Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Consumer Law
Maldini v. Marriott International, Incorporated
In 2018, Marriott announced a data breach affecting the guest reservation database of Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, which Marriott had acquired in 2016. The breach exposed personal information of approximately 133.7 million guests, including some payment card information. Plaintiffs filed class action lawsuits against Marriott and Accenture, a third-party IT service provider for Starwood and Marriott during the breach. The cases were consolidated for pretrial proceedings in the District of Maryland.The district court initially certified multiple state-specific damages classes against Marriott and issue classes against both Marriott and Accenture. However, the court did not address the effect of a class-action waiver in the Starwood Preferred Guest Program (SPG) contract, which Marriott argued precluded class certification. The Fourth Circuit vacated the class certification, instructing the district court to consider the class-action waiver's impact.On remand, the district court again certified the classes, holding that Marriott had waived its right to enforce the class-action waiver by participating in multidistrict litigation (MDL) and by agreeing to pretrial proceedings in Maryland, contrary to the SPG contract's venue and choice-of-law provisions. The court also suggested that the class-action waiver might be unenforceable under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's decision. The Fourth Circuit held that Marriott did not waive its right to enforce the class-action waiver and that the waiver was valid and enforceable. The court found that the waiver applied to the plaintiffs' claims, including consumer protection and negligence claims, as they were related to the SPG Program. Consequently, the court reversed the certification of all classes against Marriott and the issue classes against Accenture, as the latter were justified only in combination with the Marriott damages classes. View "Maldini v. Marriott International, Incorporated" on Justia Law
Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co.
M.G. received health care coverage through Medi-Cal and was treated by Dameron Hospital Association (Dameron) after an automobile accident. Dameron required M.G. or her representative to sign a conditions of admissions (COA) form, which included an assignment of benefits (AOB) clause. This clause assigned to Dameron the right to direct payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist (UM) benefits from M.G.'s automobile insurance policy with Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (Progressive). Dameron sought payment from Progressive for M.G.'s treatment at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. Progressive settled a UM claim with M.G. but did not pay Dameron, leading Dameron to sue Progressive for damages, an injunction, and declaratory relief.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County sustained a demurrer to Dameron's complaint without leave to amend, citing collateral estoppel based on a prior decision in Dameron Hospital Assn. v. AAA Northern California, Nevada & Utah Ins. Exchange (Dameron v. AAA). The court found the COA forms to be contracts of adhesion and the AOBs unenforceable, as it was not within the reasonable expectations of patients that a hospital would collect payments for emergency care directly from their UM benefits.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the COAs were contracts of adhesion and that it was not within the reasonable expectations of Medi-Cal patients that their UM benefits would be assigned to the hospital for payment of medical bills at rates higher than Medi-Cal would pay. The court concluded that the AOBs were unenforceable and did not need to address arguments regarding collateral estoppel or the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan Act. The court also denied Progressive's motion to strike exhibits from Dameron's reply brief. View "Dameron Hospital Assn. v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc.
