Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The district court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence, contract, and fraud claims brought by Path to Health, LLP (“Path”) against Daren Long and ALL-IN INC. d/b/a RE/MAX ALL-IN REALTORS (collectively “Realtors”). Path’s claims were based on the allegation that Long misrepresented that property Path purchased was zoned for commercial use when it was actually zoned for residential use. After review, the Supreme Court found that the district court erred in dismissing Path's breach of contract claim because Idaho Code section 54-2087 was incorporated into the Buyer Representation Agreement at issue in this case. Further, the Court found the district court erred in dismissing Path's fraud claim because it found issues of fact as to whether Path justifiably relied upon Long's representations. The Court reversed on those two issues, but affirmed as to all others. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Path to Health, LLP v. Long" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellee Century Surety Company (“Century”) issued a commercial lines policy to Defendant-Appellant Shayona Investment, LLC covering commercial property and business income coverage. Shayona submitted claims, Century paid them, and then Century sought a declaratory judgment in the district court as to whether the claims were fraudulent. At trial, the jury found in favor of Century, awarding it both the amount the company paid Shayona under the policy and the sum it spent investigating the claims. Shayona appealed, arguing that the standard of proof the court instructed the jury to use was wrong. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's entry of judgment on the verdict. View "Century Surety Co. v. Shayona Investment" on Justia Law

This case centered on a dispute between SOLIDFX, LLC, a software development company, and Jeppesen Sanderson, Inc., a subsidiary of Boeing that developed aviation terminal charts. SOLIDFX sued Jeppesen, asserting antitrust, breach-of-contract, and tort claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment on the antitrust claims, but the remaining claims proceeded to trial. A jury ultimately found in favor of SOLIDFX and awarded damages in excess of $43 million. Jeppesen appealed, challenging only the district court’s ruling that SOLIDFX could recover lost profits on its contract claims. SOLIDFX cross-appealed the district court’s summary judgment order in favor of Jeppesen on the antitrust claims. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded the License Agreement at issue here unambiguously precluded the recovery of lost profits, irrespective of whether they were direct or consequential damages. But the Court also determined that, even if the agreement could be read to allow the recovery of direct lost profits, the lost profits awarded by the jury here were consequential damages and therefore not recoverable. Because the Court held that SOLIDFX was contractually precluded from recovering the amounts awarded for lost profits, it did not reach the question of whether SOLIDFX proved those lost profits with reasonable certainty, nor did it address the admissibility of expert testimony offered by SOLIDFX to establish the amount of its lost profits. Finally, the Court agreed with the district court that Jeppesen was entitled to summary judgment on SOLIDFX’s antitrust claims. View "Solidfx v. Jeppesen Sanderson" on Justia Law

Vehicle Market Research, Inc. (VMR) sued Mitchell International, Inc. (Mitchell) to recover royalties Mitchell allegedly owed pursuant to a software licensing agreement. The jury returned a verdict for Mitchell, and VMR appealed. VMR argued: (1) the district court erred by allowing Mitchell, contrary to the law of the case doctrine, to cross-examine VMR’s sole shareholder on the value of VMR as he stated in his personal bankruptcy; and (2) the district court erred in omitting part of VMR’s proposed jury instruction on Rule 30(b)(6) witnesses. Finding no error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Vehicle Market Research v. Mitchell International" on Justia Law

Eaton manufactures truck transmissions for sale to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs), which offer “data books,” listing the options for truck parts. Customer choose among the options; the OEM sources the parts from the manufacturers and uses them to build custom trucks then sold to that customer. Eaton was a near-monopolist in supplying Class 8 truck transmissions. In 1989, ZF emerged as a competitor. Eaton allegedly sought to retain its market share by entering agreements with the OEMs, with increasingly large rebates on Eaton transmissions based on the percentage of transmissions a given OEM purchased from Eaton as opposed to ZF. ZF closed in 2003. In 2006, ZF successfully sued Eaton for antitrust violations. Separately, indirect purchasers who bought trucks from OEMs’ immediate customers brought a class action; that case was dismissed. In this case, Tauro attempt to represent direct purchasers in an antitrust suit was rejected because Tauro never directly purchased a Class 8 truck from the OEMs, but rather purchased trucks from R&R, a direct customer that expressly assigned Tauro its direct purchaser antitrust claims. The Third Circuit reversed. An antitrust claim assignment need not be supported by bargained-for consideration in order to confer direct purchaser standing on an indirect purchaser; it need only be express. That requirement was met. The presumption that a motion to intervene by a proposed class representative is timely if filed before the class opt-out date applies in this pre-certification context. View "Wallach v. Eaton Corp" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review arose from a deficiency action brought by appellant SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”) as the assignee under a motor vehicle conditional sales contract following its repossession and sale of a motor vehicle purchased by appellee Mattie Venable. Specifically, the issue was which statute of limitations applied here: the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA 11-2-725 (1) applicable to actions on contracts for the sale of goods, or the six-year statute of limitation found in OCGA 9-3-24, generally applicable to actions on simple written contracts. After review, the Court concluded that this action was subject to the four-year statute of limitation found in 11-2-725 (1). View "SunTrust Bank v. Venable" on Justia Law

