Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Class Action
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In spring 2020, Czigany Beck, a full-time student at Manhattan College, paid tuition and a comprehensive fee for the semester. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the college transitioned to remote learning in March 2020, and Beck received only 46% of her education in person. Beck filed a class action lawsuit against Manhattan College, claiming breach of implied contract and unjust enrichment for not refunding a portion of her tuition and fees.The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed Beck's claims. The court found that the college's statements were not specific enough to constitute a promise for in-person classes or access to on-campus facilities. The court also ruled that the comprehensive fee was nonrefundable based on the college's terms, and thus Beck's unjust enrichment claim for fees was barred. The court granted summary judgment to Manhattan College on Beck's remaining unjust enrichment claim for tuition, concluding that the college's switch to online instruction was reasonable given the pandemic.Beck appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, arguing that the district court's judgment should be reversed based on the decision in Rynasko v. New York University. Manhattan College countered with decisions from the New York Supreme Court's Appellate Division, which supported affirming the district court's judgment. The Second Circuit identified a split between federal and state courts on New York contract-law principles and certified the question to the New York Court of Appeals: whether New York law requires a specific promise to provide exclusively in-person learning to form an implied contract between a university and its students regarding tuition payments. The Second Circuit reserved decision on Beck's appeal pending the New York Court of Appeals' response. View "Beck v. Manhattan College" on Justia Law

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In 2014, Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. (EMCF) filed a putative class action against BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. (BCBST), alleging breach of contract due to a cap on certain payments for medical services. The trial court denied class certification, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. EMCF then voluntarily nonsuited its claims. After a favorable ruling in a separate lawsuit against TennCare, EMCF refiled its case against BCBST, again seeking class certification.The trial court held that collateral estoppel precluded relitigation of class certification, but the Court of Appeals reversed, stating that the prior class certification denial was not final for collateral estoppel purposes because the case had been voluntarily nonsuited.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reviewed the case to determine whether the prior denial of class certification, affirmed on appeal, was entitled to preclusive effect. The Court held that the trial court's and appellate court's decisions denying class certification in the earlier case were final and binding for purposes of collateral estoppel. The Court reasoned that the class certification issue had been fully litigated and decided, and the decision was subject to appeal, which EMCF did not pursue further. Therefore, EMCF was precluded from relitigating the class certification issue in the refiled case.The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court, reinstating the order striking the class action allegations against BCBST and VSHP. The Court emphasized that the denial of class certification, affirmed on appeal, was sufficiently final to warrant preclusive effect, preventing EMCF from seeking a do-over on class certification. View "Emergency Medical Care Facilities, P.C. v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc." on Justia Law

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A certified class of Ohio landowners alleged that a Colorado-based mining company, Antero Resources Corporation, underpaid them $10 million in natural gas royalties. The landowners claimed that Antero improperly deducted costs for processing and fractionation from their royalties. Antero counterclaimed, seeking authority to deduct additional costs related to gathering, dehydrating, compressing, and transporting the unrefined natural gas. The district court certified the class, denied Antero's motion for summary judgment, granted the landowners' motion, and entered a final judgment after the parties stipulated damages.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled in favor of the landowners, finding that Antero improperly deducted processing and fractionation costs from the royalties. The court determined that these costs were necessary to transform the gas into marketable form and thus could not be deducted under the lease agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Antero could not deduct the costs of processing and fractionation from the landowners' royalties. The court found that the lease agreement's Market Enhancement Clause allowed deductions only for costs that enhanced the value of already marketable products, not for costs required to make the products marketable. The court concluded that the gas products first became marketable after processing and fractionation, and thus, these costs were not deductible. The court also noted that the Fourth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving the same defendant and lease terms. View "The Grissoms, LLC v. Antero Resources Corp." on Justia Law

