Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Katelyn Hove was hospitalized in 2018 for pregnancy complications, and the Billings Clinic billed Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) of Montana for her services. BCBS of Montana indicated that BCBS of Texas was her insurance provider. BCBS of Texas paid part of the bill, leaving a balance that Hove did not pay. The clinic assigned the unpaid debt to CB1, a debt-collection agency, which then sued the Hoves for breach of contract, breach of obligation, and unjust enrichment. The Hoves named BCBS of Montana as a third-party defendant. CB1 moved for summary judgment, supported by affidavits from the clinic. Hove responded with a written declaration disputing the charges, including an EOB from BCBS of Texas and an email from the Montana Commissioner of Securities and Insurance.The Thirteenth Judicial District Court, Yellowstone County, granted summary judgment in favor of CB1, reasoning that Hove's declaration and attached EOB were unverified and inadmissible. The court entered a final monetary judgment against the Hoves. The Hoves filed a motion to amend the judgment, attaching a sworn affidavit with the same information as the declaration. The District Court denied the motion, stating that the declaration and its attachments were inadmissible hearsay and that the declaration did not meet the statutory criteria under § 1-6-105, MCA.The Supreme Court of the State of Montana reviewed the case and found that a declaration under § 1-6-105, MCA, is equivalent to an affidavit. The court determined that Hove's declaration, which stated she never spent time in the ICU despite being billed for it, raised a genuine issue of material fact. The court reversed the District Court's summary judgment and remanded the case for trial on the merits. View "CB1 v. Hove" on Justia Law

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Charles and Yvette Whittier sued Ocwen Loan Servicing, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, Merscorp, and Mortgage Electronic Registration System to prevent the foreclosure of their home mortgage loan. The parties reached a settlement and notified the district court, which issued an interim order of dismissal pending final documentation. The parties then filed a Joint Stipulation to Dismiss Action under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and a proposed Order of Dismissal With Prejudice, which stated that the court would retain jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. However, the court's dismissal order did not explicitly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the settlement terms.The Whittiers later filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement and sought attorneys' fees. The defendants argued that the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. A magistrate judge recommended enjoining foreclosure proceedings, and the district judge adopted this recommendation, issuing an injunction in April 2020. Over two years later, PHH and Deutsche Bank moved to reopen the case and dissolve the injunction, claiming the Whittiers were in default. A different magistrate judge found that the court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement and recommended dissolving the injunction. The district judge agreed, dissolved the injunction, and dismissed the suit with prejudice in May 2024, explicitly declining jurisdiction over the settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that the district court lacked ancillary jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement because the dismissal order did not expressly retain jurisdiction or incorporate the settlement terms. The court affirmed the district court's decision to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the case with prejudice. View "Whittier v. Ocwen Loan Servicing" on Justia Law

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In 2012, the City of Providence suspended cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) pension benefits for retired police and fire department members. The retirees challenged this suspension, leading to a series of legal actions. Most retirees settled, agreeing to a ten-year suspension of their COLA benefits, but some plaintiffs opted out and pursued further legal action, claiming breach of contract and constitutional violations.The Superior Court granted partial summary judgment for the City on some claims and, after a bench trial, ruled against the plaintiffs on the remaining claims. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Andrews I found that the 2012 ordinance violated the separation of powers doctrine by attempting to override prior consent judgments and judicial decisions. The case was remanded, and the Superior Court reinstated the plaintiffs' COLAs and awarded accrued benefits but did not address prejudgment interest.The plaintiffs then sought prejudgment interest on the past-due COLA payments, which the Superior Court denied, reasoning that the damages were not contractual in nature but were awarded based on constitutional grounds. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court held that the plaintiffs' recovery of past-due COLAs was based on the enforcement of final judgments, not on a breach of contract. Since the award was rooted in constitutional law rather than contract law, the plaintiffs were not entitled to prejudgment interest under the relevant statute, which applies strictly to tort and contract claims. View "Andrews v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

