Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Expro Americas, LLC ("Expro") filed a complaint seeking, inter alia, a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction against Eddie Walters, a former Expro employee, and H&H Welding, LLC. Expro offered "oil and gas well and pipeline services," including providing "specially designed flaring products and services to pipeline transmission companies and refineries along the Gulf Coast." Expro's six-inch, trailer-mounted flare stacks were at the heart of this dispute. Eddie Walters was an Expro employee until August 5, 2013. Thereafter, Walters was employed by Clean Combustion, a competitor of Expro's that was created in 2013 by former Expro employees. Expro filed its application for a restraining order against H&H and Walters, alleging that both defendants stole the design for its flare stack. Expro specifically alleged that "[t]he information used to design and create the trailer-mounted flaring system is a ‘trade secret' of Expro's." Furthermore, it alleged breach of contract against H&H, claiming that the terms of Expro's purchase orders with H&H contained a "Proprietary Rights" section "in which H&H ‘warrants to keep all design, information, blueprints and engineering data with respect to the Goods confidential and to not make use of but to assign to Expro each invention, improvement and discovery relating thereto (whether or not patentable) conceived or reduced to practice in the performance of the Purchase Order by any person employed by or working under the directions of the Supplier Group.'" The trial court granted the restraining order, but after conducting an evidentiary hearing, the chancellor dissolved the temporary restraining order and found no facts to justify the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The chancellor awarded the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses in excess of the $5,000 injunction bond that Expro had posted. After determining that Expro's suit against H&H was meritless, the chancellor sua sponte dismissed H&H from the suit with prejudice. Expro appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court found that the chancellor did not err by awarding the defendants attorneys' fees and expenses, because Expro's application for a preliminary injunction was frivolous and was made in bad faith. However, the Court found the chancellor misapplied Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4, and therefore erred by dismissing H&H from the suit with prejudice. View "Expro Americas, LLC v. Walters" on Justia Law

Zachary Johnson and Margie Johnson contracted with Buskohl Construction Inc. as a general contractor to oversee the construction of their new house. John Buskohl was the sole shareholder, officer, and director of Buskohl Construction Inc. Due to a deteriorating relationship with the Johnsons, Buskohl walked off the job before construction was complete, leaving various "odds-and-ends" unfinished on the house. The Johnsons repaired some of the alleged deficiencies themselves and solicited bids from various contractors to fix the remaining issues. The Johnsons sued Buskohl alleging Buskohl negligently constructed the house, breached the contract, and breached the warranty to construct the house in a workmanlike manner. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Johnsons. Buskohl moved for a new trial under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59(b), arguing irregularities in the proceedings prevented him from receiving a fair trial. The district court denied the motion. On appeal, Buskohl argued the district court abused its discretion by denying a new trial because the district court erred by: (1) failing to provide a special verdict form that categorically itemized damages; (2) allowing hearsay into evidence; (3) excluding Buskohl's expert from testifying; and (4) denying Buskohl's motion for mistrial based on improper closing argument. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in admitting hearsay evidence that did not fall within an exclusion or exception. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for a new trial, because the district court's error affected Buskohl's substantial right to a fair trial. View "Johnson v. Buskohl Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2012, appellant Charles D. Leone II resigned his position as a principal of Madison Street Partners, LLC (“MSP”). Pursuant to the terms of MSP’s Operating Agreement, fellow principals Steven Owsley and Drew Hayworth elected to buy Leone’s interest in MSP. The agreement required the purchase price to be set at fair market value, as determined in good faith by MSP’s managers, Owsley and Hayworth. After receiving valuations from two independent valuation firms, the Managers proposed a purchase price of $135,850, which Leone rejected. Leone then sued the Managers in federal district court, contending the proposed purchase price was far below market value and asserted claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Managers moved for summary judgment on both claims, arguing Leone’s claims were barred by their good faith reliance upon the value set by the independent valuation firms. The district court granted the motion. On appeal, Leone argued: (1) the district court misapplied the law regarding express and implied good faith obligations; (2) the district court incorrectly held that bad faith requires a tortious state of mind; and (3) he presented sufficient evidence of bad faith to survive summary judgment. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded Leone indeed presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment: “three different types of ‘good faith’ were at play in this case: the express contractual provision, an implied covenant of good faith, and the statutory safe harbor for good faith reliance on experts’ opinions. Regardless of which one applies, the Managers bore the burden as movants for summary judgment to establish there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to their defense of good faith reliance on outside valuations. Although the Managers are entitled to a rebuttable presumption of good faith in relying on the outside valuations, Mr. Leone has raised genuine issues of material fact to rebut that presumption. Without the presumption and given the existence of fact issues regarding the Managers’ good faith, we conclude the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Managers on their affirmative defense.” View "Leone v. Owsley" on Justia Law

