Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Class Action
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Noah Gilbert purchased a motor vehicle insurance policy from Progressive Northwestern Insurance Company, initially declining underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage but later adding a UIM endorsement with $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident limits. The policy included an offset provision, reducing any UIM payout by amounts received from another party’s insurance. Gilbert paid premiums for this coverage but never filed a UIM claim or experienced an accident triggering such coverage. He later filed a putative class action, alleging that Progressive’s UIM coverage was illusory under Idaho law and asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, unjust enrichment, fraud, and constructive fraud.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court raised the issue of standing and ultimately held that Gilbert lacked standing because he had not filed a claim or been denied coverage, and thus had not suffered an injury-in-fact. Alternatively, the court found that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits: there was no breach of contract or bad faith without a denied claim, no damages to support fraud or constructive fraud, and unjust enrichment was unavailable due to the existence of a valid contract. The court granted summary judgment for Progressive and denied Gilbert’s motion for class certification as moot.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho held that Gilbert did have standing, as payment of premiums for allegedly illusory coverage constituted a concrete injury. However, the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment, finding that Gilbert’s claims failed on the merits because he never filed a claim, was never denied coverage, and did not incur damages. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, as an enforceable contract provided an adequate legal remedy. The judgment in favor of Progressive was affirmed. View "Gilbert v. Progressive Northwestern Insurance Co." on Justia Law

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A borrower in Rhode Island financed a home purchase with a mortgage from a national bank. The mortgage required the borrower to make advance payments for property taxes and insurance into an escrow account managed by the bank. The bank did not pay interest on these escrowed funds, despite a Rhode Island statute mandating that banks pay interest on such accounts. Years later, the borrower filed a class action lawsuit against the bank, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment for failing to pay the required interest under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the bank that the National Bank Act preempted the Rhode Island statute. The court reasoned that the state law imposed limits on the bank’s federal powers, specifically the power to establish escrow accounts, and thus significantly interfered with the bank’s incidental powers under federal law. The court did not address class certification or the merits of the unjust enrichment claim, focusing solely on preemption.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case after the Supreme Court’s decision in Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., which clarified the standard for preemption under the National Bank Act. The First Circuit held that the district court erred by not applying the nuanced, comparative analysis required by Cantero. The appellate court found that the bank failed to show that the Rhode Island statute significantly interfered with its federal banking powers or conflicted with the federal regulatory scheme. The First Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings, allowing the borrower’s claims to proceed. View "Conti v. Citizens Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

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A property management company operating several apartment buildings in Missoula County contracted with a waste management provider for “three-yard” dumpster service. After the expiration of their initial service agreement, the provider continued to supply waste removal services on an invoice-by-invoice basis. The property management company later discovered that many of the dumpsters labeled as “three-yard” actually had a capacity of less than three cubic yards, with one model measuring approximately 2.52 cubic yards. The waste management provider rotated these containers among customers and did not maintain records of which customers received which models. The property management company alleged that it was charged overage fees for exceeding the stated capacity of these undersized containers.The property management company filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County, asserting claims for breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation, and sought to represent a class of similarly situated customers. The District Court bifurcated discovery and, after briefing and oral argument, certified two classes: one for breach of contract and one for negligent misrepresentation, both defined as customers who paid for “three-yard” service but received dumpsters of 2.6 cubic yards or less. The District Court found that common questions predominated over individual issues and that class litigation was superior to individual actions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed whether the District Court abused its discretion in finding predominance of common questions and whether it erred by not considering the ascertainability of class members. The Supreme Court held that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the classes, as common questions regarding the provider’s contractual and legal obligations predominated, and individualized damages did not preclude certification. The Court also held that ascertainability is not a mandatory requirement under Montana’s class action rule. The District Court’s order granting class certification was affirmed. View "Allied Waste v. LH Residential" on Justia Law