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Chesapeake Exploration, LLC (Chesapeake) and Morton Production Company, LLC (Morton) entered into a joint operating agreement for oil and gas development in Converse County, Wyoming. Morton sued Chesapeake for breach of contract, violation of the Wyoming Royalty Payment Act (WRPA), and conversion after Chesapeake adjusted Morton’s ownership interest and withheld production proceeds. Chesapeake counterclaimed for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Morton.Chesapeake appealed, challenging the district court’s summary judgment on Morton’s breach of contract claim, the supplemental decision on Chesapeake’s counterclaims and affirmative defenses, and the determination that Chesapeake violated the WRPA. The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case.The Wyoming Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that Chesapeake breached the contract by adjusting Morton’s ownership interest and billing for costs beyond the twenty-four-month limitation period specified in the 1985 COPAS Form, which was incorporated into the joint operating agreement. The court found the language in the COPAS Form unambiguous and declined to consider extrinsic evidence. The court also upheld the district court’s use of Rule 60(a) to correct a clerical error in its original order and found that Chesapeake’s counterclaims were properly dismissed as they were rendered moot by the summary judgment on Morton’s claims. Additionally, the court ruled that Chesapeake violated the WRPA by withholding production proceeds without placing the disputed funds in escrow, as required by the statute. View "Chesapeake Exploration, LLC, v. Morton Production Company, LLC" on Justia Law

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CEZ Prior, LLC ("CEZ") entered into a purchase agreement with 755 N Prior Ave., LLC ("Prior") to buy a property for $26 million. The agreement required Prior to cooperate in obtaining tenant estoppel certificates. Errors in square footage measurements led to rent discrepancies, prompting an amendment to reduce the purchase price to $15.1 million and the cash required at closing to $3.8 million. CEZ later requested to delay closing due to financial issues, but Prior did not agree. Prior sent estoppel certificates that did not address rate increases, and CEZ proposed edits that Prior rejected. CEZ demanded satisfactory certificates on the closing date, but Prior terminated the agreement, alleging CEZ failed to tender cash.CEZ sued Prior for breach of contract in Minnesota state court and sought to enjoin the termination. Prior removed the case to federal court and counterclaimed for breach of contract. The district court stayed the matter and later denied CEZ's motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction. The court found that CEZ was unlikely to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim, as Prior had reasonably cooperated in obtaining the estoppel certificates. The balance of harms favored Prior, given CEZ's insufficient evidence of its ability to pay. The public interest did not favor CEZ due to its low probability of success on the merits.The court also addressed CEZ's argument under Minnesota law, finding that the district court's stay order was not an injunction and did not extend statutory deadlines. Consequently, CEZ was not entitled to additional time to close under Minnesota statutes. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. View "CEZ Prior, LLC v. 755 N Prior Ave. LLC" on Justia Law

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Automotive Finance Corporation (AFC) extended a loan to Monmars Automotive Group LLC, which was guaranteed by Meng Liu, her then-husband Ning Ao, and Liu’s friend Xiaoqiao Yang. After Monmars defaulted, AFC sued to recover the debt. Liu, representing herself, filed unsworn letters claiming she did not sign the loan agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment for AFC. Ao later admitted in an unsworn letter to forging Liu’s and Yang’s signatures, but Liu did not file a motion to correct error or appeal properly.The Marion Superior Court set aside the judgment based on fraud under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) after Liu, now represented by counsel, presented Ao’s testimony about the forgery. AFC appealed, and the Indiana Court of Appeals issued conflicting opinions in related cases. In Liu’s case, the court affirmed the trial court’s decision, but in Yang’s case, it reversed.The Indiana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(3). The court found that Liu could have raised the fraud issue in a timely motion to correct error or on appeal. Additionally, there was no evidence that the alleged fraud prejudiced Liu’s ability to present her case. The court emphasized the importance of finality in judgments and the need for litigants, including those representing themselves, to comply with procedural requirements.The Indiana Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of AFC. View "Automotive Finance Corporation v. Liu" on Justia Law

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Christine Berger and Brian Repnow were in a decade-long relationship but never married. During their relationship, they accumulated various properties and businesses. In August 2021, Berger filed a lawsuit seeking partition, conversion, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment, requesting an equitable division of their accumulated real and personal property or monetary damages. Repnow claimed sole ownership of the properties and requested denial of Berger's claims.The District Court of Mercer, South Central Judicial District, held a two-day bench trial in October 2023. The court granted Berger's partition claim for the Expansion Drive property, awarding her sole ownership, and determined that the other properties and vehicles were solely owned by Repnow. The court also granted Berger's unjust enrichment claim, awarding her $64,000 for her contributions to Repnow's properties, and denied the claims of conversion and promissory estoppel. The court awarded the Dream Girls Boutique business to Repnow and Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's finding that the parties intended to share ownership of the Expansion Drive property and the award of Powerhouse Nutrition to Berger. However, it reversed the decision to award 100% of the Expansion Drive property to Berger, stating that the district court should have considered the parties' respective ownership interests and made an equitable division. The court also found that the district court failed to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and adequately explain the $64,000 award.The North Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case for the district court to determine the parties' respective ownership interests in the Expansion Drive property and make an award consistent with those interests. The court also instructed the district court to complete the unjust enrichment analysis and provide a clear explanation for the $64,000 award if necessary. View "Berger v. Repnow" on Justia Law

