Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case involved the enforceability of a binding arbitration clause included within a debt adjustment contract. The trial court denied the defendant's motion to compel arbitration, ruling that the motion was untimely and that the binding arbitration clause was unconscionable. Upon review of the trial court record and the clause at issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's holding that the clause was unconscionable, which then required the Court to decide whether this conclusion as to the validity of the binding arbitration clause is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Finding no preemption, the Court affirmed. View "Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants in this suit included the St. Labre Indian Education Association, Inc. and the St. Labre Home for Indian Children and Youth (collectively, St. Labre). After St. Labre experienced a decrease in government funding, St. Labor began a fundraising campaign that NCT asserted resulted in millions of dollars donated to St. Labre through efforts that marketed the plight and need of NCT. NCT filed suit against Defendants alleging (1) St. Labre's fundraising system created a constructive trust on behalf of NCT and St. Labre wrongfully converted those funds to its own use, thus unjustly enriching itself; (2) contract and fraud type issues; and (3) St. Labre unconstitutionally committed cultural genocide against NCT. The district court dismissed all of NCT's motions. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment on NCT's claim for unjust enrichment and the imposition of a constructive trust that may arise from St. Labre's fundraising activities after 2002; (2) reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment regarding St. Labre's fundraising activities before 2002; and (3) affirmed the court's grant of summary judgment on all of NCT's remaining claims. View "N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Roman Catholic Church" on Justia Law

Through cold calls, defendants sold plaintiffs shares in oil and gas joint ventures in Texas, Alabama and Mississippi. Plaintiffs all signed agreements with forum selection clauses stating that courts in Dallas County, Texas would have exclusive jurisdiction should any disputes arising from the agreements arise. The ventures lost money, and plaintiffs sued in Colorado, raising violations of the Colorado Securities Act (CSA) and various other common-law claims. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims citing the forum selection clause. Plaintiffs argued on appeal that the clauses were void because they were unenforceable on public policy grounds. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the forum selection clauses were valid, and that they requires the parties to litigate their claims in Texas. View "Cagle v. Mathers Family Trust" on Justia Law

Leisnoi, Inc. retained the law firm of Merdes & Merdes to represent it in litigation against Omar Stratman over its certification of and title to certain lands Leisnoi claimed under the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. Leisnoi and Merdes entered a contingency fee agreement under which, if Leisnoi was successful, Merdes would receive an interest in the lands Leisnoi obtained or retained. The case was resolved in 1992 in favor of Leisnoi, although Stratman appealed and the related litigation continued for another decade. In October 2008, the Stratman litigation finally concluded in Leisnoi's favor. The following year, Merdes moved the superior court to issue a writ of execution. Leisnoi opposed the motion, arguing among other things that the judgment was void under 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s restrictions on contingency fee contracts involving Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act lands. In January 2010, the Superior Court issued an order denying Leisnoi's motion and granting Merdes's motion to execute. Six months later, Leisnoi paid Merdes the remaining balance. Leisnoi then appealed the superior court's ruling. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned questions of waiver and whether the superior court's judgment was void or voidable. Upon review of the matter, the Court concluded: (1) Leisnoi did not waive its right to appeal by paying Merdes the balance due on the judgment; (2) an Arbitration Panel's fee award and the superior court's 1995 entry of judgment violated 43 U.S.C. 1621(a)'s prohibition against attorney contingency fee contracts based on the value of Native lands that were subject to the Act; (3) the superior court's 2010 order granting Merdes's motion to execute on the 1995 judgment separately violated the Act's prohibition against executing on judgments arising from prohibited attorney contingency fee contracts; (4) notwithstanding the illegality of the Arbitration Panel fee award and the 1995 judgment, Leisnoi was not entitled to relief pursuant to Civil Rule 60(b) (the 1995 order was voidable rather than void for purposes of Civil Rule 60(b), and therefore not subject to attack under Civil Rule 60(b)(4)); and (5) Leisnoi was not entitled to relief under Civil Rule 60(b)(5) or 60(b)(6). Accordingly, Merdes was ordered to return Leisnoi's payment of the balance on the judgment, but Leisnoi was not entitled to recover payments made prior to the issuance of the writ of execution. View "Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C." on Justia Law

