Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Contracts
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A fuel distribution company sought to acquire a competitor in Western Alaska, prompting the State to sue for anticompetitive conduct under Alaska’s consumer protection laws. To resolve the dispute, the State and the company negotiated a consent decree requiring the company to divest a portion of its fuel storage capacity in Bethel to another distributor, Delta Western, before completing the acquisition. The consent decree specified that it would expire in 30 years or could be dissolved by court order for good cause. Delta Western was not a party to the consent decree, but entered into a separate fuel storage contract with the acquiring company as required by the decree. The contract’s term extended beyond the initial five years at Delta Western’s option.Years later, the Superior Court for the State of Alaska, Second Judicial District, Nome, dissolved the consent decree at the acquiring company’s request. The company then notified Delta Western that it considered the fuel storage contract terminated as a result. Delta Western filed a breach of contract action in Anchorage Superior Court, seeking to enforce the contract and arguing that its terms were independent of the consent decree. The contract case was transferred to Nome Superior Court, which issued a preliminary ruling that the contract remained valid despite the dissolution of the consent decree. The court also vacated its initial order dissolving the consent decree to allow Delta Western to intervene and present its position.The Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reviewed whether dissolution of the consent decree automatically terminated the fuel storage contract and whether the superior court abused its discretion by permitting Delta Western to intervene. The court held that dissolution of the consent decree did not automatically void the contract between the parties, and that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Delta Western to intervene. The Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions and lifted the stay on the contract case. View "Crowley Marine Services, Inc. v. State of Alaska" on Justia Law

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Noah Gilbert purchased a motor vehicle insurance policy from Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, initially declining underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage but later adding a UIM endorsement with $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident limits. The policy included an offset provision, reducing any UIM payout by amounts received from another party’s insurance. Gilbert paid premiums for this coverage but never filed a UIM claim or experienced an accident triggering such coverage. He later filed a putative class action, alleging that Progressive’s UIM coverage was illusory under Idaho law and asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud, and constructive fraud.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court raised the issue of standing and ultimately held that Gilbert lacked standing because he had not filed a claim or been denied coverage, and thus had not suffered an injury-in-fact. Alternatively, the court found that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits: there was no breach of contract or bad faith without a denied claim, no damages to support fraud or constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment was unavailable due to the existence of a valid contract. The court granted summary judgment for Progressive and denied Gilbert’s motion for class certification as moot.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that Gilbert did have standing, as payment of premiums for allegedly illusory coverage constituted a concrete injury. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits because he never filed a claim, was never denied coverage, and did not incur damages. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, as an enforceable contract provided an adequate legal remedy. The judgment in favor of Progressive was affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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Two parties, both experienced in the grocery business, negotiated the sale of a grocery store’s inventory, stock, and equipment for $175,000. The agreement was reached orally and memorialized with a handshake, but no written contract was signed. Following the oral agreement, the buyers took control of the store, closed it for remodeling, met with employees, and were publicly identified as the new owners. However, within two weeks, the buyers withdrew from the deal, citing issues with a third-party wholesaler. The sellers, having already closed the store and lost perishable goods, were unable to find another buyer and subsequently filed suit.The sellers brought ten claims in the Lee County Circuit Court, including breach of contract, estoppel, and negligent misrepresentation. The buyers moved to dismiss, arguing that the Statute of Frauds barred enforcement of the oral agreement because the sale involved goods valued over $500 and no signed writing existed. The circuit court agreed, dismissing the contract and estoppel-based claims, as well as the negligent misrepresentation claim, but allowed other claims to proceed. The sellers appealed the dismissal of the contract and estoppel claims.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case de novo. It held that the sellers’ complaint plausibly invoked two exceptions to the Statute of Frauds under Mississippi law: the merchants’ exception and the part-performance exception. The Court found that, at the motion to dismiss stage, it could not determine as a matter of law that no valid contract existed under these exceptions. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed the circuit court’s dismissal of claims (1) through (7) and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Palmer's Grocery Inc. v. Chandler's JKE, Inc." on Justia Law

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Jay Gould served as CEO of Interface, Inc., a carpet manufacturer. After an incident at an annual sales meeting in which Gould allegedly became intoxicated and verbally abused an employee, Interface’s board of directors terminated his employment for cause. This followed a prior warning and an investigation by King & Spalding LLP, which corroborated the allegations. Under Gould’s employment agreement, termination for cause resulted in significantly reduced compensation compared to termination without cause.Gould filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging breach of contract and arguing that Interface’s determination of cause was made in bad faith. Interface moved for summary judgment, asserting that the contract gave it absolute discretion to determine cause, or, alternatively, that it had acted in good faith. Gould’s arguments in the district court focused on the company’s alleged lack of good faith, contending that the investigation was a sham. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to Interface, finding both that the company had absolute discretion and, alternatively, that Gould had not shown bad faith. The district court adopted this recommendation and denied Gould’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, ruling that Gould had waived a new argument that Interface had no discretion to determine cause.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Gould advanced the new theory that Interface had no discretion to determine cause under the contract. The Eleventh Circuit held that this theory was a new issue, not a subsidiary argument, and that Gould had forfeited it by failing to raise it in the district court. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, concluding that Gould’s remaining claims did not warrant reversal. View "Gould v. Interface, Inc." on Justia Law

