Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Automation & Electronics, Inc. (A&E) and Consolidated Electric Distributors, Inc. (CE) sued for Red Desert Reclamation, LLC for amounts due on their respective contracts. Pursuant to a stipulation between A&E and Red Desert, the district court entered judgment in favor of A&E. CE was later voluntarily dismissed from the case. A&E subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend its complaint to add CSC Group Holdings, LLC and Cate Street Capital, Inc. as defendants and to add alter ego and fraudulent conveyance claims. The district court granted the motion to amend. The district court then entered two default judgments in favor of A&E making CSC, Cate Street and Red Desert jointly and severally liable on Red Desert’s debt to A&E and setting aside as fraudulent a mortgage granted by Red Desert to CSC, thereby allowing A&E to execute on real property to recover on its judgment against Red Desert. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not lose subject matter jurisdiction over A&E’s motion to amend its complaint after signing off on the stipulated judgment in its favor because A&E was allowed to amend its complaint before CE was voluntarily dismissed from the action. View "CSC Group Holdings, LLC v. Automation & Electronics, Inc." on Justia Law

At the heart of these three consolidated appeals was Sky Harbor’s alleged failure to pay rent to the Cheyenne Regional Airport and to leave the Airport premises. Sky Harbor argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide any of the cases now on appeal. The district court generally ruled in favor of the Airport in all three cases. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district and circuit courts did not lack subject matter jurisdiction in the three combined appeals; and (2) the judgments were entered in accordance with the law. View "Sky Harbor Air Serv., Inc. v. Cheyenne Reg’l Airport Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Archangel Diamond Corporation Liquidating Trust, as successor-in-interest to Archangel Diamond Corporation (collectively, “Archangel”), appealed dismissal of its civil case against defendant OAO Lukoil (“Lukoil”), in which it alleged claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), breach of contract, and commercial tort law. The district court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Lukoil and under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Archangel Diamond Corporation was a Canadian company and bankrupt. The liquidating trust was located in Colorado. In 1993, Archangel entered into an agreement with State Enterprise Arkhangelgeology (“AGE”), a Russian state corporation, regarding a potential license to explore and develop diamond mining operations in the Archangelsk region of Russia. Archangel and AGE agreed that Archangel would provide additional funds and that the license would be transferred to their joint venture company. However, the license was never transferred and remained with AGE. In 1995, AGE was privatized and became Arkhangelskgeoldobycha (“AGD”), and the license was transferred to AGD. Diamonds worth an estimated $5 billion were discovered within the license region. In 1998, Lukoil acquired a controlling stake in AGD, eventually making AGD a wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil. Pursuant to an agreement, arbitration took place in Stockholm, Sweden, to resolve the license transfer issue. When AGD failed to honor the agreement, Archangel reactivated the Stockholm arbitration, but the arbitrators this time concluded that they lacked jurisdiction to arbitrate the dispute even as to AGD. Archangel then sued AGD and Lukoil in Colorado state court. AGD and Lukoil removed the case to Colorado federal district court. The district court remanded the case, concluding that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because all of the claims were state law claims. The state trial court then dismissed the case against both AGD and Lukoil based on lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal as to AGD, reversed as to Lukoil, and remanded (leaving Lukoil as the sole defendant). On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s previous dismissal on forum non conveniens grounds, which it had not addressed before, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The trial court granted Lukoil and AGD's motion to hold an evidentiary hearing, and the parties engaged in jurisdictional discovery. In 2008 and early 2009, the case was informally stayed while the parties discussed settlement and conducted discovery. By June 2009, Archangel had fallen into bankruptcy due to the expense of the litigation. On Lukoil’s motion and over the objection of Archangel, the district court referred the matter to the bankruptcy court, concluding that the matter was related to Archangel’s bankruptcy proceedings. Lukoil then moved the bankruptcy court to abstain from hearing the matter, and the bankruptcy court concluded that it should abstain. The bankruptcy court remanded the case to the Colorado state trial court. The state trial court again dismissed the action. While these state-court appeals were still pending, Archangel filed this case before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, maintaining that Lukoil had a wide variety of jurisdictional contacts with Colorado and the United States as a whole. Finding no reversible error in the district court's ruling dismissing the case on forum non conveniens grounds, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Archangel Diamond v. OAO Lukoil" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Master Purchase/Service Agreement (MPSA) containing a provision that, under certain conditions, allowed the prevailing party in a dispute arising under the MPSA to recovery attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff brought suit in the Delaware Superior Court, and then Defendant filed in New Jersey. The venue dispute ended with the Delaware Superior Court granting Defendant’s motion to stay in favor of the New Jersey action, which effectively mooted the Delaware action. Plaintiff sought a voluntary dismissal, but Defendant wanted dismissal with prejudice and to recover its attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in the action. The Court of Chancery dismissed this action under Court of Chancery Rule 419(a)(2), without prejudice. As a condition of dismissal, the Court retained jurisdiction to award attorneys’ fees and costs to Defendant in accordance with the MPSA, holding (1) dismissal without prejudice was appropriate as to the venue dispute; and (2) while waiting for the final outcome of the New Jersey action would be the preferable approach before awarding attorneys’ fees, at this point, under the terms of the MPSA, Defendant was entitled to its attorneys’ fees that were incurred in this action. View "Avaya, Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns Holding Co., LLC" on Justia Law

