Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs filed suit against 24 Hour Fitness, alleging that their membership contracts did not strictly comply with several technical provisions of the Texas Health Spa Act, Tex. Occ. Code Ann. 702.304, 702.305, 702.401, 702.402(a)(2). The district court dismissed the suit based on lack of standing. Because plaintiffs are not entitled to a full refund of their membership dues, and because 24 Hour’s alleged violations of the Act did not cause plaintiffs actual damages or any other form of economic harm, plaintiffs have sustained no economic injury. Furthermore, plaintiffs have not suffered a non-economic injury where plaintiffs have suffered no cognizable statutory injury under the Act. The Act does not authorize members to sue health clubs for technical statutory violations which cause the member no harm. Moreover, the Act does not authorize health club members to recover statutory or nominal damages for mere technical violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment because plaintiffs lack Article III standing. View "Wendt v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Copia Communications, LLC, a Massachusetts company, brought this action in federal district court in Massachusetts against Seawind Key Investments, Limited, a Jamaican resort operator, and Seawind’s alleged alter-ego, AMResorts, LP, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, alleging breach of contract. The subject contract was proposed and executed in Jamaica, performance on the contract occurred almost exclusively in Jamaica, and the contract was governed by the laws of Jamaica. Both defendants, neither of which operated any business or had any corporate presence in Massachusetts, moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants was barred by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, LP" on Justia Law

Normandy Apartments, Ltd. owned and managed a low-income rental housing project where tenants’ rents were federally subsidized under the Section 8 project-based program. In 2004, Normandy and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) entered into a contract (the HAP contract) wherein HUD agreed to pay rental housing assistance to Normandy. Normandy and HUD renewed the contract annually until 2004. The named parties and signatories of the 2004 HAP contract were the Oklahoma Housing Finance Authority and Normandy. In 2007, HUD notified Normandy that its assistance payments would be terminated because Normandy defaulted on the HAP contract by repeatedly failing to maintain the apartments. In 2010, Normandy filed suit against the government in the United States Court of Federal Claims asserting a breach of the 2004 HAP Contract and requesting damages. The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Normandy then filed an amended complaint asserting a takings claim against the government. The Claims Court granted summary judgment in favor of the government. The Federal Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the Claims Court correctly dismissed Normandy’s breach of contract claim for lack of jurisdiction because the United States was not a party to the 2004 HAP contract; and (2) HUD’s conduct did not constitute a regulatory taking. View "Normandy Apartments, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Trona is a sodium carbonate compound that is processed into soda ash or baking soda. Because oil and gas development posed a risk to the extraction of trona and trona worker safety, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which manages the leasing of federal public land for mineral development, indefinitely suspended all oil and gas leases in the mechanically mineable trona area (MMTA) of Wyoming. The area includes 26 pre-existing oil and gas leases owned by Barlow. Barlow filed suit, alleging that the BLM’s suspension of oil and gas leases constituted a taking of Barlow’s interests without just compensation and constituted a breach of both the express provisions of the leases and their implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing. The Federal Circuit affirmed the Claims Court’s dismissal of the contract claims on the merits and of the takings claim as unripe. BLM has not repudiated the contracts and Barlow did not establish that seeking a permit to drill would be futile. View "Barlow & Haun, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

Defendants, an unlicensed residential builder; his businesses; and Denaglen Corp., a check-cashing service, appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, homeowners who contracted to have their home restored following a flood. On appeal, this case raised four issues: (1) whether MCL 339.2412(1), which prohibited an unlicensed builder from "bring[ing] or maintain[ing] an action . . . for the collection of compensation," prevents an unlicensed builder from defending on the merits against claims asserted against him by a homeowner; (2) whether MCL 339.2412(1) provided a homeowner with an independent cause of action for damages arising from the statute's violation; (3) whether a contract for the services of an unlicensed builder was void ab initio or whether it may have some form of continuing legal existence; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default of defendant Denaglen Corp., the check-cashing service. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the appellate court erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs. While the Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 339.2412(1) did not prevent an unlicensed builder from defending against a lawsuit on its merits and did not afford a homeowner an independent cause of action to seek damages for its violation. However, contracts between an innocent homeowner and an unlicensed residential builder were voidable by the homeowner and thereby effective in conveying rights and authorities to both parties and third parties. The Court of Appeals therefore erred when it declared the contract at issue void ab initio, "although that court's error was wholly understandable given the confusing state of applicable law." Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant defendant Denaglen relief from its default. However, because the proper amount of damages remained in dispute, Denaglen was free to attempt to challenge the extent of its liability. View "Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Town of Camden for thirty-one years prior to being laid off. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police union and the Town provided for recall of qualified employees based on seniority. During the twelve-month period after Plaintiff was laid off, vacancies opened in the Camden Police Department, but the Town did not recall Plaintiff. Plaintiff and his wife brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the Town had deprived Plaintiff, without due process of law, of his property interest in his right to be recalled. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. The First Circuit vacated the dismissal and remanded. On remand, the district court entered judgment for the Town, concluding that the CBA contained a condition precedent requiring Plaintiff to submit his address and phone number to the Town after his layoff in order to assert his recall rights and that Plaintiff did not submit such information post-layoff. The First Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded, holding that the CBA recall provision did not unambiguously create a condition precedent, and therefore, further fact-finding was necessary. View "Clukey v. Town of Camden, Maine" on Justia Law

