Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to New York City's Guaranty Law, which was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law rendered personal guaranties of commercial lease obligations arising between March 7, 2020, and June 30, 2021, permanently unenforceable and identified efforts to collect on such guaranties as proscribed commercial tenant harassment. Plaintiffs, a group of New York City landlords, argued that the law violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Guaranty Law was unconstitutional.The City of New York appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the City did not enforce the Guaranty Law. The Second Circuit found that while the plaintiffs had standing at the pleadings stage due to the presumption of enforcement, they failed to meet the heightened burden on summary judgment to show a credible threat of imminent enforcement by the City. The City had unequivocally disavowed any intent to enforce the Guaranty Law against the plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award of summary judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the City's request to vacate its earlier judgment reversing the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and denied the City costs on the appeal due to its negligent delay in raising the enforcement-based standing challenge. View "Bochner v. City of New York" on Justia Law

Anthony Cordero, a student at Montana State University (MSU) during the Spring 2020 semester, sued MSU for prorated reimbursement of his tuition and fees after the university transitioned to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cordero claimed that MSU breached an express contract to provide in-person education and services. He also asserted claims for breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, due process violation, violation of the takings clause, and inverse condemnation.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County dismissed four of Cordero’s six claims, including the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU on the remaining claims, including the express contract claim, and denied Cordero’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The court found that Cordero did not identify a specific, bargained-for promise by MSU to provide in-person education and that he had no compensable property interest in the tuition and fees paid.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that there was an express contract between Cordero and MSU, but it did not include a specific promise to provide in-person education. The court found that MSU had the right to change its regulations and policies, including transitioning to online learning during emergencies. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, noting that an implied contract cannot exist when an express contract is present. The court concluded that MSU did not breach its contractual duties regarding tuition and fees, as it maintained campus facilities and services to the extent possible during the pandemic. View "Cordero v. Montana State University" on Justia Law

Dr. Anthony Tufaro, a former Chief of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery and Professor of Medicine at the University of Oklahoma (OU), filed a lawsuit against OU and three of its doctors after his contract was not renewed. Tufaro alleged that his contract was not renewed because he had exposed various discrepancies and misconduct within OU’s Medical and Dental Colleges. His claims included wrongful termination, First Amendment retaliation, Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property and liberty, breach of contract, and violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. In the federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all the § 1983 claims against OU and the individual defendants in their official capacities, as they were not considered "persons" under § 1983. The court also dismissed the breach of contract claim against OU, as it found that OU had followed the procedures outlined in the Faculty Handbook. However, Tufaro's Burk tort claim against OU survived the motion to dismiss.After discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court ruled that Tufaro's complaints fell outside the scope of the First Amendment because they were made during his employment as part of his official duties. The court also held that Tufaro failed to demonstrate he was an "at-will" employee, an essential element of the Burk tort claim. Following the entry of summary judgment on all remaining claims, the district court entered final judgment, ending Tufaro’s case. Tufaro appealed several of the district court's rulings. View "Tufaro v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma" on Justia Law

The case involves Mid Valley Pipeline Company, an interstate pipeline company, and the Board of Mississippi Levee Commissioners. In 1949, the Levee Board granted Mid Valley a permit to construct and maintain two pipelines across a levee in Mississippi. The permit was not limited to a term of years and could be revoked by the Levee Board if Mid Valley failed to comply with any of the permit's conditions. In 2005, Mid Valley was instructed to relocate its pipelines, which it did at a cost of over $700,000. In 2020, the Levee Board informed Mid Valley that it would be charging an annual pipeline crossing fee and would revoke all existing permits for pipelines not currently paying the fee. Mid Valley did not respond to these notices.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi granted summary judgment in favor of the Levee Board, dismissing Mid Valley's claim that the imposition of the annual fee and the revocation of the permit violated the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution. The court reasoned that the 1949 permit was not a contract.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with the district court that the 1949 permit was not a contract. The court noted that under Mississippi law, a contract requires mutual assent, among other elements. The court found that the permit was a unilateral grant of permission by the Levee Board, and there was no evidence of mutual assent to form a contract. Therefore, the Levee Board's actions did not violate the Contract Clause. View "Mid Valley Pipeline v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Intellectual Tech LLC (IT), a wholly owned subsidiary of OnAsset Intelligence, Inc. (OnAsset), and its patent dispute with Zebra Technologies Corporation (Zebra). In 2019, IT asserted U.S. Patent No. 7,233,247 against Zebra, claiming that it was the owner and assignee of the patent. However, Zebra moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that IT lacked standing. The district court initially denied the motion, but later granted it based on its determination that IT lacked constitutional standing, leading to the dismissal of all claims without prejudice.Previously, OnAsset had granted Main Street Capital Corporation (Main Street), a lender, a security interest in its patents, including the one in question, as part of a loan agreement. When OnAsset defaulted on the loan, Main Street gained certain rights. Subsequently, OnAsset assigned the patent to IT, which also defaulted on its obligations. The district court found that Main Street's ability to license the patent upon default deprived IT of all its exclusionary rights, leading to a lack of constitutional standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation. The appellate court found that IT retained at least one exclusionary right, even considering the rights Main Street gained upon default. The court clarified that a patent owner has exclusionary rights as a baseline matter unless it has transferred all exclusionary rights away. The court concluded that IT still suffered an injury in fact from infringement even if IT and Main Street could both license the patent. Therefore, the appellate court reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Intellectual Tech LLC v. Zebra Technologies Corp." on Justia Law

