Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Husband and wife paid $83,475 for a new Volvo T8, plus $2,700 for a charging station. Volvo’s advertisements claimed that the T8’s battery range was 25 miles. In practice their T8 averaged a eight-10 miles of battery‐only driving. Husband filed suit, asserting a class of others similarly situated under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), and received a letter from Volvo that offered “a full refund upon return of the vehicle if you are not satisfied with it for any reason” and to “arrange to pick up your vehicle.” The next day Volvo moved to dismiss husband’s suit on the theory that he lacked standing because only his wife was on the car’s title. Before the court ruled on the motion, his wife was added to the complaint. Volvo moved to dismiss, contending that she lacked standing because its letter had offered complete relief before she filed suit. The district judge agreed and dismissed. The Seventh Circuit reversed, seeing “no reason why the timing of the offer has such a powerful effect. Offers do not bind recipients until they are accepted. An unaccepted pre‐litigation offer does not deprive a plaintiff of her day in court. View "Laurens v. Volvo Cars of North America, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals reversing the trial court’s order of dismissal that dismissed the attempts of Plaintiff, a former chief of police for the City of Greensboro, to obtain reimbursement from the City for costs he incurred in defending lawsuits brought against him for events that occurred during his tenure as chief of police. The trial judge granted the City’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the City was shielded by the doctrine of governmental immunity and that immunity was not waived. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that Plaintiff set forth allegations that the City waived governmental immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently presented allegations that were adequate to raise a waiver of governmental immunity and thus to survive the City’s motion to dismiss. View "Wray v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law

In 1999, Plaintiff and Defendants entered into an agreement. Defendants never performed any of their obligations under the agreement. For more than a decade, Defendants allegedly continued to be in breach of the agreement. Despite having never received the benefit of its bargain, Plaintiff waited fourteen years before filing this action in 2014. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged breach of contract, fraud, unfair and deceptive trade practices, and unjust enrichment. The trial court granted Defendants’ motions to dismiss, finding that Defendants did not perform their obligations as early as 2000, and therefore, North Carolina’s statutes of limitations barred all of Plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Plaintiff failed to pursue its claims within the statute of limitations period, Plaintiff’s claims were time barred. View "Christenbury Eye Center, P.A. v. Medflow, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Dennis Ponte demanded defendant County of Calaveras (County) to pay him over $150,000 to reimburse him for work purportedly performed on the County’s behalf pursuant to an oral contract. The contract did not contain any fixed payment, and no bid was submitted nor approved pursuant to relevant county ordinances governing public contracts. Ponte disregarded opportunities to abandon his claims after the County provided him with pertinent legal authority demonstrating that his claims lacked merit. After multiple sustained demurrers, the trial court granted summary judgment to the County on Ponte’s third amended complaint. The court later awarded substantial attorney fees, finding Ponte’s claims, including those based on promissory estoppel, were not brought or maintained in both subjective and objective good faith. Ponte appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Ponte v. County of Calaveras" on Justia Law

Former Howmedica Sales Representatives, all California natives, signed employment agreements with confidentiality, non-compete, and forum-selection clauses, designating New Jersey (or Michigan) as the forum for any litigation arising out of the agreements. After clashes with Howmedica, the Sales Representatives resigned and became independent contractors representing Howmedica’s competitor, DePuy. Some of Howmedica’s customers, previously assigned to the Sales Representatives, followed them. Howmedica suspected that the Sales Representatives and DePuy conspired to convert those customers before the Sales Representatives’ resignations. Howmedica filed suit in New Jersey, joining DePuy’s regional distributor, Golden State as a “necessary party.” The defendants successfully moved to transfer the case to California under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a), which, for “the convenience of parties and witnesses” and “in the interest of justice,” allows transfer to a district where the case “might have been brought.” The Third Circuit directed the district court to transfer claims against only the two corporate defendants who did not agree to any forum-selection clause. Where contracting parties have specified the forum in which they will litigate disputes arising from their contract, federal courts must honor the forum-selection clause “[i]n all but the most unusual cases.” In this case, all defendants sought transfer to one district; some, but not all, defendants are parties to forum-selection clauses. View "In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp" on Justia Law

Under 42 U.S.C. 1485, the USDA's Rural Housing Service (RHS) makes loans for construction of affordable rental housing. From 1972-1982, each of 10 limited partnerships (with a common general partner, Olsen) entered into a 50-year loan agreement that stated that each borrower could pay off the loan and convert its properties to conventional housing after 15 or 20 years. The 1987 Emergency Low Income Housing Preservation Act, 42 U.S.C. 1472(c)), provided that before accepting prepayment, the USDA must attempt to enter into an agreement with the borrower. In 2002, Olsen was negotiating to sell to a nonprofit organization. He notified the RHS of “intent . . . to convert [some] units into conventional housing” and sought approval to pay off the mortgages. RHS responded with a checklist. Olsen did not proceed; the potential acquirer decided against purchasing the properties. In 2011, Olsen submitted more definite prepayment requests. RHS responded with an incentive offer concerning four properties, which Olsen accepted, remaining in the program. For three other properties, RHS informed Olsen that prepayment was not an option. Olsen purportedly believed that pursuing prepayment on any properties was futile. He did not submit additional applications. In 2013, the partnerships sued, alleging that the government, through the 1987 enactment or the 2011 correspondence, violated their prepayment rights. The Federal Circuit reversed the Claims Court's dismissal. The 2002 correspondence did not trigger the RHS’s duty to accept prepayment; RHS did not take any steps inconsistent with prepayment. The government did not breach its contractual obligation in 2002. Because the alleged breaches occurred no earlier than 2011, the contract claims are not barred by the six-year limitations period. The Claims Court implicitly premised the dismissal of takings claims on the same erroneous rationale. View "Airport Road Associates, Ltd. v. United States" on Justia Law

