Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Shake Out, LLC entered into a contract with Clearwater Construction, LLC (“Clearwater”), to repair the building Shake Out’s restaurant occupied. The relationship between the parties quickly deteriorated, resulting in Shake Out filing a lawsuit against Clearwater. The parties attempted to mediate their dispute but were unsuccessful. After the case had proceeded for some time, Clearwater sought to compel arbitration pursuant to the contract. Shake Out objected, asserting that Clearwater had waived its right to enforce the arbitration clause because it had participated in the litigation for almost ten months before seeking to compel arbitration. The district court concluded Clearwater had not waived its right to seek arbitration and entered an order compelling arbitration and staying the proceedings. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shake Out, LLC v. Clearwater Construction, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment awarding attorney fees in this action brought over a dispute between a general contractor and a property owner related to a residential construction contract but otherwise affirmed the judgment, holding that there was no statute or uniform course of procedure that allowed recovery of attorney fees on this record.After Property Owner failed to pay a construction lien General Contractor filed a breach of contract action and sought to foreclosure on the lien. Property Owner counterclaimed. The district court entered judgment in favor of General Contractor. Thereafter, the district court granted prejudgment interest in the amount of $49,946 and attorney fees in the amount of $115,473. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in part, holding that the district court (1) erred in awarding attorney fees pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 52-157 of the Nebraska Construction Lien Act; and (2) Property Owner was not entitled to relief on her remaining allegations of error. View "BCL Properties, Inc. v. Boyle" on Justia Law

After submitting the winning bid, Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. (“Eagle Rock”), contracted with Teton County, Idaho to reconstruct a stretch of road known as “Chapin Lane.” During the course of the project, Eagle Rock claimed it discovered unsuitable base material under portions of the road. Eagle Rock maintained that Teton County’s agent, Darryl Johnson, directed Eagle Rock to remove the material and said that the county would “make it right.” However, when Eagle Rock attempted to recover an amount in excess of the original Contract Price, Teton County denied Eagle Rock’s request, stating that it had not authorized any changes to the Contract. When the parties could not resolve this dispute over the amount owed, Eagle Rock filed suit. Teton County twice moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the first motion, concluding that genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Johnson orally waived the writing requirement and whether Johnson had authorized Eagle Rock to remove the unsuitable base material, which could support an equitable remedy. In the County's second motion, the district court granted it, ruling that since Teton County’s agent did not have actual or apparent authority to bind Teton County, the claims asserted by Eagle Rock failed as a matter of law. Eagle Rock appealed, asserting that the district court erred because there were still genuine issues of material fact that should be resolved by a jury. Further, Eagle Rock claimed the district court’s refusal to grant leave to amend its complaint to assert a separate cause of action against Johnson personally was an abuse of discretion. After review, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of leave to amend. However, the Court affirmed the district court in not considering the ratification issue because it was beyond the scope of the pleadings at the time it was presented. View "Eagle Rock Timber, Inc. v. Teton County" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the judgment of the business court disposing of WW Consultants, Inc.'s (WWC) claims for contractual indemnity in favor of third-party defendants but affirmed in part as to the denial of WWC's claims for implied indemnity and contribution in favor of third-party defendants, holding that the business court erred by granting summary judgment for third-party defendants on this claim.In this case arising from a dispute involving the construction of a wastewater treatment facility in Pocahontas County, WWC, the project's design engineer, appealed the business court's rulings dismissing or granting summary judgment to three third-party defendant contractors who supplied materials for or worked on the project. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) there were material questions of fact that precluded summary judgment as to WWC's contractual indemnity claim; (2) WWC failed to plead or present facts alleging the requisite special relationships to support its implied indemnity claims; and (3) WWC failed to plead contribution claims that are recognized under the modified comparative fault statutory scheme codified at W. Va. Code 55-7-13a to -13d. View "WW Consultants, Inc. v. Pocahontas County Public Service District" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment for United Fire and Casualty Company and concluding that Clifford Christian and/or his Estate were not owed a defense or indemnification for claims made against Christian in litigation brought by Linda and Albert Parisian, holding that there was no error.Christian contracted with a general contractor on his project to construct four townhomes, one of which was pre-sold to the Parisians. A subcontractor later sued the general contractor and Parisians to obtain payment for his work to landscape the homesites. Christian was named as a third-party defendant and sought defense and indemnification from United Fire, which had insured the general contractor with a liability policy for the period at issue. After United Fire denied Christian's request Christian's Estate initiated this action. The district court granted summary judgment to United Fire. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the complaint did not allege facts that if proven, would trigger policy coverage. View "Christian v. United Fire & Casualty Co." on Justia Law

