Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed this putative class action against Defendants - Nisource Corporate Services Company and AGL Resources, Inc. - alleging that Defendants engaged in deceptive business practices by disguising credit sales of hot water heaters as leases to avoid making the disclosures required under federal and Massachusetts’ consumer protection laws. Plaintiff alleged three disclosure violations: (1) a federal claim under the Truth in Lending Act; (2) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Retail Installment Sales and Services Act (RISSA) and (3) a state law claim under the Massachusetts Consumer Credit Cost Disclosure Act (CCCDA). The district court found that Plaintiff did not qualify for protection in light of the state-law standards governing these transactions and dismissed her suit. The First Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds, holding (1) Plaintiff’s federal claim under TILA is barred by the statute of limitations; and (2) as to the pendent state law claims, which were timely, the Court affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim. View "Philibotte v. Nisource Corp. Services Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a wood manufacturer, alleging that wood he bought for a fence at his home was not properly pressure-treated and that it prematurely rotted. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims under the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), Ala. Code 8-19-5(5), (7), and for breach of express warranty. The court held that where a conflict exists between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which authorizes class actions including for consumer claims of this kind, and the ADTPA, which creates a private right of action but forbids private class actions, Rule 23 controls. The court also concluded that Alabama law allows a consumer to recover for breach of an express warranty, even in the absence of privity, in some circumstances. In this case, the court held that the complaint adequately alleges the required circumstances and thus states an express warranty claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against MBCC, alleging claims arising from MBCC's failure to timely release a lien placed on her residence after she satisfied her underlying debt obligation. The district court granted summary judgment to MBCC and plaintiff appealed. The court rejected plaintiff's claims for breach of contract; slander of title; violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. 2601 et seq.; violation of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (VCPA), Va. Code 59.1-200; violation of Virginia Code 55-66.3; and declaratory judgment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. The court noted the substandard nature of MBCC’s conduct in releasing the lien on plaintiff’s home. While the various statutory barriers cited negate plaintiff’s claims, had she acted diligently she may have had viable claims at least as to breach of contract and Va. Code 55-66.3(B). Finally, the court stated that MBCC would be well served to review its business practices to forestall such claims in future cases. View "Poindexter v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp." on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased and financed an automobile from Respondent. Petitioners averred that Respondent failed properly to disclose the vehicle’s history. At issue in this case was the extent to which multiple documents executed on the same day during the course of the purchase and financing could be read together as constituting the entire agreement between the parties. The issue arose in the context of whether Petitioners’ claims against Respondent were subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in the Buyer’s Order, which set forth the purchase price. A Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC), which contained the financing terms of the purchase, did not include an agreement to arbitrate. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration, thus disagreeing with Petitioners that the language of the Buyer’s Order was superseded by the RISC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of the instant case, the Buyer’s Order may be construed together with the RISC as evincing the entire agreement between the parties. View "Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd." on Justia Law

Gladys Tellis, Sherry Bronson, Gwendolyn Moody, Nadine Ivy, and Uneeda Trammell (collectively, "the policyholders") initiated separate actions against American Bankers Insurance Company of Florida, asserting generally that American Bankers had sold them homeowner's insurance policies providing a level of coverage they could never receive, even in the event of a total loss involving the covered property. American Bankers moved the trial court hearing each action to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions it alleged were part of the subject policies; however, the trial courts denied those motions, and American Bankers appealed. The Supreme Court consolidated the five appeals for the purpose of writing one opinion, and reversed those orders denying the motions to compel arbitration. The Court based its decision on its holdings that the policyholders manifested their assent to the arbitration provision in their policies by continuing to renew the policies, that the sale of the policies affected interstate commerce, and that the arbitration provision in the policies was not unconscionable. View "American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Tellis" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against ISPC, alleging that ISPC violated the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1635, 1637, by failing to disclose examples of minimum payments and the maximum repayment period, as well as failing to properly delay performance to allow plaintiffs to rescind the contract. The court concluded that ISPC did not take the requisite interest in plaintiffs’ primary residence to trigger the TILA protections on which plaintiffs rely. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment. View "Lankhorst v. Indep. Savings Plan Co." on Justia Law

