Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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In 2016, the Village of Schaumburg enacted an ordinance requiring commercial and multifamily properties to route fire alarm signals directly to a regional emergency-dispatch center. This ordinance aimed to reduce fire department response times and had financial benefits for the Village. Several alarm companies, which previously used a different model for transmitting alarm signals, claimed that the ordinance caused them to lose business and led to more expensive and lower-quality alarm services for customers.The alarm companies sued the Village, alleging that the ordinance violated the Contracts Clause and tortiously interfered with their contracts and prospective economic advantage. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois initially dismissed the federal claims and relinquished jurisdiction over the state-law claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed in part, allowing the Contracts Clause claim to proceed. However, on remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the Village, finding that the alarm companies failed to provide evidence that the ordinance caused customers to breach existing contracts or that the Village intended to interfere with their business relationships.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the alarm companies did not present sufficient evidence to show that the ordinance caused customers to breach contracts or that the Village acted with the intent to harm the alarm companies' businesses. The court also found that the alarm companies' claims of tortious interference with prospective economic advantage failed because the Village's actions were motivated by public safety and financial considerations, not a desire to harm the alarm companies. View "Alarm Detection Systems, Inc. v. Village of Schaumburg" on Justia Law

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Darian McKinney, a health and physical education teacher, was employed by the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) for four years. During his tenure, he was investigated for sexual harassment, leading to a grievance he filed against DCPS. Both disputes were resolved through a Settlement Agreement, under which McKinney resigned but was allowed to reapply for teaching positions. However, when he reapplied, DCPS blocked his return, citing a failed background check.McKinney sued the District of Columbia, alleging that DCPS breached the Settlement Agreement by not fairly considering his employment applications and deprived him of property and liberty without due process. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed his complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Settlement Agreement did not obligate DCPS to fairly consider McKinney’s applications, only to allow him to apply. The court found no basis in the contract’s language or law for McKinney’s demand for fair consideration. Additionally, the court ruled that McKinney did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his original job, the contingent job offers, or his eligibility for DCPS positions. The court also found that McKinney’s claim of deprivation of liberty without due process was forfeited as it was not raised in the lower court.The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of McKinney’s complaint. View "Darian McKinney v. DC" on Justia Law

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Intellectual Capitol, Inc., JMI Sports, and JMIS College, LLC (Appellants) obtained contracts through the state procurement process with the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (WCC) and Clemson University (Respondents). Disputes arose under these contracts, leading Respondents to file Requests for Resolution of Contract Controversy with the Chief Procurement Officer (CPO) for the State of South Carolina. Appellants then filed separate declaratory judgment actions in circuit court, challenging the constitutionality of section 11-35-4230 of the South Carolina Code, which grants the CPO exclusive jurisdiction over state contract disputes.The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss the declaratory judgment actions, ruling that section 11-35-4230 placed exclusive jurisdiction over the State's contract disputes with the CPO. The court also dismissed Appellants' constitutional claims as premature due to their failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Appellants appealed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court held that the contracts between Appellants and Respondents contained a clear choice-of-forum provision, which unambiguously gave the CPO exclusive authority to resolve disputes. By agreeing to this provision, Appellants waived their right to have their disputes decided by a court of the unified judicial system. Consequently, there was no justiciable controversy, rendering the constitutional challenge to section 11-35-4230 a purely academic exercise. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment actions, as there were no legal rights at issue. View "Intellectual Capital, Inc. v. Chief Procurement Officer" on Justia Law

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8fig, Incorporated, a technology company, entered into agreements with several e-commerce merchants (Defendant-Appellants) to purchase projected revenue in exchange for an up-front payment. 8fig alleged that the Defendant-Appellants failed to remit the agreed payments and instead transferred the funds to a religious movement, World Olivet Assembly, closed their bank accounts, and went out of business. 8fig filed a lawsuit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964, 1962, and various state and common law claims. The parties filed a Joint Agreed Motion to Administratively Close and Seal Proceedings, which the district court granted, and the case settled quickly.Newsweek Digital, LLC moved to intervene and unseal the judicial record, arguing that the seal hindered its reporting. The district court granted Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal, allowing any party to propose redactions. Certain defendants filed proposed redactions, which the district court granted, and denied a motion to extend filing deadlines. The district court proceeding has been unsealed for over a year, except for documents with redacted versions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Newsweek had standing to intervene, as alleged violations of the public right to access judicial records and gather news are cognizable injuries-in-fact. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in unsealing the records, emphasizing the public’s common law right of access to judicial records and the presumption in favor of transparency. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal the proceeding. View "8Fig v. Stepup Funny" on Justia Law

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In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

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King County, Washington, issued Executive Order PFC-7-1-EO, which directed county officials to ensure that future leases at Boeing Field prohibit fixed base operators (FBOs) from servicing U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) charter flights. This order was based on the county's disagreement with federal immigration policies. Following the issuance of the order, all three FBOs at Boeing Field ceased servicing ICE flights, forcing ICE to relocate its operations to Yakima Air Terminal, which increased operational costs and security concerns.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment for the United States, finding that the Executive Order violated both the Supremacy Clause’s intergovernmental immunity doctrine and a World War II-era contract reconveying Boeing Field to King County. The district court concluded that the Executive Order discriminated against the federal government and its contractors and breached the Instrument of Transfer, which required King County to allow the United States nonexclusive use of the landing area at Boeing Field.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the United States had Article III standing to bring the suit, as it had suffered concrete and particularized injuries due to the increased operational costs and imminent risk of future injury from the Executive Order. The court also found that the United States’ claims were ripe for adjudication.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Executive Order violated the Instrument of Transfer by preventing ICE from using Boeing Field, thus breaching the contractual right of the United States to use the airport. Additionally, the court held that the Executive Order violated the intergovernmental immunity doctrine by improperly regulating federal operations and discriminating against the federal government and its contractors. The court rejected King County’s defenses, including the anti-commandeering and market participant doctrines. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA V. KING COUNTY" on Justia Law

