Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Cashman sued, alleging Cardi provided defective cofferdams for construction of the Sakonnet River Bridge. Cofferdams are temporary watertight enclosures that are pumped dry to expose the bottom of a body of water so that construction can occur. During discovery, Cashman sought, and Cardi refused to produce, computer models and draft reports that had been “considered by” its testifying engineering expert to determine “certain stress and loads that are going to be placed on certain points on this cofferdam,” including models “that [the expert] created which [he] may not have relied on but certainly would’ve considered” and draft reports. Cardi argued that Rule 26(b)(4)(A) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure does not allow discovery of materials “considered by” an expert in forming an expert opinion. The hearing justice concluded that he did not have the authority to compel production of the material. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed, after considering interpretations of the corresponding Federal Rule. The state rule is “clear and unambiguous” and is confined to discovery through interrogatories or deposition. It does not provide for the disclosure of documents. View "Cashman Equip. Corp., Inc. v. Cardi Corp., Inc." on Justia Law

Susan Lundberg, as Trustee of the Gabriel J. Brown Trust, appealed the grant of summary judgment quieting title in a tract of land to Greg Holverson, directing the Trust to convey the land to Holverson, and dismissing the Trust's counterclaims for rescission or for damages for breach of contract. In May 1980, Holverson owed a balance on a contract for deed. Robert Lundberg, as original Trustee, released 5.09 acres from the contract and deeded that land to Holverson. Holverson executed a mortgage on the 5.09 acres as additional security for the contract for deed and the single indebtedness of $39,018.40 under the same repayment terms as the contract for deed. Holverson made sporadic payments under the amended contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she wrote Holverson multiple times asking him to make required payments. In December 2012, the Trust initiated proceedings to cancel the contract for deed and served Holverson with a notice of default. Holverson agreed to pay the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage. According to Susan Lundberg, she reviewed records at the Burleigh County Recorder's Office and learned Holverson had obtained and satisfied several other mortgages on the land while making sporadic payments to the Trust since 1978. Susan Lundberg claimed she discovered Holverson had executed five mortgages on the land and satisfied three of the mortgages between 1978 and 1997, and he had obtained six mortgages and satisfied seven mortgages after 1997. She claimed she also discovered Holverson's stated reason for amending the contract for deed and mortgage on November 10, 1997, was false, because the record in the recorder's office reflected he had obtained the Capital Credit Union mortgage several days before Holverson's contract for deed and mortgage with the Trust were amended on November 10, 1997. Holverson made a timely tender of a certified check for the balance due under the contract for deed and mortgage, and the Trust refused to accept the check and execute a warranty deed for the land. Holverson sued the Trust to quiet title and determine ownership of the land. Holverson generally denied the Trust's allegations of fraud and misrepresentation and affirmatively pled accord and satisfaction, estoppel, laches, payment, release, statute of limitations, and waiver. The district court granted Holverson's motion for summary judgment. After review, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded the Trust's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Holverson v. Lundberg" on Justia Law

GSS appealed the district court’s dismissal of its second attempt to confirm a $44 million arbitral award entered against the Port Authority for breach of a construction contract. GSS first tried to confirm the award, but the district court found that it had no personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority. Then GSS filed its second petition, also naming the Republic of Liberia, which owns the Port Authority, as respondents. The district court again dismissed GSS’s petition, finding that issue preclusion barred relitigating its personal jurisdiction over the Port Authority and that GSS failed to demonstrate that Liberia was liable for the Port Authority’s alleged breach. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against Liberia for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330 et seq.; affirmed the district court's dismissal of GSS's petition against the Port Authority on sovereign immunities grounds; and concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing GSS's petition before allowing jurisdictional discovery. View "GSS Group Ltd. v. Republic of Liberia" on Justia Law

Jeff Lokey and Mike Irwin were business partners in two Wyoming businesses. After the parties dissolved their shared business interests, Irwin filed suit against Lokey, alleging that Lokey had materially breached the terms of the agreement. When Lokey did not timely file an answer the district court entered a default judgment against Lokey that included a provision allowing the parties ten days to file objections to the judgment. Lokey filed an objection, which the district court denied. Lokey appealed, challenging the court’s denial of his objections. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding (1) the Court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal because Lokey did not timely appeal an appealable order; but (2) the Court had jurisdiction to award, and Irwin was entitled to recover, reasonable attorney fees incurred as a result of this appeal. View "Lokey v. Irwin" on Justia Law

This appeal grew out of a conflict between the business models of Sprint Nextel Corporation and The Middle Man, Inc. Middle Man bought mobile telephones, including Sprint’s, and tries to resell them at a profit. Sprint brought a breach of contract lawsuit against Middle Man, and Middle Man counterclaimed seeking a declaration that its business model did not violate the contract that accompanied the purchase of Sprint telephones. The district court held as a matter of law that the contract unambiguously prohibited Middle Man from selling new mobile telephones purchased from Sprint regardless of whether they were active on Sprint’s network. In light of this holding, the district court: (1) granted judgment on the pleadings to Sprint on Middle Man’s counterclaim for a declaratory judgment; and (2) granted summary judgment to Sprint on its breach of contract claim, awarding Sprint nominal damages of $1. Middle Man appealed, contending that the entry of judgment on Sprint’s claim and Middle Man’s counterclaim was made in error and that the district court should have awarded judgment to Middle Man on both claims. The Tenth Circuit, after review of the contract at issue here, determined parts were ambiguous, and that the district court erred in ruling as a matter of law that it was not. As such, Sprint was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. The district court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Middle Man" on Justia Law

