Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Gary Martin and Lewistown Miller Construction Company entered into a written contract for the construction of a dwelling on Martin's property. When construction was completed, Martin refused to pay additional amounts above the bid price, and LMCC filed a construction lien on the property. LMCC then filed suit, seeking damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and foreclosure of the lien. Martin counterclaimed for declaratory relief that the lien was invalid and to quiet title, among other things. The district court (1) granted foreclosure of LMCC's construction lien and awarded damages to LMCC; and (2) denied LMCC's and Martin's request for attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in ordering foreclosure of the construction lien, and the award of damages was not clearly erroneous; but (2) the district court erred in failing to award statutorily mandated attorney fees to LMCC, as it established its lien. Remanded.

Homeowners sued Contractor for, inter alia, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and fraudulent concealment, claiming that Contractor negligently failed to perform contractually required work. The district court granted summary judgment in Contractor's favor on all claims. As to the negligence allegations of interest in this appeal, the district court held (1) the economic loss doctrine prevented Homeowners from bringing a tort action under circumstances governed by contract, and (2) the economic loss doctrine supplied an additional bar to Homeonwers' fraud claims. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court accepted the appeal to decide whether the economic loss doctrine barred any negligence claims. The Court reversed, holding that the doctrine should not apply in this case where (1) existing caselaw establishes that homeowners' claims against residential contractors may be asserted in tort, contract, or both, depending on the nature of the duty giving rise to each claim; and (2) rationales upholding the economic loss doctrine do not support its adoption for disputes between homeowners and their contractors. Remanded.

A casino-hotel filed for bankruptcy. Appellant, the administrative agent for a syndicate of lenders that loaned money to the casino's developers, and Respondents, contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers who asserted statutory liens against the property, entered into a dispute over the priority of their respective liens on the property. The Supreme Court accepted questions certified to it from the bankruptcy court regarding the application of contractual subordination, equitable subordination, and equitable subrogation in the context of a mechanic's lien. Appellant moved to strike Respondents' appendix, contending that the included documents contained information beyond the facts certified to the Court by the bankruptcy court. Respondents opposed the motion, arguing that the additional information was necessary for the Court's understanding of the certified legal questions. The Supreme Court granted the motion to strike after determining that Respondents' appendix was filed solely to contradict the certification order and the complaint, holding that while an appendix may be filed to assist the Court in understanding the matter, it may not be used to controvert the facts as stated in the certification order.

Appellant, an LLC, purchased an "all-risks" insurance policy for an office building it owned from Insurer. The building was significantly damaged after a general contractor Appellant had hired to renovate the building removed the waterproof membrane on the roof and the building was exposed to substantial rainfall. Insurer denied coverage, concluding that the damage did not result from a covered cause of loss. Appellant sued Insurer, alleging that Insurer breached the insurance policy and denied coverage in bad faith. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Insurer, concluding that the policy unambiguously excluded from coverage for the damage sustained to the building. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the damages sustained by the building were excluded from coverage based on the policy's rain limitation and the contractor's faulty workmanship in repairing the roof. In addition, although the doctrine of efficient proximate cause did not provide relief under the facts of this case, the Court adopted the doctrine of efficient proximate cause in Nevada.

Excel Construction entered into a contract with the Town of Lovell to replace the Town's water and sewer system mains and service connections. Excel subsequently filed a complaint against the Town of breach of contract and related claims. The district court dismissed Excel's claims for failure to submit a governmental notice of claim that met the itemization requirements of the Wyoming Constitution and Wyoming Governmental Claims Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Excel's notice of claim met the itemization requirements of Wyo. Stat. Ann. 1-39-113(b)(iii) and Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7; (2) Excel complied with the service requirements of Wyo. Const. art. XVI, 7 when it served its notice of claim on the mayor, town administrator, town attorney, and town project engineer; and (3) the district court had jurisdiction to consider Excel's motion for leave to file a second amended complaint. Remanded.

Border States Paving was awarded the prime contract by the state DOT for a road project. Border States entered into a subcontract with Morris, Inc. for aggregates and work on the project. During work on the project, the DOT orally informed Morris that certain materials passed the soundness test. However, the materials actually failed. Ultimately, the paving was not completed by the seasonal deadline. When the project was completed the next year, the DOT paid Border States in full. Border States withheld several thousand dollars from Morris for costs associated with the project because it believed Morris defaulted in its contractual obligations under the subcontract. Morris brought suit against the DOT, alleging that the DOT breached its express and implied contractual obligations owed to Morris and that the DOT breached its implied contractual obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The circuit court ruled in favor of Morris and awarded Morris damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the DOT's erroneous pass report proximately damaged Morris where there was no evidence in the record that this error alone caused the project to not get completed by the deadline.

After Leon Coleman failed to perform eight construction contracts for detached homes, he was convicted of eight counts of theft by deception and eight counts of failure to escrow under Deposits on New Homes Subtitle (Act). The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Act did not apply and that there was insufficient evidence of intent to support the theft convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was insufficient to conclude that Coleman intentionally deprived buyers of their property, as required under the theft statute; and (2) the plain meaning of the Act indicated that it did not apply to Coleman.

A construction company (Contractor) entered into a contract with the State to restructure an interstate interchange. The contract contained an incentive clause stating that no incentive payment would be made if work was not completed in its entirety by December 15, 2006. After the work was completed, Contractor filed a complaint alleging that the State had breached the contract by refusing to grant an appropriate time extension of the completion date, the disincentive date, and the incentive date. The claims commission (1) found that the contract contained a latent ambiguity requiring extrinsic evidence to interpret the contract, and (2) considered extrinsic evidence in concluding that Contractor was entitled to the maximum incentive payment and an extension of the contract completion date. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the contract was unambiguous and did not permit an extension of the incentive date, and (2) therefore, Contractor was not entitled to an incentive bonus. Remanded.

Plaintiffs sued defendant in contract and tort, alleging that defendant failed to take necessary precautions to protect its premises from water damage. At issue on appeal was the trial judge's decision not to grant prejudgment interest on the amounts that were awarded by the jury to plaintiffs. The court held that plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest as a matter of right and remanded to the Superior Court to determine the amount of prejudgment interest owed.

The Weitz Company sued MacKenzie House and MH Metropolitan for breach of construction contract. Arrowhead and Concorde were third-party defendants. MH Metropolitan counterclaimed for breach of the same contract, seeking liquidated damages and the cost to complete the project. Arrowhead also counterclaimed. The jury returned a verdict for MH Metropolitan, Arrowhead, and Concorde on Weitz's claim. The district court denied post-judgment motions and Weitz appealed. The court held that there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's verdict; the district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the evidence of other projects; the district court correctly decided that the issue of liquidated damages and completion costs were issues of fact that were properly submitted to the jury; there was a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for the district court to deny judgment as a matter of law for Weitz's breach-of-contract claims against Arrowhead; the district court did no err in refusing to enter a default judgment against Concorde when it failed to appear at trial, or in the alternative, refusing to grant Weitz judgment as a matter of law on its claims against Concorde; and because the district court properly found against Weitz on all issues, there was no reason to consider the issue of vicarious liability.