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Two former employees of a fire alarm and sprinkler company provided fire alarm testing and inspection services on public works projects in New York. They alleged that their employer failed to pay them the prevailing wages required by New York Labor Law § 220, which mandates that workers on public works projects receive at least the prevailing rate of wages. The contracts between the employer and various public entities included clauses that either disclaimed the applicability of prevailing wage laws, were silent on the issue, or referenced prevailing wage rates. Many contracts also contained a provision shortening the statute of limitations for any action against the company to one year.The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York granted partial summary judgment in favor of the employer on all prevailing wage-related claims. The court found that: (1) the contracts did not expressly promise to pay prevailing wages; (2) the one-year contractual limitations period barred the claims; and (3) fire alarm testing and inspection work was not covered by § 220’s prevailing wage requirement. The court also dismissed related quantum meruit and unjust enrichment claims and later approved a class action settlement on other claims, with the prevailing wage claims reserved for appeal.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that, based on a 2009 New York State Department of Labor opinion letter and relevant precedent, fire alarm testing and inspection work is covered by § 220, entitling the plaintiffs to prevailing wages. However, the Second Circuit found New York law unsettled on whether a promise to pay prevailing wages is implicit in every public works contract (even if not expressly stated) and whether a contractual one-year limitations period is enforceable against workers’ third-party beneficiary claims. The court therefore certified these two questions to the New York Court of Appeals for resolution. View "Walton v. Comfort Systems" on Justia Law

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NCR Corporation established five “top hat” retirement plans to provide supplemental life annuity benefits to senior executives. Each plan promised participants a fixed monthly payment for life, with language allowing NCR to terminate the plans so long as no action “adversely affected” any participant’s accrued benefits. In 2013, NCR terminated the plans and paid participants lump sums it claimed were actuarially equivalent to the promised annuities, using mortality tables, actuarial calculations, and a 5% discount rate. NCR knew that, statistically, about half of the participants would outlive the lump sums if they continued to withdraw the same monthly benefit, resulting in some participants receiving less than they would have under the original annuity.Participants filed a class-action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, alleging breach of contract and seeking either replacement annuities or sufficient cash to purchase equivalent annuities. The district court certified the class and granted summary judgment for the participants, finding that NCR’s lump-sum payments adversely affected the accrued benefits of at least some participants, in violation of the plan language. The court ordered NCR to pay the difference between the lump sums and the cost of replacement annuities, plus prejudgment and postjudgment interest.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment order de novo. The Eleventh Circuit held that the plan language was unambiguous and did not permit NCR to unilaterally replace life annuities with lump sums that reduced the value of accrued benefits for any participant. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, including the remedy of requiring NCR to pay the cost of replacement annuities and awarding prejudgment interest. View "Hoak v. NCR Corp." on Justia Law

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Several individuals and an LLC, who own oil and gas interests in West Virginia, leased their mineral rights to EQT, a group of related energy companies. The leases, numbering nearly 3,843, required EQT to pay royalties to the lessors. During the period from January 1, 2012, to February 28, 2021, EQT extracted “wet gas” from the wells, which contains valuable natural gas liquids (NGLs) like propane and butane. EQT sold the wet gas at the wellhead to its own affiliates and paid royalties to the lessors based on the energy content (BTU) of the wet gas, not on the value of the NGLs. EQT then separated and sold the NGLs to third parties but did not pay additional royalties for these sales. In 2021, EQT notified lessors it would begin calculating royalties based on the separate value of NGLs and residue gas.The plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, alleging breach of contract and fraudulent concealment, and sought class certification. The district court granted partial summary judgment, finding EQT’s affiliates were its alter egos, and certified classes for both claims, later dividing the class into three subclasses based on lease language. EQT petitioned for interlocutory appeal of the class certification order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court’s certification order. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the certification of the breach of contract claim, holding that the class was ascertainable and that common questions of law and fact predominated, given EQT’s uniform royalty payment method and the immateriality of lease language variations under West Virginia law. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the certification of the fraudulent concealment claim, holding that individual questions of reliance would predominate, making class treatment inappropriate for that claim. Thus, the district court’s order was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Glover v. EQT Corporation" on Justia Law

