Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS), a medical debt collector, sought to collect $460 from Katrina Melanese (now Katrina Sullivan) for an emergency room visit in September 2017. Sullivan was treated at Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center (EIRMC) by Intermountain Emergency Physicians (IEP), which did not collect insurance information directly from patients. Sullivan provided her insurance information to EIRMC, but IEP billed her outdated insurance information from a previous visit. When the outdated insurers denied the claim, IEP assigned the bill to MRS for collection.The magistrate court ruled in favor of Sullivan, finding that an implied condition precedent existed, requiring IEP to bill Sullivan’s insurance before seeking payment from her. The district court affirmed the magistrate court’s decision, agreeing that the condition precedent was not satisfied because IEP did not make reasonable efforts to obtain Sullivan’s correct insurance information.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that an implied-in-fact contract existed between IEP and Sullivan, and that the contract included a condition precedent requiring IEP to bill Sullivan’s insurance before seeking payment from her. The court found substantial and competent evidence supporting the magistrate court’s finding of the condition precedent, noting that Sullivan provided her insurance information to EIRMC and that IEP’s general practice was to bill insurance before seeking payment from patients. The court also rejected MRS’s argument that the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) prevented the application of the condition precedent in emergency room settings.The court concluded that IEP failed to make reasonable efforts to satisfy the condition precedent and, therefore, MRS could not collect the debt from Sullivan. The court awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal to Sullivan. View "Medical Recovery Services, LLC v. Melanese" on Justia Law

A landlord, JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC (JJD), owns a shopping center in Elk Grove, California, and leased space to Jo-Ann Stores, LLC (Jo-Ann). The lease included a cotenancy provision allowing Jo-Ann to pay reduced rent if the number of anchor tenants or overall occupancy fell below a specified threshold. When two anchor tenants closed, Jo-Ann invoked this provision and paid reduced rent for about 20 months until the occupancy threshold was met again.The Sacramento County Superior Court ruled in favor of Jo-Ann, finding the cotenancy provision to be an alternative performance rather than a penalty. The Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate District affirmed this decision, distinguishing the case from a previous ruling in Grand Prospect Partners, L.P. v. Ross Dress For Less, Inc., which found a similar provision to be an unenforceable penalty.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the case to determine the validity of the cotenancy provision. The court held that the provision was a valid form of alternative performance, allowing JJD a realistic choice between accepting lower rent or taking steps to increase occupancy. The court found that the provision did not constitute an unreasonable penalty under California Civil Code section 1671, nor did it result in a forfeiture under section 3275. The court emphasized that contracts should be enforced as written, especially when negotiated by sophisticated parties.The Supreme Court of California affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeal, upholding the cotenancy provision as a valid and enforceable part of the lease agreement. View "JJD-HOV Elk Grove, LLC v. Jo-Ann Stores, LLC" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Jesse Smith divorced in 2017 after fifteen years of marriage. Jennifer, a stay-at-home mother, and Jesse, a construction superintendent, entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement requiring Jesse to pay Jennifer spousal support until January 1, 2025. The agreement included a "Review Term" stating that spousal support would be reviewed every two years. In 2018, Jesse unilaterally reduced the spousal support payments and later stopped paying altogether, leading Jennifer to file a breach of contract action.The magistrate judge dismissed Jesse's petition to modify the spousal support due to a non-merger clause, which kept the spousal support provision outside the court's jurisdiction. Jennifer then sought partial summary judgment in district court, arguing that the Review Term was too vague to be enforceable. The district court agreed, striking the Review Term but upholding the rest of the spousal support provision under the agreement's severability clause. The jury found Jesse in breach of the agreement and awarded Jennifer $76,514 in damages, plus attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Idaho reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the Review Term was unenforceable due to its vagueness, indefiniteness, and uncertainty. The court also upheld the district court's application of the severability clause, maintaining the enforceability of the remaining spousal support provision. Jennifer was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Smith v. Smith" on Justia Law

