Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate
JHVS Group, LLC and its members, Jasanjot Singh and Harshana Kaur, purchased a 66.4-acre pistachio orchard from Shawn Slate and Dina Slate for approximately $2.6 million. The Slates agreed to carry a loan for $1,889,600, and JHVS made a $700,000 down payment. The agreement included provisions for interest payments and additional payments coinciding with expected crop payments. JHVS alleged that the Slates and their brokers, Randy Hayer and SVN Executive Commercial Advisors, misrepresented material facts about the property, including water rights and the value of the 2022 crop. JHVS claimed the actual value of the crop was significantly lower than represented, and they fell behind on payments, leading the Slates to record a notice of default.JHVS filed a lawsuit in the Superior Court of Madera County, raising seven causes of action, including breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, intentional fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, rescission based on fraud or mutual mistake, and injunctive relief to stop the foreclosure process. JHVS filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the foreclosure sale, arguing that the Slates and Hayer had lied about water restrictions and misrepresented the crop's value. The trial court granted the preliminary injunction after the defendants did not appear or file a response.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the trial court lacked fundamental jurisdiction over the Slates because they were never served with the summons and complaint. The appellate court determined that the trial court's order was void as to the Slates due to the lack of proper service and reversed the preliminary injunction order with respect to the Slates. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "JHVS Group, LLC v. Slate" on Justia Law
Goomai v. H&E Enterprise, L.L.C.
Niv Goomai and Bar Hajbi purchased a property in Cincinnati and contracted with H&E Enterprise, L.L.C., Ohad Investment Group, and Avi Ohad for renovations. The renovations were not completed, leading Goomai to sell the property. Goomai then sued the defendants for breach of contract, violation of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and fraudulent misrepresentation, seeking actual damages but not injunctive relief.A jury trial was held before a magistrate, where the jury found that H&E had breached its contract and awarded Goomai $30,604.09 in damages. The jury also found that H&E and Ohad had engaged in deceptive trade practices but awarded $0 in damages for this violation. The jury ruled in favor of the defendants on the fraudulent misrepresentation claim. Goomai subsequently filed a motion for attorney’s fees and costs, which the magistrate denied, reasoning that Goomai did not qualify as a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act since they did not obtain any relief on the merits of their claim. The trial court adopted the magistrate’s decision, and Goomai appealed.The First District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act is one who obtains a judgment in their favor, regardless of whether they received a remedy. The court remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney’s fees to which Goomai was entitled.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case and concluded that to be a prevailing party under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, a plaintiff must obtain actual damages or injunctive relief. Since Goomai did not receive any monetary damages or injunctive relief, they were not considered prevailing parties. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of the First District Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial court’s judgment denying attorney’s fees. View "Goomai v. H&E Enterprise, L.L.C." on Justia Law
Bluebird v. World Business Lenders
Bluebird Property Rentals, LLC, a Montana limited liability company, and its sole member, Alaina Garcia, received a $450,000 loan from World Business Lenders, LLC (WBL) and its subsidiaries in December 2020. The loan, secured by real property in Gallatin County, had an annual percentage rate of approximately 85% and required weekly payments. Bluebird signed several agreements, including a Business Promissory Note and Security Agreement, which listed Axos Bank as the lender, although Bluebird had no prior dealings with Axos. After falling behind on payments, Bluebird sold the collateral property in a distress sale and paid off the loan in October 2022, having paid a total of $945,990.39.Bluebird sued WBL, alleging that WBL engaged in a "rent-a-bank" scheme to evade Montana's usury laws, claiming that Axos Bank was merely a front and that WBL was the true lender. Bluebird sought a declaration that Montana law applied and sought double the interest paid above the maximum allowable rate under Montana law. WBL filed a motion to dismiss and compel arbitration based on the agreements' arbitration and choice-of-law provisions.The Eighteenth Judicial District Court denied WBL's motion, ruling that Montana law must be applied to determine the enforceability of the arbitration and choice-of-law provisions. The court treated WBL's motion as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and found that the validity of the arbitration clause was for the court to decide, not an arbitrator.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the District Court's decision, holding that the general rule that courts determine arbitrability was not overcome by the facts of this case. The court found no clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability, despite WBL's arguments regarding the incorporation of AAA rules. The court did not address the merits of the enforceability of the arbitration agreement or the choice-of-law provision. View "Bluebird v. World Business Lenders" on Justia Law
Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC
Shymikka Griggs filed a data-breach action against NHS Management, LLC, a consulting firm providing management services for nursing homes and physical-rehabilitation facilities. NHS collects sensitive personal and health information from employees, patients, and vendors. In May 2021, NHS discovered a cyberattack on its network, which lasted 80 days. NHS notified affected individuals, including Griggs, in March 2022. Griggs, a former NHS employee, claimed her personal information was found on the dark web, leading to credit issues, spam communications, and fraudulent activities.Griggs initially filed a class-action complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama but later dismissed it. She then filed a class-action complaint in the Jefferson Circuit Court in June 2023, alleging negligence, negligence per se, breach of contract, invasion of privacy, unjust enrichment, breach of confidence, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act. NHS moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed Griggs's complaint with prejudice.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The court held that Griggs failed to sufficiently plead her claims. Specifically, she did not demonstrate that NHS owed her a duty under Alabama law, failed to establish proximate cause for her negligence per se claim, did not allege intentional conduct for her invasion-of-privacy claim, and did not show that she conferred a benefit on NHS for her unjust-enrichment claim. Additionally, the court found that breach of confidence is not a recognized cause of action in Alabama and that Griggs did not establish a fiduciary relationship between her and NHS. View "Griggs v. NHS Management, LLC" on Justia Law
Pompey v. Bank of Stockton
In November 2014, the plaintiff purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from a dealership, with the defendant bank financing the purchase. The sales contract inaccurately reflected the downpayment as $19,100 in cash instead of $1,000 in cash and $18,100 in trade-in value. The plaintiff later discovered issues with the RV and filed a lawsuit in February 2017, alleging violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA) due to the incorrect downpayment disclosure.The Superior Court of Fresno County reviewed the case and concluded that the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied, rather than the one-year statute for statutory penalties. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff against the dealership for violating the ASFA, and the dealership's liability was extended to the bank under the Federal Trade Commission’s holder rule. The court entered judgment requiring the bank to accept the return of the RV and pay the plaintiff $42,263.64.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the rescission and restitution remedy under the ASFA is a penalty. The court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture applied. The court noted that the ASFA imposes strict liability without regard to actual damages or fault, and the legislative history indicated the remedy was intended as a penalty. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pompey v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law
Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC
The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for a new vehicle, which later exhibited multiple defects. Despite several repair attempts, the issues persisted. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking various forms of relief including replacement or restitution, damages, and attorney fees.The case proceeded to trial in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, where the jury found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff damages. However, the jury did not find the defendant’s violation to be willful, thus no civil penalties were awarded. Subsequently, both parties filed motions regarding costs and attorney fees. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, limiting the plaintiff to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and awarding the defendant post-offer costs based on a prior settlement offer under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed two main issues: whether a section 998 offer consisting of two simultaneous offers is valid, and whether an offer that promises to pay for statutory categories of damages with disputes resolved by a third party is sufficiently certain. The court concluded that simultaneous offers are generally invalid under section 998 due to the uncertainty they create for the trial court in determining whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer. However, since only one of the defendant’s two offers was invalid, the remaining valid offer was operative. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff was limited to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and the defendant was entitled to post-offer costs. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law
Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA
Debra Stevenson and Eugene Smith co-own a property for which Stevenson initially took out a loan from Wells Fargo. After defaulting, she refinanced with Fremont Investment & Loan, which paid off the Wells Fargo loan. Stevenson defaulted again and filed for bankruptcy. HSBC Bank, as Fremont's successor, sought to enforce its interest in the property through equitable subrogation, claiming the right to stand in Wells Fargo's position.In bankruptcy court, HSBC was found to be the holder of the note and entitled to equitable subrogation for the amount used to pay off the Wells Fargo loan. The federal district court adopted this decision, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that HSBC could enforce its interest despite Fremont's knowledge of Smith's co-ownership and refusal to sign the loan documents.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to HSBC. The court held that Stevenson and Smith were collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in federal court, including HSBC's standing and entitlement to equitable subrogation. The court also rejected their Truth in Lending Act (TILA) rescission argument, as it had been previously litigated and decided against them. The court affirmed the Superior Court's ruling, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that HSBC was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Stevenson v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law
Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc.