Pilkington North America, Inc. entered into a social contract with Toledo Edison Company under which Toledo provided one of Pilkington’s facilities with discounted electric service. The Public Utilities Commission approved the special contract. Pilkington later filed a complaint alleging that Toledo Edison had unlawfully terminated the special contract. Five other companies that also had special contracts with the utility also filed complaints against Toledo Edison. The Commission consolidated the six complaints and dismissed them. With the exception of Pilkington, each of the industrial customers appealed the Commission’s decision. The Supreme Court reversed the Commission’s order, concluding that Toledo Edison had prematurely terminated the special contracts. Pilkington subsequently filed a Ohio R. Civ. P. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment with the Commission seeking relief from the Commission’s order dismissing its complaint and its order denying the application for rehearing that the other five complainants filed. The Commission denied Pilkington’s motion, concluding that Pilkington may not use Rule 60(B) as a substitute for appeal. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Pilkington did not appeal the Commission’s adverse judgment, that judgment is final, and res judicata precludes the use of Rule 60(B) to obtain relief from that final judgment. View "In re Complaint of Pilkington N. Am., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the executrix of her husband's estate, along with her husband's former business, Federal City, filed suit against Life Investors for conversion and tortious interference with a contract. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of the complaint. The court concluded that this action is not barred by claim preclusion because the claims brought are not based upon the same cause of action as the prior suit. In this case, plaintiffs allege claims for conversion and tortious interference with contract against Life Investors because Life Investors removed over $400,000 from certain accounts to cover expenses above the alleged debt plaintiffs owed Life Investors. Life Investors removed these funds after the decision in the Maryland district court. The Maryland court never determined that plaintiffs lacked any interest in the assets in the accounts. Instead, it decided that plaintiffs were time-barred from bringing claims from a 2000 request for withdrawal of the assets and that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., claims were either time-barred or failed to allege a violation of ERISA law. Similarly, the claim is not barred by issue preclusion. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Corrado v. Life Investors Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Life Investors filed suit against defendants, alleging breach of a settlement agreement that required defendants to repay advances of monies defendants received from Life Investors. On appeal, defendants challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to Life Investors. The court affirmed, concluding that defendants' laches defense failed because they cannot show unreasonable delay on the part of Life Investors in bringing this suit nor can defendants show that they were prejudiced; even if the alleged inconsistencies were material, defendants chose not to investigate further and thus the determination that they ratified the Settlement Agreement was correct; the district court correctly granted summary judgment on the question of ratification of the Settlement Agreement after certifying that question to the Iowa Supreme Court and receiving its answer; and defendants' attempt to argue an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq., violation as a defense in this action is barred as a matter of issue preclusion. View "Life Investors Ins. Co. v. Federal City Region" on Justia Law

Randy Braswell sued Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc. in Amite County over some oil contracts. Two days later, Ergon brought a declaratory judgment action against Braswell in Rankin County over those same contracts. Ergon removed the Amite County action to federal court, where it remained for eighteen months before it was remanded. In the meantime, Ergon obtained summary judgment against Braswell in Rankin County. Braswell appealed, arguing that the Rankin County judge erred when he granted summary judgment in Ergon's favor and when he refused to transfer the action to Amite County. The Supreme Court agreed with Braswell that the action should have been transferred to Amite County, and reversed the judgment of the Rankin County circuit judge based on the doctrine of priority jurisdiction, and remanded the case to the circuit court. View "Braswell v. Ergon Oil Purchasing, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, owners of a rare coin known as a "Brasher Doubloon," alleging claims for quantum meruit, fraud, breach of contract, constructive trust, and misappropriation of trade secrets. Plaintiff offered to sell defendants information that would prove that their coin was the first legal-tender coin struck pursuant to an Act of Congress. After plaintiff gave defendants the information, defendants denied payment. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the Coin was not, as plaintiff theorized, legal tender struck pursuant to the Act Regulating Foreign Coins, and For Other Purposes, ch. 5. 1 Stat. 300. Plaintiff could not recover because he had not provided the information he alleged he was required to provide pursuant to the parties’ agreement. Further, the court concluded that plaintiff did not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d) because he failed to identify what specific facts a deposition of Defendant Contursi would have revealed that would have precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Swoger v. Rare Coins Wholesalers" on Justia Law

Relator filed a qui tam action on behalf of the United States, twenty-five states, and the District of Columbia, naming his former employer as the defendant and asserting several claims under the False Claims Act (FCA) and analogous state statutes. Thereafter, Relator filed three amended complaints adding five defendants. Defendants filed motions to dismiss. Relator subsequently filed a fourth amended complaint, asserting that he had an absolute right to amend his complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike the fourth amended complaint after construing Relator’s filings as a request for leave to amend, concluding that Relator had not established good cause for amending his complaint once again. The district court then dismissed the case with prejudice, concluding that the FCA’s public disclosure bar deprived it of jurisdiction over certain allegations and that, as to the remaining allegations, the third amended complaint failed to state a cognizable claim. The First Circuit vacated the judgment below and remanded, holding that the district court (1) did not err in concluding that Relator exhausted his one-time right to amend under Rule 15(a)(1); but (2) appraised Relator’s request for leave to amend under the wrong legal standard. View "D'Agostino v. ev3, Inc." on Justia Law

HKS a Texas architecture firm, provided services for a luxury hotel in Mammoth Lakes under an Agreement that contained a Texas forum selection clause, requiring mediation, and a Texas choice of law provision.The Agreement authorized HKS to hire “[c]onsultants.” Vita, a California landscape design firm, submitted to HKS a Contract incorporating the terms of the Agreement. Neither Vita or HKS signed the Contract, but Vita performed work in 2008, during the “design phase” and sent invoices to HKS. Owner began having financial problems before construction commenced, leaving HKS with unpaid bills for its own services and those provided by “consultants.” HKS obtained a judgment against Owner in 2010 in Texas for $1,617,073.70 but was unable to recover anything. In 2013, Vita sued HKS, alleging breach of contract; unjust enrichment; quantum meruit; and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, seeking $370,650.53. After answering the complaint, HKS moved to enforce the forum selection clause and dismiss. The court of appeal reversed dismissal. HKS established the existence of a contract between HKS and Vita containing a forum selection clause, but Code of Civil Procedure 410.42 prohibits enforcement of construction contract provisions requiring disputes between contractors and California subcontractors to be litigated outside California. View "Vita Planning & Landscape Architecture, Inc. v. HKS Architects, Inc." on Justia Law