Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

TCR, LLC, a Wyoming limited liability corporation, filed a lawsuit against Teton County, Idaho, after the County refused to record a Condominium Plat for property within a planned unit development (PUD) owned by TCR. TCR sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the lot had already been approved for condominium development, and also alleged breach of a 1996 settlement agreement between the County and TCR’s predecessor. The district court granted TCR’s motion for summary judgment on the declaratory and injunctive relief claim, ordering the County to record the Condominium Plat, but granted the County’s motion for summary judgment on the breach of contract claim.The district court found that the County had previously approved amendments to the PUD Plat in 2018 and 2019, allowing TCR to build sixteen standalone condominiums on Lot 12B. The County’s refusal to record the Condominium Plat was based on an alleged site plan from 1995, which the district court found inadmissible. The district court concluded that the County had no legal basis to refuse the recording and enjoined the County from preventing TCR’s attempts to record the Plat.The Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to grant TCR’s claim for declaratory and injunctive relief, holding that the County had no valid reason to refuse the recording. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the County on the breach of contract claim, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the County breached the 1996 Settlement Agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this issue.The Supreme Court also found that the district court erred in denying TCR’s second motion to enforce, which sought to compel the County to issue building permits after the Condominium Plat was recorded. The Court awarded TCR its attorney fees and costs on appeal, concluding that the County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. View "TCR, LLC v. Teton County" on Justia Law

Centaur, L.L.C. entered into a Master Services Contract (MSC) with United Bulk Terminals Davant, L.L.C. (UBT) in 2015 to build a concrete containment wall at UBT's dock facility. River Ventures, L.L.C. provided vessel transportation for Centaur’s employees working on the project. Centaur employee Devin Barrios was injured while transferring a generator from a River Ventures vessel to a barge leased by Centaur. The district court found River Ventures 100% at fault for the accident and imposed a $3.3 million judgment. River Ventures and its insurer, XL Specialty Insurance Company, satisfied the judgment and subsequently brought breach of contract claims against Centaur under the MSC.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana held a bench trial on the breach of contract claims. The court dismissed the claims, finding an ambiguity in the MSC regarding Centaur’s insurance procurement obligations. Specifically, the court found that requiring Centaur to procure a Protection & Indemnity (P&I) policy with crew/employee coverage would result in an absurd consequence due to potential duplicative coverage with the Worker’s Compensation policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court found that the MSC unambiguously required Centaur to procure a P&I policy that included crew/employee coverage. The court disagreed with the district court’s finding of absurdity, noting that mutually repugnant escape clauses in the Worker’s Compensation and P&I policies would result in both policies being liable on a pro rata basis. The appellate court also reversed the district court’s dismissal of the excess/bumbershoot breach of contract claim, as it was contingent on the P&I claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Centaur v. River Ventures" on Justia Law

Brian Herman and Skyler Herman sued Peter Tonn Enterprises, LLC, doing business as I39 Supply, for breach of contract. The Hermans alleged that they agreed to buy a livestock trailer from I39 Supply, but I39 Supply failed to honor the agreement. The Hermans served I39 Supply via certified mail, but I39 Supply did not respond, leading the Hermans to file for a default judgment. The district court granted the default judgment, ruling that I39 Supply was properly served and had failed to answer the complaint.I39 Supply, represented by its owner Peter Tonn, who is not an attorney, sent documents to the district court and participated in the default judgment hearing by telephone. The district court ruled that Tonn could not represent the LLC and entered a $19,000 judgment in favor of the Hermans. I39 Supply later retained counsel and filed a motion to vacate the default judgment, arguing that Tonn was unaware he could not represent the LLC. The motion did not mention personal jurisdiction. The district court granted the motion to vacate the default judgment and set the matter for a pretrial conference.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that I39 Supply made a general appearance by filing the motion to vacate the default judgment without raising the issue of personal jurisdiction. This action conferred personal jurisdiction on the district court. The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order dismissing the Hermans' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Herman v. Peter Tonn Enters." on Justia Law

