Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court of North Carolina was required to decide whether a trial court can refuse to hear oral testimony during a summary judgment hearing on the mistaken belief that the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit the receipt of such testimony. The plaintiff, a corporation, had sued the defendants for breach of a commercial lease, and the defendants counterclaimed for fraud. During the summary judgment hearing, the trial court declined a request by the defendants to introduce live testimony, asserting that it was not permitted during a summary judgment hearing. The defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's summary judgment order and remanded the case, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that a trial court errs if it fails to exercise its discretion under the misapprehension that it has no such discretion, referring to Rule 43(e) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure that allows for the introduction of live oral testimony during a summary judgment hearing at the discretion of the trial court. The court found that the trial court was mistaken in its belief that it could not allow oral testimony, and this error warranted vacatur and remand for reconsideration. The Supreme Court thereby modified and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals to vacate the trial court's summary judgment order and remand the case. View "D.V. Shah Corp. v. VroomBrands, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves an Iowa attorney, Marc Harding, who hired an Indiana-based doctor, Rick Sasso, to provide expert witness services in a potential medical malpractice suit in Iowa. After things did not go as planned, Harding sued Sasso in Iowa to recover a portion of the $10,000 retainer he had paid, plus additional damages. Sasso moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that the Iowa court did not have personal jurisdiction over him. The district court denied the motion, and Sasso appealed. The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision and ordered the case to be dismissed, but the Supreme Court of Iowa granted Harding's application for further review.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the Iowa court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Sasso. The court found that Sasso had sufficient minimum contacts with Iowa to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him with respect to the contract dispute. Sasso had entered into a contractual relationship with Harding, who is an Iowa lawyer, and agreed to evaluate a medical malpractice claim involving Iowa residents and to provide expert testimony at any trial in the medical malpractice case, which would have been venued in Iowa. The court also found that the exercise of jurisdiction would not be unreasonable or offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Iowa vacated the decision of the court of appeals, affirmed the district court's order denying Sasso's motion to dismiss, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Harding v. Sasso" on Justia Law

In a dispute before the Supreme Court of Mississippi, Amrut Patel claimed that Dilip Bhana failed to repay three loans. The Chancery Court of DeSoto County had granted a judgment in favor of Patel in 2014. In 2021, Patel attempted to renew the judgment by filing a notice of renewal with the DeSoto County Circuit Court. In 2022, Patel pursued executing the judgment in the DeSoto County Chancery Court. However, Bhana filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the judgment had expired because Patel did not properly renew it. The chancery court denied Bhana’s motion to dismiss.Bhana's case was brought before the Supreme Court of Mississippi on interlocutory appeal. The Supreme Court clarified that there are three ways to renew a judgment in Mississippi: filing a notice of renewal with the clerk of the court that rendered the judgment, filing a motion to renew in the court that rendered the judgment, or filing a new suit on the judgment in any court in which venue is proper. The court found that Patel did not follow any of these methods properly. Patel had filed a notice of renewal in the circuit court, not the chancery court that had issued the judgment, and he had not filed a new suit to renew the judgment.The Supreme Court of Mississippi held that Patel's judgment against Bhana had expired because Patel had not renewed it in any manner provided by law or case precedent. The court also ruled that Bhana did not waive his statute of limitations defense and that the chancery court had abused its discretion by finding Bhana’s motion to dismiss untimely. Consequently, the court reversed the chancery court’s denial of Bhana’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in favor of Bhana. View "Dilip v. Patel" on Justia Law

