Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Govind Vaghashia and other plaintiffs appealed a trial court order denying their motion to vacate a settlement agreement with Prashant and Mita Vaghashia. The settlement involved a $35 million payment from the Govind Parties to Prashant and Mita, with specific terms about collateral and property interests. Disputes arose over the interpretation and execution of the agreement, leading to motions to enforce the settlement by both parties. The trial court enforced the agreement largely in favor of Prashant and Mita, rejecting the Govind Parties' interpretations.The trial court found that the Govind Parties were judicially estopped from challenging the settlement agreement after previously moving to enforce it. The court concluded that the Govind Parties' current position that the agreement was unenforceable was inconsistent with their earlier position that it was enforceable. The court also found that the Govind Parties had not taken their initial position due to ignorance, fraud, or mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the elements of judicial estoppel were met: the Govind Parties had taken two totally inconsistent positions in judicial proceedings, and the trial court had accepted their initial position that the settlement was enforceable. The appellate court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's application of judicial estoppel and upheld the denial of the motion to vacate the settlement agreement. The court also denied Prashant and Mita's motion to dismiss the appeal based on the disentitlement doctrine, finding insufficient evidence of non-compliance with trial court orders by the Govind Parties. View "Vaghashia v. Vaghashia" on Justia Law

Vernon K. Stensvad, the plaintiff, owns a small cattle herd and entered into a Grazing Lease Contract with Newman Ayers Ranch, Inc. in July 2022. The contract stipulated that Stensvad would graze his cattle on Ayers Ranch's property for a fee, with higher winter rates to be determined. Stensvad paid the fees for July and August but later agreed orally to perform labor in exchange for reduced fees. Disputes arose over the quality of Stensvad's work and the amount owed. In October 2023, Ayers Ranch issued an agister’s lien for $78,662.50, seizing Stensvad’s herd. Stensvad sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the sale of his cattle under the lien.The Seventh Judicial District Court in Prairie County granted Stensvad’s application for a preliminary injunction, ordering the cattle to be moved to a third-party feed lot. Ayers Ranch appealed, arguing that the District Court failed to consider all four factors required for a preliminary injunction under Montana law and that a preliminary injunction was not an appropriate remedy for challenging an agister’s lien.The Montana Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the District Court manifestly abused its discretion by not addressing all four factors of the preliminary injunction standard. The Supreme Court clarified that under the revised standard, a party must satisfy all four factors: likelihood of success on the merits, likelihood of irreparable harm, balance of equities, and public interest. The Court adopted the "serious questions" test from the Ninth Circuit, allowing for flexibility in evaluating these factors. The case was remanded for the District Court to make supplemental findings consistent with this standard. The Supreme Court also held that a preliminary injunction is an appropriate remedy to challenge an agister’s lien and that Stensvad did not have an adequate remedy at law. View "Stensvad v. Newman Ayers Ranch" on Justia Law

The case involves Meisam Sedighi, who sought reimbursement from his employer, Schnackel Engineers, Inc., for $3,000 he paid to an immigration attorney for the preparation and filing of a permanent labor certification application. Sedighi argued that under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b), Schnackel Engineers was responsible for these costs. Schnackel Engineers contended that Sedighi was to pursue his green card at his own expense, as stipulated in his employment contract, and that it did not agree to pay for the certification application.The small claims court of the county court for Douglas County ruled in favor of Sedighi, finding that Schnackel Engineers was responsible for the attorney fees under 20 C.F.R. § 656.12(b). Schnackel Engineers appealed to the district court for Douglas County, which reversed the small claims court's decision. The district court found that the employment contract controlled the parties' obligations and that Sedighi was responsible for his own green card expenses. It concluded that the Michigan immigration attorney represented Sedighi, not Schnackel Engineers.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its appellate review. The Supreme Court noted that the small claims court's judgment was supported by competent evidence showing that Schnackel Engineers actively participated in the preparation and filing of the permanent labor certification application. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have presumed that the small claims court found the Michigan immigration attorney represented both Sedighi and Schnackel Engineers. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment and directed it to reinstate the small claims court's judgment in favor of Sedighi. View "Sedighi v. Schnackel Engineers" on Justia Law

