Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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In 2002, Deere became the exclusive North American wholesale supplier of Hitachi products. In 2014, Deere notified Rudd, a long-time authorized dealer of Hitachi equipment, of its intent to terminate its dealer agreements and initiated arbitration proceedings, as required by the agreement. Although Rudd agreed that arbitration was the proper forum, it sought injunctive relief to maintain the status quo during arbitration and moved to seal the case, stating that “the very fact of this lawsuit” could cause loss of customers, layoffs (or preemptive departure) of employees, and diminution of the value of Rudd’s financial investment. Two weeks later, the district court entered Rudd's proposed order, before Deere submitted a response. During an on-the-record telephonic status conference, the court asked the parties whether the case should remain under seal; Rudd’s counsel replied that it should, while Deere’s counsel was silent. The matter proceeded to an Agreed Order. The arbitration panel requested a copy of that Order, believing that it would obviate the need for an expedited hearing. Deere’s counsel forwarded the Order without consulting Rudd. Rudd moved for contempt . Deere moved to vacate the sealing order. The Sixth Circuit affirmed an order unsealing the case. Rudd cannot show any countervailing privacy interest sufficient to outweigh the strong presumption in favor of public access to federal court records View "Rudd Equip. Co., Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co." on Justia Law

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Concrete Construction (Contractor) was sued by employees of Nibbi Concrete, who were injured after a shoring system designed by Contractor collapsed. Subsequently, Contractor sued Employer for indemnification based on a specific provision in the parties’ contract. The trial court dismissed, relying on the allegations in the underlying lawsuit that set forth claims only against Contractor and not against Employer. The court of appeal reversed, stating that the allegations in the underlying lawsuit are not determinative of Contractor’s claim for indemnity. View "Aluma Systems Concrete Constr. of Cal. v. Nibbi Bros., Inc." on Justia Law

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Pulte Homes Corporation sued Williams Mechanical, Inc. for defective performance of a plumbing subcontract. Even before the action was filed, however, Williams was defunct; first, it was suspended by the Secretary of State, and thereafter, it dissolved voluntarily. Pulte served Williams though an attorney whom Williams had designated as its agent for service of process. The attorney, however, did not notify Williams of the action; he also did not identify or notify Williams’s liability insurer. Williams failed to respond to the complaint, and Pulte obtained a default judgment. Pulte then notified Williams’s liability insurer of the default judgment. About four and a half months later, the insurer retained counsel to represent Williams, and Williams’ counsel filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The trial court granted the motion. Pulte appealed, arguing (1) Williams lacked the capacity to defend this action because it had been suspended; and (2) Williams failed to establish that it was entitled to relief from the default and default judgment. After review, the Court of Appeal held the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that Williams was entitled to relief. Accordingly, the Court did not address whether Williams had the capacity to defend. View "Pulte Homes Corp. v. Williams Mechanical" on Justia Law

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At the heart of this case was a 2004 oil and gas lease with a five-year term between Trans-Western Petroleum, Inc. and United States Gypsum Co. (“USG”). Trans-Western contacted USG to lease its land at the conclusion of an existing lease between USG and Wolverine Oil & Gas. USG and Trans-Western agreed to terms, and Trans-Western recorded its lease. Wolverine protested the recording of the new lease, claiming that its lease with USG remained valid under pooling and unitization provisions contained in its lease. In response to the protest, USG, in writing and by phone, rescinded the Trans-Western lease. Trans-Western sued for a declaration that the Wolverine lease expired. The district court determined that the Wolverine lease had expired. As part of their agreement, USG and Trans-Western executed a ratification and lease extension. Armed with the determination that the Wolverine lease was no longer in effect, in 2010, Trans-Western also filed a second amended complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment that its lease with USG was valid and damages for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment, among other claims. The district court granted partial summary judgment to Trans-Western, determining that USG had breached the lease but denied attorney’s fees due to disputed material facts on damages. During a bench trial on damages, Trans-Western contended that it was entitled to expectation damages for both breach of contract and breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment because USG deprived it of the opportunity to assign the lease during its five-year term. USG contended, inter alia, that damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease, like any real property, were measured at the date of breach and not pegged to a hypothetical sale at the market’s peak. The district court rejected Trans-Western’s damages theories, finding that Trans-Western was entitled only to nominal damages based on the value of the contract on the date of breach, which had not increased since the date of execution. The Tenth Circuit certified a question of how expectation damages for the breach of an oil and gas lease should have been measured to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court held that general (or direct) and consequential (or special) damages were available for the breach of an oil and gas lease and should be measured in “much the same way as expectation damages for the breach of any other contract.” In light of the Utah Supreme Court’s holding, the Tenth Circuit remanded this case to the district court for consideration of damages. View "Trans-Western Petroleum v. United States Gypsum Co." on Justia Law

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CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“CEEG”), a Chinese company, agreed to sell solar energy products to LUMOS, LLC, a U.S. company. After receiving certain shipments, LUMOS filed a warranty claim alleging workmanship defects, and refused to remit the balance due. After two years of "fitful" negotiations, CEEG filed an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the parties’ agreements. Although the parties had communicated exclusively in English to that point, CEEG served LUMOS with a Chinese-language notice of the proceedings, and LUMOS did not immediately realize what the notice was. After the arbitration panel ruled in its favor, CEEG moved for the district court to confirm the award. LUMOS filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Chinese-language notice caused it to miss the deadline to participate in appointing the arbitration panel. The district court granted the motion, finding that the notice was not reasonably calculated to apprise LUMOS of the arbitration proceedings. The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed. View "CEEG (Shanghai) Solar Science v. Lumos" on Justia Law

