Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Riceland, requesting the district court compel Riceland to contribute a portion of its recoveries in various cases to the common benefit fund established by the district court to compensate plaintiffs for their legal work. The district court dismissed Riceland's counterclaims of breach of contract and tortious interference and certified the dismissal as a final judgment under FRCP 54(b). The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that a res judicata effect can properly be considered as a “miscellaneous factor” under the Hayden factor analysis. In this case, the district court did not err in considering the res judicata ramification in the Arkansas state court case. The district court found that plaintiffs and the district court itself would suffer injustice if entry of final judgment was delayed. On the merits, the court concluded that the claims regarding genetically-modified rice were released by the Settlement Agreement and Release, but the Release does not govern plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims against Riceland for its failure to contribute to the fund. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Riceland Foods v. Downing" on Justia Law

Copia Communications, LLC, a Massachusetts company, brought this action in federal district court in Massachusetts against Seawind Key Investments, Limited, a Jamaican resort operator, and Seawind’s alleged alter-ego, AMResorts, LP, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, alleging breach of contract. The subject contract was proposed and executed in Jamaica, performance on the contract occurred almost exclusively in Jamaica, and the contract was governed by the laws of Jamaica. Both defendants, neither of which operated any business or had any corporate presence in Massachusetts, moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants was barred by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, LP" on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law

VTB Bank, a Ukranian bank and company, brought this lawsuit against Development Max, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and Navitron Projects Corp., a Panamanian corporation and managing member of Development Max, alleging fraudulent transfer, constructive fraudulent transfer, and unjust enrichment. Development Max and Navitron filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of forum non conveniens, among other theories. The Court granted the motion with respect to VTB’s claim against Navitron but denied the motion with respect to VTB’s claim against Development Max. On reconsideration, the Court granted, without prejudice, Development Max’s motion to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens, holding that Ukraine, as opposed to Delaware, was the proper forum in which to litigate this dispute. View "VTB Bank v. Navitron Projects Corp." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Delbert Soseeah, Maxine Soseeah and John Borrego filed this action against defendants Sentry Insurance, Dairyland Insurance Company, Peak Property and Casualty Insurance Company, and Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin (collectively Sentry) claiming, in part, that Sentry failed to timely and properly notify them and other Sentry automobile insurance policyholders of the impact of two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions regarding the availability of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage under their respective policies. The complaint alleged that Delbert Soseeah, after being injured in a motor vehicle accident, made a claim for UM/UIM benefits under two policies of automobile insurance issued by Sentry to Mrs. Soseeah. According to the complaint, Mrs. Soseeah “never executed a valid waiver of UM/UIM coverage under the” two policies and, consequently, Mr. Soseeah “demanded that . . . Sentry reform” the two policies “to provide stacked uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage limits equal to the limits of the liability coverage on each of the vehicles covered by the” policies pursuant to the two New Mexico Supreme Court decisions. Sentry purportedly refused to reform the policies and rejected Mr. Soseeah’s claim for UM/UIM benefits. The complaint alleged that Sentry, by doing so, violated New Mexico’s Unfair Practices Act (UPA), violated a portion of New Mexico’s Insurance Code known as the Trade Practices and Frauds Act (TPFA), breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breached the terms of the two policies. The district court granted plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. Sentry subsequently sought and was granted permission to appeal the district court’s class certification ruling. Because plaintiffs failed to establish that all members of the general certified class suffered the common injury required by Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(2), the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the general class. Because the district court’s certification ruling did not expressly address the Rule 23 factors as they applied to each of the identified subclasses, the Court did not have enough information to determine whether the district court abused its discretion in certifying two subclasses. Consequently, the Court directed the district court on remand to address these issues. View "Soseeah v. Sentry Insurance" on Justia Law

In IRB-Brasil Resseguros, S.A. v. Inepar Invs., S.A., the Court of Appeals held that, where parties include a New York choice-of-law clause in a contract, such a provision demonstrates the parties’ intent that courts not conduct a conflict-of-laws analysis. In the instant case, Plaintiff was a New York not-for-profit corporation that administered a retirement plan and a death benefit plan. Decedent was enrolled in both plans. Decedent named Appellants as beneficiaries. Both plans stated that they shall be governed by and construed in accordance with New York law. After Decedent died, a Colorado court admitted his will to probate. Plaintiff was unsure to whom the plan benefits should be paid after Decedent’s death and commenced a federal interpleader action against Decedent’s Estate, the personal representative (PR) of the Estate, and Appellants. A federal district court directed Plaintiff to pay the disputed funds to the PR, concluding that Colorado’s revocation law terminated any claims to the plans by Appellants. On appeal, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals certified questions to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered by extending the holding in IRB to contracts that do not fall under Gen. Oblig. Law 5-1401 and clarifying that this rule obviates the application and both common-law and conflict-of-laws principles and statutory choice-of-law directives, unless the parties expressly indicate otherwise. View "Ministers & Missionaries Benefit Bd. v. Snow" on Justia Law

A landowner filed a complaint for breach of contract against the predecessor in interest to Huntington National Bank. The trial judge ruled in favor of the landowner and awarded damages. The court of appeals reversed on the issue of the proper standard for calculating damages and remanded the case for a recalculation. On remand, the trial judge ordered a new evidentiary hearing on damages, concluding that the court could not arrive at a proper measure of damages without additional testimony. Huntington filed this action in procedendo and prohibition in the court of appeals and filed a notice of appeal of the trial court’s order. The court of appeals (1) dismissed the appeal on grounds that the order requiring a new hearing was not a final appealable order, and (2) dismissed the procedendo and prohibition petition, concluding that Huntington had an adequate remedy by way of appeal and that the trial court did not exceed its jurisdiction by ordering an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Huntington had an adequate remedy at law by way of appeal and that the trial judge’s jurisdiction to order the evidentiary hearing and to determine damages based on new evidence was not patently and ambiguously lacking. View "State ex rel. Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Kontos" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Defendant, alleging breach of contract and misappropriation of trade secrets. Concerned by Plaintiffs’ counsel’s (Counsel) exposure to certain documents as a result of Counsel working “closely” with Defendant’s former finance manager, Defendant moved to disqualify Counsel from representing Plaintiff. The special master denied the motion to disqualify. The trial court, however, ordered Counsel’s disqualification. The court of appeals subsequently denied Plaintiffs’ petition for mandamus relief. The Supreme Court conditionally granted mandamus relief, holding that the trial court improperly disqualified Counsel under In re American Home Products Corp., as the American Home Products screening requirement does not govern a fact witness with information about his former employer if his position with that employer existed independently of litigation and he did not primarily report to lawyers. Rather, to the extent that a fact witness discloses his past employer’s privileged and confidential information, the factors outlined in In re Meador should guide the trial court’s decision regarding disqualification. View "In re RSR Corp. and Quemetco Metals Ltd., Inc." on Justia Law

Real parties in interest (collectively, Seaver) filed a complaint against Petitioners (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet Imaging, Inc., alleging claims arising out of agreements between the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet’s purchase of the Helfsteins’ companies. The Helfsteisn settled with Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Helfsteins. Seaver later filed a notice of rescission, alleging that the Helfsteisn fraudulently induced them to settle. Meanwhile, the district court resolved the claims between Seaver and Uninet. Seaver later filed a Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal, seeking to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteisn filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the Rule 60(b) motion was procedurally improper. The district court denied the motion. The Helfsteins then filed this original writ petition asking the Supreme Court to consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that even if Rule 60(b) applied in this case, the motion was time-barred. View "Helfstein v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law