Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court affirming the judgment of the trial court denying a property owner's motion for summary judgment in the underlying dispute with a contractor arising from a construction project, holding that the trial court correctly denied Defendants' motion for summary judgment.Defendants hired Plaintiff to serve as a general contractor to renovate a home located on Greenwich property. Defendants later terminated their contractual relationship with Plaintiff. Plaintiff served mechanics' liens on Defendants and brought this action to foreclose its lien. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the trial court was required to give res judicata effect to the findings of the trial court in a prior action between Plaintiff and one of Defendants' subcontractors. The trial court denied Defendants' summary judgment motion, determine that all four required elements of res judicata were not met. The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the appellate court did not err in holding that the presumption of privity that the Supreme Court held to apply in Girolametti v. Michael Horton Associates, Inc., 208 A.3d 1223 (Conn. 2019), did not apply to the instant case. View "Strazza Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris" on Justia Law

L&C Expedition, LLC (“L&C”) appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of International Fidelity Insurance Company (“IFIC”) and denying summary judgment to L&C. L&C contracted with Unlimited Excavating (“Unlimited”) to perform work on a residential development project. Unlimited completed its work in November 2016 and received final payment in July 2017. In 2019, L&C learned of major problems in the construction and notified Unlimited it needed to make repairs. Unlimited did not make the repairs and L&C demanded IFIC arrange for performance of Unlimited’s work per the terms of the performance bond. IFIC refused to arrange for performance. L&C subsequently initiated suit against IFIC in May 2020 arguing L&C is entitled to recover $393,000 under the terms of the performance bond. The performance bond provided the following: “[a]ny suit under this bond must be[] [i]nstituted before the expiration of two years from the date on which final payment under the subcontract falls due.” The parties do not dispute the district court’s finding L&C initiated its action outside the limitation period provided within the terms of the bond. L&C argued the district court erred in finding a contractual limitation on the period to assert a claim was enforceable, erred in failing to apply N.D.C.C. § 9-08-05 to preclude modification of the applicable statute of limitations, and erred in interpreting N.D.C.C. § 22-03-03 as providing an exception to the prohibition against modifying the applicable statute of limitations. Finding no reversible error, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "L&C Expedition, et al. v. Swenson, Hagen and Co., et al." on Justia Law

Homeowner Trefan Archibald hired an individual, Gina Dobson, to refinish his hardwood floors. Dobson worked as a longshoreman full-time but did some construction work on the side. Archibald selected her for the job based on a referral and her reputation of completing similar construction projects. Upon completion of the floors, Archibald was dissatisfied with the results and refused to pay the agreed-upon price. Dobson sued for breach of contract and, as part of the suit, claimed she was not a contractor and did not need to be registered. The issue this case presented for the Washington Supreme Court’s review was: (1) whether such an individual was a “contractor” under RCW 18.27.010(1)(a); and (2) whether nonregistration under RCW 18.27.080 was an affirmative defense that had to be timely pleaded or was otherwise waived. The Court of Appeals held that Dobson was a contractor within the meaning of the contractor registration statutes and that Archibald was not required to raise nonregistration as an affirmative defense. To this, the Supreme Court agreed, holding that Dobson was a contractor as defined by statute and that registration was a prerequisite to suit. Therefore, Dobson was precluded from bringing this lawsuit, and her breach of contract action was properly dismissed. View "Dobson v. Archibald" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Ghidorzi Construction Company, LLC and dismissing the complaint brought by Primrose Retirement Communities, LLC and Gillette Retirement, LLC its local affiliate (together, Primrose), holding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Primrose's breach of contract claim.Primrose filed a complaint against Ghidorzi alleging negligence, breach of contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ghidorzi following a hearing. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) there were material questions of fact precluding summary judgment on the interpretation of the contract and whether Ghidorzi's actions contributed to Primrose's damages; and (2) the district court properly concluded that the contract language obviated any need to impose an implied covenant. View "Primrose Retirement Communities, LLC v. Ghidorzi Construction Co." on Justia Law

