Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 1989, Southeastern recovered a judgment against David Herzig in a North Carolina court. In August 1998, the North Carolina judgment was transcribed and filed in North Dakota under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, and renewed in North Carolina in 2000, and was again transcribed and filed in North Dakota for enforcement purposes. In 2004, Alphild Herzig, David Herzig's mother, was joined as a party. In 2005, Southeastern moved for an order compelling Alphild Herzig to comply with Southeastern's discovery requests and requested sanctions. In June 2006, Southeastern moved to compel discovery and requested sanctions. The court granted Southeastern's motion for sanctions against Alphild Herzig contingent on submission of a checklist of items to be produced so the court could set a daily sanction for each item not provided. The court also found Alphild Herzig was in contempt and awarded attorney fees. In August 2006, Alphild Herzig moved for release from the sanctions. The court denied her motion. In 2008, Alphild Herzig moved for an order to dismiss her as a party in the original action and vacating the 2004 order joining her as a party and all subsequent orders issued against her, including the 2006 contempt orders. Southeastern opposed Alphild Herzig's motion to dismiss. However, Alphild Herzig died before the court ruled on the motion. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the daily sanctions imposed on Alphild Herzig under 2006 contempt orders abated at her death. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court had not followed its instructions on whether a portion of the daily sanctions were intended to be money damages to compensate Southeastern or whether the sanctions were a forfeiture. As such, the Court reversed and remanded the district court to make that determination. View "Investors Title Ins. Co. v. Herzig" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters and police officers who worked for the City of Columbia all elected to have group health insurance provided to them by the city. Prior to July 2009, the City paid all costs to fund the group health insurance for employees and retirees. The retirees received newsletters stating that their health insurance was free and were told by the City's human resources department that retiree health insurance would be at no cost to the retiree. In planning the 2009-2010 budget, the City considered a number of cost-saving measures including shifting part of rising health care costs to participants in the group health plan. The retirees sued under claims of breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and equitable estoppel. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the City on the retirees' causes of action. Seven of the thirteen retirees appealed that decision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court properly granted summary judgment against the retirees on their contract and estoppels claims to the extent that those claims were based on an employee handbook and benefits booklet each received when they were hired. However, the Court found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment against the retirees on their estoppel claims based upon representations made by their supervisors and the City's human resources personnel. View "Bishop v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) received funds appropriated by Congress under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act. In 2006, HHS contracted with the U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) to provide services to trafficking victims. At USCCB's insistence, the contract incorporated a restriction pursuant to which neither USCCB nor any of its subcontractors would use funding to counsel or provide contraceptive services and prescriptions or abortions to trafficking victims. The ACLU of Massachusetts (ACLUM) brought suit, alleging that HHS violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In 2012, the district court issued a declaratory judgment that HHS had violated the Establishment Clause. The federal defendants appealed. The First Circuit Court of Appeals vacated on grounds of mootness, where the 2006 contract expired in 2011. Remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "ACLU of Mass. v. U.S. Conference of Catholic Bishops" on Justia Law

A bail bond company challenged the district court's decision affirming an order of the Director of the Idaho Department of Insurance. That order, which was based on I.C. 41-1042, prohibited a bail bond company from contemporaneously writing a bail bond and contracting with a client to indemnify the company for the cost of apprehending a bail jumper. It also prohibited a bail bond company from later requiring a client to agree to such indemnification as a condition of the bond's continuing validity. While the proceedings before the district court were pending, the Director promulgated I.D.A.P.A. 18.01.04.016.02, which by rule expressed the Final Order. Upon review of the applicable statutory authority and the trial court record below, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) the plain text of I.C. 41-1042 permits a bail bond company to contemporaneously write a bail bond and contract with a client to indemnify the company for the cost of apprehending a defendant who jumps bail; and (2) the Director's interpretation of I.C. 41-1042 prejudiced PetitionerTwo Jinn's substantial rights. The Court reversed the district court's memorandum decision and remanded the case for further review. View "Two Jinn, Inc. v. Idaho Dept of Insurance" on Justia Law

Upon an investigation by the Maine Bureau of Insurance (Bureau) and the Maine Attorney General's Office (AG's Office) into the questionable business practices of Bankers Life and Casualty Company (Company), Appellant, the Company's employee, accepted responsibility for his own unlawful conduct. In exchange, several state officials (Appellees) representing the Bureau and the AG's Office agreed to take no further action against Appellant. Appellees, however, subsequently agreed to Appellant's termination in a separate agreement with the Company. Appellant filed a complaint against Appellees, asserting violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 42 U.S.C. 1985(2). The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellees were entitled to absolute immunity on the section 1983 claim, and (2) Appellant failed to plead a plausible section 1985(2) claim. The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Appellees met their burden in establishing they were entitled to absolute immunity for entering into the consent agreements with Appellant and the Company, and the district court did not err by refusing to invoke the doctrine of judicial estoppel on Appellees' immunity defense; and (2) because the complaint failed to allege any racial or class-based invidiously discriminatory animus underlying Appellees' actions, the district court properly dismissed Appellant's section 1985(2) claim. View "Knowlton v. Shaw" on Justia Law

