Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

David Roberson appealed a circuit court's dismissal of his claims against Balch & Bingham, LLP ("Balch"), on the basis that those claims were barred by the limitations periods contained in the Alabama Legal Services Liability Act ("the ALSLA"). After review of the trial court record, the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed, but on grounds that differed from the trial court's. "[T]he gravamen of Roberson's claims against Balch involved the provision of legal services. However, both Roberson and Balch assert that Roberson was not Balch's client, and those assertions are borne out in the third amended complaint, which indicates that Balch was engaged by Drummond, not personally by Roberson. ... Roberson's claims against the law firm Drummond engaged, Balch, are barred by the ALSLA because Roberson cannot meet an essential element of an ALSLA claim -- namely, he was not Balch's client -- and thus Balch owed no duty to Roberson. ... the circuit court's rationale was based on the applicability of the ALSLA's limitations periods." View "Roberson v. Balch & Bingham, LLP" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought by Smart against the County, based on the forum-selection clause in the parties' contract. The district court determined that the clause precluded Smart from suing the County in federal court and dismissed the case.The court explained that the ordinary understanding of "Arkansas courts" refers to courts that are constituted under the Arkansas state government, not any court that happens to be within Arkansas's borders. Furthermore, the word "pertinent" does not alter the meaning of "Arkansas courts," as Smart suggests. In this case, both the forum-selection clause and the anti-removal provision in the contract are clear, and they obviate the need to resort to the rule against surplusage. View "Smart Communications Collier Inc. v. Pope County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Hue Thi Dong Mai was sued for breach of contract by a prospective purchaser of the apartment building she owned, brought about because of fraudulent conduct on the part of Mai’s real estate agent. The prospective purchaser ultimately dismissed the breach of contract action, and Mai invoked the “tort of another” doctrine in suing, by cross-complaint, the agent and her employer to recover the attorney’s fees Mai incurred defending the contract action. In the course of that litigation, Mai’s counsel failed to appreciate the difference between presenting a claim for attorney’s fees as damages at trial, and one for fees as costs of suit in a posttrial motion. By its own admission, the trial court was equally confused. The cross-defendants submitted, as dispositive authority, the Court of Appeal decision in Copenbarger v. Morris Cerullo World Evangelism, Inc., 29 Cal.App.5th 1 (2018). Figuring it was bound by Copenbarger, the trial court decided it had no discretion to guide the case to what it believed was a fair resolution. Urging Mai to appeal the decision, it ultimately concluded it could not award anything on her claim for attorney’s fees. Mai appealed, presenting two issues: (1) to what extent did Copenbarger accurately define the minimum showing required to sustain an award of attorney’s fees as damages?; and (2) was the trial court correct in believing that Copenbarger eliminated its discretion to allow Mai to present her attorney’s fee claim on the merits? As to the first issue, the Court of Appeal concluded Copenbarger’s analysis, some of which was dicta, might mislead trial courts by causing them to disregard well-established and binding precedent that predated it. For that reason, the appellate court offered a narrow reading of Copenbarger that harmonized it with other case authority to the extent that was possible. Regarding the second issue, even accepting Copenbarger’s analysis at face value did not, as the trial court here seemed to believe, eliminate all discretion the court possessed to make mid-trial adjustments and accommodations that respect defendants’ right to a fair trial while also allowing plaintiffs to litigate the merits of their claims. Accordingly, judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for a limited retrial on the issue of attorney’s fees as damages in which the court could both apply the proper legal principles and exercise its discretion to achieve substantial justice between the parties. View "Mai v. HKT Cal, Inc." on Justia Law

The city of Puyallup (City) hired Conway Construction Company to build a road. The contract allowed the City to terminate the contract early either for its convenience or on Conway’s default, but a termination for convenience would result in more costs for the City. The City ended up terminating the contract partway through construction, claiming Conway defaulted. After a lengthy bench trial, the trial court concluded that Conway was not in default when the City terminated the contract and converted the termination into one for convenience. After review, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. Further, the Court held that the City was not entitled to an offset for any defective work discovered after termination because the City did not provide Conway with the contractually required notice and opportunity to cure. View "Conway Constr. Co. v. City of Puyallup" on Justia Law

The Sellers bought an Oakland property to “flip.” After Vega renovated the property, they sold it to Vera, providing required disclosures, stating they were not aware of any water intrusion, leaks from the sewer system or any pipes, work, or repairs that had been done without permits or not in compliance with building codes, or any material facts or defects that had not otherwise been disclosed. Vera’s own inspectors revealed several problems. The Sellers agreed to several repairs Escrow closed in December 2011, but the sewer line had not been corrected. In January 2012, water flooded the basement. The Sellers admitted that earlier sewer work had been completed without a permit and that Vega was unlicensed. In 2014, the exterior stairs began collapsing. Three years and three days after the close of escrow, Vera filed suit, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, breach of contract, fraud, and negligent misrepresentation. Based on the three-year limitations period for actions based on fraud or mistake, the court dismissed and, based on a clause in the purchase contract, granted SNL attorney’s fees, including fees related to a cross-complaint against Vera’s broker and real estate agent.The court of appeal affirmed. Vera’s breach of contract claim was based on fraud and the undisputed facts demonstrated Vera’s claims based on fraud accrued more than three years before she filed suit. Vera has not shown the court abused its discretion in awarding fees related to the cross-complaint. View "Vera v. REL-BC, LLC" on Justia Law

