Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Commercial Law
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Plaintiff-Appellant Flying Phoenix Corporation appealed a district court’s dismissal of its claims against Defendants North Park Transportation Company and R&L Carriers Shared Services (the carriers), with prejudice, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Flying Phoenix purchased a machine designed to package fireworks for sale to end users from Defendant Creative Packaging Machinery, Inc. The machine arrived severely damaged. Creative Packaging was responsible for shipping the machine to Flying Phoenix. Creative Packaging used R&L Carriers Shared Services to ship from North Carolina to Wyoming. The bill of lading limited the period for filing claims with a carrier to nine months, and limited the time for filing civil suit to two years and one day following denial of a claim. At some point during the delivery, R&L Carriers transferred the machine to North Park Transportation Company to complete delivery to Flying Phoenix. Three days after the machine was delivered, Flying Phoenix filed a claim with North Park based on damage to the machine. Roughly two weeks later, North Park inspected the machine and confirmed that it was damaged. A little less than a month later, North Park and R&L Carriers notified Flying Phoenix that its claim was denied, citing evidence that the shipment was issued with insufficient packaging or protection. Flying Phoenix renewed its claim approximately six months later, in November 2007, and the carriers again denied the claim, asserting that the machine was "used" and inadequately packaged. On appeal, Flying Phoenix argued that the district court erred by holding that (1) its claims were based on the bill of lading, and (2) it was bound by the terms of the bill of lading even though it was not a party and did not consent. Upon review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Flying Phoenix's claims: "Flying Phoenix claim[ed] that, although it was listed as consignee on the bill of lading, it never saw the bill of lading until after the limitations period lapsed. It argue[d] that, since it did not know the terms of the carriage, it should not be bound. [The Court found] no precedent for Flying Phoenix’s position, and Flying Phoenix [did] not direct [the Court] to any. There is no suggestion in the record that Flying Phoenix ever sought a copy of the bill of lading but was denied access, and it is well-established that a party may not sit idly by, making no effort to obtain obviously necessary documents, and then claim ignorance. Lack of diligence precludes equitable intervention."

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Plaintiff contracted to sell a furniture business to Mendoza in 2004. Westernbank provided partial funding and obtained a first mortgage. To secure a deferred payment of $750,000, Mendoza signed a mortgage in favor of plaintiff and a contract under which plaintiff consigned goods with expected sales value of more than $6,000,000. An account was opened at Westernbank for deposit of sales proceeds. Plaintiff alleges that Westernbank kept funds to which plaintiff was entitled for satisfaction of Mendoza’s debts to Westernbank. Mendoza filed for bankruptcy and transferred its real estate to Westernbank in exchange for release of debt to the bank. Plaintiff agreed to forgive unpaid debts in order to obtain relief from the stay and foreclose its mortgage, then sued Westernbank, employees, and insurers, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-68, and Puerto Rico law causes of action. After BPPR became successor to Westernbank, plaintiff agreed to dismiss the civil law fraud and breach of fiduciary duty claims and the RICO claim. The district court later dismissed remaining claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over non-federal claims. The First Circuit affirmed.

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GMG contracted with Amicas to develop and license computer programs to accept information from a radiology patient management system established by Sage and send information to a billing system established by Sage. The warranty excluded any failure resulting from databases of GMG or third parties and warned that Amicas did not warrant that the software would meet GMG’s requirements. Amicas worked with Sage on the interfaces. GMG began using the programs and reported problems, eventually returning to its old method of manual processing, but did not inform Amicas of that decision or of persistent problems with the interface. GMG began negotiating with Sage to develop substitute software. When Amicas became aware of problems with the interface, it worked with Sage to resolve the concerns, but GMG sent Amicas a termination notice, citing failure to deliver a functional product. The district court found for Amicas on its breach of contract claim, rejected counterclaims, and awarded $778,889 in damages, $324,805 in attorneys’ fees, plus costs and interest. The Third Circuit affirmed, finding that Amicas satisfied its burden of proving performance and that GMG offered only conclusory allegations of noncompliance.

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Ford provides a warranty, entitling buyers of new vehicles to have Ford repair or replace defective components at any Ford dealer, regardless of where they purchased the vehicle. Ford reimburses dealers, providing a mark-up of 40% over cost for most parts. However, under the New Jersey Franchise Protection Act, Ford must reimburse dealers for parts at the "prevailing retail rate," charged customers for non-warranty work. Ford implemented a Dealer Parity Surcharge to recoup the increased cost. Ford calculated, for each New Jersey dealer, the cost of increased warranty reimbursements and divided by the number of vehicles purchased by that same dealer. That amount constituted the surcharge added to the wholesale price of every vehicle. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment that DPS violated the NJFPA. Ford devised a new system, NJCS, under which Ford calculated its total cost of complying with the NJFPA and divided by the number of wholesale vehicles sold in the state. A dealer’s total NJCS increased in proportion to the number of vehicles it purchased, regardless of how many warranty repairs it submitted. The district court found that NJCS violated NJFPA. The Third Circuit reversed in part, holding that the scheme does not violate the statute.

