Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

John Stubbs was awarded damages for breach of contract after he sued Martin and Valerie Falkner to enforce a construction lien on their home. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment, but reversed its award of attorney's fees and prejudgment interest, finding that Stubbs's recovery was based in quantum meruit and, thus, attorney's fees and prejudgment interest were unavailable remedies. Stubbs petitioned for certiorari, arguing that the Court of Appeals failed to consider various statutory grounds for an award of attorney's fees. Although the Court of Appeals did not discuss the statutes Stubbs raised, the Supreme Court found that those statutes provided an insufficient basis for an award of either prejudgment interest or attorney's fees in this case. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision and the judgment of the Circuit Court. View "Falkner v. Stubbs" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two agreements: a ground lease agreement between ASC Utah, Inc. (ASCU) and Wolf Mountain Resorts, and a specifically planned area (SPA) development agreement, which had thirty-six signatories, including ASCU, Wolf Mountain, the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership (Osguthorpe). ASCU and Wolf Mountain began litigating claims involving both the ground lease and the SPA agreement. Shortly thereafter, Osguthorpe sued ASCU and Wolf Mountain, alleging that each party had breached a land-lease agreement distinct from the ground lease or the SPA agreement. The district court consolidated Osguthorpe's separate actions into ASCU's litigation. Osguthorpe later moved to compel arbitration on all the claims related to the SPA agreement, including the claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain, to which Osguthrope was not a party. The district court denied Osguthrope's motion. Osguthrope withdrew its SPA claims from the case, leaving for appeal only Osguthrope's motion to compel arbitration of the SPA claims between ASCU and Wolf Mountain. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the disputes for which Osguthrope sought to compel arbitration were not subject to the SPA agreement's arbitration provision; and (2) furthermore, as a non-party to the disputes, Osguthrope had no contractual right to compel their arbitration. View "Osguthorpe v. Wolf Mountain Resorts, L.C." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Richard J. Sternberg, M.D. brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, its CEO and members of the hospital's Medical Executive Committee (MEC) (collectively "Nanticoke") for tortious interference with existing business relationships, defamation, and breach of the Medical Staff Bylaws. The suit arose from a precautionary suspension of his clinical privileges imposed by Nanticoke under its professional review procedures. Nanticoke asserted immunity under federal and state law and sought attorneys fees, citing state law and a fee-shifting provision of Nanticoke's Medical Staff Bylaws Credentials Policy. After cross-motions for summary judgment, the Superior Court denied Sternberg's motion and granted Nanticoke's motion, awarding attorney's fees under state law without addressing Nanticoke's claim for costs and fees under the Credentials Policy. Sternberg appealed and the Supreme Court affirmed on the issue of immunity but reversed the award of attorney's fees under the applicable statute because Sternberg refuted the only fact supporting the requisite bad faith for an award under that law. Upon remand, the Superior Court awarded attorney's fees and costs based upon the Credentials Policy. Sternberg raised three claims on appeal: (1) he claimed that the Superior Court erred by granting Nanticoke's motion for summary judgment for attorney's fees under the Credentials Policy, because the bylaw violates public policy; (2) he claimed the Credentials Policy was unenforceable against him because Nanticoke materially breached the bylaws; and (3) he claimed that the Superior Court abused its discretion in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to be awarded. Finding no merit to any of his claims on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court. View "Sternberg, M.D. v. Nanticoke Memorial Hospital, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were two shareholders of a closely held corporation. They attempted to tender their shares to the corporation pursuant to a buy-sell agreement. Unhappy with the corporation's purchase offer, the shareholders brought suit in Chancery Court, and the court in turn submitted the matter to binding arbitration as required by the agreement. The chancellor ultimately rejected the arbitrators' valuations and ordered the corporation to buy plaintiffs' shares at a much higher price. The corporation appealed the chancellor's rejection of the arbitrator's award, and plaintiffs cross-appealed claiming they were entitled to additional damages. Finding no legal basis for setting aside the arbitration award, the Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court and reinstated the arbitration award. View "Bailey Brake Farms, Inc. v. Trout" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this breach of contract case was whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to submit an issue of punitive damages to the jury. Finding that the plaintiff presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant exhibited bad faith in breaching the contract, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the trial court for the jury to determine what punitive damages, if any, were due. View "T.C.B. Construction Company, Inc. v. W. C. Fore