Bremer Bank, the Public Service Commission ("PSC"), Auto-Owners Insurance Company, and Curt Amundson appealed a judgment in a grain warehouse insolvency proceeding involving Grand Forks Bean Company after the district court appointed the PSC as trustee for the sale of dry edible beans from Grand Forks Bean's warehouse, denied Bremer's motion to intervene in the insolvency proceeding, and ordered distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the beans to growers determined to be noncredit-sale receiptholders. We conclude the district court did not err in construing applicable statutory provisions for insolvency proceedings and in applying those provisions. The PSC initially issued a trustee's report concluding all nine bean growers were noncredit-sale receiptholders entitled to participate in the trust fund proceeds and recommending payment of $652,747.92 to those receiptholders based on a December 2014 insolvency date and a market price of $23 per hundredweight on that date. The court ruled eight of the bean growers were noncredit-sale receiptholders entitled to participate in the insolvency trust fund proceeds. The court concluded one grower, Amundson, had a credit-sale contract with Grand Forks Bean under N.D.C.C. 60-04-01(2) and was not entitled to participate in the trust fund proceeds. The court also determined the date of Grand Forks Bean's insolvency under N.D.C.C. 60-04-02 was October 15, 2013, and the market price for beans on that date was $38 per hundredweight. The court determined three growers were entitled to a different price per hundredweight for their beans because they had cash claims with Grand Forks Bean for an agreed price. The court further concluded the PSC was entitled to its costs and expenses under N.D.C.C. sections 60-04-03.1, 60-04-09, and 60-04-10. The court ordered disbursement of the trust fund proceeds and thereafter issued an order denying Auto-Owner's motion for post-hearing relief. The district court denied without prejudice Bremer's motion to intervene to litigate the priority of its security interest, but allowed Bremer to participate in the proceeding "to the full extent provided to any other receiptholder/claimant." Amundson argued the district court erred in concluding he had a credit-sale contract with Grand Forks Bean because the definition of a credit-sale contract in N.D.C.C. 60-02-19.1 controls and required signatures by both the grower and the warehouseman to be a credit-sale contract. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. View "Public Service Commission v. Grand Forks Bean Company, Inc." on Justia Law

In 1999, Ayala, unable to qualify for a mortgage to buy a five-unit Vacaville residential property, sought assistance from Dawson, a real estate broker. According to Ayala, they orally agreed that Dawson would obtain the loan and buy the property in Dawson’s name for $330,000; Ayala would pay the 20% downpayment and pay Dawson a $200 per month fee, plus the monthly principal and interest on the mortgage. The parties executed a written contract provided by Dawson, which Ayala claims he understood to confirm an installment contract on terms the two had previously discussed. Ayala moved into one of the units and claims he spent hundreds of thousands of dollars improving the property. From 2000-2008, he paid Dawson $2,700 per month; from 2008-2012, he paid $2,900 per month. Ayala actually had signed a standard form lease/option; the option expired in 2004. In 2011 Dawson offered to sell Ayala the property for $330,000, with a credit for the down payment. In Dawson’s unlawful detainer action, Ayala defended by claiming he held equitable title. Dawson prevailed. In Ayala's separate action against Dawson for fraud, the court granted Dawson summary judgment. The court of appeal affirmed, stating that, under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, Ayala is barred from relitigating his fraud-in-the-inducement theory. View "Ayala v. Dawson" on Justia Law

After Enerplus mistakenly overpaid mineral royalties to defendant and demanded repayment, defendant filed suit in tribal court. Enerplus then filed suit in federal court, seeking the return of the excess funds and a declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over the dispute. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to preliminarily enjoin defendant from proceeding with his case in tribal court. In this case, the contracting parties agreed that any disputes arising under the settlement agreement would be resolved in federal district court. Therefore, defendant could not bring suit arising from or related to the settlement agreement in the tribal court based on the forum selection clause. The court rejected defendant's bare assertion that Enerplus lacked standing to enforce the forum selection clause. View "Enerplus Resources (USA) Corp. v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

A district court has broad discretion on evidentiary matters and its decision to admit or exclude evidence will not be overturned unless it abused its discretion. Issues not raised before the district court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Brian Linstrom and Leisa Bennett (collectively referred to as the "Linstroms") hired Mike Normile to complete a remodeling of their home for a price of $107,000.00. The Linstroms paid Normile the contract price plus an additional $30,000.00 for certain changes made during the remodel. Normile believed the Linstroms owed more money for the work that was completed. After failing to receive additional payment, Normile put a mechanic's lien on the home. The Linstroms commenced a breach of contract action against Normile after they were unsatisfied with the work completed on their home. The Linstroms' complaint also requested the lien on their home be discharged. Mike Normile appealed after a jury found him liable for breach of contract and awarded damages to the Linstroms. Because the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded each issue raised was either waived or was not error, it affirmed the judgment. View "Linstrom v. Normile" on Justia Law