Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs Patrick and Terese Ayer appealed a trial court's order granting summary judgment to Frances Harris and Louis Hemmingway, III. The dispute arose over plaintiffs' attempts to collect a debt from defendant Hemmingway individually, and doing business as Hemmingway Construction. Plaintiffs obtained a default judgment against Hemingway in February 2001. Plaintiffs subsequently secured a nonpossessory writ of attachment against Hemingway's nonexempt goods and estate. In 2010, Frances Harris brought an unrelated action against Hemingway for damages. The trial court issued a stipulated judgment order that, among other things, awarded Harris judgment against Hemingway plus interest from September 8, 2005 until the release of the lien in favor of plaintiffs, required Hemingway to keep current on payments to plaintiffs pursuant to a written payment agreement signed by Hemingway and plaintiff Terese Ayer, and provided that if Hemingway defaulted on the lien, he would be liable to Harris for any costs, including attorney's fees, to obtain a release of the lien. In May 2011, plaintiffs filed a complaint seeking to foreclose on their judgment lien. Plaintiffs cited a 2006 trial court order as controlling and asked the court to renew or revive it. Hemingway filed an unverified answer to plaintiffs' complaint, acknowledging his debt to plaintiffs and offering to make immediate payments pursuant to the 2010 agreement. Plaintiffs moved for a default judgment, but the court denied their request. Harris responded to this order; Hemingway did not. Harris later moved for summary judgment, and plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for summary judgment and default.  In January 2011, the trial court granted Harris's motion, and found that plaintiffs' judgment lien was no longer effective because more than eight years had elapsed from the issuance of the original final judgment on which it was based. In reaching its conclusion, the court rejected plaintiffs' assertion that the 2001 judgment had been renewed or revived by the 2006 stipulated amended order. This appeal followed. Agreeing with the trial court's reason to dismiss plaintiffs' motion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Ayer v. Hemingway" on Justia Law

Maria Marusa was driving her car when it was struck by a police cruiser driven by a police officer (Officer). Marusa and her daughter (collectively, Appellants) were injured in the accident. Appellants filed suit against Marusa's insurer (Insurer), seeking damages to compensate for medical expenses and pain and suffering. Insurer answered that it was not obligated to pay damages because even though the policy included uninsured-motorist coverage and the officer was an uninsured motorist, Appellants were not "legally entitled to recover" because Officer was immune under the Ohio Political Subdivision Tort Liability Law (OPSTLL). The trial court granted summary judgment for Insurer, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the language of the policy unambiguously provides uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage when the insured is injured by an owner or operator who is immune under the OPSTLL. View "Marusa v. Erie Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The case before the Supreme Court was a fifteen-year old contract dispute regarding the construction of Kevin Clark's house. During the litigation, the contractor and counter-plaintiff William Knesal, died. His defense attorney, provided to him by his insurance company upon commencement of the suit, filed a suggestion of death in the deceased's name. When no substitution motion was filed within the prescribed ninety-day period, Knesal's attorney moved to dismiss. Knesal filed the appropriate motion for substitution well after the mandatory ninety-day period, asserting that Knesal's attorney had no standing to submit a suggestion of death and that, additionally, he never received proper notice of the filing until the motion to dismiss was served. The trial court dismissed the action, and Clark appealed. The issue before the Court centered on determining who may file a suggestion of death with the trial court and what circumstances surrounding a failure to file an appropriate substitution motion within the statutory period constitute "excusable neglect." The Court found that the plain language of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25 permitted Knesal's attorney to file to suggestion of death without naming Knesal's successors or representatives. Similarly, there was no requirement under the rule that a motion to dismiss be filed at all prior to dismissal, so the fact that a motion to dismiss was filed by Knesal's attorneys did not provide grounds to overturn the trial court's decision. Furthermore, the Court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find Clark's delay in responding to the suggestion of death resulted from excusable neglect. Therefore, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. View "Clark v. Knesal" on Justia Law