Trucking, Inc." on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal in this case related to attorney fees incurred in litigation arising from a construction contract for a custom cabin in Island Park, Idaho. There were two issues: (1) whether the district court erred in holding that the Maglebys were entitled to recover only $2,500 from defaulting parties by operation of I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4); and (2) whether the district court erred in its decision regarding the Maglebys' entitlement to post-judgment attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(4) did not limit the Maglebys' fees to the $2,500 pled in their complaint even though defendants did not contest them. The Court vacated the judgments of the district court as they related to attorney fees awards in light of I.C. sec. 12-120(5) and "ITP" and "Jenks." The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Magleby v. Garn" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant Adriana Berneike appealed the district court’s dismissal of her Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), Utah Consumer Sales Protection Act (UCSPA), and breach of contract claims asserted against CitiMortgage, Inc. (Citi). In 2010, Plaintiff faxed twenty-eight different letters to Citi, her mortgage loan servicer, asserting that Citi was incorrectly billing her for overcharges and improper fees. She faxed a two more rounds of different letters, insisting Citi was overcharging her. Citi replied that Plaintiff's account was correct and that taxes and an escrow shortage caused billing fluctuation. Several months later, Plaintiff sent a third round of fort-seven different letters to Citi claiming billing errors. Altogether, Plaintiff faxed more than one hundred letters to Citi, and claimed that despite paying in full every bill she received, she continued to be overcharged and was facing foreclosure and bankruptcy. Plaintiff then filed suit in Utah state court. Among other damages, she sought $1,000 per violation of RESPA. Citi removed the case to federal court, and the court subsequently granted Citi's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. Finding that the federal court did not err by dismissing Plaintiff's claims, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Bruce Cedell lost his home in a fire. After hearing nothing from his insurer for several months, the company threatened to deny coverage and issued an ultimatum to Petitioner to accept one quarter of what the trial court eventually found Petitioner's claims to be worth. Petitioner brought suit alleging bad faith. The company resisted disclosing its claims file, among other things, and Petitioner moved to compel production. After a hearing and a review of the claims file in camera, the trial court granted Petitioner's motion. On interlocutory review, the Court of Appeals held that the attorney-client privilege applied to a bad faith claim by a first party insured, that the fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege required a showing of actual fraud, and that the trial court erred in reviewing Petitioner's claims file in camera because Petitioner had not made a sufficient prima facie showing of fraud. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial for further proceedings. "In first party insurance claims by insured's claiming bad faith in the handling and processing of claims, other than UIM claims, there is a presumption of no attorney-client privilege. However, the insurer may assert an attorney-client privilege upon a showing in camera that the attorney was providing counsel to the insurer and not engaged in a quasi-fiduciary function. Upon such a showing, the insured may be entitled to pierce the attorney-client privilege. If the civil fraud exception is asserted, the court must engage in a two-step process. First, upon a showing that a reasonable person would have a reasonable belief that an act of bad faith has occurred, the trial court will perform an in camera review of the claimed privileged materials. Second, after in camera review and upon a finding there is a foundation to permit a claim of bad faith to proceed, the attorney-client privilege shall be deemed to be waived. . . . Cedell is entitled to broad discovery, including, presumptively the entire claims file. The insurer may overcome this presumption by showing in camera its attorney was not engaged in the quasi-fiduciary tasks of investigating and evaluating the claim." View "Cedell v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Wash." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from a commercial lease dispute. Boise Mode, LLC leased space in its building to Donahoe Pace & Partners, Ltd. (DPP). Timothy Pace executed a personal guarantee for the lease. During the term of the lease, Boise Mode remodeled part of the building for another tenant. After raising concerns to Boise Mode about the adverse effects of the construction to its business, DPP eventually stopped paying rent and vacated the premises prior to the end of the lease. Boise Mode then brought an action against DPP, alleging breach of contract, and against Pace for breaching the guarantee. DPP counterclaimed, alleging that the disruption caused by the construction constituted breach of contract and constructive eviction. After Boise Mode moved for summary judgment on all claims and counterclaims, DPP requested a continuance to complete discovery. The district court denied DPP's motion and ultimately granted Boise Mode's motion for summary judgment. DPP appealed the grant of summary judgment as well as the district court's denial of its request for a continuance. Upon review, and finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boise Mode, LLC v. Donahoe Pace" on Justia Law