Kenneth and Janet Lathrop purchased a motorhome from a dealer in California, manufactured by Thor Motor Coach, Inc. They later sued the dealer and Thor under the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act and the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), alleging defects in the motorhome and failure to perform necessary repairs. Thor moved to stay the action based on a forum selection clause in its warranty, which designated Indiana as the exclusive forum for disputes and included a jury trial waiver and an Indiana choice-of-law clause. Thor acknowledged these provisions were unenforceable under California law and offered to stipulate that California substantive rights would apply in an Indiana court.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Thor’s motion to stay, finding the forum selection clause mandatory and not unreasonable. The court placed the burden on the Lathrops to show that enforcing the clause was unreasonable. The Lathrops appealed, arguing that the trial court applied the wrong standard and that Thor did not meet its burden to show that litigating in Indiana would not diminish their unwaivable rights under California law.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case and concluded that the trial court erred by placing the burden on the Lathrops instead of Thor. The appellate court held that Thor did not meet its burden to show that litigating in Indiana would not substantially diminish the Lathrops’ rights under the Song-Beverly Act and the CLRA. The court also found that enforcing the forum selection clause based on Thor’s proposed stipulation would violate California public policy and that the stipulation was insufficient to protect the Lathrops’ unwaivable statutory rights. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order granting the motion to stay and directed the trial court to deny the motion. View "Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, Inc." on Justia Law
Das v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited
Santanu Das, a sales associate at Tata Consultancy Services, participated in a compensation incentive plan that promised a bonus exceeding $400,000 for achieving certain sales targets. Das met the target but was paid less than $100,000. He sued Tata under Illinois law, which requires employers to pay all agreed-upon compensation. Tata argued that disclaimers in the incentive plan negated any agreement to pay the bonus. The district court dismissed Das’s complaint, leading to this appeal.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially dismissed Das’s claims without prejudice. Das amended his complaint, adding breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. The district court dismissed the repleaded claims with prejudice but allowed Das to replead the new claims. Das chose to appeal only the Wage Act and fraudulent misrepresentation claims. The district court found that the disclaimers in the incentive plan prevented the formation of an agreement to pay wages and that Das’s fraudulent misrepresentation claim lacked the necessary particularity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court found that Illinois law does not treat disclaimers as necessarily preventing the formation of mutual assent to terms. The court noted that past practices between Das and Tata could establish mutual assent. The court concluded that Das had plausibly alleged that Tata agreed to pay him the full bonus, reversing the district court’s dismissal of the Wage Act claim. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim, as Das failed to allege a scheme to defraud.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s decision on the Wage Act claim and remanded the case for further proceedings. The dismissal of the fraudulent misrepresentation claim was affirmed. View "Das v. Tata Consultancy Services Limited" on Justia Law
TERPIN V. AT&T MOBILITY LLC
Michael Terpin, a cryptocurrency investor, sued AT&T Mobility, LLC after hackers gained control over his phone number through a fraudulent "SIM swap," received password reset messages for his online accounts, and stole $24,000,000 of his cryptocurrency. Terpin alleged that AT&T failed to adequately secure his account, leading to the theft.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed some of Terpin's claims for failure to state a claim and later granted summary judgment against him on his remaining claims. The court dismissed Terpin's fraud claims and punitive damages claim, holding that he failed to allege that AT&T had a duty to disclose or made a promise with no intent to perform. The court also held that Terpin failed to allege facts sufficient to support punitive damages. On summary judgment, the court ruled that Terpin's negligence claims were barred by the economic loss rule, his breach of contract claim was barred by the limitation of liability clause in the parties' agreement, and his claim under Section 222 of the Federal Communications Act (FCA) failed because the SIM swap did not disclose any information protected under the Act.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Terpin's fraud claims and punitive damages claim, agreeing that Terpin failed to allege a duty to disclose or an intent not to perform. The court also affirmed the summary judgment on Terpin's breach of contract claim, holding that consequential damages were barred by the limitation of liability clause. The court affirmed the summary judgment on Terpin's negligence claims, finding them foreclosed by the economic loss rule. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the summary judgment on Terpin's claim under Section 222 of the FCA, holding that Terpin created a triable issue over whether the fraudulent SIM swap gave hackers access to information protected under the Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "TERPIN V. AT&T MOBILITY LLC" on Justia Law