In this case, Nova Group/Tutor-Saliba (“NTS”) was awarded a construction contract by the United States Department of the Navy to build a new aircraft carrier maintenance pier at a naval base. The contract required NTS to demolish an old pier, design and build a replacement pier, and construct a new structure known as the Mole Quaywall, which would be designed by the government. During construction, NTS encountered unexpected subsurface soil conditions that complicated and increased the cost of the project. NTS sought additional compensation from the government alleging differing site conditions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the United States Court of Federal Claims which had denied NTS's claim for additional compensation. The Court of Federal Claims found that NTS had not established a Type I differing site condition because the contract documents disclosed that NTS would encounter unpredictable subsurface conditions and possible obstructions. It also found that NTS had failed to prove a Type II differing site condition, as it had not demonstrated that any of the potential causes for hard driving were unknown or unusual in the region or materially different from comparable work. The Court of Appeals agreed with these findings and also ruled that the parol evidence rule had not been violated as NTS claimed. The Court of Appeals found that the parol evidence rule does not prevent a party from presenting evidence that a recital of fact in an integrated agreement may be untrue, and the challenged evidence was not introduced to modify any term of the contract. Therefore, the appeal by NTS was denied and the decision of the Court of Federal Claims was affirmed. View "NOVA GROUP/TUTOR-SALIBA v. US " on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Montana, the plaintiff, Kevin Barber, appealed against his former employer, Bradford Aquatic Group, LLC, alleging wrongful termination. Bradford Aquatic Group, a North Carolina-based company, had employed Barber as a Regional Business Development Manager for its Rocky Mountain region, which includes Montana. The employment contract between Barber and the company included a choice-of-law and forum selection clause, specifying that any disputes arising from the agreement would be governed by North Carolina law and adjudicated in North Carolina courts.Barber, a resident of Montana, argued that Montana law should apply to his claims of wrongful discharge, breach of contract, and bad faith, and that the suit should be heard in Montana. The district court dismissed Barber's claims due to improper venue, based on the choice-of-law and forum selection clauses in the employment agreement.Upon review, the Supreme Court of the State of Montana affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the choice-of-law provision in the employment agreement was valid and that North Carolina law should apply to Barber's claims. The court also upheld the validity of the forum selection clause, concluding that it is enforceable under North Carolina law. Therefore, the court determined that the dispute should be adjudicated in North Carolina, not Montana. View "Barber v. Bradford Aquatic" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska, the petitioner, Eric McDonald, an employee of a subcontractor, suffered injuries during the renovation of a high school. He sued Architects Alaska, Inc. and BBFM Engineers, Inc., alleging that they negligently failed to exercise reasonable care in the design, supervision, implementation, and specifications of the demolition of the renovation project. Before trial, the parties’ attorneys discussed the possibility of a settlement, and the defendants moved to enforce a “walk-away” settlement they claimed had been reached through email correspondence. McDonald, unrepresented at this point, did not file a substantive response to the defendants’ motion. The superior court granted the defendants’ motion and dismissed the case.About a year later, McDonald moved for relief from judgment under Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), arguing that he had never given his attorney authority to settle the case. A different superior court judge granted the motion, finding that factual issues precluded summary judgment on whether a settlement agreement existed, that the earlier dismissal was erroneous as a law matter, and that extraordinary circumstances otherwise entitled McDonald to Rule 60(b) relief. The defendants petitioned for review, and the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska reversed the ruling on the ground that McDonald’s Rule 60(b) motion was not filed within a reasonable time. View "BBFM Engineers, Inc. v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In this case, the Gibson Foundation, a charitable arm of Gibson Brands, sued Rob Norris and The Piano Mill Group, alleging that they breached a contract and bailment when they refused to return a piano that had been used by entertainer Liberace, upon Gibson Foundation's request. The piano was initially transferred from Gibson Brands to Norris and Piano Mill. The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that the breach-of-bailment claim was not time-barred, reversing the lower court's decision. The court explained that a reasonable juror could find that Gibson Brands, the