This dispute over uninsured motorist ("UM") coverage arose from a motor vehicle accident on Louisiana Highway 6 near Natchitoches. Martin Baack, an employee of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation, was driving his work vehicle when he was struck by a vehicle driven by Michael McIntosh. The vehicle Baack was driving belonged to PPC Transportation Company. Both Pilgrim’s Pride and PPC Transportation were subsidiaries of JBS USA Holdings, Inc. (“JBS”). McIntosh was determined to be solely at fault for the accident and pled guilty to improper lane usage. Baack and his wife filed suit individually and on behalf of their minor daughter naming as defendants McIntosh, his insurer, and Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) in its capacity as the UM provider for PPC Transportation’s vehicle. In JBS’s policy with Zurich, PPC Transportation was listed as a Broad Named Insured. The Baacks sought damages under Zurich’s UM coverage as well as penalties and attorney fees based on Zurich’s failure to timely settle the claim. The Louisiana Supreme Court granted consolidated writs to determine whether an insured’s initial UM coverage waiver remains valid where, upon consecutive renewals, the insured submitted new signed and dated UM forms without initialing the blanks provided to reject UM coverage. Based on the Court's interpretation of the UM statute, it found such a subsequently submitted form changes the prior rejection and operated to provide UM coverage. Additionally, finding no error in the quantum of damages and denial of penalties and attorney fees by the court of appeal, the Court affirmed. View "Baack v. McIntosh et al." on Justia Law

Fuston, Petway & French, LLP ("the Firm"), appealed the grant of summary judgment entered in favor of The Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham ("the Board") regarding the Board's termination of a contract between the parties. In September 2015, the Firm and the Board entered into a one-year contract in which the Firm agreed to provide legal representation for the Board. In 2016, the Firm and the Board entered into negotiations for a new contract. The chairman of the Board approached the Firm regarding the Board's need to have independent oversight and review of a program designed to attract "historically underutilized business entities" ("the HUB program"). Board meeting minutes at the end of 2016 reflected that the contract was approved. The contract between the Firm and the Board provided, in pertinent part, that the Firm would administer a Contract Compliance Program for the HUB program. Before the contract expired, the Board elected to terminate its contract with the Firm. The Firm sued for breach of contract and other theories. In its judgment, the trial court found, among other things, that the entirety of the Firm's obligations in the contract entailed legal services and that, as a result, the contract was terminable by the Board at any time. After review of the Firm's arguments appealing the trial court judgment, the Alabama Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Fuston, Petway & French, LLP v. Water Works Board of the City of Birmingham" on Justia Law

Appellant, Concerned Citizens of the Estates of Fairway Village, was an unincorporated association composed of people who own property in Fairway Village (the “Community”), a planned residential community located in Ocean View, Delaware. Appellants Julius and Peggy Solomon, Edward Leary, Kenneth and Denise Smith, and Terry and Carmela Thornes (collectively, the “Homeowners”) owned properties in the Community and were members of Concerned Citizens of the Estates of Fairway Village. Appellee Fairway Cap, LLC was the Community's developer. Demand for vacant townhomes in the Community was weaker than the developers expected. In the winter of 2016, Fairway Cap, LLC hired a real estate consultant who recommended converting unsold townhome lots into a rental community. Fairway Cap, LLC accepted the advice, secured funding, and began working on the rental properties. Appellee Fairway Village Construction, Inc. was an entity involved in the construction. The Homeowners discovered the plan after seeing an advertisement for “The Reserve at Fairway Village,” a forthcoming rental community. The Homeowners raised various objections to the rental community, including that the proposed units did not conform with existing dwellings and would lower property values. The Town of Ocean View and Fairway Cap, LLC rejected all the objections, concluding that the planned construction complied with the housing code and was allowed under the Community’s governing documents. This appeal presented two questions for the Delaware Supreme Court's review: (1) whether the Court of Chancery erred by holding that the Community’s governing documents allowed the developer to build rental properties; and (2) whether the Court of Chancery erred by awarding damages for a wrongful injunction after releasing the bond posted with the court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Chancery's judgment. View "Concerned Citizens of the Estates of Fairway Village v. Fairway Cap" on Justia Law

Craig Stark entered into a contract with McCarthy Corporation to construct a storage facility for recreational vehicles and boats. The relationship turned sour after McCarthy sent Stark an invoice for work Stark believed he had already paid for in full. After the parties were unable to resolve their dispute, Stark terminated McCarthy’s contract. McCarthy then filed a lien against Stark’s property and brought suit for breach of contract and to foreclose its lien. Stark, Stark Investment Group, and U.S. Bank, Stark’s construction lender on the project, counterclaimed for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraudulent misrepresentation, slander of title by the recording of an unjust lien, and breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act (“ICPA”). After a bench trial, the district court largely agreed with Stark's counterclaims and dismissed McCarthy's complaint. McCarthy appealed the district court’s findings, damages award, and attorney fees award. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court's holdings that McCarthy breached the contract between the parties and McCarthy violated the ICPA. View "McCarthy Corporation v. Stark Investment Group" on Justia Law

The superior court dismissed a subcontractor’s claims against the contractor because a venue provision in the subcontract required that litigation be conducted in another state. The superior court also dismissed the subcontractor’s unjust enrichment claim against the project owner for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The subcontractor appealed the dismissals; finding no reversible error, the Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s decisions. View "Resqsoft, Inc. v. Protech Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law