Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

MMS Construction & Paving, L.L.C. entered into a subcontract with Head, Inc. to pave asphalt runway shoulders at Altus Air Force Base in Oklahoma. The project was delayed and MMS, expressing concern that Head had not been making agreed payments, quit the job. MMS also complained that completing the job would be more expensive than it originally believed because certain requirements were being imposed that Head said would be waived. After MMS quit, Head finished the job, relying on other subcontractors. MMS sued Head on state-law claims of breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, quantum meruit, and misrepresentation, and brought a claim under the federal Miller Act on Head’s surety bond for the project. Head filed a counterclaim, alleging that MMS breached the contract. After a jury trial, MMS was awarded damages and attorney fees. Head filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial, both of which the district court denied. Head appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to show that Head breached the contract; (2) if there was a breach, it was not material; (3) an Oklahoma statute limited MMS’s breach-of-contract damages to the amount unpaid plus interest; (4) the evidence was not sufficient to establish MMS’s alleged lost-profits damages for breach of contract; (5) MMS did not present sufficient evidence to prove misrepresentation or any damages from misrepresentation, MMS waived the misrepresentation claim, and the award of misrepresentation damages duplicated the award of damages for breach of contract; and (6) MMS was not entitled to attorney fees from Head because the Miller Act does not allow recovery of those fees. Upon careful consideration of the district court record, the Tenth Circuit reversed damages award based on the misrepresentation claim because the jury’s award was not supported by any evidence at trial. On all other issues, the Court affirmed. View "MMS Construction & Paving v. Head, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Border States Paving Company, Inc. was the prime contractor on a South Dakota Department of Transportation road construction project. Weatherton Contracting Company, Inc. entered into a subcontract with Border States to supply crushed aggregate for the project. Stern Oil Company sold Weatherton fuel and petroleum products necessary for Weatherton to perform its subcontract, but Weatherton failed to pay Stern Oil for the products. Stern Oil Company brought suit against Border States and its surety, Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, pleading causes of action against Border States for unjust enrichment and breach of an alleged third-party beneficiary payment agreement to pay the bill and against Liberty Mutual for payment on the bond. The circuit court granted summary judgment against Stern Oil on all claims. The Supreme court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment against Stern Oil on its claims. View "Stern Oil Co. v. Border States Paving, Inc." on Justia Law

Miller-Davis Company was an "at risk" contractor for the Sherman Lake YMCA's natatorium project. Miller-Davis hired defendant Ahrens Construction, Inc., as a subcontractor to install similar roof systems on three rooms, including the natatorium. After nearly a decade of litigation and alternative dispute resolution proceedings, the indemnification contract underlying the troubled natatorium roof in this case was brought before the Supreme Court. The Court previously held that the six-year period of limitations of MCL 600.5807(8) applied to the parties’ indemnification contract. Upon further review, the Court held that the indemnity clauses in the parties’ subcontract applied here, because the plain language of the indemnification clauses extended to Ahrens’s failure to undertake corrective work as obligated by the subcontract. Furthermore, because the Sherman Lake YMCA made a "claim" upon Miller-Davis which triggered Ahrens’s liability under the indemnity clauses, Ahrens’ failure to indemnify caused the damages Miller-Davis sustained in undertaking the corrective work itself. Finally, the Court held that Miller-Davis’ claim was not barred by the six-year statute of limitations found in MCL 600.5807(8). Rather, Miller-Davis’ breach of contract claim for Ahrens’s failure to indemnify is distinct from its breach of contract claim based on Ahrens’s failure to install the roof according to specifications, and Miller-Davis’s indemnity action necessarily accrued at a later point. The Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion discussing Miller-Davis’s indemnity claim, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for entry of judgment in Miller-Davis’s favor and to determine whether Miller-Davis is entitled to attorney’s fees under the relevant indemnification clauses. View "Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

