Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Trump Tower Chicago is a 92-story building with 486 residential condominium units, 339 hotel condominium units, retail space, a health club, ballrooms, meeting rooms, restaurants, a hair salon, and other facilities. When the owner of a hotel condominium unit is not occupying the unit, building management can rent it to a visitor; rental income is divided with the owner’s share credited against his annual maintenance fee. Plaintiff, an 80-year-old CPA and financial planner, agreed to buy two hotel condominium units in 2006 for $2.2 million. She bought them as an investment and already owned other investment condominium units, including a residential unit in Trump Tower Chicago. The agreement gave TrumpOrg “the right, in its sole and absolute discretion, to modify the Condominium Documents.” Plaintiff asked TrumpOrg to give her the right to terminate the agreement and get her deposit back if she disapproved of any such changes. TrumpOrg refused. Plaintiff signed the agreement, even though TrumpOrg had already made three changes. The next year, TrumpOrg made changes that greatly curtailed owners’ rights in the hotel facilities. Plaintiff refused to close. TrumpOrg did not seek to compel her to close, but did not return her down payment, $516,000 and canceled the purchase agreement. Plaintiff sought damages under the common law of contracts, the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, the Condominium Property Act, and Illinois Securities Law. The district court ruled in favor of the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. View "Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash Venture, L.L.C., " on Justia Law

After Plaintiff purchased a used yacht, the yacht’s starboard engine failed beyond repair. Plaintiff sued Defendant-manufacturer, alleging several causes of action, including breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. The jury found Defendant liable only on the implied warranty claim. The trial court granted Defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiff was a subsequent purchaser of the used yacht and because Defendant disclaimed any implied warranty at the time of the first sale. The court of appeals reversed, holding that someone who knowingly buys used goods may still rely on an implied warranty from the manufacturer to the original buyer since the warranty passes with the goods. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant could not rely on its purported express disclaimer of implied warranties issued at the first sale because it did not properly raise that defense in the trial court; (2) an implied warranty of merchantability, unless properly disclaimed, passes to subsequent buyers; and (3) therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to recover on his implied-warranty claim. View "MAN Engines & Components, Inc. v. Shows" on Justia Law

Richard Feingold’s mother purchased a life insurance policy from an Insurer listing her husband as the only beneficiary. Feingold's mother died in 2006. In 2012, Richard informed Insurer of his mother's death. The Insurer issued Feingold a check for death benefits but did not provide a copy of his mother's life insurance policy. Feingold filed a class action complaint against Insurer in 2013, alleging that the Insurer owed Feingold and the putative class of similarly situated beneficiaries damages based on the Insurer’s handling of unclaimed benefits under its life insurance policies. Specifically, Feingold claimed that the Insurer had an obligation, arising from a regulatory agreement (“Agreement”) between the Insurer and several states, to discover the death of its insureds and notify beneficiaries. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, noting that the Agreement was a contract only between Insurer and participating states. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that because Feingold was neither a party nor a third-party beneficiary of the Agreement, he had no authority to enforce the terms of the Agreement. View "Feingold v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellee, which manufactures and distributes specialized products for use in the defense, security, and aerospace industries, entered into a consultant agreement with Appellant, under which Appellant agreed to identify buyers for Appellee’s products. Three years later, Appellee acquired the rights to manufacture and sell RH1280B field-programmable gate array (“FPGA”)s, which are semiconductor integrated circuits that are used in satellites and other space equipment. Operating under the terms of the consultant agreement, Appellant found customers for RH1280B FPGAs, accepted delivery of the PFGAs, and resold the goods to its customers. Before Appellant accepted delivery, however, Appellee warned it that the RH1280Bs failed to meet certain specifications. Appellant subsequently refused to pay an outstanding balance of $1,800,000, alleging that Appellee breached its express warranty regarding the performance characteristics of the RH1280B. Thereafter, Appellee terminated the consultant agreement. The district court granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in Appellee’s favor. View "BAE Sys. Info. & Elec. Sys. Integration, Inc. v. SpaceKey Components, Inc." on Justia Law

