Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellee, Peter Rosenow, brought a class-action complaint individually and on behalf of similarly situated persons against Appellants, Alltel Corporation and Alltel Communications, Inc. (collectively, Alltel), alleging violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act and unjust enrichment arising from Alltel’s imposition of an early termination fee on its cellular-phone customers. Alltel filed a motion seeking to compel arbitration based on an arbitration clause contained in its “Terms and Conditions.” The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Alltel’s arbitration provision lacked mutuality. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in finding that a lack of mutuality rendered the instant arbitration agreement invalid.View "Alltel Corp. v. Rosenow" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, appellants, and cross-respondents were consumers who purchased vehicles from defendant, respondent, and cross-appellant Raceway Ford. Plaintiffs raised numerous causes of action based on laws proscribing certain acts against consumers, unfair competition, and deceptive business practices, bringing both individual claims and claims on behalf of two certified classes. After a bench trial, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Raceway and against plaintiffs on all causes, except that a single plaintiff was granted rescission on a single cause of action. Separately, the trial court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to Raceway. In consolidated appeals, plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s judgment on the merits (case No. E054517) and fee order (case No. E056595); Raceway cross-appealed regarding one aspect of the trial court’s fee order. In their appeal, plaintiffs specifically argued that, as a matter of law, Raceway’s previous practice of “backdating” second or subsequent contracts for sale of a vehicle to the original date of sale violated the Automobile Sales Finance Act (also known as the Rees-Levering Motor Vehicle Sales and Finance Act (ASFA)), the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Unfair Competition Law (UCL). The Court of Appeal agreed that the practice of backdating could have resulted in inaccurate disclosures to class members, thereby violating the ASFA, at least in some cases. On the record, however, the Court declined to order entry of judgment in favor of the plaintiff class, rather reversed the trial court’s judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to plaintiffs’ backdating claims. Plaintiffs also appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims of a second certified class, consisting of Raceway customers who purchased used diesel vehicles from Raceway and who were charged fees for smog checks and smog certifications that were only properly applicable to purchases of gasoline vehicles. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment with respect to plaintiffs’ smog fee claims. Additionally, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway on certain individual plaintiffs’ claims that Raceway violated the ASFA by failing to provide them with copies of their credit applications. The Court found plaintiffs’ evidence in support of these claims was insufficient to overturn the trial court's decision, so that ruling was also affirmed. Lastly, plaintiffs appealed the judgment in favor of Raceway with respect to claims under the UCL and the CLRA brought by plaintiff Francisco Salcedo in his individual capacity. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Salcedo on his claim of fraud, and granted him the remedy of rescission, though it declined to award any punitive damages. Plaintiffs contended that the judgment in Mr. Salcedo’s favor on his fraud claim established as a matter of law that he should also have judgment entered in his favor on his UCL and CLRA claims. The Court of Appeal agreed, and reversed. The basis for the trial court’s award of fees to Raceway was, in part, undermined by the Court's partial reversal of the judgment. The case was therefore remanded with respect to Raceway's claims in light of remand on other issues. View "Raceway Ford Cases" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the New Jersey Supreme Court's review centered on an agreement for the sale of a residential property and a subsequent lease and repurchase agreement, specifically whether the transactions collectively gave rise to an equitable mortgage, violated consumer protection statutes, or contravened its decision in "In re Opinion No. 26 of the Committee on the Unauthorized Practice of Law," (139 N.J. 323 (1995)). In 2007, defendant Barbara Felton faced foreclosure proceedings with respect to her unfinished, uninhabitable home and the land on which it was situated. Felton and plaintiff Tahir Zaman, a licensed real estate agent, entered into a written contract for the sale of the property. A week later, at a closing in which neither party was represented by counsel, Felton and Zaman entered into two separate agreements: a lease agreement under which Felton became the lessee of the property, and an agreement that gave her the option to repurchase the property from Zaman at a substantially higher price than the price for which she sold it. For more than a year, Felton remained on the property, paying no rent. She did not exercise her right to repurchase. Zaman filed suit, claiming that he was the purchaser in an enforceable land sale agreement, and that he therefore was entitled to exclusive possession of the property and to damages. Felton asserted numerous counterclaims, alleging fraud, slander of title, violations of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), and violations of other federal and state consumer protection statutes. She claimed that the parties’ transactions collectively comprised an equitable mortgage and constituted a foreclosure scam, entitling her to relief under several theories. She further contended that the transactions were voidable by virtue of an alleged violation of "In re Opinion No. 26." A jury