After Karrie Lynn Serrania went to Discovery Dental Group, PLLC (DDG) for a toothache, DDG referred her account to LPH, Inc., a debt collection agency. Serrania later sued LPH and DDC, alleging, among other claims, that LPH violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). LPH and DDG counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court (1) sanctioned Serrania’s attorney for failing to attend a pretrial conference, (2) entered summary judgment against Serrania on the contract and FDCPA claims, and (3) sanctioned Serrania and her attorney for their conduct in the course of litigation. After the district court entered judgment, Serrania underwent bankruptcy, and her dental debts and the district court’s orders were discharged. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part, holding (1) some of Serrania’s arguments on appeal are moot, but her appeal of the district court’s summary judgment order on her FDPCA claim is live, and her attorney has an interest in overturning the sanctions entered against him; (2) the district court correctly entered judgment to LPH on the FDCPA claim; and (3) the district court erred in ordering Serrania and her attorney jointly to pay $24,797 to DDG and $41,113 to LPH as sanctions. View "Serrania v. LPH, Inc." on Justia Law

Patron won 185 credits, or $1.85, while playing a penny slot machine at a Casino. However, at the same time, a message appeared on the screen stating, “Bonus Award - $41797550.16.” The Casino refused to pay the alleged bonus, claiming that the slot machine game malfunctioned, and therefore, the bonus award displayed on the screen was not valid. The Patron filed suit against the Casino, asserting breach of contract, estoppel, and consumer fraud. The district court granted summary judgment to the Casino on all three counts. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the rules of the game formed a contract between the Patron and the Casino, and the Patron was not entitled to the bonus under those rules; (2) the Patron failed to prove the necessary elements of either promissory or equitable estoppel; and (3) the Patron failed to present proof of an ascertainable loss sufficient to warrant recovery on her consumer fraud claim. View "McKee v. Isle of Capri Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

In this putative nationwide class action Plaintiffs claimed that they were deceived into purchasing Defendants’ “natural” cosmetics, which contained allegedly synthetic and artificial ingredients. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief and damages under the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, California’s unfair competition and false advertising laws, and common law theories of fraud and quasi-contract. The district court dismissed the quasi-contract cause of action for failure to state a claim and dismissed the state law claims under the primary jurisdiction doctrine so that the parties could seek expert guidance from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding (1) the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not expressly preempt California’s state law causes of action that create consumer remedies for false or misleading cosmetics labels; (2) although the district court properly invoked the primary jurisdiction doctrine, it erred by dismissing the case rather than staying proceedings while the parties sought guidance from the FDA; and (3) the district court erred in dismissing the quasi-contract cause of action as duplicative of or superfluous to Plaintiffs’ other claims. View "Astiana v. Hain Celestial Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant realtor who represented the seller in the sale of an inn. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in concluding that defendant's alleged misrepresentation and omission were immaterial as a matter of law. Defendant Barbara Walowit Realty, Inc. was the listing agent for the inn. The prior-prospective purchaser claims she told defendant during their conversation that she had witnessed flooding in the parking lot and had learned of "major problems with the roof and that there was a possibility of collapse." Based on statements made by defendant, and a report prepared by the seller with regard to the condition of the inn, plainitffs entered into a purchase-and-sale agreement with the seller in December 2007. The agreement contained an inspection contingency. At the recommendation of defendant, plaintiffs then hired engineers to perform a pre-purchase structural inspection of the property, and received an inspection report in late January 2008. The sale closed in May 2008. In September, after encountering various problems relating to the condition of the inn, plaintiffs sued defendant for negligence and consumer fraud for defendant's alleged misrepresentations and omissions concerning the condition of the inn. Plaintiffs and defendant filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On the claim of negligence, the trial court granted summary judgment to defendant. As to the claim of consumer fraud, the court considered, among other things, defendant's alleged failure to disclose the contents of her conversation with the prior-prospective purchaser and to disclose the estimate of roof repair costs that was in her files. The court concluded that the statements from the prior-prospective purchaser were "simply too vague and foundationless to give rise to knowledge of specific material facts that [defendant] would have a duty to disclose" under the Consumer Fraud Act. The court further concluded that defendant's failure to disclose the roof-repair estimate was not a material omission because plaintiffs "already knew the roof needed repairs" from the engineer's report, and disclosure "would have left them in the same position in which the report placed them; needing to make further inquiry." Thus, the court concluded that the estimate "cannot be considered material as a matter of law," and granted judgment to defendant. Plaintiffs appealed. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's decision with regard to the consumer protection claim, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. View "PH West Dover Property, LLC. v. Lalancette Engineers" on Justia Law