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Monsanto Company, Pharmacia, LLC, and Solutia, Inc. (collectively, "Monsanto") filed a lawsuit in St. Louis County Circuit Court in Missouri against Magnetek, Inc., General Electric Co. ("GE"), Paramount Global, KYOCERA AVX Components Corporation, Cornell Dubilier Electronics, Inc., and The Gillette Company LLC (collectively, "Defendants"). Monsanto alleged that it continues to incur substantial costs to defend against PCB lawsuits that should be borne by Defendants and sought to enforce written agreements obligating Defendants to defend, indemnify, and hold Monsanto harmless in all currently pending and future PCB lawsuits.GE removed the action to federal court, asserting jurisdiction under the federal officer removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri granted Monsanto’s motion to remand, finding that GE's removal was untimely. GE appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the parties had waived Missouri Supreme Court Rule 54.13(c)’s personal service provision and expressly agreed that January 31, 2023, was the effective date for service of process. The court determined that the 30-day removal period began on the agreed effective date of service, not when GE signed the acknowledgment and waiver of service of process or when Monsanto filed the document. Consequently, GE's notice of removal was filed within the 30-day period, making the removal timely.The Eighth Circuit vacated the district court’s order of remand and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court declined to address whether GE satisfies the government contractor requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), as this issue was not addressed by the district court. View "Monsanto Company v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

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An inmate at Green Bay Correctional Institution, who is a practicing Muslim, filed a lawsuit under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) against the Wisconsin Department of Corrections (WDOC). He challenged WDOC's policy prohibiting inmates from leading religious programs when no outside religious leader or volunteer is available, claiming it resulted in unnecessary cancellations of religious programs. He also alleged that the cancellation of these programs breached a prior settlement agreement with WDOC.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment in favor of WDOC on the RLUIPA claim, finding that the policy was the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling interest of maintaining prison safety and security. The court also granted summary judgment in favor of the inmate on the state law breach-of-contract claim as to liability but relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of WDOC on the RLUIPA claim, agreeing that the policy was the least restrictive means to ensure prison safety and security. However, the appellate court vacated the district court's partial judgment on the state law breach-of-contract claim. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over the remedy portion of the claim while retaining jurisdiction over liability. The case was remanded to the district court to determine whether to retain or relinquish jurisdiction over the entire state law claim. View "West v Hoy" on Justia Law

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Appellants CKHS, Inc. and The Foundation for Delaware County sought a preliminary injunction to prevent Appellees Prospect Medical Holdings, Inc. and Prospect Crozer, LLC from converting Delaware County Memorial Hospital from an emergency and acute care facility to a behavioral health hospital. The asset purchase agreement (APA) between the parties included clauses requiring Prospect to maintain key service lines, including emergency medicine, for five years and to consult with a local advisory board before making significant changes after that period. Additionally, the APA stipulated that any breach would cause irreparable damage.The Delaware County Court of Common Pleas granted the preliminary injunction, finding that Appellants demonstrated the necessary prerequisites, including irreparable harm. The court relied on the APA's irreparable harm clause and expert testimony from Melissa Lyon, who testified that removing healthcare access points from a community almost always negatively impacts health outcomes, particularly for socioeconomically disadvantaged and elderly populations.The Commonwealth Court reversed the trial court's order, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by finding irreparable harm based on speculative and hypothetical evidence. The Commonwealth Court held that the APA's irreparable harm clause alone was insufficient and required concrete evidence of harm, which it found lacking in Lyon's testimony.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed the case and determined that the Commonwealth Court misapplied the appellate standard of review, which requires a highly deferential approach to the trial court's decision. The Supreme Court found that the trial court had apparently reasonable grounds to issue the preliminary injunction based on Lyon's testimony and the APA's irreparable harm clause. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the Commonwealth Court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the remaining factors for preliminary injunctive relief. View "CKHS, Inc. v. Prospect Med Hldgs, Inc." on Justia Law