The plaintiff, Joshua Naranjo, filed a class action lawsuit against Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc., alleging violations of the unfair competition law (UCL) and the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA) due to the hospital's practice of charging an undisclosed "Evaluation and Management Services Fee" (EMS Fee) to emergency room patients. Naranjo claimed that the fee was charged without prior notification or agreement, making it an unfair, deceptive, and unlawful practice.The Superior Court of Stanislaus County sustained the hospital's demurrer to each cause of action in Naranjo's first amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend and entered a judgment of dismissal. Naranjo appealed, and the Court of Appeal initially reversed the judgment, finding that Naranjo had stated valid causes of action under the UCL and CLRA and for declaratory relief. The court also directed the trial court to consider any future motion by Naranjo to amend his FAC to state a breach of contract cause of action.The California Supreme Court granted review and subsequently transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal, directing it to reconsider the matter in light of its ruling in Capito v. San Jose Healthcare System, LP. In Capito, the Supreme Court held that hospitals do not have a duty under the UCL or CLRA to disclose EMS fees to emergency room patients prior to treatment beyond what is required by the statutory and regulatory scheme.Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeal concluded that Naranjo's claims are barred to the extent they are based on an alleged duty to disclose EMS fees prior to treatment. However, the court found that Naranjo had stated a valid contract-based cause of action for declaratory relief and should be allowed to amend his FAC to state causes of action for breach of contract and violations of the UCL and CLRA, subject to specific parameters. The judgment of dismissal was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Naranjo v. Doctors Medical Center of Modesto, Inc." on Justia Law
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Duvall
Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC, a debt purchaser, filed suits against three consumers, Jeannie Duvall, Allease Riddle, and Lorrena Terry, to collect past-due credit card debts. The consumers counterclaimed, alleging that Portfolio's debt-collection practices violated Alaska's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPA). The superior courts ruled in favor of the consumers on Portfolio's debt-collection claims, finding insufficient admissible evidence to prove Portfolio's ownership of the debts or the amounts owed. The courts also ruled in favor of the consumers on some of their UTPA counterclaims, awarding statutory damages and attorney's fees.In Duvall's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim that Portfolio sought unauthorized fees and charges, finding Portfolio failed to produce the original credit card agreement. The court excluded a late-disclosed witness and certain documents as inadmissible hearsay. Portfolio's contract claim failed due to lack of evidence. The court awarded Duvall partial attorney's fees under the UTPA and Rule 82.In Riddle's case, the superior court granted summary judgment on her UTPA counterclaim, finding Portfolio lacked standing to sue without proving ownership of the debt. The court awarded Riddle statutory damages and partial attorney's fees, reducing the award due to excessive litigation by both parties.In Terry's case, the superior court ruled in her favor on Portfolio's contract claim and her UTPA counterclaims after a bench trial. The court found Portfolio's conduct unfair and deceptive, awarding Terry statutory damages and full attorney's fees.The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior courts' rulings on the merits and statutory damages. It found no abuse of discretion in the evidentiary rulings or the exclusion of the late-disclosed witness. The court affirmed the attorney's fees award in Duvall, remanded the fees award in Riddle for reconsideration, and remanded the fees award in Terry for a minor correction. View "Portfolio Recovery Associates, LLC v. Duvall" on Justia Law
Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc.
Bernadette O’Malley purchased a used 2007 Dodge Caliber from Valpo Motors, Inc. in late 2019. Valpo provided O’Malley with a Buyers Guide stating the car was sold “AS IS” and a Sales Agreement that disclaimed all warranties unless a written warranty or service contract was extended within 90 days. O’Malley also purchased a Service Contract, which was noted in the Buyers Guide. The car broke down a month later, and a repair shop deemed it not worth repairing due to extensive mechanical issues. O’Malley’s son-in-law, Glenn Thomas, took the car to the shop. After Valpo refused to arbitrate, O’Malley sued for breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA). O’Malley passed away during the proceedings, and Thomas continued the case as the personal representative of her estate.The Porter Superior Court granted summary judgment for Valpo Motors, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Buyers Guide’s disclaimer of all warranties controlled over any contrary provisions in the Sales Agreement. The appellate court rejected Thomas’s argument that the handwritten note on the Buyers Guide negated the warranty disclaimer. Judge Felix dissented, arguing that the Sales Agreement’s specific terms should trump the Buyers Guide’s general terms and that there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Valpo’s opportunity to cure the breach.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Valpo did not effectively disclaim the implied warranty of merchantability due to ambiguities in the Buyers Guide. The court found that fact issues remained regarding whether Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure the defects. The court vacated the summary judgment for Valpo, directed the trial court to enter partial summary judgment for Thomas on the warranty-disclaimer issue, and remanded for further proceedings to determine if Valpo had a reasonable opportunity to cure. If Thomas prevails, the trial court is to assess damages and reasonable attorney’s fees. View "Thomas v. Valpo Motors Inc." on Justia Law
