Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The case involved two related companies and three individuals who operated a business targeting immigrants detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and eligible for release on immigration bonds. The companies marketed their services as an affordable way to secure release, but in reality, they charged high fees for services that were often misrepresented or not provided. The agreements were complex, mostly in English, and required significant upfront and recurring payments. Most consumers did not understand the terms and relied on the companies’ oral representations, which were deceptive. The business was not licensed as a bail bond agent or surety, and the defendants’ practices violated federal and state consumer protection laws.After the plaintiffs—the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia—filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, the defendants repeatedly failed to comply with discovery obligations and court orders. They did not produce required documents, ignored deadlines, and failed to appear at hearings. The district court, after multiple warnings and opportunities to comply, imposed default judgment as a sanction for this misconduct. The court also excluded the defendants’ late-disclosed witnesses and exhibits from the remedies hearing, finding the nondisclosures unjustified and prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decisions. The Fourth Circuit held that the default judgment was an appropriate sanction for the defendants’ repeated and willful noncompliance. The exclusion of evidence and witnesses was also upheld, as was the issuance of a permanent injunction and the calculation of monetary relief, including restitution and civil penalties totaling approximately $366.5 million. The court found no abuse of discretion or legal error in the district court’s rulings and affirmed the final judgment in all respects. View "Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Nexus Services, Inc." on Justia Law

A borrower in Rhode Island financed a home purchase with a mortgage from a national bank. The mortgage required the borrower to make advance payments for property taxes and insurance into an escrow account managed by the bank. The bank did not pay interest on these escrowed funds, despite a Rhode Island statute mandating that banks pay interest on such accounts. Years later, the borrower filed a class action lawsuit against the bank, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment for failing to pay the required interest under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the bank that the National Bank Act preempted the Rhode Island statute. The court reasoned that the state law imposed limits on the bank’s federal powers, specifically the power to establish escrow accounts, and thus significantly interfered with the bank’s incidental powers under federal law. The court did not address class certification or the merits of the unjust enrichment claim, focusing solely on preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., which clarified the standard for preemption under the National Bank Act. The First Circuit held that the district court erred by not applying the nuanced, comparative analysis required by Cantero. The appellate court found that the bank failed to show that the Rhode Island statute significantly interfered with its federal banking powers or conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the borrower’s claims to proceed. View "Conti v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A property management company operating several apartment buildings in Missoula County contracted with a waste management provider for “three-yard” dumpster service. After the expiration of their initial service agreement, the provider continued to supply waste removal services on an invoice-by-invoice basis. The property management company later discovered that many of the dumpsters labeled as “three-yard” actually had a capacity of less than three cubic yards, with one model measuring approximately 2.52 cubic yards. The waste management provider rotated these containers among customers and did not maintain records of which customers received which models. The property management company alleged that it was charged overage fees for exceeding the stated capacity of these undersized containers.The property management company filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, asserting claims for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, and sought to represent a class of similarly situated customers. The District Court bifurcated discovery and, after briefing and oral argument, certified two classes: one for breach of contract and one for negligent misrepresentation, both defined as customers who paid for “three-yard” service but received dumpsters of 2.6 cubic yards or less. The District Court found that common questions predominated over individual issues and that class litigation was superior to individual actions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding predominance of common questions and whether it erred by not considering the ascertainability of class members. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the classes, as common questions regarding the provider’s contractual and legal obligations predominated, and individualized damages did not preclude certification. The Court also held that ascertainability is not a mandatory requirement under Montana’s class action rule. The District Court’s order granting class certification was affirmed. View "Allied Waste v. LH Residential" on Justia Law