On March 28, 2014, real party in interest PCH Enterprises, Inc. sued defendants Sallie Cribley-Cole and Anna Gonzalez for breach of contract, specific performance, and declaratory relief. It alleged defendants failed to perform on a written agreement to sell a certain parcel of real property to PCH. PCH recorded a lis pendens on the same day it filed the complaint. No proof of service accompanied the lis pendens. Petitioner Rey Sanchez Investments sought to intervene, claiming it was the true owner of the property pursuant to a grant deed recorded April 2, 2014. Petitioner moved to expunge the lis pendens on grounds that there were technical defects in the service. PCH offered a proof of service that the lis pendens was personally served on Cribley-Cole in November 2014. The trial court denied the motion to expunge. On appeal, petitioner argued the lis pendens was completely void and subject to expungement because service was improper. The Court of Appeal agreed service was improper and reversed the trial court's judgment by way of a writ of mandate. View "Rey Sanchez Investments v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this complex, multi-forum dispute over compensation between a German company (PACT) and its former CEO, the CEO appealed the district court's dismissal, without prejudice, based on forum nonconveniens (FNC). The court concluded that the forum selection clause in the contract at issue is mandatory and enforceable. Further, no overwhelming public interest requires retention in Texas. Given the Supreme Court’s strong admonitions in favor of dismissal and against retention save for extraordinary matters, the district court was well within the bounds of its considerable discretion in dismissing. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Weber v. Pact XPP Techs." on Justia Law

VLM, a Montreal-based supplier, sold frozen potatoes to IT in Illinois. After nine successful transactions, IT encountered financial difficulty and failed to pay for the next nine shipments. Invoices sent after delivery included a provision purporting to make IT liable for collection-related attorney’s fees if it breached the contracts. VLM sued; the deadline for an answer passed. The court entered a default. On defendants' motion, the court vacated the default as to IT’s president only. All three defendants then filed answers, contesting liability for attorney’s fees. The judge applied the Illinois Uniform Commercial Code and found that the fee provision had been incorporated into the contract. The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods applied. On remand, the judge applied the Convention and held that the fee provision was not part of the contracts and that IT could benefit from this ruling, despite the prior entry of default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. IT never expressly assented to the attorney’s fees provision in VLM’s trailing invoices, so under the Convention that term did not become a part of the contracts. VLM waived its right to rely on the default by failing to raise the issue until its reply brief on remand. View "VLM Food Trading Int'l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action against Riceland, requesting the district court compel Riceland to contribute a portion of its recoveries in various cases to the common benefit fund established by the district court to compensate plaintiffs for their legal work. The district court dismissed Riceland's counterclaims of breach of contract and tortious interference and certified the dismissal as a final judgment under FRCP 54(b). The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that a res judicata effect can properly be considered as a “miscellaneous factor” under the Hayden factor analysis. In this case, the district court did not err in considering the res judicata ramification in the Arkansas state court case. The district court found that plaintiffs and the district court itself would suffer injustice if entry of final judgment was delayed. On the merits, the court concluded that the claims regarding genetically-modified rice were released by the Settlement Agreement and Release, but the Release does not govern plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment and quantum meruit claims against Riceland for its failure to contribute to the fund. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Riceland Foods v. Downing" on Justia Law

Copia Communications, LLC, a Massachusetts company, brought this action in federal district court in Massachusetts against Seawind Key Investments, Limited, a Jamaican resort operator, and Seawind’s alleged alter-ego, AMResorts, LP, a Pennsylvania limited partnership, alleging breach of contract. The subject contract was proposed and executed in Jamaica, performance on the contract occurred almost exclusively in Jamaica, and the contract was governed by the laws of Jamaica. Both defendants, neither of which operated any business or had any corporate presence in Massachusetts, moved to dismiss, arguing lack of personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens. The district court dismissed the case without prejudice, finding that it lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendants was barred by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. View "Copia Commc’ns, LLC v. AMResorts, LP" on Justia Law

GA entered into a blanket purchase agreement (BPA 218), with the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) in June 2011, to furnish trained service dogs for disabled veterans. A year later, the contracting officer sent an email questioning GA's performance. On August 31, 2012, the officer sent notice terminating BPA 218 for default and suspending open orders, informing GA that it had the right to appeal under the disputes clause of the contract. On December 21, 2012, GA sent a letter to the VA’s Rehabilitation Research & Development Service, arguing that it had fulfilled its duties and that the default termination should be converted to a termination for the convenience of the government. On February 28, 2013, GA sent the contracting officer a “formal demand.” On March 21, the officer sent a letter stating that she had received the claim but needed supporting documentation. GA began compiling documentation, but on May 3, the officer sent another letter, stating that she would not reconsider her decision, but that GA could appeal under 41 U.S.C. 7104(b). On January 7, 2014, GA filed suit. The Court of Federal Claims dismissed, finding the claim time-barred because, while the February 2013 letter qualified as a request for reconsideration, the officer did not reconsider, so the statute of limitations never tolled. The Federal Circuit reversed. The 12-month statutory appeal period did not begin to run until the officer rejected the request for reconsideration on May 3. View "Guardian Angels Med. Serv. Dogs, Inc. v. United States" on Justia Law