This was Defendants’ fourth appeal from a lawsuit in which Plaintiff obtained a $23 million judgment based on an an indemnification clause in an agreement. Plaintiff sought to secure payment on that judgment by bringing suit against Defendants. Defendants then began a series of attempts to evade payment to Plaintiff and to elude the power of the courts. As relevant to this appeal, Defendants violated a preliminary injunction, resulting in a civil contempt order entered by the district court. The contempt order included an escalating fines provision. The First Circuit affirmed the contempt order and remanded with directions to amend the sanction order so that the fines cease to accrue at some total amount. Defendants appealed the revised contempt order issued by the district court, arguing that the underlying preliminary injunction expired by its own terms so the district court could no longer coerce compliance with it. Defendants failed to raise this argument at any time prior to the present appeal. The First Circuit denied the appeal, holding that Defendants’ belated challenge was implicitly foreclosed by the Court’s prior decisions. View "AngioDynamics, Inc. v. Biolitec AG" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of fiduciary duty resulting from oppressive conduct, breach of fiduciary duty resulting from self-dealing, fraud in the inducement, and negligent misrepresentation. During trial, Plaintiff produced 155 pages of documents that had not been produced to Defendants during discovery. Defendants argued that they were denied a fair trial because the information contained in the documents would have permitted them to properly cross-examine Plaintiff. The district court dismissed the case with prejudice pursuant to Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 37(b) as a sanction for the mid-trial production of documents. The court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s motion to vacate the order of dismissal under Sup. Ct. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trial justice did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice pursuant to Rule 37; and (2) the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in denying Rule 60(b) relief. View "Joachim v. Straight Line Prods., LLC" on Justia Law

As part of a joint effort to construct a Zoroastrian worship center, the parties signed a ninety-nine-year lease on a parcel of property owned by Rustam Guiv in the Vienna area of Fairfax County, Virginia. After Rustam Guiv terminated the lease, the Center filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment to reinstate the lease. After removal, the district court granted summary judgment to Rustam Guiv and awarded attorneys’ fees. The court concluded that Rustam Guiv presented sufficient evidence to show complete diversity between the parties, thereby establishing subject matter jurisdiction in federal court. The court also concluded that the undisputed material facts show that The Center breached the lease. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. The court concluded, however, that the attorneys' fee award must be vacated where the district court correctly identified Rustam Guiv as the prevailing party but made no effort to narrow the fee award to its successful claims. Under Virginia law governing contractual fee-shifting provisions, the prevailing party is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for work performed only on its successful claims. View "Zoroastrian Center v. Rustam Guiv Found." on Justia Law

Defendants were business entities that organize physically challenging obstacle course events in locations throughout the United States. The four named Plaintiffs registered to participate in one of those events. Plaintiffs filed suit in Massachusetts superior court alleging that they were unable to participate in the event because of a second change of location and that Defendants refused to refund Plaintiffs’ registration fees. Plaintiffs sought relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated persons. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that removal was permitted under the Class Action Fairness Act because the matter in controversy exceeded $5 million. Plaintiffs moved to remand the case to state court arguing that Defendant failed to show that over $5 million was in controversy. The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand the case to state court. The district court then dismissed the case and compelled mediation and arbitration of the dispute. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that Defendants met their burden of showing that over $5 million was in controversy in this matter. Remanded with instructions to remand the case to state court for lack of jurisdiction. View "Pazol v. Tough Mudder Inc." on Justia Law

When the main Youngstown-area crushed-stone supplier discontinued production, RGI, a Sandusky quarry, approached Hardrives, Sabatine's asphalt paving company, to discuss jointly establishing a large RGI distribution center and Hardrives production plant. In 1998, RGI’s representatives and Sabatine produced a draft agreement, with contingencies, such as the minimum amount of stone Hardrives was to buy, low-cost railroad transportation, and government incentives; it stated that it was subject to RGI senior management approval. Sabatine was unable to convince Norfolk Railroad to establish access and enlisted Congressman Traficant’s help.Unbeknownst to RGI, Sabatine paid Traficant a $2,400 bribe and was later indicted. Ultimately, the parties arrived at an acceptable rail rate and selected a Youngstown site. Hardrives began bidding on larger projects and purchasing new equipment. All the agreed contingencies were fulfilled, except RGI had arguably not given explicit senior management approval. Sabatine called RGI about ordering a $1.5 million asphalt plant for the site. According to Sabatine, RGI gave him the go ahead. Sabatine purchased the plant. Two months later RGI told Hardrives that it would no longer participate in the joint venture. Hardrives began losing money, and by 2001, became Cranmark and sold to McCourt. In 2004, Cranpark sued, alleging breach of contract and promissory estoppel. In 2010, the court granted RGI summary judgment, based on the limitations period, and holding RGI’s representations were not unambiguous promises. On remand, RGI argued that Cranpark was not the “proper party” because it had sold everything, including the right to bring the cause of action, to McCourt. The court denied the motion. A jury awarded $15.6 million, but the court then held that Cranmark lacked standing. The Sixth Circuit reversed, stating that the court failed to timely call the proof-of-standing issue to counsel’s attention, once RGI finally squarely presented the issue. View "Cranpark, Inc. v. Rogers Group, Inc." on Justia Law