Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Farnsworth Coleman, the sole member of Coleman Consulting, LLC (CC), entered into a written Confidentiality Agreement with Domtar A.W. LLC (Domtar A.W.) in November 2016 to provide consulting services for a pulp mill in Ashdown, Arkansas. CC was compensated for its services and expenses at an agreed hourly rate. CC later claimed that an oral agreement was made with Domtar A.W. for additional compensation based on a percentage of increased profits from CC's recommendations, which Domtar A.W. denied. CC filed a lawsuit for breach of contract and unjust enrichment after Domtar A.W. terminated the consulting services in May 2017.The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas granted summary judgment in favor of Domtar A.W., concluding that the Arkansas statute of frauds barred CC's breach of contract claim because the alleged oral agreement could not be performed within one year. The court also found that CC failed to prove its unjust enrichment claim, as CC had been fully compensated for its services under the written agreement. CC's motion for reconsideration, based on newly discovered evidence, was denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that the oral agreement was subject to the statute of frauds and could not be performed within one year. The court also found that the part performance and detrimental reliance exceptions to the statute of frauds did not apply. Additionally, the court upheld the dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim, noting that CC had been paid for its services and could not use unjust enrichment to enforce an unenforceable oral contract. The denial of the motion for reconsideration was also affirmed, as CC failed to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the new evidence. View "Coleman Consulting, LLC v. Domtar Corporation" on Justia Law

A fire damaged a malt beverage store owned by A Maxon Company, LLC (AMC). Acuity Insurance Company sought a declaratory judgment to determine coverage under an insurance policy listing Greg and Tammy Weatherspoon as additional loss payees. The Weatherspoons counterclaimed for breach of contract. The circuit court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Weatherspoons’ counterclaim, determining that the insurance policy terms prevented the Weatherspoons from recovering damages unless AMC successfully asserted a claim. The jury found that AMC principal, Russel Maxon, had intentionally started the fire, excluding coverage under AMC’s policy. The Weatherspoons appealed.The Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit, Corson County, South Dakota, initially denied the Weatherspoons’ motion for summary judgment, ruling that the insurance contract was unambiguous and that the Weatherspoons’ claim was dependent on AMC’s claim. The court also denied Acuity’s motion for summary judgment, finding that there were factual disputes suitable for a jury. At trial, the court granted Acuity’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, concluding that the Weatherspoons could not recover under the policy because AMC’s claim was excluded due to Russel’s intentional act.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota affirmed the circuit court’s decision. The court held that the insurance policy’s Loss Payable Clause only allowed the Weatherspoons to collect if AMC could collect, and since the jury found that Russel intentionally started the fire, AMC was precluded from recovering. The court also found no abuse of discretion in admitting expert testimony from Special Agent Derek Hill and allowing the impeachment of Tracy Maxon with prior inconsistent statements. The court concluded that the Weatherspoons’ arguments regarding ambiguity and third-party beneficiary status were unavailing. View "Acuity Insurance V. A Maxon Company" on Justia Law

American Environmental, Inc. (plaintiff) challenged the Burlington School District (defendant) over a contract awarded for the demolition and remediation of Burlington High School, which was closed due to toxic substances. The District sent a Request for Qualifications to fifteen contractors, including the plaintiff and the winning bidder, EnviroVantage. The plaintiff argued that EnviroVantage did not meet the prequalification criteria and that the contract should have been awarded to them.The Superior Court, Chittenden Unit, Civil Division, denied the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction, citing potential financial harm to the District and public interest. The court later granted summary judgment to the District, finding the case moot because the project was substantially complete. The court applied factors from Citineighbors Coalition of Historic Carnegie Hill ex rel. Kazickas v. New York City Landmarks Preservation Commission, determining that no effective relief could be granted due to the project's advanced stage.The Vermont Supreme Court took judicial notice of the project's completion, including demolition and soil remediation, based on public records and visual evidence. The court dismissed the appeal as moot, stating that no effective relief could be provided under Rule 75, which does not allow for damages. The court also rejected the plaintiff's argument that the case met the exception for issues capable of repetition yet evading review, noting the plaintiff's delay in seeking expedited relief and the lack of demonstrated probability of encountering the same situation again. View "American Environmental, Inc. v. Burlington School District" on Justia Law

Wanda Bowling entered into a contract with the Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission to manage its information technology functions. When the contract ended, Bowling allegedly withheld login information for three online accounts, leading the Commission to sue for breach of contract. Bowling counterclaimed for libel and misclassification of her employment status. The district court dismissed the misclassification counterclaim and granted summary judgment to the Commission on all other claims.The United States District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed Bowling's counterclaim for misclassification and denied her motion to amend it, citing untimeliness. The court also granted summary judgment to the Commission on its breach of contract claim, concluding that Bowling's login information constituted intellectual property and that she had breached the contract by not certifying the erasure of confidential information. The court awarded the Commission $956.67 in damages. Additionally, the court granted summary judgment on Bowling's libel counterclaim, citing a qualified privilege defense.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case. It affirmed the district court's finding of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the Commission had adequately alleged damages exceeding $75,000. However, the appellate court found that the contract was ambiguous regarding whether the login information constituted intellectual property or other materials covered by the contract, and that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the damages. Therefore, it reversed the summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. The court also upheld the district court's denial of Bowling's motion to amend her counterclaim for misclassification, finding no abuse of discretion.On the libel counterclaim, the appellate court agreed that the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on a qualified privilege without giving Bowling notice. However, it affirmed the summary judgment on the grounds that the Commission's statements were substantially true. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Interstate Medical Licensure Compact Commission v. Bowling" on Justia Law

