Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

In 2008, the legislature enacted legislation to establish the Idaho Education Network (IEN), which was to be a high-bandwidth telecommunications distribution system for distance learning in every public school in the state. Syringa Networks, LLC (Syringa), an Idaho telecommunications company, entered into a “teaming agreement” with ENA Services, LLC (ENA). Pursuant to their agreement, ENA submitted a proposal in response to a request-for-proposals (RFP) with the Department of Administration, although the cover letter stated that both ENA and Syringa were responding jointly to the proposal. Qwest Communications Company, LLC, and Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., also submitted responsive proposals. The proposals were then scored based upon specific criteria; the ENA and Qwest proposals received the highest scores. The Department issued a letter of intent to award contracts to Qwest and ENA. One month later, it issued amendments to the two purchase orders to alter the scope of work that each would perform. Qwest became "the general contractor for all IEN technical network services" (providing the “backbone”) and ENA became "the Service Provider." The effect of these amendments was to make Qwest the exclusive provider of the backbone, which was what Syringa intended to provide as a subcontractor of ENA. Syringa filed this lawsuit against the Department, its director, the chief technology officer, ENA and Qwest. The district court ultimately dismissed Syringa’s lawsuit against all of the Defendants on their respective motions for summary judgment. Syringa then appealed the grants of summary judgment, and the State Defendants cross-appealed the refusal to award them attorney fees. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment dismissing all counts of the complaint except count three seeking to set aside the State's contract with Qwest on the ground that it was awarded in violation of the applicable statutes. Furthermore, the Court reversed Qwest’s award of attorney fees against Syringa. We remand to the trial court the determination of whether any of the State Defendants were entitled to an award of attorney fees against Syringa for proceedings in the district court. The Court awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal to ENA. Because the State Defendants and Syringa both prevailed only in part on appeal, the Court did not award them either costs or attorney fees on appeal. View "Syringa Networks v. Idaho Dept of Admin" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the FCC's issuance of an order requiring telecommunications carriers to make payments into a Universal Service Fund for subsidizing services for certain categories of consumers. At issue was what should happen to the intrastate portion of the fees that the customers paid to reimburse the carriers for the payments they made to the fund. The court held that the district court correctly decided that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the claims. Because the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the FCC's orders at all, it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the orders were invalid because they were outside the jurisdictional authority of the agency. View "Self v. BellSouth Mobility, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Gol TV produces soccer-related television programming, while Defendants EchoStar Satellite Corporation and EchoStar Satellite L.L.C. (known as DISH Network) distribute television programming to individual viewers via satellite. From 2003 until 2008, Gol TV’s programming was made available to subscribers of certain EchoStar service packages in exchange for EchoStar’s payment to Gol TV of contractually determined licensing fees. Gol TV brought a breach-of-contract suit against Echostar to recover monies due under the contract. The issue on appeal central to this dispute involved: (1) the calculation of licensing fees for the final ten days of the contract period; and (2) the accrual of interest for overdue payments. Upon review of the contract at issue, the Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation and affirmed its disposition of the case. View "Gol TV v. Echostar" on Justia Law

Razorback Concrete Company (Razorback) sued Dement Construction Company (Dement) for breach of contract and fraud based on disputes over performance of a concrete supply contract. The district court granted summary judgment to Dement on the fraud claim and partial summary judgment to Dement as to the measure of damages for the breach of contract claim, holding that Razorback was not entitled to recover damages under a lost profits theory. After obtaining a judgment on the contract claim, Razorback appealed the grants of summary judgment. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in (1) granting summary judgment in favor of Dement on Razorback's fraud claim, as Razorback failed to identify any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dement knew its representation as false at the time it was made; and (2) granting partial summary judgment to Dement on Razorback's claim for lost provides, holding that Razorback failed to supply evidence creating a fact issue regarding whether it was a lost volume seller or whether damages provided or under Ark. Code Ann. 4-2-708(1) were otherwise inadequate. View "Razorback Concrete Co. v. Dement Constr. Co. " on Justia Law