The case involves disputes over horse consignment contracts between Ramsey and Hickstead Farms and Dapple Stud, LLC. Ramsey and Hickstead entered into agreements with Dapple Stud to sell their horses at auction, with Dapple Stud acting as the consigning agent. The sales proceeds were deposited into Dapple Sales' checking account, managed by Mike Akers, who allegedly misappropriated the funds, resulting in Ramsey and Hickstead not receiving their due proceeds.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Dapple Stud and Dapple Sales, dismissing Ramsey and Hickstead's breach of contract claims. The court also required Ramsey and Hickstead to pay restitution to Dapple Stud for amounts previously paid. Additionally, the court denied Ramsey and Hickstead's motions to file third-party complaints against Akers and Dapple Sales, citing the statute of limitations.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reviewed the case and found that Ramsey and Hickstead had valid consignment contracts with Dapple Stud, which were breached when the sales proceeds were not remitted. The court held that Akers, as the manager of Dapple Stud, had the authority to bind the company in these transactions. The court reversed the summary judgment in favor of Dapple Stud and Dapple Sales and the restitution orders, remanding the case for further proceedings to determine the amounts owed to Ramsey and Hickstead, including interest.However, the court affirmed the lower court's decision to bar the third-party complaints against Akers and Dapple Sales due to the statute of limitations. The court also upheld the dismissal of the conversion and theft claims against Dapple Sales. The case was remanded to the Fayette Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "RAMSEY V. DAPPLE STUD, LLC" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law

In November 2014, the plaintiff purchased a recreational vehicle (RV) from a dealership, with the defendant bank financing the purchase. The sales contract inaccurately reflected the downpayment as $19,100 in cash instead of $1,000 in cash and $18,100 in trade-in value. The plaintiff later discovered issues with the RV and filed a lawsuit in February 2017, alleging violations of the Automobile Sales Finance Act (ASFA) due to the incorrect downpayment disclosure.The Superior Court of Fresno County reviewed the case and concluded that the four-year statute of limitations for written contracts applied, rather than the one-year statute for statutory penalties. The court granted summary adjudication in favor of the plaintiff against the dealership for violating the ASFA, and the dealership's liability was extended to the bank under the Federal Trade Commission’s holder rule. The court entered judgment requiring the bank to accept the return of the RV and pay the plaintiff $42,263.64.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case and determined that the rescission and restitution remedy under the ASFA is a penalty. The court concluded that the one-year statute of limitations for actions upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture applied. The court noted that the ASFA imposes strict liability without regard to actual damages or fault, and the legislative history indicated the remedy was intended as a penalty. Consequently, the appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Pompey v. Bank of Stockton" on Justia Law

