Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. v. Lynchar, Inc.
In Lynchar, Inc. v. Colonial Oil Industries, Inc., 801 SE2d 576 (2017), the Court of Appeals found that certain individual guaranties of Lynchar, Inc.’s debt to Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. were unenforceable under Georgia’s Statute of Frauds. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the guaranties were unenforceable because they did not reference the legal name of the corporate debtor (“Lynchar, Inc. d/b/a T & W Oil Company”), but instead referenced only the corporate debtor’s trade name (“T&W Oil, Inc.”). The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by Colonial Oil and posed two questions: (1) To what extent did a misnomer or other defect in the identification of the principal debtor render a contract of suretyship or guaranty unenforceable; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the guaranties sought to be enforced against appellees are unenforceable? The Supreme Court held: (1) to the extent that any misnomer or clerical defect created any ambiguity or Lynchar contended that it was not a party to the guaranty, parol evidence would be admissible to identify the parties to the guaranty; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by holding the guaranty was unenforceable. View "Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. v. Lynchar, Inc." on Justia Law
G.R.L.C. Trust v. Garrison Decatur Crossings, LLC
G.R.L.C. Trust, formed under the laws of Texas, appealed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Garrison Decatur Crossings, LLC ("Garrison Decatur"), in Garrison Decatur's action for a judgment declaring the need for reformation of a recorded memorandum of lease on the ground of a mutual mistake. The Alabama Supreme Court determined the trial court's finding that there had been a
mutual mistake in omitting Exhibit A from the lease memorandum was supported by the evidence; therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Garrison Decatur reforming the lease memorandum was affirmed. View "G.R.L.C. Trust v. Garrison Decatur Crossings, LLC" on Justia Law
Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc.
Optometrists across the country noticed that Chase Amazon Visa credit card accounts had been fraudulently opened in their names, using correct social security numbers and birthdates. The victims discussed the thefts in Facebook groups dedicated to optometrists and determined that the only common source to which they had given their personal information was NBEO, where every graduating optometry student submits personal information to sit for board-certifying exams. NBEO released a Facebook statement that its “information systems [had] NOT been compromised.” Two days later, NBEO stated that it had decided to further investigate. Three weeks later, NBEO posted “a cryptic message stating its internal review was still ongoing.” NBEO advised the victims to “remain vigilant in checking their credit.” Victims filed suit under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d)(2). The district court dismissed for lack of standing. The Fourth Circuit vacated. These plaintiffs allege that they have already suffered actual harm in the form of identity theft and credit card fraud; they have been concretely injured by the use or attempted use of their personal information to open credit card accounts without their knowledge or approval. There is no need to speculate on whether substantial harm will occur. The complaints contain allegations demonstrating that it is both plausible and likely that a breach of NBEO’s database resulted in the fraudulent use of the plaintiffs’ personal information. View "Hutton v. National Board of Examiners in Optometry, Inc." on Justia Law
2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp.