Hudgen LeBlanc and Jodi LeBlanc filed a complaint against Residence Doctor Home Inspection, LLC, and its owner-operator, Terry J. Holder, alleging negligence, wantonness, gross negligence, fraudulent/innocent misrepresentation, suppression, and breach of contract. The claims arose from a pre-purchase home inspection performed by Holder, which the LeBlancs claimed failed to report structural issues with the flooring of the home they purchased. Instead, the report only mentioned "microbial growth" on the floor joists and recommended hiring a mold-remediation specialist. After purchasing the home, the LeBlancs hired a mold-remediation specialist who discovered rotten floor joists, costing nearly $40,000 to repair.The St. Clair Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the inspection company and Holder on the negligence and breach-of-contract claims and dismissed the fraud, suppression, and wantonness claims with prejudice. The court found that the LeBlancs failed to provide expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care or Holder's breach of that standard, which was necessary to prove their claims.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. The court held that expert testimony is required to establish a home inspector's breach of the applicable standard of care, similar to other professionals such as real-estate appraisers, engineers, and architects. The LeBlancs did not present expert testimony or establish that the breach was so obvious that it did not require expert testimony. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the inspection company and Holder. View "LeBlanc v. Residence Doctor Home Inspection, LLC" on Justia Law

Shymikka Griggs filed a data-breach action against NHS Management, LLC, a consulting firm providing management services for nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation facilities. NHS collects sensitive personal and health information from employees, patients, and vendors. In May 2021, NHS discovered a cyberattack on its network, which lasted 80 days. NHS notified affected individuals, including Griggs, in March 2022. Griggs, a former NHS employee, claimed her personal information was found on the dark web, leading to credit issues, spam communications, and fraudulent activities.Griggs initially filed a class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama but later dismissed it. She then filed a class-action complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court in June 2023, alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. NHS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Griggs's complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that Griggs failed to sufficiently plead her claims. Specifically, she did not demonstrate that NHS owed her a duty under Alabama law, failed to establish proximate cause for her negligence per se claim, did not allege intentional conduct for her invasion-of-privacy claim, and did not show that she conferred a benefit on NHS for her unjust-enrichment claim. Additionally, the court found that breach of confidence is not a recognized cause of action in Alabama and that Griggs did not establish a fiduciary relationship between her and NHS. View "Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC" on Justia Law

The Comedy Store, a stand-up comedy venue in Los Angeles, was forced to close for over a year due to COVID-19 restrictions. In July 2021, the Store hired Moss Adams LLP, an accounting firm, to help apply for a Shuttered Venue Operator Grant from the U.S. Small Business Administration. The parties signed an agreement that included a Washington choice of law provision and a forum selection clause mandating disputes be resolved in Washington state courts, along with a predispute jury trial waiver. The Store alleged Moss Adams failed to inform it of the grant program's impending expiration, causing it to miss the application deadline and lose an $8.5 million grant.The Store initially filed a complaint in the United States District Court in Los Angeles, but the case was dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Store then refiled in the Los Angeles Superior Court, asserting claims including gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. Moss Adams moved to dismiss or stay the action based on the forum selection clause. The trial court granted the motion, contingent on Moss Adams stipulating that the Store could exercise its right to a jury trial in Washington. Moss Adams provided such a stipulation, and the trial court signed an order affirming the Store's right to a jury trial in Washington.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred by not properly applying the reversed burden of proof, which required Moss Adams to show that litigating in Washington would not diminish the Store's unwaivable right to a jury trial. The appellate court concluded that Moss Adams did not meet this burden, as Washington courts have enforced predispute jury waivers, and the stipulation offered by Moss Adams was not a binding modification of the agreement. The appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded with instructions to deny Moss Adams's motion to dismiss or stay the action. View "The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit brought by Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller against Antero Resources Corporation. The plaintiffs, who own oil and gas interests in Harrison County, West Virginia, allege that Antero breached the terms of their leases by failing to pay the full one-eighth royalty specified in the leases. They argue that Antero improperly deducted postproduction costs from the gross sale proceeds of the gas, contrary to West Virginia Supreme Court precedents in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, L.L.C.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, which is handling the case, certified two questions to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. The first question asked whether the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend only to the "first available market" as opposed to the "point of sale" when the duty to market is implicated. The second question asked whether the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on natural gas liquids (NGLs) and, if so, whether the lessors share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting the NGLs to sale.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia answered the first question in the negative, holding that the requirements of Wellman and Estate of Tawney extend to the point of sale, not just to the first available market. The court reaffirmed that the lessee must bear all costs incurred in exploring for, producing, marketing, and transporting the product to the point of sale unless the lease provides otherwise.For the second question, the court held that the marketable product rule extends beyond gas to require a lessee to pay royalties on NGLs. However, the court also held that absent express language in the lease to the contrary, the lessors do not share in the cost of processing, manufacturing, and transporting residue gas and NGLs to the point of sale. View "Jacklin Romeo, Susan S. Rine, and Debra Snyder Miller v. Antero Resources Corporation" on Justia Law