Vincennes Indiana Girls, Inc. (VIG) deeded Camp Wildwood to the predecessor of Girl Scouts of Southern Illinois, Inc. (GSSI) on the condition that the property be used for scouting purposes for forty-nine years. The deed provided that ownership of the campground would revert to VIG if the scouting-use condition was breached during that time. After forty-four years, GSSI stopped using the camp as a Girl Scout facility and decided to sell. VIG sued to quiet title to Camp Wildwood and enjoin GSSI from selling the camp until the forty-nine-year period had expired. The trial court granted summary judgment quieting title in VIG. At issue on appeal was whether the forty-nine-year land use limitation was enforceable despite a subsequently enacted statute, Ind. Code 32-17-10-2, which purported to limit reversionary clauses in land transactions to a maximum of thirty years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that section 32-17-10-2 was unconstitutional as applied retroactively to the land-use restriction in VIG's deed to GSSI. View "Girl Scouts of S. Ill. v. Vincennes Ind. Girls, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellant Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003 ("Lloyds") appealed the district court's denial of its summary judgment motion and subsequent grant of summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff-Appellee Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. ("BYA") in an action arising out of a professional liability insurance contract. The district court concluded Lloyds failed to pay sufficient indemnity to BYA for claims brought against BYA in an arbitration before the National Association of Securities Dealers. The underlying suit alleged BYA agents mismanaged and unlawfully "churned" the investment accounts of its clients. The court concluded the claims brought in the arbitration did not relate back to earlier claims brought outside the policy period and, therefore, rejected Lloyds' argument coverage was precluded altogether. Additionally, the court rejected BYA's argument that Lloyds was equitably estopped from denying coverage due to its course of conduct in receiving and defending the claims. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court erred in its interpretation of the law of the case, and therefore abused its discretion in making its judgments in this case. Accordingly, the district court's decisions were reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Brecek & Young Advisors, Inc. v. Lloyds of London Syndicate 2003" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision affirming the circuit court's order that upheld an arbitration award. The underlying dispute arose from a construction contract whereby general contractor respondent C-Sculptures, LLC agreed to build a home for Petitioners Gregory and Kerry Brown. The contract price was in excess of $800,000. However, Respondent only possessed what is referred to as a Group II license, limiting Respondent to construction projects that did not exceed $100,000. A dispute arose between the parties, and Respondent filed an action in circuit court seeking to enforce a mechanic's lien against Petitioners. Upon Petitioners' motion and pursuant to an arbitration clause in the parties' contract, the circuit court matter was stayed pending arbitration. Petitioners sought to have the matter dismissed after they learned Respondent held only a Group II license. The arbitrator was apprised of the applicable law, but nevertheless denied Petitioners' motion to dismiss "after due consideration of all the evidence and authorities presented by the parties in this Arbitration." Respondent prevailed at arbitration, receiving an award of damages and an award of attorney's fees as the prevailing party pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. section 29-5-10(b) (Supp. 2012). Petitioners challenged the arbitration award, contending the arbitrator's denial of their motion to dismiss amounted to a manifest disregard of the law. Following adverse decisions in the circuit court and the court of appeals, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari. Petitioners argue the court of appeals erred in refusing to find the arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law in declining to dismiss the action. Upon review, the Court agreed, and reversed the appellate court and directed that judgment be entered for Petitioners. View "C-Sculptures v. Brown" on Justia Law

Michael Holton appealed the grant of an interlocutory injunction prohibiting him from working in an executive capacity for a particular competitor of his former employer for one year. He also challenged the trial court's ruling that he would inevitably disclose his former employer's trade secrets and confidential information in violation of the trade secrets act and his confidentiality covenant if he went to work for the competing business. Because a stand-alone claim for the inevitable disclosure doctrine of trade secrets is not cognizable in Georgia, the Supreme Court reversed the part of the order enjoining Holton from the inevitable disclosure and use of trade secrets. On the remaining issues, the Court dismissed as moot his challenge to the order enjoining him from working for the competitor until October 2012 and affirmed the part of the order enforcing the confidentiality covenant. View "Holton v. Physician Oncology Services, LP" on Justia Law

Agreeing with the Board, the district court ruled that Quantum's 1996 Management Agreement with the Pueblo was null and void for lack of approval by the Secretary as required by 25 U.S.C. 81, and that it was incapable of being validated by the 2000 amendment to section 81, the application of which would be impermissibly retroactive. Applying Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the court concluded that Congress made no clear statement that it intended the 2000 amendment to apply retroactively. The court also concluded that, because the 1996 Agreement required Secretarial approval that was never obtained and the parties agreed that the Agreement would be valid without Secretarial approval under section 81 as amended, the application of the new law would give life to a null and void agreement, thereby attaching new legal consequences to it. Although the Pueblo may have voluntarily undertaken the stated duties and liabilities under the Agreement, such an agreement was null and void without Secretarial approval before 2000. Since the Secretary never approved the Agreement, any legislative validation of the duties or liabilities attached to it was impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. View "Quantum Entertainment Ltd. v. Dept. of the Interior" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Brooks Insurance Agency, Sidney Brooks (its agent), and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company and Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Company (collectively "Nationwide") petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Jefferson Circuit Court to vacate its order denying their motion to dismiss an action filed by Guster Law Firm, LLC, and Guster Properties, LLP (collectively "Guster"), against them. Guster made a claim for a fire loss under commercial property policies issued to it by Nationwide. In April 2011, Nationwide filed a declaratory-judgment action requesting that the federal court determine the rights and obligations under the insurance policies it had issued to Guster. Guster answered and asserted compulsory counterclaims against Nationwide, including bad-faith failure to pay an insurance claim and breach of contract, among others. Months later, Guster filed a lawsuit in the Jefferson Circuit Court alleging against the agency, Brooks, and Nationwide: negligent/wanton failure to provide insurance coverage; misrepresentation; suppression and concealment; and negligent/wanton failure to train. The agency, Brooks, and Nationwide moved to dismiss the state court action on the ground that the action violated the state abatement statute and the compulsory-counterclaim rule. The trial court summarily denied the motion to dismiss. The agency, Brooks, and Nationwide then petitioned the Supreme Court for mandamus relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and issued the writ. Although the causes of action in the federal court and the state court arose out of the same transaction or occurrence and were thus related, Guster's claims against the agency and Brooks were not compulsory counterclaims in the federal declaratory-judgment action because the agency and Brooks were not "opposing part[ies]" in the federal action. Accordingly, the Alabama abatement statute mandated that the claims against Nationwide in Guster's complaint filed in state court be dismissed. The Court concluded that the agency and Brooks did not show a clear legal right to the dismissal of Guster's claims against them in the state-court action. However, Nationwide did show a clear legal right to the dismissal of Guster's claims against it in the state-court action, therefore the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss as to Nationwide. View "Guster Law Firm, LLC v. Brooks Insurance Agency" on Justia Law