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Laura Marie Obert, a former Broadwater County Commissioner, was investigated by the Montana Department of Justice Division of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in 2015 for allegedly receiving unlawful overtime pay and potential ethics violations. In 2016, Obert entered a deferred prosecution agreement with the Assistant Attorney General, agreeing to repay the excess wages and abstain from voting on matters where she had a conflict of interest. In 2019, based on new allegations of violating the agreement, Obert was charged with felony theft and misdemeanor official misconduct. The district court dismissed these charges in 2021, finding Obert had complied with the agreement and there was insufficient evidence for the misconduct charge.Obert then sued the State of Montana and Broadwater County Attorney Cory Swanson, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, due process violations, and malicious prosecution. The First Judicial District Court dismissed her claims, leading to this appeal.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and made several determinations. It reversed the lower court's dismissal of Obert's breach of contract and good faith and fair dealing claims, holding that these claims were not time-barred and did not accrue until the criminal charges were dismissed. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of Obert's bad faith claim, finding no special relationship existed between Obert and the State that would support such a claim. The court also upheld the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim, ruling that Swanson was protected by prosecutorial immunity as he acted within his statutory duties. Lastly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the due process claim, concluding that Obert's procedural due process rights were not violated as the State followed proper procedures in charging her and the district court provided an appropriate forum to address the alleged breach of the agreement. View "Obert v State" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to New York City's Guaranty Law, which was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law rendered personal guaranties of commercial lease obligations arising between March 7, 2020, and June 30, 2021, permanently unenforceable and identified efforts to collect on such guaranties as proscribed commercial tenant harassment. Plaintiffs, a group of New York City landlords, argued that the law violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Guaranty Law was unconstitutional.The City of New York appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the City did not enforce the Guaranty Law. The Second Circuit found that while the plaintiffs had standing at the pleadings stage due to the presumption of enforcement, they failed to meet the heightened burden on summary judgment to show a credible threat of imminent enforcement by the City. The City had unequivocally disavowed any intent to enforce the Guaranty Law against the plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award of summary judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the City's request to vacate its earlier judgment reversing the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and denied the City costs on the appeal due to its negligent delay in raising the enforcement-based standing challenge. View "Bochner v. City of New York" on Justia Law

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Anthony Cordero, a student at Montana State University (MSU) during the Spring 2020 semester, sued MSU for prorated reimbursement of his tuition and fees after the university transitioned to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Cordero claimed that MSU breached an express contract to provide in-person education and services. He also asserted claims for breach of implied contract, unjust enrichment, due process violation, violation of the takings clause, and inverse condemnation.The First Judicial District Court of Lewis and Clark County dismissed four of Cordero’s six claims, including the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, under M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The court granted summary judgment in favor of MSU on the remaining claims, including the express contract claim, and denied Cordero’s motion to certify the case as a class action. The court found that Cordero did not identify a specific, bargained-for promise by MSU to provide in-person education and that he had no compensable property interest in the tuition and fees paid.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decisions. The court held that there was an express contract between Cordero and MSU, but it did not include a specific promise to provide in-person education. The court found that MSU had the right to change its regulations and policies, including transitioning to online learning during emergencies. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the implied contract and unjust enrichment claims, noting that an implied contract cannot exist when an express contract is present. The court concluded that MSU did not breach its contractual duties regarding tuition and fees, as it maintained campus facilities and services to the extent possible during the pandemic. View "Cordero v. Montana State University" on Justia Law

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Dr. Anthony Tufaro, a former Chief of Plastic & Reconstructive Surgery and Professor of Medicine at the University of Oklahoma (OU), filed a lawsuit against OU and three of its doctors after his contract was not renewed. Tufaro alleged that his contract was not renewed because he had exposed various discrepancies and misconduct within OU’s Medical and Dental Colleges. His claims included wrongful termination, First Amendment retaliation, Fourteenth Amendment deprivation of property and liberty, breach of contract, and violation of the Oklahoma Constitution.The case was initially filed in state court but was later removed to federal court. In the federal court, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which the court granted in part and denied in part. The court dismissed all the § 1983 claims against OU and the individual defendants in their official capacities, as they were not considered "persons" under § 1983. The court also dismissed the breach of contract claim against OU, as it found that OU had followed the procedures outlined in the Faculty Handbook. However, Tufaro's Burk tort claim against OU survived the motion to dismiss.After discovery, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted. The court ruled that Tufaro's complaints fell outside the scope of the First Amendment because they were made during his employment as part of his official duties. The court also held that Tufaro failed to demonstrate he was an "at-will" employee, an essential element of the Burk tort claim. Following the entry of summary judgment on all remaining claims, the district court entered final judgment, ending Tufaro’s case. Tufaro appealed several of the district court's rulings. View "Tufaro v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma" on Justia Law