Duit, an Oklahoma highway contractor, contracted with the Arkansas State Highway and Transportation Department (ASHTD) to reconstruct I-30 between Little Rock and Benton. Duit encountered soil conditions that, it alleges, differed materially from information provided by the ASHTD during bidding. Duit’s claims for compensation were denied by the ASHTD, the Arkansas State Claims Commission, and the General Assembly. Duit sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, citing the “in re Young” exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Duit alleged violations of the Federal Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. 101, and the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses and sought to “enjoin Defendants from accepting federal aid … until . . . they fully comply with the federally mandated differing site clause.” The court dismissed the FAHA claim because that statute is enforced exclusively by an executive agency, dismissed the due process claim because Duit’s interest in future highway contracts is not a protected property interest and because the state appeals process for claim denials satisfies procedural due process requirements. The court declined to dismiss the equal protection claim, concluding Duit sufficiently alleged that the Commission treated out-of-state-contractor Duit differently from similarly situated in-state contractors without a rational reason. The Eighth Circuit held that Duit lacks standing to bring its equal protection claim and that the court erred in not dismissing that claim. View "Duit Constr. Co. Inc. v. Bennett" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the district court found Defendant guilty of harassment. Defendant attended his sentencing hearing without his lawyer. After a brief colloquy with Defendant, the district court found that Defendant had validly waived his right to counsel. The court then sentenced Defendant to the maximum five-day jail term allowed for a term of probation for the harassment offense. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) upheld Defendant’s sentence, concluding that Defendant waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court vacated Defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing hearing, holding that the record did not support a finding that Defendant’s waiver of counsel was knowingly and intelligently made. View "State v. Phua" on Justia Law

Zastrow appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on their claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. 961–1968, and 42 U.S.C. 1981 and 1982. The court concluded that plaintiff has not shown that defendants’ alleged predicate acts amount to or constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity; even if plaintiff had produced evidence of a pattern of racketeering activity, he has not demonstrated the existence of an enterprise; and therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's breach of contract claim dressed in civil RICO garb. The court also concluded that because plaintiff has alleged that Mercedes Greenway refused to sell him parts after he testified in support of some clients' discrimination claims, he has stated a claim for retaliation under section 1981. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's RICO claim and his section 1982 claim, but vacated as to the section 1981 claim, remanding for further proceedings. View "Zastrow v. Houston Auto Imports Greenway" on Justia Law

This case involves multiple causes of action based on allegations of bribery to procure construction sites. Plaintiff alleged that he and his company GRG were punished for refusing to participate in the corruption of municipal authorities. On appeal, the court concluded that GRG has met its summary judgment burden with respect to its Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims and has sufficiently supported those elements of its claims for tortious interference with business relations that the district court ruled on. The court affirmed the judgment dismissing HISD from liability for RICO and federal constitutional violations and state law claims; affirmed the judgment dismissing Defendant Marshall from liability for constitutional violations; reversed and remanded for further proceedings the summary judgment dismissing the RICO claims against the non-HISD defendants insofar as they allege injury covering the remainder of the 2009 job-order contract period; and reversed and remanded or further proceedings the summary judgment dismissing the claim against the non-HISD defendants for tortious interference with prospective business relations and the civil conspiracy claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed and remanded in part. View "Gil Ramirez Group, L.L.C. v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist." on Justia Law