Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Pyramid Tech filed suit against its insurer, alleging express breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Without holding a Daubert hearing, the district court excluded Pyramid Tech's expert witnesses and granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding insufficient evidence that a flood caused damage to Pyramid Tech's property. The court held that, after an expert establishes admissibility to the judge's satisfaction, challenges that go to the weight of the evidence are within the province of a fact finder, not a trial court judge. A district court should not make credibility determinations that are reserved for the jury. In this instance, the district court abused its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of David Spiegel and Ken Pytlewski, but did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert evidence of Del Mortenson. The district court erred in granting summary judgment against Pyramid Tech's claims where genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the insurer breached its contract with Pyramid Tech and breached the implied covenant of good faith. However, to the extent such claims were premised on Pyramid Tech's business interruption theory, no material issues of fact existed and the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against that theory of liability. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for retrial. View "Pyramid Tech. v. Allied Public Adjusters" on Justia Law

Dozens of suits were filed against Irving Oil Limited (IOL) alleging environmental contamination by methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) occurring from 1979 to the present. At the time of this opinion, all of the MTBE suits against IOL had been settled. In 2009, IOL filed a complaint asking the superior court to declare that ACE INA Insurance (ACE) had a duty to defend and indemnify in the MTBE suits. The superior court granted IOL’s motion for summary judgment in part and denied it in part, concluding that it could not declare that IOL was entitled a judgment on the duty-to-defend count as a matter of law. IOL appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed IOL’s appeal and ACE’s cross-appeal, holding that although a decision that an insurer does not have a duty to defend its insured is ordinarily immediately appealable under the death knell exception to the final judgment rule, the exception did not apply in this case because there were no MTBE cases pending against IOL. View "Irving Oil Ltd. et al. v. ACE INA Ins." on Justia Law

GDG filed suit, alleging that the Government of Belize breached a contract for the lease of office telecommunications. The district court dismissed based on the doctrines of forum non conveniens and international comity without reaching the merits of the dispute. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing for forum non conveniens without first evaluating the significance of a forum-selection clause in the underlying contract. Accordingly, the court vacated the forum non conveniens dismissal and remanded to allow the district court to determine the enforceability and significance of the forum-selection clause. The court also vacated the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground of international comity where retrospective international comity did not apply without a judgment from a foreign tribunal or parallel foreign proceedings and where prospective international comity did not apply to this commercial contract dispute. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded. View "GDG Acquisitions, LLC v. Government of Belize" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3101(a)(4), which allows a party to obtain discovery from a nonparty. John Kapon was the CEO of Acker, Merrall & Condit Company (AMC), a retailer and auctioneer of fine and rare wines, and the employer of Justin Christoph. In 2008, William Koch commenced an action against AMC in Supreme Court concerning alleged counterfeit wine that Rudy Kurniawan had consigned to AMC and that AMC had sold to Koch. In 2009, Koch commenced a fraud action in California against Kurniawan, alleging that Kurniawan had sold Respondent counterfeit wine through AMC’s auctions and sales. In 2012, Koch, seeking disclosure in the California action, served subpoenas on Kapon and Christoph (together, Petitioners). Petitioners filed motions to quash the subpoena, which Supreme Court denied. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding that Petitioners failed to show that the requested deposition testimony was irrelevant to the prosecution of the California action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the subpoenas satisfied the notice requirement of section 3101(a)(4); and (2) in moving to quash the subpoena, Petitioners failed to meet their burden of establishing that their deposition testimonies were irrelevant to the California action. View "Kapon v. Koch" on Justia Law

Crosstex Energy Services, LP hired Pro Plus, Inc. as the principal contractor to construct a natural gas compression station. Crosstex sued Pro Plus after an explosion occurred at the station, causing $10 million in property damage. The parties entered an agreement to move expert designation dates beyond the limitations period, but after limitations ran, Pro Plus filed a motion to dismiss because Crosstex had not filed a certificate of merit with its original petition as required by Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. 150.002. The trial court denied the motion and granted Crosstex an extension to file the certificate. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the court of appeals did not err in asserting jurisdiction over Pro Plus’s interlocutory appeal of the extension order; (2) section 150.002’s “good cause” extension is available only when a party filed suit within ten days of the end of the limitations period, and therefore, Crosstex could not claim protection from the good cause extension; and (3) a defendant’s conduct can waive the plaintiff’s certificate of merit requirement, but Pro Plus’s conduct did not constitute waiver. View "Crosstex Energy Servs. L.P. v. Pro Plus, Inc." on Justia Law