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Companion was authorized to license space in Wal-Mart stores to companies that sell durable medical equipment and entered into licensing agreements with defendants. In 2007, defendants shut down operations. Companion sued. Problems arose during discovery, including defense counsel motions to withdraw, allegations of inadequate responses to discovery requests, objections to the scope of discovery, refusal to attend depositions, motions to compel, multiple extensions, and claims of obstruction. After three years, the district judge imposed a default as to all counts, based on discovery violations by the defendants. The court eventually lifted the default except as to Companion's veil piercing claim, allowing the substantive claims to go to trial. A jury found for Companion and awarded more than $1 million in damages. Defendants, personally liable as a result of the default, appealed. The First Circuit vacated the default and remanded, "because the district court imposed such a severe sanction based on a very limited slice of the relevant facts."

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This was the second of two related lawsuits filed by Torrington Livestock Cattle Company (TLCC) against Daren and Jennifer Berg. In the first suit, Daren was found liable for breach of contract, conversion, and fraud. The court entered judgment in the favor of TLCC in the amount of $517,635, but the judgment remained unsatisfied. While the first suit was pending, the Bergs signed a promissory note with the First Bank of Torrington. As collateral, the bank acquired security interests in a variety of the Bergs' property, including livestock and ranching equipment. Later, the bank assigned the promissory note to TLCC. After the Bergs did not make the first payment, TLCC commenced the instant action, alleging breach of contract for promissory note and to enforce security agreement. The district court determined that no material issues of fact existed and TLCC was entitled to summary judgment. The Supreme Court summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court based upon the deficient brief offered by the Bergs and their failure to follow the rules of appellate procedure.

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BB&T brought suit against Borrowers and Guarantors for more than $19 million then due under certain promissory notes at issue. The promissory notes were executed as a result of BB&T's issuance of 16 loans for residential housing development. In Case No. S1161728, appellants argued that the Court of Appeals in holding that no valid foreclosure sale occurred, erroneously relied on its determination that BB&T did not satisfy the Statue of Frauds. The court held that there were no valid foreclosure sales to prevent BB&T from suing on the notes in the absence of confirmation under OCGA 44-14-161, regardless of whether there was a valid executory sales contract which satisfied the Statute of Frauds. In Case No. S11G1729, the court held that, although the Court of Appeals correctly held that none of BB&T's claims was barred by its failure to seek confirmation after the foreclosure auctions, that court did err in holding that the 2008 guaranties did not sufficiently identify any pre-2008 notes and that the 2008 Guarantors were estopped by BB&T's part performance from asserting a Statute of Frauds defense to BB&T's claims against them on pre-2008 notes.

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Metropolitan National Bank (MNB) loaned Grand Valley Ridge several million dollars for the completion of a subdivision. After Grand Valley failed to make its interest payments, MNB filed a petition for foreclosure. Grand Valley and Thomas Terminella, a member of Grand Valley (collectively, Appellants), filed an amended counterclaim alleging various causes of action. During the trial, the circuit court granted Appellants' motion to take a voluntary nonsuit of their claims of negligence and tortious interference with contract. The circuit court held in favor of MNB. The court subsequently granted MNB's petition for foreclosure and awarded a judgment against Appellants. Thereafter, Appellants filed a complaint alleging their original nonsuited counterclaims and adding additional claims. MNB moved to dismiss Appellants' complaint and filed a motion for sanctions. The circuit court granted both motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding, inter alia, (1) because Appellants brought claims clearly barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in awarding sanctions; and (2) the circuit court properly granted summary judgment for MNB on Grand Valley's nonsuited issues based on the applicable statute of limitations.

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Appellants, Leland and Ilene Haugen and Haugen Nutrition and Equipment, defaulted on promissory notes held by respondent United Prairie Bank-Mountain Lake (UPB). The various loan agreements between the parties contained provisions in which Appellants agreed to pay UPB's reasonable costs and attorney fees associated with the protection of UPB's security interests and the enforcement of Appellants' obligation to repay the loans. The district court denied Appellants' motion to submit the question of reasonable attorney fees to the jury and subsequently awarded UPB over $400,000 in attorney fees. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that UPB's claim for the recovery of attorney fees was equitable in nature and thus did not give rise to a jury trial right under the Minnesota Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that Appellants were constitutionally entitled to a jury determination on UPB's claim for attorney fees because the nature of the claim was contractual and the remedy sought was legal.

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The LLC was organized in 1999 to own and operate 100 fast-food restaurants. Khan owned 40% of the common units. Remaining common units, and all preferred units, were owned by Sentinel. Plaintiffs, restaurant managers, claim that they accepted lower salaries because Khan told them that he would acquire full ownership and would reward top managers with equity. In 2005, Khan became the sole equity owner, but did not distribute common units to any managers. Plaintiffs calculated that the price paid for Sentinel's interest implied that the business was worth about $48 million; in 2005, 20 managers qualified for units, so each lost about $1.2 million. The district court held that plaintiffs had not adequately estimated damages. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that value is what people will pay. The judiciary should not reject actual transactions prices when they are available.