Ms. Wilson owned a property in the District of Columbia, which she subdivided into three lots: 825, 826, and 827. She sold Lot 826 to Ntaky Management in 2009 and Lot 825 to Ms. Lumbih in 2010. The deed for Lot 826 described it as measuring twenty feet by forty feet, while the deed for Lot 825 described it as thirty-eight feet in length, based on an informal survey by Vyfhuis & Associates. This created a disputed area of eight feet between the properties. Ms. Lumbih installed an HVAC unit and deck in this disputed area. In 2018, Ntaky asked Ms. Lumbih to remove these installations, but she did not comply, leading Ntaky to sue her.The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a non-jury trial and ruled that Ntaky owned the disputed area and could remove the encroachments at Ms. Lumbih’s expense. The court also denied Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson and her claim for implied indemnity, which sought to hold Ms. Wilson responsible for the costs associated with removing the encroachments.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case. The court upheld the trial court’s decision regarding Ntaky’s ownership of the disputed area and the removal of the encroachments. However, it vacated the denial of Ms. Lumbih’s breach-of-contract claim against Ms. Wilson, finding that the trial court did not address whether Ms. Wilson breached her duty to convey a property thirty-eight feet in length. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue. The court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Ms. Lumbih’s claim for implied indemnity, as she failed to identify a non-contractual duty of care owed by Ms. Wilson. View "Lumbih v. Wilson" on Justia Law

A five-year-old child tragically died after being struck by a vehicle driven by an Alltrade employee at an apartment complex owned by Whispering Brook Acquisitions LLC. Alltrade had a commercial general liability policy with Motorists Mutual Insurance Company, while Whispering Brook had a similar policy with First Specialty Insurance Corporation. Both policies contained "other insurance" provisions, which led to a dispute over which insurer was primarily responsible for covering the incident.The Jefferson Circuit Court determined that Alltrade and its employees were insured under First Specialty’s policy. The court found that the "other insurance" provisions in both policies were mutually repugnant excess clauses, meaning neither could claim to be secondary to the other. Consequently, the court ruled that both insurers shared primary liability and must contribute equally to defend and indemnify the insureds. Motorists' argument that First Specialty should be primarily liable due to an indemnification provision in the Service Agreement between Alltrade and Whispering Brook was rejected. First Specialty appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that First Specialty’s provision was a nonstandard escape clause, making Motorists primarily liable.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The court held that both "other insurance" provisions were mutually repugnant excess clauses, requiring Motorists and First Specialty to share primary liability equally. The court also overruled the earlier decision in Empire Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Haddix, which the Court of Appeals had relied upon. Additionally, the court found that Motorists had waived its indemnification argument by not filing a cross-appeal and requesting the Court of Appeals to affirm the trial court's summary judgment. The case was remanded to the Jefferson Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "MOTORISTS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY V. FIRST SPECIALTY INSURANCE CORP." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether an insurance policy issued by State Auto Property and Casualty Company to Greenville Cumberland Presbyterian Church covered the collapse of the Church’s roof. The Church's roof, part of a one-story sanctuary building, was around 120 years old. In September 2019, during a roof replacement project, a significant section of the roof dropped overnight. An engineer, Harold Gaston, found that the roof trusses had decayed due to long-term water infiltration, causing the roof to collapse. The Church filed a claim with State Auto, which was denied on the basis that the damage did not constitute a collapse under the policy.The Muhlenberg Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Auto, ruling that there was no collapse as defined by Kentucky precedent in Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Curtsinger and Thiele v. Kentucky Growers Ins. Co. The court held that the roof's condition did not meet the "rubble on the ground" standard for collapse.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the roof had indeed collapsed under the Curtsinger definition, which does not require the building to fall to the ground. The court also found the policy ambiguous and ruled in favor of the Church.The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding that the policy provided coverage for the actual collapse of any part of the building, including the roof. The court found that the roof had indeed collapsed due to hidden decay and insect damage, and that the Church had taken reasonable steps to mitigate further damage. The court vacated the circuit court’s summary judgment in favor of State Auto and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Church on its breach of contract claim, and for further proceedings on the Church’s extra-contractual claims. View "STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY V. GREENVILLE CUMBERLAND PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH" on Justia Law

LKQ Corporation, a Delaware corporation in the auto salvage and recycled parts business, designated certain employees as "Key Persons" eligible for Restricted Stock Units (RSUs) through RSU Agreements. These agreements included non-competition clauses and provisions for forfeiture of RSUs and any stock issued if the employee competed with LKQ within nine months post-departure. Robert Rutledge, a plant manager at LKQ, signed these agreements and received stock under them. In April 2021, Rutledge resigned and joined a competitor shortly after.LKQ sued Rutledge in Illinois federal court for breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking to enjoin him from working for a competitor and to recover proceeds from the sale of LKQ stock. The district court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim and granted summary judgment for Rutledge on the contract claims, holding that the non-competition provisions were unreasonable restraints of trade under Illinois law and unenforceable under Delaware law, based on the Court of Chancery's decision in Ainslie v. Cantor Fitzgerald, L.P.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim and the summary judgment ruling on the Restrictive Covenant Agreements. However, it was uncertain about the enforceability of the RSU Agreements' forfeiture-for-competition provisions under Delaware law, especially after the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the Court of Chancery's decision in Cantor Fitzgerald. The Seventh Circuit certified two questions to the Delaware Supreme Court regarding the applicability of Cantor Fitzgerald outside the limited partnership context.The Delaware Supreme Court held that the principles from Cantor Fitzgerald, which endorse the employee choice doctrine and prioritize freedom of contract, apply beyond the limited partnership context, including to RSU agreements. The court emphasized that forfeiture-for-competition provisions do not restrict competition or an employee's ability to work and should be treated as enforceable terms subject to ordinary breach of contract defenses. View "LKQ Corp. v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