New York’s borrowing statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. 202, applies when contracting parties have agreed that their contract would be “enforced” according to New York law.Plaintiff brought this action for breach of contract and unjust enrichment in state court in New York. SkyPower Corp., an Ontario renewable energy developer, had assigned its claims against Defendants to Plaintiff, also an Ontario corporation. Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the action was time-barred pursuant to Ontario’s two-year statute of limitations, which applied pursuant to section 202. Plaintiff contended that the choice-of-law provision in the non-disclosure agreement (NDA) entered into by SkyPower and Defendants required the conclusion that the parties intended to preclude application of section 202 and instead apply the six-year limitations period provided by N.Y. C.P.L.R. 213(2). Supreme Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims asserted on SkyPower’s behalf as time-barred. The Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the contracting parties chose New York’s procedural law, and section 202 is part of that procedural law, the borrowing statute applied. View "2138747 Ontario, Inc. v. Samsung C&T Corp." on Justia Law
Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. and RMEI Bakken Joint Venture
This case arose from a series of transactions in which petitioners Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. and RMEI Bakken Joint Venture Group (collectively, “RMEI”) sold oil and gas assets to Lario Oil and Gas Company (“Lario”). In the transaction, Lario was acting as an agent for Tracker Resource Exploration ND, LLC and its affiliated entities (collectively, “Tracker”), which were represented by respondents Davis Graham & Stubbs LLP and Gregory Danielson (collectively, “DG&S”). Prior to RMEI’s sale to Lario, RMEI and Tracker had a business relationship related to the oil and gas assets that were ultimately the subject of the RMEI-Lario transaction. The RMEI-Tracker relationship ultimately soured; Tracker and Lario reached an understanding by which Lario would seek to purchase RMEI’s interests and then assign a majority of those interests to Tracker. Recognizing the history between Tracker and RMEI, however, Tracker and Lario agreed not to disclose Tracker’s involvement in the deal. DG&S represented Tracker throughout RMEI’s sale to Lario. In that capacity, DG&S drafted the final agreement between RMEI and Lario, worked with the escrow agent, and hosted the closing at its offices. No party disclosed to RMEI, however, that DG&S was representing Tracker, not Lario. After the sale from RMEI to Lario was finalized, Lario assigned a portion of the assets acquired to Tracker, and Tracker subsequently re-sold its purchased interests for a substantial profit. RMEI then learned of Tracker’s involvement in its sale to Lario and sued Tracker, Lario, and DG&S for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and civil conspiracy, among other claims. As pertinent here, the fiduciary breach claims were based on RMEI’s prior relationship with Tracker. The remaining claims were based on allegations that Tracker, Lario, and DG&S misrepresented Tracker’s involvement in the Lario deal, knowing that RMEI would not have dealt with Tracker because of the parties’ strained relationship. Based on these claims, RMEI sought to avoid its contract with Lario. Lario and Tracker eventually settled their claims with RMEI, and DG&S moved for summary judgment as to all of RMEI’s claims against it. The district court granted DG&S’s motion. The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether: (1) Lario and DG&S created the false impression that Lario was not acting for an undisclosed principal (i.e., Tracker) with whom Lario and DG&S knew RMEI would not deal; (2) an assignment clause in the RMEI-Lario transaction agreements sufficiently notified RMEI that Lario acted on behalf of an undisclosed principal; (3) prior agreements between RMEI and Tracker negated all previous joint ventures and any fiduciary obligations between them; (4) RMEI stated a viable claim against DG&S for fraud; and (5) RMEI could avoid the Lario sale based on statements allegedly made after RMEI and Lario signed the sales agreement but prior to closing. The Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rocky Mountain Exploration, Inc. and RMEI Bakken Joint Venture" on Justia Law
Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer
Charlotte Fischer was moved into a nursing home; after she died, her family initiated a wrongful death action against the health care facility in court. Citing a clause in the admissions agreement, the health care facility moved to compel arbitration out of court. The trial court denied the motion, and the court of appeals affirmed, determining the arbitration agreement was void because it did not strictly comply with the Health Care Availability Act ("HCAA"). In this case, the Colorado Supreme Court considered whether section 13-64-403, C.R.S. (2017) of the HCAA, the provision governing arbitration agreements, required strict or substantial compliance. The HCAA required that such agreements contain a four-paragraph notice in a certain font size and in bold-faced type. Charlotte’s agreement included the required language in a statutorily permissible font size, but it was not printed in bold. Charlotte’s daughter signed the agreement on Charlotte’s behalf. The Supreme Court held the Act demanded only substantial compliance. Furthermore, the Court concluded the agreement here substantially complied with the formatting requirements of section 13-64-403, notwithstanding its lack of bold-faced type. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer" on Justia Law
Samelko v. Kingstone Insurance Co.