Endo sells Opana® ER extended-release tablets containing a painkiller, oxymorphone. In earlier litigation, Endo sued Roxane and Actavis for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(2)(A), based on their Abbreviated New Drug Applications to market generic versions of Opana® ER. The lawsuits settled; Endo granted defendants a license and a covenant not to sue. After making the agreements the 122 and 216 patents issued to Endo. They are continuations of the same parent application and directed to extended-release oxymorphone compositions and methods of treating pain using those compositions. Endo also acquired the unrelated 482 patent, concerning purified oxymorphone compositions and methods of making those compositions. The asserted patents are listed in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (Orange Book) entry for Opana® ER. Endo again sued for infringement and sought a preliminary injunction to prevent marketing or sales of generic oxymorphone formulations. The district court held that Endo was estopped from claiming that the activity of defendants, “which has gone on for a substantial period of time, is now suddenly barred because of these new patents.” The Federal Circuit vacated, finding that the defendants did not have an express or implied license to practice the patents at issue.View "Endo Pharm. Inc. v. Actavis, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a civil complaint against The Power Company, Inc. (“TPCI”) and TPCI’s president, Rick Rizzolo. Less than five years after Plaintiffs filed their action, they entered into a settlement agreement with TPCI and Rizzolo providing that Plaintiffs would receive $9 million upon the sale of Crazy Horse Too, which TPCI owned. More than five years after Plaintiffs filed their complaint, TPCI and Rizzolo filed two motions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) for want of prosecution. The district court denied the motions. After the Crazy Horse Too sold at a foreclosure sale, Plaintiffs filed a third motion to reduce the settlement agreement to judgment. The district court granted the motion. TPCI and Rizzolo appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Rule 41(e)’s provision requiring dismissal for want of prosecution does not apply to an action in which the parties enter into a binding settlement agreement before Rule 41(e)’s five-year deadline has expires, and therefore, the district court properly denied TPCI and Rizzolo’s motions to dismiss for want of prosecution; and (2) the district court did not err in reducing the parties’ settlement agreement to judgment. View "The Power Co., Inc. v. Henry" on Justia Law

Russell Reichert sued Sherry Hara in small claims court, claiming that Hara owed him for a $4,000 loan he gave her. The court found the transaction was a loan and entered judgment for Reichert. Hara subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the district court, alleging that the $4,000 was a gift and not a loan. The district court dismissed Hara’s complaint, concluding that the action was barred by both claim preclusion and issue preclusion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) claim preclusion, but not issue preclusion, applies to small claims court judgments; and (2) the elements of claim preclusion were satisfied in this case, and therefore, the district court correctly dismissed Hara’s action. View "Hara v. Reichert" on Justia Law

Mike Richey sold his interest in Richey Oilfield Construction, Inc. to Nighthawk Oilfield Services, Ltd. Richey remained employed as president of Richey Oil and became a limited partner in Nighthawk. The primary agreements regarding the transaction were a stock purchase agreement, an agreement for the purchase of Richey Oil’s goodwill, and a promissory note. Each of the acquisition agreements contained a forum selection clause naming Tarrant County as the venue for state court actions. When the business did not go as well as the parties had hoped, Richey filed suit in Wise County, where Richey resided, against two Nighthawk executives (together, Relators) for, among other claims, breach of fiduciary duty, common law fraud, statutory fraud, and violations of the Texas Securities Act. Relators responded by unsuccessfully moving the trial court to transfer venue to Tarrant County or dismiss the suit pursuant to the mandatory venue selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. Relators subsequently sought mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted relief, holding that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to enforce the forum selection clauses in the acquisition agreements. View "In re Fisher" on Justia Law