Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Brady Dougan and Tomoko Dougan entered into a stipulation for judgment dissolving their marriage that contained a provision ordering Brady to pay interest if he failed to make payments to Tomoko. Both of the parties entered into the agreement with knowledge of its terms, and the trial court found the stipulation for judgment to be fair and reasonable. When Brady later failed to render a complete payment to defendant, Tomoko moved for enforcement of the stipulation and requested that the trial court order the plaintiff to pay her interest in accordance with the terms of the judgment. The trial court held that the provision for interest was invalid and unenforceable as against public policy. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court. On Brady's appeal to the Supreme Court, Tomoko was granted special permission to raise the alternate ground that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed because the doctrine of judicial estoppel supports the enforcement of the interest provision. The Court agreed with Tomoko and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court, finding the doctrine of judicial estoppel barred Brady from claiming the provision was unenforceable.

Defendant and his wife appeal the trial court's judgment in a breach of contract and lien foreclosure action arising out of a dispute concerning the construction of a single-family home in the town of Greenwich. Defendants challenged all aspects of the trial court's judgment in favor of plaintiff except the portion of the judgment awarding plaintiff loss profit. Plaintiff challenged in his cross-appeal that the trial court improperly accepted the attorney trial referee's determination that the mechanic's lien was invalid and therefore improperly awarded defendants damages under General Statutes 49-8(c). The court held that because plaintiff and third party defendant offered no legal support for the attorney trial referee's finding that the wife was liable for breaching the contract between defendant and plaintiff, the portion of the trial court's judgment that was rendered against her could not stand. The court also held that the judgment of foreclosure must be reversed where there was no evidence that plaintiff furnished any materials or provided any services in connection with the contract balance and that the portion of the judgment awarding plaintiff attorney's fees pursuant to General Statutes 52-249 must also be reversed where such an award was authorized only when a valid judgment of foreclosure had been obtained. The court further held that the parties did not intend to impose liability for delays in the permitting and wetlands approval process and that the attorney trial referee improperly found that plaintiff was entitled to damages for the delays attributable to the change orders. The court also held that because plaintiff was not entitled to recover delay damages, it necessarily followed that any mechanic's lien securing those damages was invalid. The court finally held that the case must be remanded to the trial court for a determination of reasonable attorney's fees in accordance with section 49-8(c).

Bruce Bedrick appeals the trial courtâs decision in favor of his wife Deborah Bedrick. Deborah filed suit seeking dissolution of her marriage in August, 2007. She sought permanent alimony, an equitable distribution of the partiesâ real and personal property, and other relief. Bruce filed a cross-complaint seeking to enforce a postnuptial agreement that the parties executed in December, 1977 but most recently modified in 1989. The agreement provided that in the event of dissolution, neither party would pay alimony. Instead, Deborah would receive a cash settlement. The 1989 amendment listed the cash settlement to be $75,000. The agreement further provided that Deborah would waive her interests in Bruceâs businesses, and not be liable for Bruceâs personal and business loans. The trial court concluded that because there was not much case law addressing the validity of postnuptial agreements in Connecticut to use as a guide, it may not enforce an agreement that was not fair and equitable. The court concluded that the postnuptial agreement was not fair and equitable, and declined to enforce it. Bruce appealed the decision and lost. The Supreme Court reviewed the case and concluded that postnuptial agreements are valid and enforceable, and generally must comply with contract principles. The Court also concluded that the terms of such agreements should be both fair and equitable at the time of execution, and not unconscionable at the time of dissolution. The Court found that the terms of the Bedricksâ agreement were unconscionable, and it affirmed the lower courtâs decision.