Two appeals are were consolidated from chancery-court cases. In the first case, Diamondhead Country Club and Property Owners Association, Inc. sued Thomas R. Alfonso, III, and Anne Scafidi Cordova,1 d/b/a Bay Jourdan Publishing Co. (BJP) for breach of a contract to publish "The Diamondhead News." In 1997, the chancery court entered a preliminary injunction order preventing BJP from publishing "The Diamondhead News," selling advertising, collecting or disposing of advertising revenues derived from the publication the paper, and interfering with the printing, publication, or distribution of "The Diamondhead News." The chancery court also found that an arbitration clause in the publishing contract was inapplicable to the lawsuit. The chancery court denied BJP’s two subsequent motions to compel arbitration of the breach-of-contract dispute. BJP appealed the chancery court’s latest denial of arbitration. In the second case, BJP sued Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing Co., Inc., d/b/a "The Sun Herald" (“Gulf Publishing”), for intentional interference with the publishing contract. Gulf Publishing filed a motion for summary judgment. The court granted summary judgment to Gulf Publishing and directed the entry of a final judgment as to Gulf Publishing pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). BJP appealed the grant of summary judgment. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the chancery court’s order denying BJP’s third motion to compel arbitration because the issue was ruled upon previously, and no appeal was taken. Finding genuine issues of material fact for trial, the Court reversed the chancery court’s order granting summary judgment to Diamondhead and Gulf Publishing, and remanded the second case for further proceedings.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit certified a question to the Washington Supreme Court concerning whether an "early termination fee" (ETF) in a broadband internet service contract constituted an "alternative performance provision" or as a liquidated damages clause. Appellants are all customers who either incurred this ETF for canceling early or were threatened with this ETF for attempting to cancel early. All Appellants were dissatisfied with Clearwire’s service, alleging that instead of the fast and reliable service promised, they received inconsistent and painstakingly slow speeds. Plaintiff Chad Minnick sued Clearwire in King County Superior Court in April 2009, claiming that Clearwire was committing false advertising and was imposing ETFs unlawfully. He then filed the first amended complaint in May, which added the other 11 plaintiffs through class certification. In July, Clearwire removed the case to the federal district court where it filed a motion to dismiss all of Appellants' claims. The district court granted Clearwire's motion. Appellants then appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the ETF was a liquidated damages provision and not an alternative performance provision as the trial court found. Under Washington law, an alternative performance provision is distinguishable from a liquidated damages provision because it provides a "real option" to the promisor and the alternatives are reasonably equal to each other. Here, the ETF provided a "real option" at the time of contracting because Appellants wanted to retain the control and flexibility that the early cancellation allowed them. Further, the ETF was less expensive than the remaining payments for the majority of the contract's life, thereby indicating the options were reasonably related. The ETF also allowed Appellants to benefit from reduced monthly premiums under the fixed-term contract but also enjoy some of the flexibility of the month-to-month subscription. Therefore, the ETF is an alternative performance provision that is not subject to a penalty analysis.

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules.

This appeal arose from a dispute between incumbent local exchange carriers that provide service in rural areas of North Carolina (RLECs) and commercial mobile radio service providers (CMRS Providers) in North Carolina. The CMRS Providers filed a complaint in the district court against the RLECs and the Commissioners of the NCUC in their official capacities, seeking review of several determinations made by the NCUC and, ultimately, the approval of portions of the interconnection agreements (ICA). The district court subsequently denied the CMRS Providers' motion for summary judgment and granted the RLECs' and the NCUC's motions for summary judgment. The district court also affirmed the NCUC's Filing of Composite Agreements (FAO) and approval order. Because the court ultimately agreed with the arguments advanced by the RLECs and the NCUC, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

This case arose out of a dispute between two telecommunications carriers over their interconnection agreement (ICA) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Plaintiff Western is a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider and Defendant Qwest is a local exchange carrier (LEC). The court concluded that Western has failed to exhaust the prudential requirement that it first present its claim, that Qwest violated its statutory duty to negotiate the ICA in good faith, to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) before bringing that claim in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that claim. The court also concluded that the ICA's provision (1) requiring Western to interconnect with Qwest's network via at least one point per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA); and (2) providing Western with the signaling systems of its choice only where such systems were available, did not violate the Act. However, the court concluded that the ICA, as approved, did violate the Act insofar as it applied to access charges, rather than reciprocal compensation, to calls exchanged between a CMRS provider and a LEC, originating and terminating in the same LATA, when those calls were carried by an interexchange carrier (IXC). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision upholding the PUC's approval of the ICA to that extent, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

Claimant appealed from a judgment of the district court ordering the forfeiture to plaintiff United States, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. 401(a), of certain communication-jamming devices, to wit, the defendant-in-rem Jammers, owned by claimant and a company of which he was the majority shareholder and CEO. On appeal, claimant contended that the district court erred in dismissing his claim, arguing principally that the stipulation he signed was void on the grounds that it was signed under duress and without consideration. The court held that, as a matter of New York law, no consideration for claimant's agreement to the release was needed; and thus, if consideration was absent, its absence did not make the stipulation invalid. The court also held that claimant's assertions did not meet any part of the test of duress. The court further held that the district court correctly granted the government's motion to strike or for summary judgment on the ground of claimant's lack of Article III standing. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.