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A group of broadband internet providers in Georgia entered into contracts with the Georgia Department of Transportation to install and maintain their equipment along public rights of way. These contracts set annual permit fees and included a clause stating that the contracts would remain in effect until the parties entered into a new agreement. In 2021, the Department amended its rules, increasing permit fees and requiring providers to sign new contracts. The providers refused, and the Department notified them that, absent new agreements, they would be subject to the new rules. The providers then filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that their contracts were enforceable, not terminable at will, and that the Department’s actions impaired their contractual rights in violation of the United States and Georgia Constitutions.The Superior Court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that sovereign immunity was waived under Article I, Section II, Paragraph V(b) of the Georgia Constitution because the providers sought declaratory relief from alleged unconstitutional acts. The court granted summary judgment to the providers, holding that the contracts were enforceable and not terminable at will by the Department.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The Court agreed with the lower court that sovereign immunity was waived for this declaratory judgment action, as the providers sought relief from acts allegedly violating constitutional provisions. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the trial court’s interpretation of the contracts. It held that the contracts were of indefinite duration and, under longstanding Georgia law, were terminable at will by either party with notice. The Court affirmed the waiver of sovereign immunity but vacated the judgment granting declaratory and injunctive relief, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "State v. Dovetel Communication, LLC" on Justia Law

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Ultra Group of Companies and Prince and Prince, LLC entered into a contract regarding the placement and operation of Ultra’s coin-operated amusement machines on Prince’s premises. A dispute arose between the parties, leading to arbitration before a Georgia Lottery Corporation (GLC) hearing officer. On July 30, 2021, the hearing officer issued an “Interim Award” that resolved most substantive contract issues in favor of Prince but left claims for fees and costs unresolved. On September 17, 2021, the hearing officer issued a “Final Award” that incorporated the Interim Award, split arbitration costs, and awarded attorney fees to Ultra. The parties received the Final Award on October 4, 2021.Ultra filed a “Request for Reconsideration and Motion for Review” with the GLC’s chief executive officer (CEO) on October 14, 2021, which was denied by operation of GLC rules after 30 days without a ruling. On December 10, 2021, Ultra filed a timely petition for certiorari to the Superior Court of Fulton County. Prince moved to dismiss, arguing Ultra failed to preserve its appeal rights by not seeking review of the Interim Award within 10 days. The Superior Court of Fulton County agreed and dismissed Ultra’s petition. Ultra appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which affirmed the dismissal without opinion. Ultra’s motion for reconsideration was denied, and Ultra petitioned the Supreme Court of Georgia for certiorari.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that only the Final Award constituted an appealable order under the GLC’s rules, as it resolved all issues presented in the arbitration. Ultra’s appeal from the Final Award was timely, and the lower courts erred in dismissing the appeal. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Ultra Group of Companies, Inc. v. Prince and Prince, LLC" on Justia Law

