Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Appellant Tommie Patterson was involved in a motor vehicle accident. His insurance company paid his medical providers to the policy limit. Two years later, Appellant sued the insurance company, arguing it had shown bad faith following the accident. The company moved for summary judgment, which was granted. A month after that decision, Appellant filed a second lawsuit, alleging the company falsely advertised its services, breached his insurance contract, embezzled money from him, falsified documents and threatened to make him at fault for the accident. The company moved for summary judgment again, which was granted. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that because Appellant's embezzlement claim in the second lawsuit alleged a different cause of action than in the first, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment with regards to that claim. All other claims were barred by res judicata. Therefore the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Patterson v. Infinity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant George Lopez conducted mediations in a program created and managed by the Administrative Office of Courts of the State of Utah. In 2006, he was removed from the panel of mediators that mediated certain domestic matters. Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court alleging that his removal from that list of mediators violated his right to due process and his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983. He also alleged breach of contract, breach of implied contract, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Upon review of the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants, the Tenth Circuit found that because Plaintiff's primary argument was based on his alleged contractual rights as a public employee, and because the Court found that there was no implied contract (because evidence in the record revealed Plaintiff was not a public employee), Plaintiff's arguments necessarily failed. View "Lopez v. Admin Office of the Court" on Justia Law

This suit stemmed from plaintiff's suit for breach of contract against his former employer, ICD, and tortious interference with contract against ICD's president. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's order, which amended a judgment to provide that plaintiff was entitled to post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. 1961, contending that he was entitled to a post-judgment interest at the rate set forth in C.P.L.R. 5004. The court concluded that plaintiff was entitled to .25% post-judgment interest where section 1961's plain terms governed the rate of post-judgment interest applicable in this case. Accordingly, the district court correctly and constitutionally applied section 1961, notwithstanding that the judgment had been entered in a diversity action and had been docketed by plaintiff in a New York state court. View "Cappiello v. ICD Publ'ns, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was a political subdivision for purposes of the governmental-immunity provisions of Ohio Rev. Code 2744. Appellee sued Appellant, asserting several claims. Appellant filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming political-subdivision immunity. Appellant then unsuccessfully sought to file an amended answer raising political-subdivision immunity as an affirmative offense. Thereafter, the trial court granted summary judgment to Appellant on two of Appellee's claims. After Appellant appealed the trial court's denial of leave to file an amended answer, the case proceeded to trial. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Appellee on two of its remaining claims. Appellant filed a second appeal from the judgment. While Appellant's appeals were pending, the Supreme Court held that Appellant's first appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed with a trial of any claim subject to the political-subdivision immunity defense. The court of appeals subsequently dismissed Appellant's appeals for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for leave to file an amended answer to raise the affirmative defense of political-subdivision immunity precluded Appellant from enjoying the benefits of the alleged immunity; and (2) the court of appeals therefore possessed jurisdiction to determine Appellant's appeal of that order. View "Supportive Solutions, LLC v. Elec. Classroom of Tomorrow" on Justia Law

The Wicks Law requires public entities seeking bids on construction contracts to obtain separate specifications for three subdivisions of the work to be performed. Until 2008 when the law was amended to raise the threshold, the Wicks Law applied to contracts whose cost exceeded $50,000. The new, higher thresholds, unlike the old one, were not uniform throughout the State. Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the amendments violated the Home Rule section of the State Constitution by unjustifiably favoring the eight counties with higher thresholds. Supreme Court dismissed the complaint, holding that Plaintiffs lacked standing to assert the Home Rule cause of action and that, in any event, the challenged amendments did not violate the Home Rule section because they "were enacted in furtherance of and bear a reasonable relationship to a substantial State-wide concern." The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed as modified, holding (1) at least one plaintiff had standing to assert the Home Rule claim, but that claim failed on the merits; and (2) most of Plaintiffs' other claims failed, but four causes of action challenging the apprenticeship requirements as applied to out-of-state contracts should be reinstated. View "Empire State Chapter of Associated Builders & Contractors v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendants Pam Wood, David Wood, Justin Wood, Josh Wood and Jacob Wood filed an interlocutory appeal for the Supreme Court to determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying their motion to transfer this case to another county. The underlying case involved a car accident in which a question arose over who was covered by an insurance policy. Defendant Pam Wood applied for the coverage in Covington County; the application was faxed from an insurance agent's office in Covington to Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company's Rankin County office where it was approved. Safeway opposed the transfer of venue. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Safeway could not demonstrate sufficient facts to support that venue was proper in Rankin County. Therefore the Court reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case with instructions to transfer it to a permissible venue. View "Wood v. Safeway Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Charles Honeycutt was injured in an automobile accident involving a Mississippi state trooper. He sued the state trooper and two automobile-insurance providers, Atlanta Casualty Company and American Premier Insurance Company. The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Plaintiff filed a writ of certiorari, seeking to appeal the grant of summary judgment for American Premier: (1) whether the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred by finding an insurance agent does not have a duty to explain uninsured-motorist coverage; (2) whether summary judgment was granted improperly. The Supreme Court found that, in order to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of uninsured-motorist coverage (UM coverage), an insurance agent does have a duty to explain UM coverage to the insured. The Court also found that summary judgment was not proper in this case. Thus, the Court reversed both lower courts' judgments and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Honeycutt v. Coleman" on Justia Law

Defendant Halliburton Energy Services hired Plaintiff Edward Flemma to work as a cement equipment operator in Houma, Louisiana, in January of 1982. During his twenty-six years of employment with Halliburton, Flemma was promoted several times and worked for the company in Louisiana, Texas, Angola, and New Mexico. The last position he held was as district manager in Farmington, New Mexico, where he worked from 2006 until the time of his termination in 2008.The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on a conflict of laws issue that requires the Court to determine whether enforcement of an arbitration agreement, formed in the State of Texas, would offend New Mexico public policy to overcome our traditional choice of law rule. Upon review, the Court concluded that the agreement formed in Texas would be unconscionable under New Mexico law, and it therefore violated New Mexico public policy. Thus, the Court applied New Mexico law and concluded that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between the parties because Halliburton's promise to arbitrate was illusory. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the district court for further proceedings. View "Flemma v. Halliburton Energy Services, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

HomeAway filed suit in the District Court of Travis County, Texas, against Eye Street and others, asserting, inter alia, state law claims for breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Eye Street did not attempt to remove HomeAway's Texas suit to federal district court but, instead, filed its own action against HomeAway and others in federal district court. After HomeAway moved to dismiss Eye Street's action for improper venue or, alternatively, to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, the district court stayed the action pending the resolution of HomeAway's Texas lawsuit. On appeal, Eye Street challenged the propriety of the stay. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in staying Eye Street's action. Given the strong case for a stay under the United Capitol Insurance Co. v. Kapiloff factors and Eye Street's deliberate choice to forego removal, the district court's decision would be an appropriate exercise of discretion under either Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America/Wilton v. Seven Falls Co. or Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "VRCompliance LLC v. HomeAway, Inc." on Justia Law