SM Energy Company appealed a summary judgment declaring that A.G. Golden and other plaintiffs were entitled to a four percent overriding royalty interest in leases and lands covered by a 1970 letter agreement and ordering SM to pay amounts due to Golden and the other plaintiffs for these interests, and an order denying SM's motion to amend or for relief from the judgment. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that SM through its predecessors in interest, expressly assumed an "area of mutual interest" clause in the 1970 letter agreement and in expanding the judgment to include unpled and unlitigated properties within the area of mutual interest. Furthermore, the Court concluded the court correctly ruled as a matter of law that SM owed Golden and the other plaintiffs retroactive royalty payments on production from a certain well located on the subject property. View "Golden v. SM Energy Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging that, without their knowledge, the City had erected a sewer line across Plaintiffs' property. Plaintiffs contended that in doing so, the City damaged a water pipe owned by Plaintiffs and that the damaged culvert was the proximate cause of three washouts on their property. Plaintiffs alleged causes of action for negligence and inverse condemnation. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, which the circuit court denied. The City appealed, arguing that the circuit court mischaracterized Plaintiffs' claim as based on contract, rather than tort, and in so doing denied the City the immunity to which it was entitled. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court erred in finding Plaintiffs' negligence claim sounded in contract rather than tort; and (2) the City was entitled to statutory immunity as to the tort cause of action. View "City of Malvern v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

A builder sued a homebuyer in a Utah state district court for failing to pay some charges for his home's construction; the homebuyer counterclaimed, alleging that the construction was defective. Shortly before the Utah state court rendered a judgment, the homebuyer sued the builder in an Idaho state district court, seeking to void the builder's allegedly fraudulent transfer of a ranch and appurtenant water shares in Franklin County, Idaho. The homebuyer also filed and recorded the Utah judgment in Franklin County, creating a lien on all of the builder's currently owned and after-acquired real property located there. The builder reversed the transfer, and therefore the ranch became subject to the lien. However, the homebuyer continued to prosecute the fraudulent-transfer action, and did not request a writ of execution. A few months later, the builder declared bankruptcy. In a settlement agreement, the bankruptcy trustee agreed to lift the automatic stay on the homebuyer's fraudulent-transfer action, and also abandoned the ranch from the bankruptcy estate. The homebuyer's judgment lien was not discharged in the builder's bankruptcy, but apparently all in personam causes of action were discharged. The fraudulent-transfer action was repeatedly delayed, and after five years from the entry of the Utah judgment, the homebuyer's lien expired. The homeowner had never attempted to renew the judgment, and had never requested a writ of execution from the Idaho district court. The builder then moved for summary judgment; the homebuyer filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing that he was entitled to a writ of execution. The Idaho district court granted the builder's motion for summary judgment, denied the homebuyer's motion for summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the builder because no relief could be granted based on the expired lien, and because there was no timely request of a writ of execution for the Utah judgment. View "Grazer v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1989, Southeastern recovered a judgment against David Herzig in a North Carolina court. In August 1998, the North Carolina judgment was transcribed and filed in North Dakota under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and renewed in North Carolina in 2000, and was again transcribed and filed in North Dakota for enforcement purposes. In 2004, Alphild Herzig, David Herzig's mother, was joined as a party. In 2005, Southeastern moved for an order compelling Alphild Herzig to comply with Southeastern's discovery requests and requested sanctions. In June 2006, Southeastern moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions. The court granted Southeastern's motion for sanctions against Alphild Herzig contingent on submission of a checklist of items to be produced so the court could set a daily sanction for each item not provided. The court also found Alphild Herzig was in contempt and awarded attorney fees. In August 2006, Alphild Herzig moved for release from the sanctions. The court denied her motion. In 2008, Alphild Herzig moved for an order to dismiss her as a party in the original action and vacating the 2004 order joining her as a party and all subsequent orders issued against her, including the 2006 contempt orders. Southeastern opposed Alphild Herzig's motion to dismiss. However, Alphild Herzig died before the court ruled on the motion. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the daily sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated at her death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not followed its instructions on whether a portion of the daily sanctions were intended to be money damages to compensate Southeastern or whether the sanctions were a forfeiture. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court to make that determination. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters and police officers who worked for the City of Columbia all elected to have group health insurance provided to them by the city. Prior to July 2009, the City paid all costs to fund the group health insurance for employees and retirees. The retirees received newsletters stating that their health insurance was free and were told by the City's human resources department that retiree health insurance would be at no cost to the retiree. In planning the 2009-2010 budget, the City considered a number of cost-saving measures including shifting part of rising health care costs to participants in the group health plan. The retirees sued under claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the retirees' causes of action. Seven of the thirteen retirees appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the retirees on their contract and estoppels claims to the extent that those claims were based on an employee handbook and benefits booklet each received when they were hired. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the retirees on their estoppel claims based upon representations made by their supervisors and the City's human resources personnel. View "Bishop v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) received funds appropriated by Congress under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In 2006, HHS contracted with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to provide services to trafficking victims. At USCCB's insistence, the contract incorporated a restriction pursuant to which neither USCCB nor any of its subcontractors would use funding to counsel or provide contraceptive services and prescriptions or abortions to trafficking victims. The ACLU of Massachusetts (ACLUM) brought suit, alleging that HHS violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In 2012, the district court issued a declaratory judgment that HHS had violated the Establishment Clause. The federal defendants appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated on grounds of mootness, where the 2006 contract expired in 2011. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law