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Russell Johnson, a resident of a continuing care retirement community operated by Stoneridge Creek, filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Stoneridge Creek unlawfully increased residents’ monthly care fees to cover its anticipated legal defense costs in ongoing litigation. Johnson claimed these increases violated several statutes, including the Health and Safety Code, the Unfair Competition Law, the Consumer Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), and the Elder Abuse Act, and breached the Residence and Care Agreement (RCA) between residents and Stoneridge Creek. The RCA allowed Stoneridge Creek to adjust monthly fees based on projected costs, prior year per capita costs, and economic indicators. In recent years, Stoneridge Creek’s budgets for legal fees rose sharply, with $500,000 allocated for 2023 and 2024, compared to much lower amounts in prior years.The Alameda County Superior Court previously denied Stoneridge Creek’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the RCA’s arbitration provision unconscionable. Johnson then moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent Stoneridge Creek from including its litigation defense costs in monthly fee increases. The trial court granted the injunction, finding a likelihood of success on Johnson’s claims under the CLRA and UCL, and determined that the fee increases were retaliatory and unlawfully shifted defense costs to residents. The court also ordered Johnson to post a $1,000 bond.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case and reversed the trial court’s order. The appellate court held that the fee increases did not violate the CLRA’s fee-recovery provision or other litigation fee-shifting statutes, as these statutes govern judicial awards of fees, not how a defendant funds its own legal expenses. The court further concluded that Health and Safety Code section 1788(a)(22)(B) permits Stoneridge Creek to include reasonable projections of litigation expenses in monthly fees. However, the court remanded the case for the trial court to reconsider whether the fee increases were retaliatory or excessive, and to reassess the balance of harms and the appropriate bond amount. View "Johnson v. Stoneridge Creek Pleasanton CCRC" on Justia Law

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Lisa Bodenburg, an Apple customer, purchased a 200 GB iCloud data storage plan, expecting it to add to the 5 GB of free storage she already had, resulting in a total of 205 GB. When she discovered that the plan only provided 200 GB in total, she filed a putative class action against Apple, alleging breach of contract and violations of California’s consumer protection laws due to Apple’s allegedly deceptive representations about its iCloud storage plans.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Bodenburg’s action with prejudice. The court found that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because Apple had fulfilled its contractual obligations by providing the additional storage as described in the iCloud Legal Agreement. The court also found that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws did not satisfy the “reasonable consumer” test or the heightened pleading standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The panel held that Bodenburg could not state a claim for breach of contract because the iCloud Legal Agreement did not promise an additional 200 GB of storage but rather additional storage, which Apple provided. The court also held that Bodenburg’s claims under California’s consumer protection laws failed the reasonable consumer test, as Apple’s statements were not misleading when considered in context. Additionally, the claims did not meet Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading requirements because Bodenburg could not demonstrate that Apple’s statements were false or deceptive. Thus, the dismissal of Bodenburg’s action was affirmed. View "Bodenburg v. Apple, Inc." on Justia Law

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Anthony Rojas, a student at the University of Florida, filed a class action lawsuit against the University of Florida Board of Trustees. Rojas claimed that the University breached its contract by suspending on-campus services and closing facilities during the COVID-19 pandemic, despite students being required to pay mandatory fees for these services. He also alleged that the University failed to refund these fees. The complaint included a spring 2020 tuition statement, a general statement of tuition and fee estimates for the 2019-2020 academic year, and the University’s financial liability agreement.The trial court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim but denied the University’s motion to dismiss the breach of contract claim, ruling that the complaint adequately pleaded the existence of an express contract. The University appealed, and the First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that the claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The First District concluded that the contract alleged by Rojas did not constitute an express written contract sufficient to overcome sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Florida reviewed the case and quashed the First District’s decision. The Court held that the waiver-by-contract doctrine does not preclude claims based on the breach of implied covenants or conditions that do not conflict with express contract provisions. The Court found that the First District erred in requiring extraordinary specificity in government contracts and in failing to recognize permissible implied covenants. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Rojas v. University of Florida Board of Trustees" on Justia Law

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Former students of the University of Montana filed a class action lawsuit against the university, alleging mishandling of student loan reimbursement payments. They claimed that the university's contract with Higher One Holdings, Inc. subjected them to excessive bank fees and unlawfully disclosed their personal information without consent. The university had contracted with Higher One from 2010 to 2015 to process student loan reimbursements, which involved issuing debit cards and charging various fees.The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District in Missoula County certified three classes of plaintiffs but was later partially reversed by the Montana Supreme Court, which upheld the certification of two classes and reversed the third. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the jury found in favor of the university, concluding that it did not breach its fiduciary duty, violate privacy rights, or unjustly enrich itself.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case on appeal. The students raised several issues, including the admissibility of evidence regarding their banking practices, the testimony of the university's expert witness, the university's closing arguments, the admission of a fee comparison chart, and the refusal of a burden-shifting jury instruction. The court found that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings, including allowing the university to present evidence about students' banking practices and admitting the fee comparison chart. The court also held that the expert witness's testimony was permissible and that the university's closing arguments did not prejudice the students' right to a fair trial.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Montana affirmed the District Court's judgment in favor of the University of Montana, upholding the jury's verdict. View "Knudsen v. U. of M." on Justia Law