Exercising jurisdiction over Defendant-insurer under the circumstances of this case was permitted by Connectictut’s corporate long arm statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. 33-929(f)(1), and comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.Defendant issued an automobile insurance policy covering a vehicle driven by Insured. The policy was written in New York at Defendant’s principal place of business, and Defendant did not direct or participate in any business transactions in Connecticut at the time. The coverage territory of the policy included Connecticut. Insured’s vehicle later collided with a vehicle occupied by Plaintiffs. A judgment was rendered against Insured in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendant failed to defend Insured or to indemnify him for the judgment rendered against him. Plaintiffs then brought this action against Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Defendant’s agreement to defend and indemnify Insured established personal jurisdiction under the long arm statute and that subjecting Defendant to the jurisdiction of this state comported with the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "Samelko v. Kingstone Insurance Co." on Justia Law
Flaten v. Couture
Defendants A&M Structuring, LLC, and Edward Couture, individually and as manager of A&M Structuring appealed a judgment entered in favor of Lynn Flaten and from a post-judgment order denying their motions to amend the judgments and "regarding ownership or interest in levied property." Flaten sued for claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Flaten alleged he agreed to sell certain real property located in Williams County to defendants for $275,000 in February 2012, defendants paid $50,000 as a down payment, but failed to pay the remaining amounts due for the property. Flaten also alleged the defendants agreed to sell him certain real property located in McKenzie County, consisting of three individual lots. Flaten alleged defendants never delivered the property. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment or abuse its discretion in denying the post-judgment motions. View "Flaten v. Couture" on Justia Law
Flaten v. Couture
Defendants A&M Structuring, LLC, and Edward Couture, individually and as manager of A&M Structuring appealed a judgment entered in favor of Lynn Flaten and from a post-judgment order denying their motions to amend the judgments and "regarding ownership or interest in levied property." Flaten sued for claims of breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and fraud. Flaten alleged he agreed to sell certain real property located in Williams County to defendants for $275,000 in February 2012, defendants paid $50,000 as a down payment, but failed to pay the remaining amounts due for the property. Flaten also alleged the defendants agreed to sell him certain real property located in McKenzie County, consisting of three individual lots. Flaten alleged defendants never delivered the property. After review of the trial court record, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment or abuse its discretion in denying the post-judgment motions. View "Flaten v. Couture" on Justia Law
Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies
CBL Data Recovery Technologies, Inc. (CBL) appealed an order denying its motion to set aside a default judgment entered in favor of Airs Aromatics, LLC (Airs). Airs sued CBL for breach of contract in 2011. The operative complaint alleged that Airs "suffered damages in an amount to be proven at trial, but estimated to exceed $25,000.00." The prayer likewise requested "damages in an amount to be proven." There was no other allegation in the complaint as to the amount of damages sought. CBL filed an answer and engaged in discovery. The parties participated in a settlement conference in which Airs demanded $5 million to settle all claims. In August 2012, the parties stipulated to withdraw CBL's answer and allow Airs to obtain a default. A month later, Airs filed a Request for Court Judgment seeking over $3 million in damages. It also filed a document entitled, "Evidence of Damages" supporting the requested amount. The court held a default prove-up hearing and, in November 2012, entered default judgment against CBL in the amount of $3,016,802.90. Years passed. CBL filed a motion in April 2017 to set aside the default judgment. Citing Code of Civil Procedure sections 580(a) and 585(c), CBL argued the court could not enter a judgment awarding damages greater than that specifically demanded in the complaint. It argued the default judgment was void and requested that it be vacated pursuant to section 473(d). Airs opposed the motion, arguing the default judgment was merely voidable, not void. In addition, Airs argued the court could exercise discretion to deny CBL's motion on equitable grounds. The court held a hearing and denied CBL's motion, finding CBL had adequate notice of the damages sought by Airs. CBL argued to the Court of Appeal the default judgment was void. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the default judgment had to be vacated. View "Airs Aromatics v. CBL Data Recovery Technologies" on Justia Law