The dispute arose when a homeowner contracted with a tree nursery company to purchase and install six trees on her property in Washington, D.C. The homeowner sought to restore privacy lost when a neighbor removed existing trees, and she wanted the new trees to provide “evergreen screening.” After installation, she was dissatisfied with the results, noting that the trees did not achieve the desired screening effect and that two of the trees died within a year. She refused to pay the remaining contract balance, prompting the nursery to sue for breach of contract. The homeowner counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, and violations of the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA).The Superior Court of the District of Columbia held a bench trial. The court found that the contract required the nursery only to select, install, and monitor six trees for six weeks, not to guarantee any particular screening effect. The court ruled in favor of the nursery on its contract claim and on most of the homeowner’s counterclaims, except for a finding that the nursery breached the implied warranty of merchantability as to one tree (the dogwood) that died soon after installation. The court rejected the homeowner’s claims regarding the CPPA and the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and denied her motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment on all grounds. The appellate court held that the contract did not obligate the nursery to provide evergreen screening, that the nursery fulfilled its contractual duties, and that the homeowner breached the contract by withholding payment. The court also affirmed the trial court’s application of the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard to the intentional CPPA claims and agreed that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached only as to the one tree that died. View "Galvin v. Ruppert Nurseries, Inc." on Justia Law

Joanne Sudakow entered into a contract with CleanChoice Energy, Inc. to purchase electricity. The initial agreement, which she accepted in October 2021, did not include an arbitration clause and specified that New York would be the exclusive venue for any lawsuits. About three weeks after the contract was executed, CleanChoice sent Sudakow a “Welcome Package” containing new terms, including an arbitration provision, but Sudakow did not sign or otherwise expressly assent to these new terms. She continued to pay for her electricity service until she terminated it in August 2022.Sudakow later filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, alleging breach of contract and deceptive business practices by CleanChoice. CleanChoice moved to compel arbitration based on the arbitration provision in the subsequently mailed terms. The district court denied the motion, finding that Sudakow did not have sufficient notice of the arbitration provision and had not assented to it.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Second Circuit held that Sudakow was not bound by the arbitration provision because CleanChoice failed to provide clear and conspicuous notice of the new terms, and a reasonable person would not have understood that making payments constituted assent to those terms. The court also found that the language of the subsequent terms indicated that a signature was required for assent, which Sudakow never provided. Accordingly, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment denying CleanChoice’s motion to compel arbitration. View "Sudakow v. CleanChoice Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Russell Johnson, a resident of a continuing care retirement community operated by Stoneridge Creek, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Stoneridge Creek unlawfully increased residents’ monthly care fees to cover its anticipated legal defense costs in ongoing litigation. Johnson claimed these increases violated several statutes, including the Health and Safety Code, the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Elder Abuse Act, and breached the Residence and Care Agreement (RCA) between residents and Stoneridge Creek. The RCA allowed Stoneridge Creek to adjust monthly fees based on projected costs, prior year per capita costs, and economic indicators. In recent years, Stoneridge Creek’s budgets for legal fees rose sharply, with $500,000 allocated for 2023 and 2024, compared to much lower amounts in prior years.The Alameda County Superior Court previously denied Stoneridge Creek’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the RCA’s arbitration provision unconscionable. Johnson then moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Stoneridge Creek from including its litigation defense costs in monthly fee increases. The trial court granted the injunction, finding a likelihood of success on Johnson’s claims under the CLRA and UCL, and determined that the fee increases were retaliatory and unlawfully shifted defense costs to residents. The court also ordered Johnson to post a $1,000 bond.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the fee increases did not violate the CLRA’s fee-recovery provision or other litigation fee-shifting statutes, as these statutes govern judicial awards of fees, not how a defendant funds its own legal expenses. The court further concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1788(a)(22)(B) permits Stoneridge Creek to include reasonable projections of litigation expenses in monthly fees. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider whether the fee increases were retaliatory or excessive, and to reassess the balance of harms and the appropriate bond amount. View "Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC" on Justia Law