Ultra Deep Picasso Pte. Limited (Ultra Deep) is a contractor specializing in undersea vessel operations for marine construction. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd. (Dynamic) subcontracted Ultra Deep for a project related to a contract with Saudi Aramco. Ultra Deep completed work worth over ten million dollars but alleged that Dynamic failed to pay, breaching their agreement. Ultra Deep filed a complaint in the Southern District of Texas, seeking breach of contract damages and a maritime attachment and garnishment of Dynamic’s funds allegedly held by Riyad Bank.The district court granted Ultra Deep an ex parte order for attachment of Dynamic’s assets at Riyad Bank. Dynamic responded with motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, improper venue, and to compel arbitration, which were denied. Dynamic and Riyad Bank then moved to vacate the attachment order, arguing that Ultra Deep failed to show Dynamic had property in the Southern District of Texas. The magistrate judge held a hearing and found that Ultra Deep did not present evidence that Dynamic’s property was within the district. The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation, vacated the attachment order, and dismissed the case with prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that for a valid Rule B attachment, the property must be found within the district. It concluded that a bank account is located where its funds can be withdrawn. Since Ultra Deep failed to show that Dynamic’s property was within the Southern District of Texas, the court affirmed the district court’s decision to vacate the attachment order and dismiss the case. View "Ultra Deep Picasso v. Dynamic Industries Saudi Arabia Ltd." on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with the defendant for a new vehicle, which later exhibited multiple defects. Despite several repair attempts, the issues persisted. The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the defendant, alleging violations of California’s Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, seeking various forms of relief including replacement or restitution, damages, and attorney fees.The case proceeded to trial in the Los Angeles County Superior Court, where the jury found the defendant liable and awarded the plaintiff damages. However, the jury did not find the defendant’s violation to be willful, thus no civil penalties were awarded. Subsequently, both parties filed motions regarding costs and attorney fees. The trial court ruled in favor of the defendant, limiting the plaintiff to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and awarding the defendant post-offer costs based on a prior settlement offer under California Code of Civil Procedure section 998.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court addressed two main issues: whether a section 998 offer consisting of two simultaneous offers is valid, and whether an offer that promises to pay for statutory categories of damages with disputes resolved by a third party is sufficiently certain. The court concluded that simultaneous offers are generally invalid under section 998 due to the uncertainty they create for the trial court in determining whether the judgment is more favorable than the offer. However, since only one of the defendant’s two offers was invalid, the remaining valid offer was operative. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision, holding that the plaintiff was limited to pre-offer costs and attorney fees, and the defendant was entitled to post-offer costs. View "Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to New York City's Guaranty Law, which was enacted in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. The law rendered personal guaranties of commercial lease obligations arising between March 7, 2020, and June 30, 2021, permanently unenforceable and identified efforts to collect on such guaranties as proscribed commercial tenant harassment. Plaintiffs, a group of New York City landlords, argued that the law violated the Contracts Clause of the U.S. Constitution.Initially, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the plaintiffs' constitutional challenges, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and remanded the case for further consideration. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Guaranty Law was unconstitutional.The City of New York appealed, arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing because the City did not enforce the Guaranty Law. The Second Circuit found that while the plaintiffs had standing at the pleadings stage due to the presumption of enforcement, they failed to meet the heightened burden on summary judgment to show a credible threat of imminent enforcement by the City. The City had unequivocally disavowed any intent to enforce the Guaranty Law against the plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated the district court's award of summary judgment and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court denied the City's request to vacate its earlier judgment reversing the dismissal of the Contracts Clause challenge and denied the City costs on the appeal due to its negligent delay in raising the enforcement-based standing challenge. View "Bochner v. City of New York" on Justia Law

A mother and son co-owned a property in Kodiak and hired an excavation company to build a retaining wall. The son made a $15,000 payment to the contractor by credit card. Disputes arose over the contract terms, leading both parties to sue each other for breach of contract. The superior court found that the contractor breached the contract and awarded damages to the mother and son, assuming the $15,000 payment would be reversed by the credit card company.The superior court's final judgment was issued on July 13, 2021. The contractor appealed, and the Alaska Supreme Court reversed several aspects of the superior court’s decision unrelated to the $15,000 payment. More than a year after the final judgment, the mother and son moved for relief from the judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 60(b), arguing that the court mistakenly assumed the $15,000 charge would be reversed. The superior court granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1), finding it had made a mistake about the credit card payment and adjusted its damages award accordingly.The contractor appealed to the Alaska Supreme Court, arguing that the superior court abused its discretion in granting relief under Rule 60(b)(1) because the motion was filed more than a year after the final judgment, making the delay unreasonable. The Alaska Supreme Court agreed, noting that Rule 60(b)(1) motions must be made within one year of the judgment and that this period cannot be tolled or extended. The court found that the superior court erred in tolling the one-year limitation period and that the Bishops' motion was untimely.The Alaska Supreme Court reversed the superior court’s order granting the Rule 60(b)(1) motion for relief from judgment and remanded for disbursement of the supersedeas bond consistent with its decision. View "Red Hook Construction, LLC v. Bishop" on Justia Law