In 2020, Luke Hogan, a graduate student at Southern Methodist University (SMU), found his final semester disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic. Like many institutions, SMU shifted to online classes in response to government lockdown orders. Hogan, feeling cheated out of the in-person educational experience he had paid for, sued SMU for breach of contract. He sought a refund of his tuition and fees, arguing that the shift to online learning constituted a breach of SMU's promise of in-person education.The federal district court sided with SMU, and Hogan appealed. The Fifth Circuit then certified a question to the Supreme Court of Texas: Does the application of the Pandemic Liability Protection Act (PLPA) to Hogan’s breach-of-contract claim violate the retroactivity clause in article I, section 16 of the Texas Constitution? The PLPA, enacted in 2021, protects schools from monetary liability for altering their activities in response to the pandemic.The Supreme Court of Texas held that the application of the PLPA to Hogan's claim does not violate the Texas Constitution's prohibition on retroactive laws. The court reasoned that Hogan did not have a settled expectation of recovering damages from SMU under these circumstances. The court noted that the common law has traditionally excused a party from performing a contract when performance is rendered impossible by an act of God or government. The court also pointed out that Hogan voluntarily accepted SMU's offer to complete his degree online without a corresponding offer of tuition refunds or reduced fees. Therefore, any right of recovery that might have existed for Hogan was speculative and untested prior to the PLPA's enactment. The court concluded that the PLPA, enacted to resolve legal uncertainty created by the pandemic, did not upset Hogan's settled expectations and thus did not violate the constitutional prohibition on retroactive laws. View "HOGAN v. SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY" on Justia Law

The Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Indian Reservation brought a suit against the United States, alleging various claims concerning water rights and water-related infrastructure. The Tribe claimed that the United States breached duties of trust by mismanaging water rights and infrastructure held by the United States and operated for the Tribe, breached contracts with the Tribe, and effected unconstitutional takings of the Tribe’s property. The Claims Court dismissed all the breach of trust claims, held that one breach of contract claim was barred by a 2012 settlement agreement, and found the remaining breach of contract and takings claims time barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the Claims Court's decision. The Court of Appeals held that the Winters doctrine and the 1899 Act did not sufficiently establish trust duties to support Indian Tucker Act jurisdiction with respect to the Tribe’s claims that the United States has a duty to construct new infrastructure and secure new water for the Tribe. However, the Court found that the 1906 Act imposes trust duties on the United States sufficient to support a claim at least with respect to management of existing water infrastructure. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of one breach of contract claim, vacated and remanded another, and affirmed the dismissal of the takings claims. View "UTE INDIAN TRIBE OF THE UINTAH & OURAY INDIAN RESERVATION v. US" on Justia Law

Whitetail Wave LLC, a Montana Limited Liability Company, sued XTO Energy, Inc., a Delaware corporation, the Board of University and School Lands of the State of North Dakota, the State of North Dakota, and the Department of Water Resources and its Director. Whitetail Wave claimed ownership of certain property in McKenzie County, North Dakota, and alleged that XTO Energy had breached their lease agreement by failing to make required royalty payments. Whitetail Wave also claimed that the State's assertion of an interest in the mineral interests associated with the property constituted an unconstitutional taking without just compensation.The District Court of McKenzie County granted summary judgment in favor of the State and XTO Energy. The court concluded that the State owned certain mineral interests within the ordinary high watermark as defined by North Dakota law. The court also found that XTO Energy was within the safe harbor provision provided by North Dakota law and did not breach the parties’ lease agreement when it withheld the royalty payments. The court awarded XTO Energy recovery of its attorney’s fees.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the judgment of the district court. The Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim of an unconstitutional taking against the State, as the State's actions were limited to a title dispute. The Supreme Court also found that the district court did not err in dismissing Whitetail Wave's claim against XTO Energy for the non-payment of royalties, as XTO Energy fell within the safe harbor provision of North Dakota law. Finally, the Supreme Court found that the district court did not err in awarding XTO Energy a recovery of its attorney’s fees as the prevailing party. View "Whitetail Wave v. XTO Energy" on Justia Law