rendered a verdict in Zaman’s favor with respect to the question of whether Felton knowingly sold her property to him. The trial court subsequently conducted a bench trial and rejected Felton’s remaining claims, including her contention that the transactions gave rise to an equitable mortgage and her allegation premised upon In re Opinion No. 26. An Appellate Division panel affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the Appellate Division’s determination. The Court affirmed the jury’s determination that Felton knowingly sold her property to Zaman. Furthermore, the Court affirmed the trial court and Appellate Division's decisions that Felton had no claim under the CFA, that this case did not implicate "In re Opinion No. 26," and that Felton’s remaining claims were properly dismissed. The Court reversed, however, the portion of the Appellate Division’s opinion that affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of Felton’s claim that the parties’ agreements constituted a single transaction that gave rise to an equitable mortgage, adopting an eight-factor standard for the determination of an equitable mortgage set forth by the United States Bankruptcy Court in "O’Brien v. Cleveland," (423 B.R. 477 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2010)). The case was remanded to the trial court for application of that standard to this case, and, in the event that the trial court concludes that an equitable mortgage was created by the parties, for the adjudication of two of Felton’s statutory claims based on alleged violations of consumer lending laws, as well as several other claims not adjudicated by the trial court. View "Zaman v. Felton" on Justia Law

Lillian Lewellen brought an action against Chad Franklin National Auto Sales North, LLC (National) and its owner, Chad Franklin, for fraudulent misrepresentation and unlawful merchandising practices under the Missouri Merchandising Practice Act. A jury awarded Lewellen actual damages of $25,000, assessed jointly and severally against both defendants. The jury also awarded Lewellen $1 million in punitive damages against Franklin and National on both counts. Pursuant to Mo. Rev. Stat. 510.265, the circuit court reduced the punitive damages awards against Franklin and National to $500,000 and $539,050, respectively. Lewellen appealed her punitive damages award, claiming that her constitutional right to trial by jury was violated when the trial court reduced the punitive damages award on her fraudulent misrepresentation claim against Franklin. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in all respects except for the portion applying section 510.265 to the punitive damages award assessed against Franklin for fraudulent misrepresentation, holding that the mandatory reduction of Lewellen’s punitive damages award against Franklin under section 510.265 violated Lewellen’s right to a trial by jury. View "Lewellen v. Franklin" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiffs Sylvia and Stanley Stroup sued defendants Peter Doran and Peter Doran Landscape Design, LLC for breach of contract, fraud, and consumer fraud after defendants failed to perform landscaping for plaintiffs. Plaintiffs obtained a judgment against defendants. Defendants failed to pay the judgment. Plaintiffs obtained a writ of execution, and the court approved plaintiffs’ motion for trustee process to attach funds owned by defendants and held by Brattleboro Savings and Loan Association (BSL). BSL disclosed to plaintiffs that it held a balance of $2,853.05 in a checking account titled in the name of one of the defendants. A few days later, the parties stipulated that BSL would release $750 to plaintiffs, and that BSL would then be discharged as a trustee and defendant’s account would be free of any lien or charge benefitting plaintiffs. Defendants further agreed to pay $3,500 to plaintiffs before January 31, 2008. BSL paid plaintiffs $750. Plaintiffs claim that defendants never paid the remainder of their debt. In 2013, plaintiffs served BSL with another trustee summons. BSL did not reply within thirty days, and on August 27 plaintiffs moved for default against BSL and entry of judgment against it as trustee for $24,155.12, the balance due under the judgment. The court ordered the clerk to schedule a hearing on plaintiffs’ motion, and directed that a copy of plaintiffs’ motion and the notice of hearing be served on BSL. On September 16, BSL filed a trustee disclosure indicating that it did not have any of defendants’ property in its possession. The court subsequently entered an order denying plaintiffs’ motion for default judgment against BSL. The court stated that “[a]lthough Trustee failed to make a timely disclosure, its disclosure now made in response to Plaintiff[s’] motion for default shows that it holds no assets for the benefit of Defendant[s]. Default judgment under these circumstances would be inequitable.” Plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in denying their motion for default because applicable Vermont law makes default mandatory when a trustee fails to serve a disclosure within thirty days. Plaintiffs did not contest the information contained in the trustee’s disclosure form or request an evidentiary hearing below. See V.R.C.P. 4.2(g) (stating that party who intends to contest information contained in trustee’s disclosure is entitled to evidentiary hearing upon written request). Nor do they contest the information on appeal. Their sole argument before this Court is that default was mandatory under 12 V.S.A. § 3062 and V.R.C.P. 4.2(f). Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stroup v. Doran" on Justia Law

