Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a deficiency action brought by appellant SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”) as the assignee under a motor vehicle conditional sales contract following its repossession and sale of a motor vehicle purchased by appellee Mattie Venable. Specifically, the issue was which statute of limitations applied here: the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA 11-2-725 (1) applicable to actions on contracts for the sale of goods, or the six-year statute of limitation found in OCGA 9-3-24, generally applicable to actions on simple written contracts. After review, the Court concluded that this action was subject to the four-year statute of limitation found in 11-2-725 (1). View "SunTrust Bank v. Venable" on Justia Law

In 2011, Medical Recovery Services, LLC (“the Collection Agency”), filed this action against defendants Allison and Nathan Olsen to recover on two entities’ unpaid medical bills. In 2012, the parties stipulated that the Collection Agency could recover a judgment against defendants and that it would forbear executing on the judgment if the defendants paid $100 per month between the 25th and 30th of each month until the judgment was paid. The court entered a judgment providing that the Collection Agency could recover from the Defendants the sum of $4,973.46. Defendants failed to make any payment on the judgment, and the Collection Agency attempted to execute on the judgment. The Collection Agency sought to execute on defendants’ bank account, but the account had been closed. The Collection Agency then sought a continuing garnishment to obtain Mr. Olsen’s disposable earnings from Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen, but that garnishment was returned unsatisfied because “Defendant is a partner in the firm, not an employee.” The Collection Agency also sought to execute on Mr. Olsen’s partnership interest, but the writ was returned unsatisfied because Mr. Olsen’s equity in the partnership was stated to be zero. The Collection Agency then sought to depose Stephen Hall, the partner in the law firm who had signed the responses to the writs of garnishment. The Collection Agency agreed to forgo taking his deposition if Hall would make $250 bi-monthly payments until the judgment was paid in full. Hall made those payments, but the Collection Agency would not accept final payment endorsed "payment in full" because it wanted to seek post-judgment attorney fees. Defendants filed a motion seeking to compel the Collection Agency to record a satisfaction of judgment in every county in which it had recorded the original judgment. The Agency responded by filing for an award of post-judgment fees it incurred trying to collect on its judgment. The Agency's motion was denied, and the Agency estopped from further collection of fees, citing the agreement reached in satisfying the judgment. The district court upheld the magistrate court's judgment. Finding that Hall only agreed to satisfy the judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in affirming the magistrate. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Recovery Svcs. v. Olsen" on Justia Law

In 2005, Connor Libby and Elena Chapa (collectively, Defendants) signed credit card agreements with Federated Capital Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The agreements contained a forum selection clause and choice of law provision that adopted Utah substantive and procedural law to govern any dispute under the contract. The agreements required Defendants to make monthly payments to the address specific on their billings statements, and each billing statement required Defendants to send their payments to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendants defaulted in 2006. In 2012, Federated filed separate claims in separate proceedings against Defendants. In each proceeding, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, ruling that Utah’s borrowing statute required the court to apply Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations, thereby barring Federated’s claims. Federated appealed, arguing that the agreement’s forum selection clause precluded the application of Utah’s borrowing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the borrowing statute applied to and barred Federated’s causes of action. View "Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Goliath Energy Services, LLC, and George Satterfield challenged orders denying their N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motions to vacate default judgments entered against them in favor of Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC, and Rossco Crane and Rigging, Inc. Monster was in the oil field construction, trucking, and rigging business. Rossco was in the business of providing various crane and rigging services. Goliath was a limited liability company with its principal place of business located in Grand Junction, Colorado, and it conducted business in North Dakota. Satterfield was Goliath's president and Karl Troestler was its chief financial officer. Rossco and Monster sued Goliath, Troestler, and Satterfield to collect payment of outstanding balances owed for services provided to Goliath. A default judgment eventually entered in favor of Monster for $240,107.23. Rossco advised its attorney that negotiations had also failed with the defendants. Rossco's attorney filed the closing papers with the clerk of court, and a default judgment was entered against the defendants in favor of Rossco for $97,233.04 a month later. On appeal, Goliath and Satterfield argued the district court erred in denying their motions to vacate the default judgments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the underlying actions and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the liquidation of Pine Top Insurance, some of its receivables were assigned to PTRIL, a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in New York. One of those receivables was owed by Nissan, a Japanese insurance company that transacted business in the U.S. Transfercom, a United Kingdom insurance company had assumed that obligation. PTRIL filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract against Transfercom and seeking recovery under reinsurance treaties entered into by Transfercom’s predecessor and Pine Top in 1981 and 1982. Transfercom removed the litigation to federal court. PTRIL moved to remand, contending that Transfercom had waived its right to remove the case in the reinsurance treaties. Those treaties contain service of suit clauses, stating: In the event of the failure of the Reinsurer hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Reinsurer hereon, at the request of the Company, will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States. The district court found that under the plain language, PTRIL reserved the exclusive authority to select jurisdiction and venue; Transfercom waived its right to remove the case to federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: to allow removal would be to ignore the contract’s plain and ordinary meanin View "Pine Top Receivables of Ill. v. Transfercom, Ltd." on Justia Law