In 2011, Medical Recovery Services, LLC (“the Collection Agency”), filed this action against defendants Allison and Nathan Olsen to recover on two entities’ unpaid medical bills. In 2012, the parties stipulated that the Collection Agency could recover a judgment against defendants and that it would forbear executing on the judgment if the defendants paid $100 per month between the 25th and 30th of each month until the judgment was paid. The court entered a judgment providing that the Collection Agency could recover from the Defendants the sum of $4,973.46. Defendants failed to make any payment on the judgment, and the Collection Agency attempted to execute on the judgment. The Collection Agency sought to execute on defendants’ bank account, but the account had been closed. The Collection Agency then sought a continuing garnishment to obtain Mr. Olsen’s disposable earnings from Petersen, Moss, Hall & Olsen, but that garnishment was returned unsatisfied because “Defendant is a partner in the firm, not an employee.” The Collection Agency also sought to execute on Mr. Olsen’s partnership interest, but the writ was returned unsatisfied because Mr. Olsen’s equity in the partnership was stated to be zero. The Collection Agency then sought to depose Stephen Hall, the partner in the law firm who had signed the responses to the writs of garnishment. The Collection Agency agreed to forgo taking his deposition if Hall would make $250 bi-monthly payments until the judgment was paid in full. Hall made those payments, but the Collection Agency would not accept final payment endorsed "payment in full" because it wanted to seek post-judgment attorney fees. Defendants filed a motion seeking to compel the Collection Agency to record a satisfaction of judgment in every county in which it had recorded the original judgment. The Agency responded by filing for an award of post-judgment fees it incurred trying to collect on its judgment. The Agency's motion was denied, and the Agency estopped from further collection of fees, citing the agreement reached in satisfying the judgment. The district court upheld the magistrate court's judgment. Finding that Hall only agreed to satisfy the judgment, the Supreme Court concluded the district court erred in affirming the magistrate. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Medical Recovery Svcs. v. Olsen" on Justia Law

In 2005, Connor Libby and Elena Chapa (collectively, Defendants) signed credit card agreements with Federated Capital Corporation’s predecessor-in-interest, a Utah corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. The agreements contained a forum selection clause and choice of law provision that adopted Utah substantive and procedural law to govern any dispute under the contract. The agreements required Defendants to make monthly payments to the address specific on their billings statements, and each billing statement required Defendants to send their payments to an address in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Defendants defaulted in 2006. In 2012, Federated filed separate claims in separate proceedings against Defendants. In each proceeding, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, ruling that Utah’s borrowing statute required the court to apply Pennsylvania’s four-year statute of limitations, thereby barring Federated’s claims. Federated appealed, arguing that the agreement’s forum selection clause precluded the application of Utah’s borrowing statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the borrowing statute applied to and barred Federated’s causes of action. View "Federated Capital Corp. v. Libby" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, Goliath Energy Services, LLC, and George Satterfield challenged orders denying their N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motions to vacate default judgments entered against them in favor of Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC, and Rossco Crane and Rigging, Inc. Monster was in the oil field construction, trucking, and rigging business. Rossco was in the business of providing various crane and rigging services. Goliath was a limited liability company with its principal place of business located in Grand Junction, Colorado, and it conducted business in North Dakota. Satterfield was Goliath's president and Karl Troestler was its chief financial officer. Rossco and Monster sued Goliath, Troestler, and Satterfield to collect payment of outstanding balances owed for services provided to Goliath. A default judgment eventually entered in favor of Monster for $240,107.23. Rossco advised its attorney that negotiations had also failed with the defendants. Rossco's attorney filed the closing papers with the clerk of court, and a default judgment was entered against the defendants in favor of Rossco for $97,233.04 a month later. On appeal, Goliath and Satterfield argued the district court erred in denying their motions to vacate the default judgments under N.D.R.Civ.P. 60(b). The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded after review that the district court acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendants in the underlying actions and did not abuse its discretion in denying the motions for relief from judgment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "Monster Heavy Haulers, LLC v. Goliath Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the liquidation of Pine Top Insurance, some of its receivables were assigned to PTRIL, a Delaware LLC with its principal place of business in New York. One of those receivables was owed by Nissan, a Japanese insurance company that transacted business in the U.S. Transfercom, a United Kingdom insurance company had assumed that obligation. PTRIL filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract against Transfercom and seeking recovery under reinsurance treaties entered into by Transfercom’s predecessor and Pine Top in 1981 and 1982. Transfercom removed the litigation to federal court. PTRIL moved to remand, contending that Transfercom had waived its right to remove the case in the reinsurance treaties. Those treaties contain service of suit clauses, stating: In the event of the failure of the Reinsurer hereon to pay any amount claimed to be due hereunder, the Reinsurer hereon, at the request of the Company, will submit to the jurisdiction of any Court of competent jurisdiction within the United States. The district court found that under the plain language, PTRIL reserved the exclusive authority to select jurisdiction and venue; Transfercom waived its right to remove the case to federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed: to allow removal would be to ignore the contract’s plain and ordinary meanin View "Pine Top Receivables of Ill. v. Transfercom, Ltd." on Justia Law