language. EQT petitioned for interlocutory appeal of the class certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the certification of the breach of contract claim, holding that the class was ascertainable and that common questions of law and fact predominated, given EQT’s uniform royalty payment method and the immateriality of lease language variations under West Virginia law. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the certification of the fraudulent concealment claim, holding that individual questions of reliance would predominate, making class treatment inappropriate for that claim. Thus, the district court’s order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Glover v. EQT Corporation" on Justia Law

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Several former members of the rock band Supertramp entered into a 1977 publishing agreement with their bandmates and manager, allocating specific percentages of songwriting royalties among themselves. These royalties were distributed according to the agreement for decades. In 2018, two of the principal songwriters and their publishing company stopped paying royalties to the plaintiffs, prompting the plaintiffs to file a breach of contract action. The dispute centered on whether the agreement could be unilaterally terminated or whether the obligation to pay royalties continued as long as the songs generated income.After the case was removed to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the court ruled as a matter of law that the defendants could terminate the agreement after a “reasonable time,” finding no express or implied duration in the contract. The case proceeded to a jury trial, which found in favor of the defendants, concluding that the contract had been terminated after a reasonable time. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and applied California contract law, which requires courts to first look for an express duration in the contract, then to determine if a duration can be implied from the contract’s nature and circumstances, and only if neither is found, to construe the duration as a reasonable time. The Ninth Circuit agreed there was no express duration but held that the contract’s nature implied a duration: the obligation to pay royalties continues as long as the songs generate publishing income, ending only when the copyrights expire and the works enter the public domain. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiffs on liability. View "Thompson v. Hodgson" on Justia Law