This case involved promises made and broken to homeowners by a developer and its affiliated entities. A jury returned verdicts on several causes of action in favor of the homeowners, and the developer appealed. The court of appeals initially upheld the jury's verdict for $1.75 million on the homeowners' breach of fiduciary claim and a verdict for $10,000 on a breach of contract claim by an individual homeowner. Thereafter, upon petitions for rehearing, the court of appeals completely reversed course, dismissing all of the homeowners' claims as a matter of law and reversing and remanding the breach of contract claim by the individual homeowner. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part, thus reinstating the jury's verdicts. The Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals' ruling on the statute of limitations because the issue as to when Homeowners had adequate notice to begin the limitations clock was properly presented to the jury and resolved by it; (2) found any procedural issues related to the derivative claims either (a) moot as the HOA was realigned as a plaintiff and the trial court explicitly found it adopted its own claims against the Developers, or (b) demand was saved by futility due to the Developer's continuing veto power; (3) held that Developers breached the fiduciary duties owed to Homeowners; (4) reversed the court of appeals' decision that Developers could not be amalgamated, as there was more than enough evidence of bad faith, abuse, fraud, wrongdoing, or injustice resulting from the blurring of the entities' legal distinctions; and (5) affirmed the court of appeals that the recreational easement was invalid. View "Walbeck, et al. v. The I'On Company" on Justia Law

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Tony and Michelle Ha, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. The Has sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for negligent construction and other claims, alleging the home developed significant mold problems due to construction defects. Plaintiffs' second amended petition named both Tony and Michelle and their three children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to Michelle and the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a family unit resides in a home and files suit for factually intertwined construction-defect claims concerning the home, a nonsignatory spouse and minor children have accepted direct benefits under the signatory spouse’s purchase agreement such that they may be compelled to arbitrate through direct-benefits estoppel. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Ha" on Justia Law

In this dispute over an arbitration clause within a contract, the Supreme Court held that the minor children who joined Plaintiffs, their parents, in bringing this action seeking damages for construction defects in their home may be compelled to arbitrate along with their parents on the basis of direct-benefits estoppel.Plaintiffs, Jack and Erin Skufca, signed a purchase agreement with Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. to build a home in Texas. The agreement included an arbitration provision. Plaintiffs sued both Taylor Woodrow Communities-League City, Ltd. and Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc., for construction defects and fraud, alleging that less than a year after they moved in, the home developed mold issues that caused their minor children to be ill. The petition listed Jack and Erin as plaintiffs individually, as well as Erin as next friend of the couple's children. Taylor Morrison moved to compel arbitration, but the trial court denied the motion as it pertained to the children. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the minor children sued based on the contract and were subject to its terms, including the arbitration clause. View "Taylor Morrison of Texas, Inc. v. Skufca" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the superior court in favor of Plaintiff in this case arising from a construction contract, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on his assignments of error on appeal.Specifically, the Supreme Judicial Court held that the trial justice (1) did not err in applying the doctrine of merger by deed; (2) did not make a mistake in calculating damages; (3) did not err in denying Defendant's claim that Plaintiff breached the parties' contract; (4) did not err in finding that the implied warranty of habitability did not apply to this case; and (5) properly found that the subcontractors' mechanics' liens were assignable to Plaintiff. View "Premier Land Development v. Kishfy" on Justia Law

Justin Shafer appealed a district court judgment confirming an arbitration award against Diamond Development & Custom Homes, L.L.C. Shafer argued the district court erred by failing to increase the amount of damages he was awarded. He also argued the North Dakota Supreme Court should narrowly expand the standard for reviewing an arbitration award. The Court declined Shafer’s request to expand the standard of review, and concluded the district court did not err in confirming the arbitration award. View "Shafer v. Scarborough, et al." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in this action to foreclose a materialmen's lien to recover for material and labor Ed Suvada expended in renovating a cabin for George and Christine Muller, holding that their was no error.Suvada brought this action to foreclose his materialmen's lien on the Muller property and also alleged breach of contract. The Mullers counterclaimed, alleging breach of contract and fraud. A jury awarded Suvada damages on his materialmen's lien claim and in favor of the Mullers on both of their claims but awarded damages only on the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion. View "Suvada v. Muller" on Justia Law