In 2014, Casey Moyer entered into an agreement with Doug Lasher Construction, Inc. for the construction and purchase of a new home, which was substantially completed in November 2014. Over the next six-and-a-half years, Moyer repeatedly informed Lasher Construction about issues with the home, particularly water leakage, and received assurances that the issues would be fixed. However, the problems persisted, and Moyer and Caitlin Bower filed suit against Lasher Construction in November 2021, alleging breach of contract and violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho granted summary judgment in favor of Lasher Construction, ruling that all claims were time-barred under Idaho Code sections 5-241(b) and 5-216, which require that claims arising out of a contract for the construction of real property be brought within five years of the final completion of construction. The court also found that the Idaho Consumer Protection Act claims were time-barred under the two-year statute of limitations provided by Idaho Code section 48-619. The court rejected the homeowners' arguments for equitable estoppel and the repair doctrine, concluding that they failed to show that Lasher Construction prevented them from pursuing their claims within the statutory period.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court's decision. The court reaffirmed that the repair doctrine is not available in Idaho and upheld the district court's conclusion that the homeowners failed to establish the elements of equitable estoppel. The court also agreed that the text messages and the July 2, 2021, response to the NORA demand did not constitute enforceable independent contracts. Lasher Construction was awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal as the prevailing party. View "Moyer v. Lasher Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

Jill Brenden appealed an order from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court, Gallatin County, which denied her claims against the estate of her late husband, Robert Brenden. Jill sought reimbursement for expenses and objected to the distribution and valuation of certain property in the estate. Barbara Jensen, Robert's sister and the appellee, sought attorney fees. Jill and Robert had a long-term relationship, cohabitated, and married in 2010. They purchased a home together in 2006 and later built another home on a property Robert inherited. Robert was diagnosed with cancer, which went into remission but later returned. Before his death, Robert designated Barbara as the Payable on Death (POD) beneficiary of his bank account.The District Court found that Jill converted funds from Robert's account after his death, despite her claim that Robert instructed her to transfer the funds before he died. The court admitted bank records as business records, which showed the transfers occurred after Robert's death. Jill continued to access the account and transferred funds to herself without notifying the estate. Barbara intervened in the probate action, filing a third-party complaint against Jill for wrongful conversion and deceit. Jill counterclaimed, alleging unjust enrichment and seeking a constructive trust over the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case. It held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the bank records as business records. The court affirmed the District Court's finding that Jill converted the funds in Robert's account, as Barbara became the rightful owner upon Robert's death. However, the court found that Jill was entitled to her share of the proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home, held in a resulting trust. The court denied Barbara's request for attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "In re Estate of Brenden" on Justia Law

The case involves a monetary dispute between a mother (defendant) and her daughter (plaintiff). The daughter sued her mother and obtained a money judgment. During enforcement proceedings, the mother tendered the judgment amount, prejudgment interest, and interest accrued on a bank account in Shanghai. The dispute centers on whether the mother fully satisfied the judgment.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found that the mother had tendered the full amount owed and granted her motion to require the daughter to acknowledge full satisfaction of the judgment. The daughter appealed, arguing there was no competent evidence to substantiate the interest amount accrued on the Shanghai bank account and that the court abused its discretion by not enforcing an order for a judgment debtor’s examination of the mother. She also complained about a comment by the trial court that she claimed offended due process.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court found no merit in the daughter’s contentions. It held that there was sufficient evidence to conclude the interest was fully paid, noting that the trial court was entitled to consider the totality of the circumstances. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s handling of the debtor examination and rejected the claim of judicial bias based on the court’s comment. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that the mother had satisfied the judgment and awarded her mandatory attorney fees. View "Merrick v. Lau" on Justia Law