County Bank v. Shalla
In February 2014, Clint Shalla entered into a debt settlement agreement with Greg and Heather Koch to prevent a foreclosure on his farm. The Kochs agreed to purchase the farm and give Clint an exclusive option to repurchase it by August 15, 2015, with written notice and financing commitment. Clint's wife, Michelle, was not a party to the agreement but conveyed her marital interest in the property. Clint sought financing from Christopher Goerdt, then president of Peoples Trust and Savings Bank, who allegedly agreed to secure financing. Clint missed the option deadline, and the Kochs later agreed to sell the farm for a higher price. Goerdt, who had moved to County Bank, secured financing for the Shallas, but was later found to be involved in fraudulent activities.The Iowa District Court for Washington County granted partial summary judgment in favor of Peoples Bank, dismissing Michelle's fraudulent misrepresentation claim. The court later reconsidered and dismissed the Shallas' negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation claims, citing Iowa Code section 535.17. The court ruled in favor of County Bank in the foreclosure action and found Goerdt liable for conversion. The Shallas appealed, and the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment, with a dissent on the application of the statute of frauds.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Iowa Code section 535.17, the credit agreement statute of frauds, barred the Shallas' claims for negligence and fraudulent misrepresentation. The court concluded that the statute applies to all actions related to unwritten credit agreements, regardless of whether the claims are framed in contract or tort. The case was remanded to the district court for a determination of County Bank's attorney fees, including appellate attorney fees. View "County Bank v. Shalla" on Justia Law
Bradshaw Renovations, LLC v. Graham
Barry and Jacklynn Graham hired Bradshaw Renovations, LLC to renovate their home. They agreed on a contract with an initial estimate of $136,168.16, which was later revised to $139,168.16. The contract included provisions for revising estimates and required written approval for changes. Throughout the project, Bradshaw sent invoices that varied from the initial estimate, leading to the Grahams' concerns about billing practices. After paying $140,098.79, the Grahams disputed a final invoice of $18,779.15, leading to a legal dispute.The Iowa District Court for Polk County held a jury trial, which found in favor of the Grahams on their breach of contract and consumer fraud claims, awarding them $16,000 and $40,000 respectively. The court denied Bradshaw's claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. Bradshaw's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict were also denied. The court awarded attorney fees to the Grahams for their consumer fraud claim.The Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the jury verdict, the district court's denial of Bradshaw's posttrial motions, and the dismissal of Bradshaw's equitable claims. It also affirmed the attorney fee award but remanded for determination of appellate attorney fees.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the Grahams did not present substantial evidence of consumer fraud as defined by Iowa Code section 714H.3(1). The court reversed the district court's ruling on the consumer fraud claim and remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bradshaw's unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims, as these were covered by the written contract. The court also upheld the $16,000 jury award for the breach of contract claim. View "Bradshaw Renovations, LLC v. Graham" on Justia Law
Beck v. Manhattan College
In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law
GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC
Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law
Tilley v. Malvern National Bank
Kenneth Tilley sought financing from Malvern National Bank (MNB) for a real estate development project in 2009 and 2010, totaling $350,000. Tilley claimed MNB engaged in unfair dealings and sued for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, violations of the Arkansas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (ADTPA), tortious interference, negligence, and fraud. The case has been appealed multiple times, with the Arkansas Supreme Court previously reversing decisions related to Tilley's right to a jury trial.Initially, the Garland County Circuit Court struck Tilley's jury demand, which was reversed by the Arkansas Supreme Court. After remand, the circuit court reinstated a bench trial verdict, citing Act 13 of 2018, which was again reversed by the Supreme Court. On the third remand, MNB moved for summary judgment on all claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment, citing Tilley's reduction of collateral as a material alteration of the agreement, a rationale not argued by MNB. Tilley appealed this decision.The Arkansas Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the circuit court did not violate the mandate by considering summary judgment. However, it was reversible error for the circuit court to grant summary judgment based on an unargued rationale. The Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment on Tilley's ADTPA, tortious interference, and negligence claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact. However, it reversed and remanded the summary judgment on Tilley's breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud claims, determining that there were disputed material facts that required a jury trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Tilley v. Malvern National Bank" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Arkansas Supreme Court, Business Law, Civil Procedure, Commercial Law, Consumer Law, Contracts