In February, 2006, Konstantinos Koumboulis shot and killed his wife and himself inside his house. The murder/suicide was highly publicized in the local media and on the internet. The Jaconos purchased the property from the Koumboulis estate at auction in September, 2006, for $450,000. After investing thousands in renovations, the Jaconos listed the property for sale in June, 2007. They informed Re/Max, their listing agents, of the murder/suicide. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court for review was whether the occurrence of a murder/suicide inside a house constituted a material defect of the property, such that appellees' failure to disclose the same to the buyer of the house constituted fraud, negligent misrepresentation, or a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law's (UTPCPL). The Court concluded a murder/suicide does not constitute an actionable material defect. View "Milliken v. Jacono" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Richard Salzer received medical care at an SSM Healthcare of Oklahoma (SSM) facility for injuries he sustained in an accident. At the time of his treatment, he had a health insurance plan (the "Plan"). Salzer entered into a contract with SSM to receive its services (the "Hospital Services Agreement"), under which he "authorized disclosure of [his] medical information for billing purposes and authorized [his] health insurance company to pay." SSM had an existing contract with Salzer's health insurance company (the "Provider Agreement") which required SSM to submit covered medical charges to Salzer's insurance company and accept discounted payment from the insurer. Although the Provider Agreement prohibited SSM from seeking payment for a covered charge from Salzer, SSM sought the non-discounted amount directly from him. Salzer sued SSM alleging breach of contract and other state law claims based on SSM's attempt to collect payment for medical care from Salzer instead of his health insurance company. SSM removed the case to federal district court. Salzer challenged the district court's denial of his motion to remand based on its determination that his claims were completely preempted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court. View "Salzer v. SSM Health Care of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of her complaint alleging that defendants fraudulently procured a mortgage on her home, and thereafter sought to foreclose on that mortgage, in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), 15 U.S.C. 1691 et seq., the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq., the New York General Business Law, N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law 349, and common law. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment on the issues of liability and granted the motions of defendants for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, ruling that, because plaintiff failed to disclose these claims in a 2006 proceeding under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, her present suit was barred for lack of standing or by collateral estoppel. The court considered all of the parties' arguments and, except to the extent indicated, have found them to be without merit. The court affirmed the judgment in regards to the denial of plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment in her favor and the grant of defendants' motions for summary judgment dismissing her claims under RICO, ECOA, New York Business Law 349, and for negligent misrepresentation. The court vacated so much of the judgment as dismissed plaintiff's claims for violation of TILA and for common-law fraud, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Crawford v. Franklin Credit Management Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action suit alleging that CUT violated the Missouri Uniform Code (Mo UCC) and Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA) by participating in a subprime motor vehicle lending program administered by now-bankrupt Centrix. The court concluded that plaintiffs' MO UCC claims were time-barred whether they were subject to the five-year statute of limitations in section 516.120(2) or the three-year statute of limitations in section 516.130(2); the court denied plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record and to take judicial notice of various Missouri legislative materials related to Mo. Rev. Stat. 516.420; the five year statute of limitations in section 516.120(2) applies in this case because plaintiffs' MMPA claims are actions based upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty; even if section 516.120(5) applied to plaintiffs' MMPA claims, they are still time-barred because the causes of action accrued no later than March 2005 under either section 516.120(2) or 516.120(5). Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment that the claims were time-barred. View "Huffman, et al. v. Credit Union of Texas" on Justia Law

The Louisiana Supreme Court granted this writ application to determine whether a plaintiff had a private right of action for damages against a health care provider under the Health Care and Consumer Billing and Disclosure Protection Act. Plaintiff Yana Anderson alleged that she was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. She received medical treatment at an Ochsner facility. Anderson was insured by UnitedHealthcare. Pursuant to her insurance contract, Anderson paid premiums to UnitedHealthcare in exchange for discounted health care rates. These reduced rates were available pursuant to a member provider agreement, wherein UnitedHealthcare contracted with Ochsner to secure discounted charges for its insureds. Anderson presented proof of insurance to Ochsner in order for her claims to be submitted to UnitedHealthcare for payment on the agreed upon reduced rate. However, Ochsner refused to file a claim with her insurer. Instead, Ochsner sent a letter to Anderson’s attorney, asserting a medical lien for the full amount of undiscounted charges on any tort recovery Anderson received for the underlying automobile accident. Anderson filed a putative class action against Ochsner, seeking, among other things, damages arising from Ochsner’s billing practices. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the legislature intended to allow a private right of action under the statute. Additionally, the Court found an express right of action was available under La. R.S. 22:1874(B) based on the assertion of a medical lien. View "Anderson v. Ochsner Health System" on Justia Law