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Francisco Rosario filed a class action lawsuit against Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (Mr. Cooper) and The Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), alleging that they collected illegal and unlicensed third-party loan servicing fees on his mortgage. Rosario claimed that these fees were prohibited by the mortgage contract and Rhode Island law. He sought to represent all similarly situated individuals who were charged these fees.The Superior Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. The court found that Rosario's claims were based on a statute that did not provide a private right of action for borrowers to recoup fees collected by unlicensed loan servicers. Rosario appealed the decision, arguing that the defendants breached the mortgage contract by charging fees in violation of Rhode Island law and that the statute should be interpreted broadly to include loan servicing activities.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's decision. The court held that the statute in question, G.L. 1956 § 19-14.11-1, did not provide a private right of action for borrowers to recover fees collected by unlicensed loan servicers. The court also found that the statute's exception for unlicensed transactions involving lending or loan brokering did not apply to loan servicing activities. Therefore, the court concluded that Rosario's breach of contract claim could not be sustained based on the alleged statutory violations. The order of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "Rosario v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

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In the spring of 2020, Colorado State University (CSU) transitioned from in-person to online learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Renee Alderman and Tyler Stokes, both students, filed class action lawsuits seeking refunds for tuition and fees paid for that semester, alleging CSU breached its contract to provide in-person learning and access to facilities. They also claimed unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed the breach of contract claims, citing CSU's statutory authority to suspend operations during unforeseen calamities, and later dismissed the unjust enrichment claims, ruling that the contract covered the same subject matter.Alderman appealed, and the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the district court's dismissal of her unjust enrichment claims, holding that CSU's invocation of the statute rendered the contract unenforceable, thus allowing the unjust enrichment claims to proceed.The Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed the case and concluded that the lower court erred in holding the contract unenforceable. The court held that the statutory provision allowing CSU to suspend operations was part of the contract, and the inability to state a breach of contract claim did not render the contract itself unenforceable. Consequently, Alderman's unjust enrichment claims failed as a matter of law because a valid, enforceable contract existed covering the same subject matter. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and directed reinstatement of the district court's judgment in favor of CSU. View "Bd. of Governors of the Colo. State Univ. v. Alderman" on Justia Law

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The case involves two homebuyers, Wynton Sanders and Tosha Lindsey, who entered into contracts with SM Landover, LLC and SM Parkside, LLC, respectively, for the purchase of new homes. Both contracts included provisions for deferred water and sewer charges and a one-year statute of limitations for bringing any claims related to the contracts. The homebuyers later filed class action complaints alleging that the sellers failed to disclose required information about the deferred charges, as mandated by Maryland law.The Circuit Court for Prince George’s County consolidated the cases for pretrial purposes and dismissed the complaints with prejudice. The court found that the sellers did not need to register as home builders because Stanley Martin Companies, LLC, a registered home builder, was also a party to the contracts. The court also concluded that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of contracting, making them time-barred under the one-year contractual limitations period.The Appellate Court of Maryland affirmed in part and reversed in part. It held that the one-year contractual limitations period was reasonable and that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of settlement, not contracting. Therefore, the claims were timely. However, the court also held that the sellers did not need to register as home builders because a registered home builder was a party to the contracts.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and held that the homebuyers’ claims accrued at the time of contracting. The court also held that the sellers were required to register as home builders under Maryland law, even though a registered home builder was a party to the contracts. Consequently, the sellers could not enforce the one-year contractual limitations period, making the homebuyers’ claims timely. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Appellate Court of Maryland. View "SM Landover LLC v. Sanders" on Justia Law

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Phillip and Sara Alig, along with Daniel and Roxanne Shea, filed a class action lawsuit against Quicken Loans, Inc. (now Rocket Mortgage, LLC) and Title Source, Inc. (now Amrock, Inc.). They alleged that during the refinancing of their home mortgage loans, they paid for appraisals that were not independent because the defendants had provided appraisers with the homeowners' estimates of their homes' value. They claimed this made the appraisals worthless and asserted statutory, breach of contract, and conspiracy claims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia certified a class of West Virginia citizens who refinanced mortgage loans with Quicken and received appraisals that included an estimate of the property's value. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, awarding over $10.6 million in damages. The court found that the plaintiffs had established a conspiracy between the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the class certification and summary judgment on the statutory and conspiracy claims but vacated and remanded the breach of contract claim. The Supreme Court vacated the Fourth Circuit's judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, which emphasized that every class member must have Article III standing to recover damages.On remand, the district court reinstated its original judgment, stating that TransUnion did not affect the class's standing. However, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs failed to establish that class members suffered concrete harm from the defendants' actions. The court reversed the district court's judgment certifying the class and awarding damages, affirming the judgment on the named plaintiffs' statutory and conspiracy claims, and vacating the judgment on the breach of contract claim, remanding it for further proceedings. View "Alig v. Rocket Mortgage, LLC" on Justia Law