This case arose from a contract between Roanoke Healthcare Authority (doing business as Randolph Medical Center) and Batson-Cook Company, a general contractor, to renovate the medical center, located in Roanoke. Batson-Cook received written notice from Roanoke Healthcare that work on the renovation project had been suspended. Batson-Cook notified one of its subcontractors, Hardy, of the suspension and stated that "[t]he contract has been suspended by [Roanoke Healthcare] through no fault of Batson-Cook ... or its subcontractors. [Roanoke Healthcare] is currently out of funding and has subsequently closed the facility while seeking a buyer." Liberty Mutual, the project's insurer, alleged in its answer that Roanoke Healthcare failed to pay Batson-Cook $241,940.51 for work performed pursuant to the contract. Batson-Cook sent Hardy a change order the change order deducted from the subcontract the $147,000 in equipment and materials another subcontractor Hardy hired, Johnson Controls, Inc. (JCI), had furnished for the renovation project and for which it has not received payment. JCI notified Liberty Mutual, Roanoke Healthcare, Batson-Cook, and Hardy by certified letters of its claim on a payment bond. The letters identified Batson-Cook as the general contractor and Hardy as the debtor. Liberty Mutual denied the claim. JCI sued Liberty Mutual, alleging JCI was entitled to payment on the payment bond Liberty Mutual had issued to Batson-Cook. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded JCI was a proper claimant on the payment bond. Therefore, the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Liberty Mutual and denying JCI's summary judgment motion. View "Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company " on Justia Law

Northern, operated by VanDuinen, was a general contractor on public construction projects, legally required to obtain surety bonds. Hanover was Northern’s bonding agent and required Northern to enter into an Indemnity Agreement, which VanDuinen signed in his individual capacity and as Northern’s President. The Midway Airport Project was financed by the FAA and managed by Parsons. In 2008 Northern won the bid and began subcontracting. in 2009 subcontractors complained that Northern failed to pay them in accordance with the bonds and contracts. Work was halted, resulting in a separate complaint, by Parsons, for failure to complete the Project as required. The FAA opted to retain possession of remaining contract funds, $127,086.00, pending resolution of the disputes and completion of the work. Hanover received claims from subcontractors McDaniel ($127,452.78) and Rex Electric ($78,495.00) and a claim for performance from Parsons. Hanover demanded collateral under the Agreement. Northern refused to post collateral or to indemnify Hanover. In 2009 McDaniel filed for bankruptcy; the bankruptcy trustee sued Hanover seeking payment for work performed. In 2012, Hanover paid the trustee $127,452.78 to resolve both McDaniels’s and Rex Electric’s claims. Hanover resolved Parson’s claim by stepping in as general contractor and arranging for completion of the Project. Parsons paid Hanover the $127,086.00 of contract funds the FAA had withheld. Hanover sued Northern and VanDuinen. The district court granted summary judgment in Hanover’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Agreement is unambiguous. Northern breached it, and Hanover is entitled to contractual damages. View "Hanover Ins. Co. v. Northern Bldg. Co." on Justia Law

Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC and Tharaldson Financial Group, Inc. appealed a judgment and amended judgment ordering Tharaldson Financial to pay VEI Global, Inc., $1,150,000 plus interest, and an order granting certification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b). VEI provided design and construction management services for an ethanol plant owned and operated by Tharaldson Ethanol. In 2009, Tharaldson Ethanol and VEI reached a settlement on disputed fees, agreeing Tharaldson Ethanol would pay VEI $1,350,000 for all work VEI performed through February 28, 2009. The agreement also provided Tharaldson Financial would enter into a $1,350,000 promissory note payable to VEI, and a copy of the note was attached and incorporated into the agreement. Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial sued VEI, claiming VEI negligently designed and constructed the ethanol plant. The complaint sought damages for breach of warranty, breach of contract, and negligence claims; and sought a declaratory judgment that Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial did not owe VEI anything under the settlement agreement or promissory note because of damages VEI caused by its breaches of contract and warranty and other wrongful acts. VEI answered and counterclaimed, including a breach of contract claim against Tharaldson Financial for failing to make payments on the promissory note. The district court ultimately granted VEI's motion for partial summary judgment, finding there were no genuine issues of material fact and VEI was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and ordered VEI was entitled to judgment against Tharaldson Financial in the amount of $1,150,000, with interest. The Supreme Court dismissed Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal, holding that "[c]ertification under N.D.R.Civ.P. 54(b) must be reserved for 'the unusual case in which the costs and risks of multiplying the number of proceedings and of overcrowding the appellate docket are outbalanced by pressing needs of the litigants for an early and separate judgment as to some claims or parties.'" The Court concluded this case did not present "out-of-the-ordinary circumstances" or the "infrequent harsh case" warranting its immediate review. Consequently, the Court did not reach the merits of Tharaldson Ethanol and Tharaldson Financial's appeal. View "Tharaldson Ethanol Plant I, LLC v. VEI Global, Inc." on Justia Law