AllianceOne Receivables Management Inc. instituted a collections action against William Carl Lewis Jr. and then voluntarily dismissed it. Lewis claimed he was entitled to attorney fees as the "prevailing party" under RCW 4.84.250 and .270 since under RCW 4.84.270 a defendant is a prevailing party when the plaintiff "recovers nothing." The district court denied Lewis' fee request, holding that there is no prevailing party for the purposes of an award of attorney fees when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the action. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "AllianceOne Receivables Mgmt., Inc. v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Abraham and Betty Jean Morrow filed a request for a modification of their home loan, serviced by Bank of America, through the federal Home Affordable Modification Program. Bank of America denied the modification and scheduled a trustee’s sale of the property. The Morrows subsequently filed a complaint against Bank of America based on the bank’s alleged breach of an oral contract for modification of their loan. The district court granted summary judgment to Bank of America, concluding (1) the Morrows’ claims for breach of contract, fraud, and violation of the Montana Consumer Protection Act (MCPA) were barred by the Statute of Frauds; and (2) the Morrows could not succeed on their claims of negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and tortious breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing because Bank of America owed no duty to the Morrows. The Supreme Court reversed as to the negligence, negligent misrepresentation, fraud, and violations of MCPA claims, holding that Bank of America owed a duty to the Morrows, genuine issues of material fact existed as to some claims, and the Statute of Frauds did not preclude the remainder of the Morrows’ claims. View "Morrow v. Bank of Am., N.A." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court started from an agreement between Respondents, the University of South Carolina and the University Gamecock Club, and Appellant George M. Lee, III. In exchange for Appellant purchasing a $100,000 life insurance policy and naming the University the sole, irrevocable beneficiary of the policy, Appellant was given the "opportunity to purchase tickets" for his lifetime to University football and basketball games. Years later, the University instituted a program that required all Gamecock Club members, including Appellant, to pay a seat license fee as a prerequisite for purchasing season tickets. Believing that the University could not require him to pay additional consideration for the opportunity to purchase tickets without violating the agreement, Appellant brought a declaratory judgment action. The trial court entered judgment for the University and the Gamecock Club, finding that Appellant was not deprived of the opportunity to purchase season tickets when the University instituted the seat license fees. The Supreme Court reversed: the Agreement unambiguously prohibited the University from requiring Lee to pay the seat license fee as a prerequisite for the opportunity to purchase tickets pursuant to the Agreement. View "Lee v. University of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Medical Recovery Services, LLC (MRS), a licensed collection agency, appeals from the district court’s order affirming default judgments entered by the magistrate court. Each Respondent’s account indebtedness was assigned to MRS. MRS filed suit to recover payment from each Respondent and also sought $350 in attorney fees from each, based on a contractual provision. None of the Respondents answered the complaints filed by MRS, so MRS filed for default judgments to be entered in each case. The magistrate court entered default judgments as to all Respondents but granted attorney fees in amounts less than the $350 that MRS was requesting under the contracts. MRS asserted that the magistrate erred in awarding attorney fees in the amount of the principal owed by the Respondents for medical services, as opposed to $350, which was the minimum amount that each Respondent contracted to pay. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. View "Medical Recovery Services v. Strawn" on Justia Law

In anticipation of the opening of the University of South Carolina's new basketball arena, the University of South Carolina and the University of South Carolina Gamecock Club distributed a brochure to high-level Gamecock Club members. The brochure offered the opportunity to purchase premium seating including a number of amenities for basketball games and other events held at the arena. The brochure offered members the opportunity to purchase these tickets over a "five year term." Members were to pay $5,000 per seat in the first year and $1,500 per seat each year in years two through five. Appellants claimed that Athletic Department employees promised Appellants that, after year five, they would only have to maintain their Gamecock Club membership and pay the face value of season tickets to retain these premium seats. Appellants accepted the University's offer and made the required payments for years one through five. After the fifth year, the University contacted Appellants and requested a $1,500 payment per seat for the sixth year of premium seating. Appellants brought an action against the University alleging breach of contract and seeking specific performance. After discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The trial judge denied Appellants' motion and granted the University's motion, finding that due to the absence of a written contract the statute of frauds barred Appellants' claims. The Supreme Court concluded the statute of frauds applied in the first instance, but that a question of fact existed concerning the question of equitable estoppel, rendering summary judgment inappropriate. View "Springob v. University of South Carolina " on Justia Law

When Frances O'Neill arranged for her mother, Elise Hopkins, to become a resident of Manahawkin Convalescent Center, she decided to pay Manahawkin's bills from Hopkins' Social Security benefits, rather than arranging for those benefits to be directly paid to the facility. When her mother was admitted to the nursing home, O'Neill signed a "Rehabilitation and Nursing Home Admission Agreement" which designated O'Neill as the "Responsible Party" for purposes of processing her mother's bills, and set forth remedies in case of a default of that obligation. Following Hopkins' death, Manahawkin demanded in writing that O'Neill pay a balance due on her mother's account. It ultimately filed a collection action against her. In a counterclaim, O'Neill asserted various causes of action, including claims based on the Nursing Home Act (NHA), the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty, and Notice Act (TCCWNA). After the parties stipulated to the dismissal of the collection action, O'Neill reasserted her NHA, CFA and TCCWNA claims and sought class certification, which the trial court denied. The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing O'Neill's claims and construing the Admission Agreement to impose no obligation on O'Neill to devote her personal funds to her mother's care. The trial court therefore deemed the Admission Agreement to conform to the NHA, and dismissed O'Neill's remaining claims. The Appellate Division affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the Admission Agreement met the requirements of the NHA, and that Manahawkin accordingly committed no unlawful act within the meaning of the CFA. Because Manahawkin's Admission Agreement imposed no requirements on O'Neill that contravened the NHA, and neither the Admission Agreement nor Manahawkin's collection complaint gave rise to a cause of action under the CFA or the TCCWNA, dismissal of O'Neill's claims was proper. "However, nursing homes and their counsel should ensure that each party's rights and remedies are clearly reflected in contracts and communications between facilities and individuals who arrange payment on a resident's behalf." View "Manahawkin Convalescent v. O'Neill" on Justia Law