Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery.

Plaintiff brought a class action against the Bank, alleging that the Bank breached its contract by charging interest in excess of the rate specified in the promissory note. The court affirmed the district court's grant of the Bank's motion to dismiss where the district court correctly concluded that the relevant provisions were clear, did not conflict with one another, and adequately disclosed the interest to be charged.

American Suzuki Motor Corporation petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the circuit court to grant its motion to dismiss the claims filed against it by John Burns and Jill S. Hearn. Plaintiffs sued Defendants American Suzuki, several local dealerships and the dealerships' owner, alleging breach of contract based on Suzuki vehicle warranties, diminution in value of their vehicles, fraudulent misrepresentations, and unjust enrichment. Plaintiffs purported to bring the action on behalf of themselves and all members of a class composed of individuals who had purchased Suzuki vehicles from Defendants and had active warranties or service contracts on those vehicles. According to the complaint, new Suzuki vehicles carried a manufacturer's warranty, and that Defendants also sold purchasers of Suzuki vehicles extended warranties and maintenance agreements. In early March 2009, "the defendants closed dealerships ⦠and [that] there are no other Suzuki dealerships closer than Nashville, Tennessee, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, or Birmingham, Alabama, to perform service work on the warranted vehicles." As a result of the dealerships being closed, Plaintiffs alleged they were "constructively barred from obtaining warranty work on their vehicles." The complaint did not allege that Plaintiffs needed or sought service under the warranties on their vehicles or that any of the Defendants refused to honor the warranties on vehicles. American Suzuki filed a motion to dismiss alleging that Plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of American Suzuki's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case to the trial court to enter an order granting American Suzuki's motion.

Plaintiffs, individual homeowners, sued defendants, some of the nation's largest housing developers, seeking damages, attorneys fees and costs, and the option to rescind their home purchases due to defendants' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of California law. At issue was whether plaintiffs, who purchased homes in new developments, had standing to sue defendants for injuries allegedly caused by defendants' practice of marketing neighboring homes to individuals who presented a high risk of foreclosure and abandonment of their homes, financing those high-risk buyers, concealing that information, and misrepresenting the character of the neighborhoods. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' overpayment and rescission claims for lack of Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs' decreased economic value and desirability were cognizable injuries. While the court agreed with the district court that, on the current record, plaintiffs have not established a sufficient causal connection between any decreased value and desirability and defendants' actions, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Frederick and Mandelena Harmon bought a home pursuant to a buy-sell agreement that realtor Dianne Burright, a licensed real estate salesperson who worked for Fiscus Realty, prepared at the Fiscus Realty office. The home was built by Dianne's husband, Jerry. The Harmons subsequently discovered numerous construction problems. The Harmons sued Defendants Jerry and Dianne Burright and Fiscus Reality, raising several causing of action, including a claim under the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (the Act). A jury returned a verdict against the Burrights on breach of warranty and negligent misrepresentation claims and held for Defendants on all other claims. After trial, Defendants filed motions for attorney fees as prevailing parties under the Act, which the district court denied. Fiscus Realty appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to Fiscus Realty as the Harmons' claims had a basis in fact and law and were not frivolous, unreasonable or unfounded.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Dealership and Porsche when the pre-owned car that she purchased from the Dealership developed serious mechanical problems during the warranty period and the Dealership refused to honor her warranty claims. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., and breach of contract and unconscionability under California law. The district court granted the Dealership's petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in the sales contract that plaintiff signed when she bought the car and stayed the action against Porsche. Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal was that the MMWA barred the provision mandating pre-dispute binding arbitration of her warranty claims against the Dealership. Although the text of the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration, Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority under the statue to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC construed the MMWA as barring pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements and issued a rule prohibiting judicial enforcement of such provisions with respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA. Because it was required to defer to the reasonable construction of a statute by the agency that Congress had authorized to interpret it, the court held that the MMWA precluded enforcement of pre-dispute agreements such as Porsche's that required mandatory binding arbitration of consumer warranty claims. The court declined to address plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against Toyota when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. The district court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff did not, before filing suit in civil court, pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP) that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her failure to initially resort to the CDSP provided Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but did not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the prerequisite in section 2310(a) of the MMWA that a "consumer may not commence a civil action... unless he initially resorts to [an informal dispute settlement procedure]" was merely a codification of the MMWA's exhaustion requirement and did not operate as a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded so that the district court could consider how to proceed with the instant action, including the failure-to-exhaust issues.

Several purchasers of condominium units sued developer Harborage Cottages-Stuart, LLLP (Harborage), alleging that Harborage violated the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act (ILSFDA), 15 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., and several Florida statutes. Central to this appeal was whether Harborage violated section 1703(a)(1)(B) by failing to provide the purchasers with a property report prior to their signing the purchase agreements. The court held that Harborage failed to prove that it was entitled to an exemption from the ILFSDA and its admitted failure to provide the report violated the ILFSDA. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on their claim under section 1703(a)(1)(B) and (C). The court also affirmed the district court's award of damages and attorney's fees under section 1709; affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Gentry-Hunt on the claim that Harborage violated Fla. Stat. 718.506 and vacated the judgment in favor of the Stones on the section 718.506 claim; and vacated the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs on the claim that Harborage violated the anti-fraud provision of the ILSFDA and the claim asserted under Fla. Stat. 501.204(1).

Plaintiffs brought an action against defendant, seeking a refund of two cruise tickets they purchased and cancelled, and damages under G.L.c. 93A for unfair and deceptive trade practices. The court concluded that the evidence at trial plainly established that defendant violated the Attorney General's travel service regulations in two respects: fist, it failed to disclose the refund policy; and second, having violated the disclosure statement, it failed to refund the payments made by a cancelling customer within thirty days. These violations qualified as unfair or deceptive acts, and they caused plaintiffs a loss: the lack of a prompt refund of the ticket price. The court also concluded that plaintiffs' demand letter satisfied the requirements of G.L.c. 93A, section 9(3). The purposes of the demand letter were sufficiently fulfilled where it constituted fair notice of the claim and enabled defendant to make a reasonable tender of settlement. Accordingly, the judgment for defendant on plaintiffs' claims was reversed and the case remanded for the entry of judgment for plaintiffs and for determination of their damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs.

This case originated with a misunderstanding regarding a $645 charge on the credit card bill of appellant. Chase Bank misidentified the basis for the charge but failed to respond to appellant's requests for information about it. After unsuccessfully attempting to get response from Chase Bank, appellant and his wife filed this action, alleging, inter alia, claims under the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), 15 U.S.C. 1666-1666j and Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act (UDCPA), Or. Rev. Stat. 646.639-643. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that appellant failed to state a claim under the UDCPA. The court declined to certify appellant's proposed question to the Oregon Supreme Court regarding this claim because existing state precedent guided the court's decision. As to the FCBA claims, the trial court erred in requiring evidence of detrimental reliance to support actual damages and in limiting statutory damages for Chase Bank's multiple violations of the FCBA to a single recovery. Finally, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying any award of attorneys' fees related to appellant's successful claim under the FCBA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.