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Freedom Vans LLC, a company that converts and customizes vans into mobile houses, hired Jeremy David and Mark Springer. David, a self-taught carpenter, was hired in 2019 and later promoted to foundations manager. Springer, an automotive and maritime mechanic, was hired in 2020 as an electrician. Both employees earned less than twice the minimum wage and signed a noncompete agreement prohibiting them from engaging in any business that competed with Freedom Vans. They claimed they declined additional work offers due to fear of termination and legal action. They stopped working for Freedom Vans in 2021.David and Springer filed a class action lawsuit in 2022, alleging the noncompete agreement violated chapter 49.62 RCW, which regulates noncompete clauses in employment contracts. They sought damages and injunctive and declaratory relief. The superior court granted summary judgment to Freedom Vans, reasoning that RCW 49.62 does not restrict an employer’s right to require employee loyalty and avoidance of conflicts of interest. The court denied Freedom Vans' request for attorney fees. Both parties appealed.The Washington Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that noncompete agreements for employees earning less than twice the minimum wage must be reasonable and narrowly construed in light of the legislature’s intent to protect low wage workers and promote workforce mobility. The court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, concluding that prohibiting employees from providing any kind of assistance to competitors exceeds a narrow construction of the duty of loyalty. The case was remanded to the superior court to determine the reasonableness of the noncompete agreement and assess damages and attorney fees. View "Springer v. Freedom Vans LLC" on Justia Law

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Christopher Meek purchased a universal life insurance policy from Kansas City Life Insurance Company, which combined a standard life insurance policy with a savings account. Meek alleged that Kansas City Life improperly included profits and expenses in the cost of insurance, which was not mentioned in the policy, leading to a lower cash value in his account. Meek filed a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and conversion, and the district court certified a class of about 6,000 Kansans with Meek as the lead plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that Meek's lawsuit was timely for payments going back five years under Kansas’s statute of limitations. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Meek on the breach-of-contract claim, interpreting the policy against Kansas City Life. The conversion claim was dismissed. A jury awarded over $5 million in damages, which was reduced to $908,075 due to the statute of limitations. Both parties appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s class certification, finding that common questions of law and fact predominated. The court also upheld the application of Kansas law for both the conversion claim and the statute of limitations. The court agreed with the district court’s interpretation of the insurance policy, concluding that the cost of insurance should not include profits and expenses. The court found that the jury’s damages award was supported by reasonable evidence and did not warrant an increase.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the class certification, the application of Kansas law, the partial summary judgment in favor of Meek, and the damages award. View "Meek v. Kansas City Life Ins. Company" on Justia Law

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Christopher Meek purchased a universal life insurance policy from Kansas City Life Insurance Company, which combined a standard life insurance policy with a savings account. Meek alleged that Kansas City Life improperly included profits and expenses in the cost of insurance, which was not mentioned in the policy, leading to a lower cash value in his account. Meek filed a federal lawsuit for breach of contract and conversion, and the district court certified a class of about 6,000 Kansans with Meek as the lead plaintiff.The United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that Meek's lawsuit was timely under Kansas’s five-year statute of limitations for breach-of-contract claims. The court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Meek on the breach-of-contract claim, concluding that the policy's cost-of-insurance provision was ambiguous and should be construed against Kansas City Life. The jury awarded over $5 million in damages, which was reduced to $908,075 under the statute of limitations. Both parties appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the cost-of-insurance provision in the policy did not include profits and expenses, as these were not listed factors. The court also upheld the class certification, finding that common questions of law and fact predominated over individual issues. Additionally, the court agreed with the district court's application of Kansas law for the conversion claim and the statute of limitations for the breach-of-contract claim. The court found that the jury's damages award was supported by sufficient evidence and did not warrant an increase. View "Meek v. Kansas City Life Ins. Company" on Justia Law