This letter opinion addressed Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss Third-Party Plaintiffs’ amended third-party complaint. The Third-Party Defendants advanced four bases on which the amended complaint should be dismissed, including lack of personal jurisdiction, failure to state a claim, failure to comply with Court of Chancery Rule 23.1, and an unreasonable delay in bringing the amended complaint. The Court of Chancery granted the Third-Party Defendants’ motions to dismiss, holding that the Third-Party Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred because the Third-Party Plaintiffs failed to identify a tolling doctrine or extraordinary circumstances sufficient to avoid application of laches. View "CMS Inv. Holdings, LLC v. Castle" on Justia Law

In 2002, Deere became the exclusive North American wholesale supplier of Hitachi products. In 2014, Deere notified Rudd, a long-time authorized dealer of Hitachi equipment, of its intent to terminate its dealer agreements and initiated arbitration proceedings, as required by the agreement. Although Rudd agreed that arbitration was the proper forum, it sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during arbitration and moved to seal the case, stating that “the very fact of this lawsuit” could cause loss of customers, layoffs (or preemptive departure) of employees, and diminution of the value of Rudd’s financial investment. Two weeks later, the district court entered Rudd's proposed order, before Deere submitted a response. During an on-the-record telephonic status conference, the court asked the parties whether the case should remain under seal; Rudd’s counsel replied that it should, while Deere’s counsel was silent. The matter proceeded to an Agreed Order. The arbitration panel requested a copy of that Order, believing that it would obviate the need for an expedited hearing. Deere’s counsel forwarded the Order without consulting Rudd. Rudd moved for contempt . Deere moved to vacate the sealing order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order unsealing the case. Rudd cannot show any countervailing privacy interest sufficient to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of public access to federal court records View "Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

Concrete Construction (Contractor) was sued by employees of Nibbi Concrete, who were injured after a shoring system designed by Contractor collapsed. Subsequently, Contractor sued Employer for indemnification based on a specific provision in the parties’ contract. The trial court dismissed, relying on the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that set forth claims only against Contractor and not against Employer. The court of appeal reversed, stating that the allegations in the underlying lawsuit are not determinative of Contractor’s claim for indemnity. View "Aluma Systems Concrete Constr. of Cal. v. Nibbi Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

Pulte Homes Corporation sued Williams Mechanical, Inc. for defective performance of a plumbing subcontract. Even before the action was filed, however, Williams was defunct; first, it was suspended by the Secretary of State, and thereafter, it dissolved voluntarily. Pulte served Williams though an attorney whom Williams had designated as its agent for service of process. The attorney, however, did not notify Williams of the action; he also did not identify or notify Williams’s liability insurer. Williams failed to respond to the complaint, and Pulte obtained a default judgment. Pulte then notified Williams’s liability insurer of the default judgment. About four and a half months later, the insurer retained counsel to represent Williams, and Williams’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Pulte appealed, arguing (1) Williams lacked the capacity to defend this action because it had been suspended; and (2) Williams failed to establish that it was entitled to relief from the default and default judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Williams was entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court did not address whether Williams had the capacity to defend. View "Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical" on Justia Law

At the heart of this case was a 2004 oil and gas lease with a five-year term between Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. and United States Gypsum Co. (“USG”). Trans-Western contacted USG to lease its land at the conclusion of an existing lease between USG and Wolverine Oil & Gas. USG and Trans-Western agreed to terms, and Trans-Western recorded its lease. Wolverine protested the recording of the new lease, claiming that its lease with USG remained valid under pooling and unitization provisions contained in its lease. In response to the protest, USG, in writing and by phone, rescinded the Trans-Western lease. Trans-Western sued for a declaration that the Wolverine lease expired. The district court determined that the Wolverine lease had expired. As part of their agreement, USG and Trans-Western executed a ratification and lease extension. Armed with the determination that the Wolverine lease was no longer in effect, in 2010, Trans-Western also filed a second amended complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that its lease with USG was valid and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, among other claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Trans-Western, determining that USG had breached the lease but denied attorney’s fees due to disputed material facts on damages. During a bench trial on damages, Trans-Western contended that it was entitled to expectation damages for both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because USG deprived it of the opportunity to assign the lease during its five-year term. USG contended, inter alia, that damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real property, were measured at the date of breach and not pegged to a hypothetical sale at the market’s peak. The district court rejected Trans-Western’s damages theories, finding that Trans-Western was entitled only to nominal damages based on the value of the contract on the date of breach, which had not increased since the date of execution. The Tenth Circuit certified a question of how expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease should have been measured to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court held that general (or direct) and consequential (or special) damages were available for the breach of an oil and gas lease and should be measured in “much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract.” In light of the Utah Supreme Court’s holding, the Tenth Circuit remanded this case to the district court for consideration of damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum v. United States Gypsum Co." on Justia Law