The case involves Francis Kaess, who owns mineral interests in land in Pleasants County, West Virginia, subject to an oil and gas lease with BB Land, LLC. The lease, dated January 6, 1979, provides for in-kind royalties, meaning Kaess is entitled to a portion of the physical oil and gas produced. BB Land began production in 2018, but Kaess did not take his share in-kind. Instead, BB Land sold Kaess' share and paid him royalties after deducting postproduction costs.Kaess filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, alleging improper deductions of postproduction costs from his royalties, among other claims. The district court denied BB Land's motion for summary judgment on the improper deductions claim, finding that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs set forth in Wellman v. Energy Resources, Inc. and Estate of Tawney v. Columbia Natural Resources, LLC apply to in-kind leases. BB Land then moved to certify a question to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and answered two certified questions. First, the court held that there is an implied duty to market the minerals in oil and gas leases containing an in-kind royalty provision. If the lessor does not take physical possession of their share, the lessee must either deliver the lessor's share to a third-party purchaser near the wellhead, buy the lessor's share, or market and sell the lessor's share along with their own.Second, the court held that the requirements for deducting postproduction costs from royalties, as established in Wellman and Estate of Tawney, apply to leases with in-kind royalty provisions. Therefore, if the lessee markets and sells the lessor's share, the lessee must tender the lessor's percentage share of the gross proceeds, free from any deductions for postproduction expenses, received at the first point of sale to an unaffiliated third-party purchaser in an arm's length transaction. View "Francis Kaess v. BB Land, LLC" on Justia Law

LCPFV, LLC owned a warehouse with a faulty sewer pipe. After experiencing toilet backups, LCPFV hired Rapid Plumbing to fix the issue for $47,883.40. Rapid's work was unsatisfactory, leading LCPFV to hire another plumber for $44,077 to correct the problem. LCPFV sued Rapid Plumbing, which initially appeared in court but later defaulted. LCPFV sought a default judgment of $1,081,263.80, including attorney fees and punitive damages. The trial court awarded a default judgment of $120,319.22, significantly less than LCPFV's demand, and also awarded $11,852.90 in sanctions.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, presided over by Judge Mark V. Mooney, reviewed the case. The court scrutinized LCPFV's default judgment package and found the requested amount excessive. The court emphasized its role as a gatekeeper in default judgment cases, ensuring that only appropriate claims are granted. The court rejected LCPFV's use of requests for admissions obtained after Rapid Plumbing had ceased participating in the case, citing a lack of candor and evidentiary value.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's judgment, agreeing that the trial court acted within its discretion in rejecting the inflated default judgment request. The appellate court upheld the trial court's decision to award $120,319.22, including $91,960.40 for breach of contract and $4,948.46 in attorney fees, rejecting the fraud and punitive damages claims. The court also affirmed the sanctions award and the decision to grant prejudgment interest from the date of the lawsuit filing, not from the date of payment to Rapid Plumbing. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's rulings and emphasized the importance of judicial vigilance in default judgment cases. View "LCPFV v. Somatdary" on Justia Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law