Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Husband and wife paid $83,475 for a new Volvo T8, plus $2,700 for a charging station. Volvo’s advertisements claimed that the T8’s battery range was 25 miles. In practice their T8 averaged a eight-10 miles of battery‐only driving. Husband filed suit, asserting a class of others similarly situated under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and received a letter from Volvo that offered “a full refund upon return of the vehicle if you are not satisfied with it for any reason” and to “arrange to pick up your vehicle.” The next day Volvo moved to dismiss husband’s suit on the theory that he lacked standing because only his wife was on the car’s title. Before the court ruled on the motion, his wife was added to the complaint. Volvo moved to dismiss, contending that she lacked standing because its letter had offered complete relief before she filed suit. The district judge agreed and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, seeing “no reason why the timing of the offer has such a powerful effect. Offers do not bind recipients until they are accepted. An unaccepted pre‐litigation offer does not deprive a plaintiff of her day in court. View "Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

Gerboc used the Wish Marketplace website to buy portable speakers for $27. Sellers on Wish can include a Manufacturer’s Suggested Retail Price, which appears (crossed-out) on a product’s “detail page.” Gerboc saw “$300” next to the speakers’ purchase price. Gerboc believed the crossed-out price was a promise of a 90% markdown but the speakers allegedly never sold for $300. Gerboc decided that he never received the promised discount and filed suit on behalf of himself and a class of similarly situated buyers. Arguing that Wish’s price visuals are deceptive, he alleged breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, and violations of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (OCSPA). ContextLogic removed to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d). Gerboc abandoned his contract claim; the court dismissed his unjust enrichment, fraud, and class OCSPA claims. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Gerboc did not establish unjust enrichment; he got what he paid for. Nor did he establish the notice element of an OCSPA claim: The consumer must show either that the Ohio Attorney General had already “declared [the seller’s practice] to be deceptive or unconscionable” or that an Ohio court had already “determined [the practice] . . . violate[s] [the OCSPA]” before the seller engaged in it. View "Gerboc v. ContextLogic, Inc." on Justia Law

Daphne Automotive, LLC, and its employee, Robin Sanders appealed a circuit court order denying their motion to compel arbitration of the claims filed against them by Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc. ("Eastern Shore"), and Rassan Tarabein. Tarabein owned Eastern Shore and another company, Infotec, Inc. Tarabein hired his nephew, Mohamad Tarbin, as an employee of Infotec. As part of the nephew's compensation, Tarabein agreed to provide him with the use of a vehicle for as long as he was employed with Infotec. Accordingly, Tarabein purchased, through Eastern Shore, a vehicle from Daphne Automotive. Tarabein, the nephew, and the dealership agreed that the dealership would arrange for the vehicle to be titled in the nephew's name, but that Eastern Shore would be listed on the title as lienholder. In conjunction with the sale, the nephew signed the sales contract, which contained an arbitration clause. Tarabein executed only the documents to establish Eastern Shore as lienholder on the title for the vehicle. In January 2014, the Department of Revenue issued an original certificate of title for the vehicle that listed no lienholders to the nephew. A few months later, the nephew was terminated from his job with Infotec, and Tarabein attempted to take back the vehicle, but the nephew refused. According to Tarabein, the dealership never informed him that it had failed to list Eastern Shore as a lienholder on the application for the certificate of title. As a result, the nephew held title to the vehicle free and clear, and Eastern Shore held a reissued certificate of title for the same vehicle, listing it as lienholder. Eastern Short attempted to repossess the vehicle; the nephew avoided being arrested by producing the free-and-clear title to the vehicle. According to Tarabein, he became aware of the existence of the second certificate of title after the attempted arrest. Tarabein thereafter sued the dealership for a variety of claims; the dealer moved to compel arbitration. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded the dealership failed to meet its burden of proving the existence of a contract calling for arbitration: the sales contract was limited in its scope with respect to disputes arising to parties to the contract and the agreements, here, between the nephew and the dealership. Accordingly, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying the dealership’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Daphne Automotive, LLC v. Eastern Shore Neurology Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the condo owners association after the foreclosure sale of their condo unit, alleging common law claims for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as violations of the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), Texas Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (TFDCPA), and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA). The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on all claims, holding that regardless whether the district court abused its discretion, any evidentiary error the district court made was harmless. In this case, the issue whether the late fee increase was properly adopted by the Association was not dispositive of any claims, so it did not affect the outcome of the litigation and did not affect their substantial rights. The court also held that plaintiffs' could not maintain their suit for breaches of the Condominium Declaration when they have themselves been in default of the contract; there was no authority supporting plaintiffs' conclusion that an inaccurate balance included in a default notice constitutes a defect in the foreclosure proceedings; and plaintiffs failed to cite specific negligent misrepresentations by defendants. The court rejected plaintiffs' remaining claims. View "Mahmoud v. De Moss Owners Association, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint against Nordstrom, Inc. alleging that Nordstrom had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers and requesting that a court order Nordstrom to restore this money and enjoin Nordstrom from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. Plaintiff’s claims were based on her purchase of a cardigan sweater for $49.97 at a Nordstrom Rack outlet store in Boston, Massachusetts. The sweater’s price tag listed both the purchase price and a higher “Compare At” price of $218. Plaintiff claimed that the sweater was never sold for $218 but, rather, that Nordstrom uses the “Compare At” price tags to mislead consumers about the quality of its items. On appeal, Plaintiff challenged the dismissal of her Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A claim and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) because Plaintiff did not adequately allege that she suffered a legally cognizable injury, her Chapter 93A claims for damages and injunctive relief were both properly dismissed; and (2) the district court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s remaining claims. View "Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against Kohl’s Department Stores, Inc. alleging that the “comparison prices” on Kohl’s price tags were entirely fictional and selected to mislead consumers about the quality of the products sold by Kohl’s. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Kohl’s had improperly obtained money from her and other Massachusetts consumers in violation of Massachusetts statutory and common law. Plaintiff requested that a court order Kohl’s to restore this money and enjoin the store from continuing to violate Massachusetts law. The First Circuit (1) affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for damages and injunctive relief and her common law claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment for the reasons stated in Shaulis v. Nordstrom, Inc., No. 15-2354, slip op. at 5-32 (1st Cir. July 26, 2017), also decided today; and (2) affirmed the district court’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, holding that the district court did not err in denying the motion. View "Mulder v. Kohl's Department Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a putative class action against Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork, alleging that Kolbe sold them defective windows that leak and rot. Plaintiffs brought common-law and statutory claims for breach of express and implied warranties, negligent design and manufacturing of the windows, negligent or fraudulent misrepresentations as to the condition of the windows, and unjust enrichment. The district court granted partial summary judgment in Kolbe’s favor on a number of claims, excluded plaintiffs’ experts, denied class certification, and found that plaintiffs’ individual claims could not survive without expert support. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Plaintiffs forfeited their arguments with respect to their experts’ qualifications under “Daubert.” Individual plaintiffs failed to establish that Kolbe’s alleged misrepresentation somehow caused them loss, given that their builders only used Kolbe windows. Though internal emails, service-request forms, and photos of rotting or leaking windows may suggest problems with Kolbe windows, that evidence did not link the problems to an underlying design defect, as opposed to other, external factors such as construction flaws or climate issues. View "Haley v. Kolbe & Kolbe Millwork Co.," on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Lincoln, alleging violations of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for Lincoln, holding that plaintiff did introduce sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that he revoked his consent, but that the TCPA does not permit a consumer to revoke its consent to be called when that consent forms part of a bargained‐for exchange. In this case, plaintiff's consent was not provided gratuitously, it was included as an express provision of a contract to lease an automobile from Lincoln. View "Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services" on Justia Law