MCR, LLC filed an action for condemnation of a compressor station site on property owned by Appellees. Appellees counterclaimed against MCR for damage to their property and claimed punitive damages. Appellees sought restoration costs as the measure of damages for their contract, trespass, and nuisance claims. The parties stipulated to the substitution of MCR Transmission, LLC (MCR-T) for MCR on the condemnation claim. The district court dismissed MCR-T's condemnation claim and granted Appellees' summary judgment motion allowing Appellees to seek restoration costs. The jury awarded restoration costs and punitive damages to Appellees. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in dismissing MCR-T's motion to condemn Appellees' property for a compressor station, as genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether Appellees' property was necessary for the compressor station; (2) properly determined that Appellees were entitled to seek restoration costs as the measure of their damages; and (3) properly admitted evidence at trial that MCR had jumped Appellees' bid on state trust land leases. View "McEwen v. MCR, LLC" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the Superior Court abused its discretion in refusing to reopen a summary judgment entered against appellants after they missed the deadline for filing a response to appellees’ motion. Appellants mistakenly believed that they had 20 additional days to respond because appellees filed supplemental materials two weeks after filing their motion. The trial court apparently accepted the fact that appellants had made a mistake, but refused to reopen the case because appellants were unable to justify their mistake. Upon review, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to give adequate weight to the policy in favor of deciding cases on the merits, and reversed. View "Keener v. Isken" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Willie Barlow, Jr., appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of his former employer, C.R. England, Inc., on his claims for race discrimination, wrongful discharge in violation of Colorado public policy, and failure to pay overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). England employed Plaintiff as a security guard and also paid him to perform janitorial work through a company Plaintiff formed. Plaintiff began receiving workers’ compensation benefits after he sustained an injury at work in June 2007. In November, England terminated its janitorial services contract with Plaintiff's company. A few months later, England fired Plaintiff from his security guard position after he failed to notice and report a theft of several trailer doors from England’s premises. The district court concluded that: (1) there was no evidence England fired Plaintiff for race-based reasons, or in retaliation for his workers’ compensation claim; (2) Plaintiff performed his janitorial work as an independent contractor, not an employee, and thus could not assert a claim for wrongful discharge from that position; and (3) Plaintiff's status as an independent contractor precluded an FLSA claim for overtime. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed with regard to Plaintiff's claims for discrimination and violation of the FLSA. The Court reversed, however, Plaintiff's state-law claim for wrongful discharge. View "Barlow, Jr. v. C.R. England Inc." on Justia Law

Wendell Lund appealed a district court order dismissing his action against his mother Betty Lund for lack of personal jurisdiction. Wendell is the son of Orville and Betty Lund. Orville and Betty Lund owned real property in Bottineau County. Wendell claimed that in 1985 he entered into an implied contract with his parents whereby he agreed to provide certain labor and supplies to maintain the real property and to pay half of the real estate taxes, and that in exchange his parents agreed to convey the property to him. In 1991, Orville and Betty signed a deed purporting to convey their interest in the property to Orville and Wendell. When Orville and Betty divorced in 2010, the trial court found the 1991 deed was not a legitimate transaction, but rather had been an attempt to deprive Betty of her interest in the property and her homestead rights. The court included the entire value of the real property in the marital estate and awarded it to Orville. Betty received other offsetting property, and each party ultimately received approximately one-half of the marital estate. Betty Lund moved to Arizona in 2010. Since then, she held an Arizona driver's license, registered her vehicle in Arizona and where she registered to vote. In 2011, Wendell brought this action against his parents alleging they failed to comply with the 1985 implied contract. He sought damages and transfer of the real property to him. Wendell claimed that Betty could not be located for service of process, so service was made by publication. Betty entered a special appearance through her attorney and moved to dismiss the action against her, arguing she was a permanent resident of Arizona and the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over her. The district court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty and subsequently dismissed Wendell's claims against both of his parents, to which Wendell appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Betty Lund resided in North Dakota, owned real property, and allegedly entered into a contract regarding her property in North Dakota. Those contacts were sufficient under Rule 4(b)(2) to assert personal jurisdiction over her for the transactions related to those activities, and she was not immune from suit because she left. The Court concluded the district court erred in concluding it lacked personal jurisdiction over Betty Lund. View "Lund v. Lund" on Justia Law

After Mack Pitts was killed in a construction accident at Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport, his estate and minor children sued the City of Atlanta and several contractors for breaches of contracts concerning the construction project on which Pitts had been working. Although Pitts was not a party to these contracts, his estate and children asserted that he was an intended beneficiary and that they, therefore, had standing to sue for breach of the contracts. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found that Pitts was not an intended beneficiary, denied summary judgment to the estate and children, and awarded summary judgment to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the trial court should have awarded summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract to the estate and children, not to the City and contractors. The Court of Appeals determined that Pitts was, in fact, an intended beneficiary of the contracts, and it found that the evidence was undisputed that the City and contractors had breached the contracts. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals misapplied or failed to apply several fundamental principles of contract law in its consideration of these cases. Accordingly, the Court vacated the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Holder Construction Company v. Estate of Pitts" on Justia Law