A resident of a memory-care facility in Massachusetts alleged that the facility’s court-appointed receiver, KCP Advisory Group, LLC, conspired with others to unlawfully evict residents, including herself, by falsely claiming that the local fire department had ordered an emergency evacuation. The resident, after being transferred to another facility, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, asserting several state-law claims against KCP and other defendants. The complaint alleged that KCP’s actions violated statutory and contractual notice requirements and were carried out in bad faith.KCP moved to dismiss the claims against it, arguing that as a court-appointed receiver, it was entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity. The district court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that while quasi-judicial immunity barred claims based on negligent performance of receivership duties, it did not bar claims alleging that KCP acted without jurisdiction, contrary to law and contract, or in bad faith. The court thus denied KCP’s motion to dismiss several counts, including those for violation of the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil conspiracy, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty. KCP appealed the denial of immunity as to these counts.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of absolute quasi-judicial immunity de novo. The appellate court held that KCP’s alleged acts—removing residents from the facility—were judicial in nature and within the scope of its authority as receiver. Because KCP did not act in the absence of all jurisdiction, the court concluded that quasi-judicial immunity barred all of the resident’s claims against KCP. The First Circuit therefore reversed the district court’s denial of KCP’s motion to dismiss the specified counts. View "Suny v. KCP Advisory Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Paul Kim, a California resident, purchased an Airstream motorhome from a dealer in California. The warranty agreement for the motorhome included an Ohio choice of law provision and an Ohio forum selection clause. Kim sued Airstream in California, alleging violations of the Song-Beverly Consumers Warranty Act. Airstream moved to stay the lawsuit in favor of the Ohio forum, citing the forum selection clause. Kim opposed, arguing that enforcing the forum selection clause would diminish his unwaivable rights under the Song-Beverly Act.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County severed the choice of law provision as illegal under the Song-Beverly Act’s waiver prohibition but granted Airstream’s motion to stay, concluding that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable California rights. The court relied on Airstream’s stipulation to apply the Song-Beverly Act in the Ohio forum.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court’s decision to sever the choice of law provision but reversed the decision to stay the case. The appellate court held that Airstream’s stipulation was insufficient to meet its burden of proving that enforcing the forum selection clause would not diminish Kim’s unwaivable rights. The court instructed the trial court to allow Airstream the opportunity to demonstrate that Ohio conflict of law principles would require the application of the Song-Beverly Act to Kim’s claims, thereby protecting his unwaivable rights. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Kim v. Airstream" on Justia Law

Lezah Roberts entered into a fixed-price contract with Advanced Building Design, a Maryland-based firm, to build a handicap-accessible addition to her home in the District of Columbia. The project, which began in 2017 and was expected to take six months, remained unfinished nearly two years later. The project went over budget due to price increases and change orders, and Advanced sought to recoup these overages from Roberts. After initially agreeing to cover some additional costs, Roberts eventually refused to pay further increases, leading Advanced to cease work on the project. Roberts then filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, alleging breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and a claim under the D.C. Consumer Protection Procedures Act (CPPA) for unfair trade practices.The Superior Court granted Advanced’s motion to dismiss Roberts’s suit, citing a mandatory forum selection clause in the contract that designated Maryland as the exclusive forum for litigation. Roberts appealed, arguing that the forum selection clause was unenforceable because it conflicted with the CPPA and was unconscionable.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reviewed the case and disagreed with Roberts on both counts. The court held that the CPPA does not preclude parties from selecting their preferred forum and that the forum selection clause did not contravene public policy or demonstrate procedural or substantive unconscionability. Consequently, the court affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of Roberts’s complaint. View "Roberts v. Advanced Building Design" on Justia Law

Lisa Bodenburg, an Apple customer, purchased a 200 GB iCloud data storage plan, expecting it to add to the 5 GB of free storage she already had, resulting in a total of 205 GB. When she discovered that the plan only provided 200 GB in total, she filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging breach of contract and violations of California’s consumer protection laws due to Apple’s allegedly deceptive representations about its iCloud storage plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Bodenburg’s action with prejudice. The court found that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because Apple had fulfilled its contractual obligations by providing the additional storage as described in the iCloud Legal Agreement. The court also found that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws did not satisfy the “reasonable consumer” test or the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because the iCloud Legal Agreement did not promise an additional 200 GB of storage but rather additional storage, which Apple provided. The court also held that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws failed the reasonable consumer test, as Apple’s statements were not misleading when considered in context. Additionally, the claims did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements because Bodenburg could not demonstrate that Apple’s statements were false or deceptive. Thus, the dismissal of Bodenburg’s action was affirmed. View "Bodenburg v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law