Technica, a subcontractor on a federal construction project in California, filed suit under the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. 3131-3134, against Candelaria, the prime contractor, and its surety CCIC. On appeal, Technica challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The Supreme Court and the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have held that rights and remedies under the Miller Act may not be conditioned by state laws. The court applied their reasoning and held that the limitation in California Business and Professions Code 7031(a) on the right of a non-licensed contractor to maintain an action for collection of unpaid services did not apply to an action under the Miller Act. Because the California licensing requirement is not a defense to a claim under the Miller Act, the court need not address whether Technica falls within the labor provider exception to the statute. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded. View "Technica LLC v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Consumers Energy entered into a Purchase Order, under which DynaSteel, operating in Tennessee and Mississippi, would fabricate ductwork for shipment to an Essexville, Michigan power plant for installation by a third party. The PO contained a Michigan choice-of-law provision. Consumers was to pay $10,634,755. PCI, with locations in Kansas and Tennessee, was to supply the insulation requested by Consumers for $1,842,890. The contract between DynaSteel and PCI contained a Tennessee choice-of-law provision. As the project progressed, Consumers paid DynaSteel $2.9 million, but DynaSteel did not pay PCI $1,542,890 it owed. DynaSteel also owed PCI more than $3.2 million for other projects. DynaSteel allegedly comingled Consumer’s payments with funds from other projects. Under a “Payment Plan Proposal,” DynaSteel was to make payments, which would apply to the unpaid orders in chronological order (the Consumers project came last in this order). The PPP did not contain a choice-of-law provision. DynaSteel paid PCI $2.1 million, which satisfied its obligations concerning the other projects, but did not fulfill its obligation as to the Consumers project. PCI sued in Michigan, alleging that DynaSteel violated the Michigan Builders Trust Fund Act. The district court entered summary judgment for Dynasteel, reasoning that the PO between PCI and DynaSteel was controlling, that the Tennessee choice-of-law provision was binding, and that the Trust Fund Act did not apply extraterritorially by its own force. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. View "Performance Contracting Inc. v. Dynasteel Corp." on Justia Law

Defendant general contractor Super One, Inc., and various subcontractors, including defendant subcontractor T. T. & L. Sheet Metal, Inc., contracted with VIP's Industries, Inc. and VIP's Motor Inns, Inc. (VIP's) to build a hotel. Defendants began work in 1996. In early 1997, VIP's posted a "completion notice" pursuant to ORS 87.045. On or about that same date, VIP's also obtained a certificate for temporary occupancy and began accepting paying guests. However, a Certificate of Substantial Completion was not issued by the architect or accepted by VIP's as had been contemplated by the contract between the parties. After the date on which VIP's posted the completion notice, defendants continued to perform construction work. The county issued a certificate of final occupancy later that year. In 2006, plaintiff purchased the hotel and soon thereafter allegedly discovered damage. Plaintiff filed an action against defendants for negligence, nuisance, and trespass in 2007, a date more than 10 years after the posting of the completion notice but less than 10 years after the issuance of the certificate of final occupancy. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff's claims were barred by ORS 12.135. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the meaning of the term "substantial completion" as used in ORS 12.135. The Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "PIH Beaverton, LLC v. Super One, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Sunset Presbyterian Church contracted with defendant Brockamp & Jaeger to act as its general contractor and build a new church facility. Defendant then subcontracted with Anderson Roofing Company and other subcontractors to perform various specialized construction tasks. Plaintiff did not enter into a contractual relationship with any of the subcontractors. In early 2009, plaintiff allegedly discovered extensive water damage in the church, and filed an action asserting tort claims against defendants. Defendant general contractor filed an affirmative defense alleging that, by the terms of the parties' contract, plaintiff's claims accrued on the "date of substantial completion" and were time-barred. A defendant-subcontractor, which was not a party to that contract, filed an affirmative defense alleging that plaintiff's claims were barred by the statute of ultimate repose. Both defendants moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted their motions and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed. Defendants then petitioned for review. The Supreme Court concluded that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment, affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversed the decision of the trial court, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Sunset Presbyterian Church v. Brockamp & Jaeger" on Justia Law