original owner of the piano, and Norris and Piano Mill had a mutual agreement where Gibson Brands would avoid storage costs by leaving the piano with Norris and Piano Mill, who would benefit from using the piano for promotional opportunities. Therefore, the six-year statute of limitations for certain contract claims applied, rather than the three-year limit for tort claims. However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Gibson Foundation, or its predecessor in title, Gibson Brands, owned the piano in question, which is necessary to establish a valid contract or bailment. The court also affirmed the lower court's denial of summary judgment to Gibson Foundation on the breach of contract claim, noting that a reasonable juror could find that Gibson Brands had given the piano to Norris and Piano Mill as a gift. View "Gibson Foundation, Inc. v. Norris" on Justia Law

In 2016 Watchous Enterprises, LLC contracted with one of the five individual defendant companies, Pacific National Capital, paying it a $7,600 nonrefundable deposit to secure help finding a lender or a joint-venture partner. Pacific introduced Watchous to companies affiliated with Waterfall Mountain LLC (collectively referred to as "Waterfall"). Watchous and Waterfall eventually executed a letter of intent to enter into a joint venture to which Waterfall would contribute more than $80 million. As part of the arrangement, Watchous paid Waterfall a $175,000 refundable deposit. Waterfall said that it would fund the venture through proceeds of loans backed by billions of dollars in Venezuelan sovereign bonds in the name of Waterfall or its lender (RPB Company). But Waterfall never funded Watchous, and Watchous was never refunded the $175,000. Watchous then filed suit under the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and common-law claims under Kansas law against Pacific and Waterfall as well as against the five Appellants sued individually. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Watchous on its fraud claims (leaving damages for the jury to decide), essentially on the ground that Appellants misrepresented and failed to disclose “the historic and contemporary facts about Waterfall’s dubious finances, loan defaults, and consistent lack of success in funding similar projects.” Watchous’s remaining claims proceeded to trial, where a jury found that Appellants engaged in a civil conspiracy to defraud Watchous, and had violated RICO. Appellants appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Watchous Enterprises v. Mournes, et al." on Justia Law

At a coffee shop in Calabasas, David Delrahim made Edwart Der Rostamian a business proposal. Rostamian got his notebook, asked a server for a pen, and worked with Delrahim to compose two pages of text. When they were done, each man signed the paper. Rostamian later sued Delrahim on contract claims. The trial court granted Delrahim’s motion for summary judgment, ruling the Calabasas writing was too indefinite to be a contract.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the order dismissing the tortious interference causes of action. The court reversed as to the breach of contract, specific performance, and unfair business practices causes of action. The court explained that before Rostamian and Delrahim wrote and signed the Writing, their discussions were freewheeling and wide-ranging. Rostamian was “under contract” and in escrow with Mekhail, so one possible form of the deal would be to complete the escrow and thus to make Rostamian the intermediate buyer, who then would sell to Delrahim, who would become the ultimate buyer. Another possibility was for Delrahim to “replace” Rostamian in the escrow, thus again making Delrahim the ultimate buyer. Or Delrahim could become Rostamian’s partner, or he could become an investor in the deal. The two men were canvassing possibilities before they reached an agreement and drafted the Writing. In the portion of the declaration the trial court cited, Rostamian explained that the Writing set out Delrahim’s promise to allow Rostamian to own the four dealer sites. Rostamian’s deposition answer did not contradict Rostamian’s declaration. View "Tiffany Builders, LLC v. Delrahim" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Weikum appealed a district court order and judgment denying his motion to compel arbitration, and granting Rodney Pagel and Scott Hager's motion for summary judgment. The parties agreed to dissolve their law firm, Pagel Weikum, PLLP, and entered into a Release and Settlement Agreement. The Agreement included an arbitration clause. Pagel and Hager filed suit against Weikum for breach of contract and conversion. Weikum moved to dismiss and compel arbitration. The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed, finding the arbitration clause at issue in the Agreement was broad, and not limited by any exceptions. The Court concluded the district court misinterpreted the Agreement by finding the claims raised were not arbitrable, and by denying the motion to compel arbitration of those claims. View "Pagel, et al. v. Weikum" on Justia Law