In this interlocutory appeal involving the application of a statutory immunity waiver in a lawsuit alleging breach of a contract to construct university housing the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the court of appeals reversing the trial court's ruling that the university was not immune from suit, holding that the court of appeals erred.In 2014, Texas Southern University (TSU) executed a contract with Pepper Lawson Horizon International Group, LLC (PLH) to work as the contractor on a project to construct student housing. PLH later sued TSU for breach of contract. TSU asserted sovereign immunity to suit as a defense despite PLH's pleadings expressly invoking the immunity waiver in Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code 114.003, arguing that section 114.003 was inapplicable because PLH failed to plead a claim covered by the waiver provision. The trial court denied TSU's plea to the jurisdiction, but the court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the court of appeals erred in concluding that PLH failed to plea a cognizable Chapter 114 claim. View "Pepper Lawson Horizon Int'l Group, LLC v. Tex. Southern University" on Justia Law

The Village alleged that the defendants breached a 2003 recorded annexation agreement executed by the Trustee that was then the legal owner of the property, which now consists of an annexed 114-acre subdivision. The Village alleged that the defendants were subject to the annexation agreement as successors to the Trustee when they purchased undeveloped portions of the property from Plank, which had acquired the property from the Trustee. The Village alleged that the defendants refused its request for a letter of credit in the amount proportionate to the number of lots the defendants owned in the subdivision, to secure the completion of roads in the subdivision.The defendants argued that, although the annexation agreement was a covenant that ran with the land, it did not confer successor status to an entity that purchased only a portion of the property subject to annexation, as opposed to the whole of the property. The Appellate Court reversed the dismissal of the action. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed. Reading the annexation agreement as a whole, the court found that its plain language required its provisions to be binding and enforceable on the parties’ successors. Defendants are successors in title to the landowner who agreed to those obligations. The obligations imposed upon any particular purchaser depend upon the obligations of the original developer that remain unsatisfied with respect to the specific parcel sold. View "Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part the opinion of the court of appeals in this interlocutory appeal concerning whether a subsequent purchaser (Purchaser) of a home is required to arbitrate her claims against the builder (Builder) for alleged construction defects, holding that the trial court erred in granting Purchaser's motion to vacate and denying Builder's motion to confirm.The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration filed by Builder, which joined two subcontractors in the arbitration, asserting that they owed defense and indemnity obligations. The arbitrator issued an award in favor of Builder. The trial court vacated the award against Purchaser but made no ruling whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors. The Supreme Court rendered judgment confirming the award against Purchaser and remanded the case, holding (1) Purchaser was bound by the arbitration clause in the purchase-and-sale agreement under the doctrine of direct-benefits estoppel; and (2) because the record contained no ruling on whether to vacate the award against the subcontractors, remand was required. View "Lennar Homes of Tex. Land & Construction, Ltd. v. Whiteley" on Justia Law

Thirteen’s building suffered fire damages covered by Foremost’s policy. Thirteen retained Paramount as its public adjuster and general contractor for repairs. Paramount was “to be [Thirteen’s] agent and representative to assist in the preparation, presentation, negotiation, adjustment, and settlement” of the fire loss. Thirteen also “direct[ed] any insurance companies to include Paramount … on all payments on” the fire loss claim. Paramount negotiated the fire loss. Foremost delivered settlement checks to Paramount. The checks named Thirteen, its mortgagee, and Paramount as co-payees. Paramount endorsed the names of all co-payees, cashed the checks, and kept the proceeds. Paramount performed some repair work on the building before Thirteen sought a declaratory judgment that the insurer had breached its policy by not paying the claim.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Foremost. Paramount received and cashed the checks, discharging the insurer’s performance obligation under the policy. The court rejected Thirteen’s arguments that Foremost waived payment as an affirmative defense by failing to plead it in its answer; that, under controlling Illinois law, Foremost’s policy obligation was not discharged when it delivered the checks to Paramount, which cashed the checks; and that Foremost agreed to make claim payments to Thirteen in installments after Foremost had inspected repair work performed. View "Thirteen Investment Co., Inc. v. Foremost Insurance Co. Grand Rapids Michigan" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeal in this action alleging that Defendants entered into a lease-leaseback construction agreement in violation of various statutes and common law rules, holding that the specific lease-leaseback arrangement at issue in this case was not a "contract" within the meaning of Cal. Gov. Code 53511.Plaintiff brought this action alleging that the Fresno Unified School District and Harris Construction Co. entered into an unlawful lease-leaseback construction agreement. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a lease-leaseback arrangement in which construction is financed through bond proceeds, rather than through the builder, is a "contract" within the meaning of section 53511. The Supreme Court held that the lease-leaseback arrangement in this case was not a "contract" under the statute because (1) the underlying project was fully funded by a prior sale of general obligation bonds and payment of the debt service on the bonds was from ad valorem property taxes; and (2) therefore, payment did not dependent on the lease-leaseback arrangement or on completion of the project. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified School District" on Justia Law