No fiduciary duty arises in a consumer transaction for the purchase of a whole life insurance policy based upon the advice of a financial advisor where the consumer purchasing the policy does not cede decision -making control over the purchase to the financial advisor. In 1995, Bryan Holland, a financial advisor for IDS Life Insurance Corporation, made an unsolicited telephone contact, a "cold call," to Eugene and Ruth Yenchi. At a subsequent meeting and for a fee of $350, Holland presented the Yenchis with a financial management proposal containing a notice that it had been prepared by "your American Express financial advisor" (Holland) and that "[alt your request, your American Express financial advisor can recommend products distributed by American Express Financial Advisors and its affiliates as investment alternatives for existing securities." The Proposal offered the Yenchis a number of general recommendations, including that they monitor monthly expenses, consolidate their debt, consider various savings plans, consolidate current life insurance policies into one policy, review long-term care coverage, keep accurate records for tax purposes (medical expenses and charitable contributions), transfer 401(k) funds into mutual funds, and continue estate planning with an attorney and their financial advisor. The Yenchis implemented some of these recommendations. In 2000, the Yenchis had their portfolio independently reviewed. Through this process, they were advised that Holland’s recommendations would be financially devastating to the Yenchis. In April 2001, the Yenchis sued Holland and his company, American Express Financial Services Corporation, American Express Financial Advisors Corporation, and IDS Life Insurance Company. The Yenchis' asserted claims of negligence/willful disregard, fraudulent misrepresentation, violation of the Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law ("UTPCPL"), bad faith, negligent supervision, and breach of fiduciary duty. Of relevance here, with respect to the breach of fiduciary duty claim, the trial court held that no fiduciary relationship was established between the Yenchis and Holland because the Yenchis continued to make their own investment decisions. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that, consistent with its jurisprudence, no fiduciary duty arose in such a situation. Consequently, the Court reversed the Superior Court's decision to the contrary. View "Yenchi v. Ameriprise Financial" on Justia Law

This case arose from an allegedly forged home-equity loan. Plaintiff sued the lenders, bringing several claims, including statutory fraud and violations of the Texas Finance Code and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The trial court granted summary judgment for the lenders without stating its reasons. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the court of appeals (1) properly affirmed summary judgment on Plaintiff’s constitutional forfeiture claim; and (2) erred in holding that Plaintiff’s remaining claims were barred on statute of limitations and waiver grounds. View "Kyle v. Strasburger" on Justia Law