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A dispute arose after Howard Misle, acting as lender, provided funds to Abram, LLC, under a promissory note to support the company’s real estate ventures. The note, initially executed in 2004 and later amended, allowed advances up to $5 million at 3% interest. In 2007, after selling a property known as Park Place, Howard was paid sums from the sale proceeds, including a payoff for the note and reimbursement for advances. Later, Howard continued to make advances to Abram for new properties in Pennsylvania. In 2020, Howard demanded repayment on the note, and when Abram did not pay, he filed suit. Abram responded by asserting a defense of recoupment, claiming Howard had been overpaid in 2007, and also filed counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and fraudulent concealment.The District Court for Lancaster County granted summary judgment for Howard on the recoupment defense, finding the 2007 payment was a separate transaction from the advances Howard sought to recover. After a bench trial, the court also found that the statute of limitations barred Abram’s counterclaims, concluding that Abram’s agents had knowledge of the relevant facts and that the discovery rule did not toll the limitations period. The court adopted Howard’s calculation of interest on the note without an evidentiary hearing, overruling Abram’s objections.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo. It held that Abram’s recoupment defense regarding the alleged 2007 overpayment should not have been dismissed on summary judgment, as it arose from the same transaction as Howard’s claim on the note. However, the court affirmed summary judgment for Howard on recoupment related to a personal loan to a third party. The court also found that the statute of limitations was tolled for Abram’s breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim but affirmed the dismissal of the fraudulent concealment claim. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings, including a determination of whether interest should be calculated as simple or compound. View "Konecne v. Abram, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this case, Christopher C. Brown, through his company Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment (TME), owned a Memphis music studio and insured both the studio and its equipment with Hanover American Insurance Company. John Falls, a musician, leased Studio B and its equipment from Brown and also obtained insurance from Hanover for the equipment and lost business income. In 2015, the studio was damaged by arson, and both Brown and Falls submitted insurance claims. Hanover discovered Brown had forged receipts for equipment purchases and sued to recover advance payments and for a declaratory judgment of no further liability. Brown, Falls, and another lessee counter-sued for breach of contract. After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Falls was awarded $2.5 million for equipment loss and $250,000 for business income, while Brown was found to have committed insurance fraud.Hanover moved to set aside the verdict under Rule 50(b), which the district court granted. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding Hanover had forfeited its Rule 50(b) motion by failing to make a Rule 50(a) motion as to Falls, and ordered reinstatement of the jury verdict. Subsequent proceedings included a federal interpleader action and a parallel state court action between Falls and TME. The district court enjoined the state action, but the Sixth Circuit reversed the injunction.In the present appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s allocation of the insurance payout, holding that Hanover was precluded by res judicata from challenging Falls’s recovery on grounds that could have been raised earlier. The court found the district court’s error in interpreting the wrong lease was harmless and upheld the allocation of funds based on the value of Falls’s leasehold interest. The court also held that Tennessee public policy barred Brown from recovering his allocated share due to his insurance fraud. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "Hanover American Insurance Co. v. Tattooed Millionaire Entertainment" on Justia Law

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Two licensed wrecker services in Connecticut were summoned by state police to remove a severely damaged tractor trailer from a highway accident. The wrecker services used specialized equipment, including a costly rotator truck, to recover and tow the vehicle, then transported it to their storage facility. They sent an itemized invoice to the vehicle owner’s insurer, which included charges for the use of special equipment and supervisory personnel. The insurer paid the invoice under protest and subsequently filed a complaint with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, arguing that the charges were excessive and not permitted under state regulations.A Department of Motor Vehicles hearing officer determined that the wrecker services had overcharged for their nonconsensual towing services by using their own rate schedule based on equipment rather than the hourly labor rate set by the commissioner. Most equipment-based charges were disallowed, and the wrecker services were ordered to pay restitution and a civil penalty. The Superior Court dismissed the wrecker services’ administrative appeal, finding the hearing officer’s conclusions supported by substantial evidence. The Appellate Court affirmed, holding that the regulations required fees for exceptional services to be based solely on the hourly labor rate, excluding equipment costs.The Connecticut Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that the relevant regulation, § 14-63-36c (c), was ambiguous and could reasonably be interpreted to allow wrecker services to charge additional fees for exceptional services, including costs associated with special equipment, provided those fees are itemized and posted in accordance with regulatory requirements. The Court held that prohibiting such charges would prevent wrecker services from recouping necessary costs and could undermine the availability of exceptional towing services. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court’s judgment in part and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its interpretation. View "Modzelewski's Towing & Storage, Inc. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles" on Justia Law

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Several development groups entered into a public improvement contract with a Texas city, purchasing over 60 acres of land, much of it in a flood zone. The developers received a variance from the city, exempting them from obtaining a federal floodplain permit (CLOMR), and invested significant funds in developing the property, including constructing a bridge. In 2018, the parties executed updated agreements, including a Master Development Agreement (MDA), which required certain conditions to be met within five years or the contract would automatically terminate, ending the city’s reimbursement obligations. As the deadline approached, the city informed the developers that they would now need to obtain the previously waived CLOMR, citing a later-enacted ordinance. Unable to comply in time, the developers sought an extension, which the city council denied, resulting in termination of the MDA.The developers sued in Texas state court, alleging the city’s actions constituted an unconstitutional taking under federal and state law, and also brought claims for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Vested Rights Statute. The city removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas and moved to dismiss. The district court dismissed the federal takings and declaratory judgment claims, finding the developers had not sufficiently alleged that the city acted in its sovereign rather than commercial capacity, and remanded the remaining state-law claims to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the developers’ allegations arose from a contractual dispute, not a sovereign act by the city, and thus did not state a plausible takings claim under the Fifth Amendment. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to dismiss the declaratory judgment claim, as the core issues would be resolved in the remanded state court action. View "Mesquite Asset Recovery Grp v. City of Mesquite" on Justia Law