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In June 2012, a hailstorm damaged Plaintiff KCOM’s motel. Soon a dispute arose between KCOM and its insurer, defendant Employers Mutual Casualty (EMC), over the extent of the damage. In October 2012, following receipt of an inspection report, KCOM submitted a proof of loss of $631,726.87. EMC admitted coverage but not the amount of loss. Dissatisfied, KCOM invoked the insurance contract’s appraisal provision. KCOM claimed there were issues with the appraisal process, prompting it to ultimately file suit against EMC, alleging breach of contract, unreasonable delay and denial of benefits, and bad faith breach of the insurance contract. The threshold question presented for the Tenth Circuit's review in this state law diversity action was whether the Court had appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s non-final order denying confirmation of a property loss appraisal. The Court concluded it did not, and dismissed the appeal. View "KCOM, Inc. v. Employers Mutual Casualty Co." on Justia Law

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Patricia Cornwell, a well-known crime novelist, and her spouse filed suit against their former business managers Anchin Block & Anchin and the company’s principal, Evan Snapper, alleging New York state law claims of negligent performance of professional services, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiffs on all three claims and awarded Plaintiffs $51 million in damages. Thereafter, the district court vacated the jury’s decision, ruling that it had incorrectly instructed the jury and that Defendants’ statements to the Department of Justice (DOJ) were protected by a qualified privilege and therefore should not have been considered by the jury. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly found that it incorrectly instructed the jury on New York’s statute of limitations for a breach of fiduciary duty claim; and (2) the district court erred in entering judgment as a matter of law for Defendants on the DOJ issue. Remanded for a new trial. View "Cornwell Ent., Inc. v. Anchin, Block & Anchin, LLP" on Justia Law

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Caudill, the owner of a real estate brokerage, sued Keller Williams for breach of a 2001 franchise contract. Caudill's position as Regional Director of Keller Williams was terminated in 2010; her franchise was terminated in 2011. The suit settled with an agreement including a prohibition against disclosure of its terms, except to tax professionals, insurance carriers, and government agencies; those recipients had to promise to keep them in confidence. Any violation entitled the victim to damages of $10,000. Months later, Keller Williams issued an FDD (Franchise Disclosure Document) to about 2000 existing or potential franchisees and other parties, describing Caudill’s lawsuit in detail. The FDD was not required by the Federal Trade Commission under 16 C.F.R. 436.2(a). Caudill sought $20 million (2000 x $10,000) in damages. The district judge rejected her claim, noting that under Texas law a liquidated damages clause is enforceable only if “the harm caused by the breach is incapable or difficult of estimation and … the [specified] amount of liquidated damages is a reasonable forecast of just compensation.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is unreasonable to suppose, without evidence, that the dissemination of the FDD caused Caudill a $20 million loss. Although the burden of proving that a liquidated damages clause is actually a penalty clause is on the defendant, Keller Williams established that there was no basis for the requested damages. View "Caudill v. Keller Williams Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendants, Markel Corporation, Markel Services, Inc. (Markel Services), and Essex Insurance Company (Essex), appealed a superior court order denying their motions for summary judgment and granting summary judgment to plaintiff Michael Newell, in this insurance coverage action. Newell was allegedly injured in a slip and fall accident at a property owned by Brames, Inc. (Brames) in Laconia. Brames was insured under an Amusement Park General Liability Policy issued by Essex. Essex was a subsidiary of Markel Corporation and Markel Services was Markel Corporation’s claims handling branch. Newell filed two personal injury actions arising from his slip and fall. The first action against Brames' co-owner and treasurer, was settled out-of-court. In the second lawsuit, Newell sued Ivy Banks, the person who allegedly cleaned the floor upon which Newell slipped and injured himself. Defendants received notice of the Banks action, but declined to defend Banks or intervene. Banks, although properly served, filed neither an appearance nor an answer and was defaulted. A default judgment was entered against Banks for $300,000, the full amount of damages sought by Newell. Newell brought suit against defendants to recover the amount of the default judgment, arguing he was a third party beneficiary under the insurance contract between Brames and Markel/Essex. On appeal, defendants argued the trial court erred in determining that the language of the Policy was ambiguous and that Banks was a “volunteer worker” under the Policy. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Newell v. Markel Corporation" on Justia Law

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Menda Warne appealed the court of appeals' judgment reversing dismissal of Bill Hall's complaint, which asserted a claim of intentional interference with contract. The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted without addressing the applicable case law in its written order. The court of appeals expressly declined to apply more recent United States Supreme Court jurisprudence governing Fed. R. Vic. P. 12(b)(6), finding itself bound by the Colorado Supreme Court's existing precedent, which heavily relied on the federal Supreme Court's earlier opinion in "Conley v. Gibson," (355 U.S. 41 (1957)). The court of appeals reversed the trial court, finding the complaint sufficient to state a claim. The Colorado Supreme Court found that the court of appeals too narrowly understood the Court's existing precedent. After review of the complaint, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. View "Warne v. Hall" on Justia Law