A physician in Puerto Rico, Dr. Jaime Salas Rushford, had his board certification suspended by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) after ABIM concluded that he had improperly shared board exam questions with his test prep instructor. ABIM sued Salas Rushford for copyright infringement in New Jersey. Salas Rushford counterclaimed against ABIM and several ABIM-affiliated individuals, alleging that the process leading to his suspension was a "sham."The counterclaims were transferred to the District of Puerto Rico, where the district court granted ABIM's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied Salas Rushford leave to amend his pleading. The court found that Salas Rushford failed to state a claim for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and tort claims against the ABIM Individuals. The court also dismissed his Lanham Act claim for commercial disparagement.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Salas Rushford's claims. It held that ABIM had broad discretion under its policies to revoke certification if a diplomate failed to maintain satisfactory ethical and professional behavior. The court found that Salas Rushford did not plausibly allege that ABIM acted with bad motive or ill intention, which is necessary to state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under New Jersey law.The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Lanham Act claim, noting that Salas Rushford failed to allege actual consumer deception or intentional deception, which is required to state a claim for false advertising. Finally, the court upheld the district court's denial of leave to amend the complaint, citing undue delay and lack of a concrete argument for why justice required an amendment. View "American Board of Internal Medicine v. Salas-Rushford" on Justia Law

A hospital and a physician entered into a settlement agreement to resolve a dispute over the suspension of the physician's clinical privileges. The agreement required the hospital to submit a report to a regulatory authority using specific language agreed upon by both parties. The hospital, however, selected codes for the report that generated additional text, which the physician claimed contradicted and was inconsistent with the agreed language. The physician sued for breach of the settlement agreement.The Circuit Court for Montgomery County granted summary judgment in favor of the hospital, ruling that the settlement agreement did not restrict the hospital's selection of codes for the report. The Appellate Court of Maryland disagreed, holding that a reasonable person would understand the hospital's obligation to report using specific language to preclude it from including contradictory and materially inconsistent language. The Appellate Court vacated the summary judgment, finding that whether the hospital breached its obligation was a question for the jury.The Supreme Court of Maryland reviewed the case and affirmed the Appellate Court's decision. The court held that the hospital's obligation to report using specific, agreed-upon language precluded it from including additional language that contradicted and was materially inconsistent with the agreed language. The court also affirmed that the physician's claim regarding the hospital's failure to provide a timely hearing was released in the settlement agreement. The case was remanded for further proceedings to determine if the hospital's actions constituted a breach of the settlement agreement. View "Adventist Healthcare v. Behram" on Justia Law

In January 2016, Kenneth McPeek Racing Stable, Inc. (McPeek) entered into an oral agreement with Nancy Polk, owner of Normandy Farm, LLC (Normandy), to train a horse named Daddy’s Lil’ Darling. McPeek was to receive monthly training fees, room and board fees, and 12% of the horse’s winnings. After Polk’s death in August 2018, her heirs decided to sell the horse, which fetched $3,500,000 at auction. McPeek claimed an additional 5% commission on the sale, asserting it was part of his oral agreement with Polk, although this term was not documented in writing.The Fayette Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of Normandy, citing KRS 230.357(11), which requires a signed writing for any compensation related to the sale of a horse. The court found that McPeek’s claim for a 5% commission was barred by this statute, as there was no written agreement. The court also dismissed McPeek’s quantum meruit claim, stating that he had already been compensated for his training services and that exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief were not present.The Kentucky Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding that KRS 230.357(11) only applied to buyers, sellers, and their agents in horse transactions. The court reasoned that McPeek’s commission was for training services, not for the sale of the horse, and thus the statute did not apply.The Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstating the trial court’s summary judgment. The Supreme Court held that KRS 230.357(11) applies broadly to any form of compensation connected with the sale of a horse, including McPeek’s claimed commission. The court emphasized that the statute’s plain language requires a signed writing for such compensation to be enforceable, and McPeek’s lack of a written agreement barred his claims. View "NORMANDY FARM, LLC V. KENNETH MCPEEK RACING STABLE, INC." on Justia Law

A petrochemical company, Sasol, expanded its Lake Charles, Louisiana facility and required a storage-in-transit yard. The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (KCSR) was contracted to construct and lease the railyard to Sasol. The lease agreement stipulated that Sasol would pay KCSR $102 per linear foot of track annually. A dispute arose over whether the term "track" included the track within switches, which are used to divert trains from one track to another.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas found the lease ambiguous regarding whether "track" included switches. After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Sasol, interpreting the lease to exclude switches from the track for which Sasol had to pay. Consequently, the court set the rent at $14,806,932 annually, less than what KCSR had invoiced, and awarded Sasol damages and interest for overpayments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined the lease's language and found no ambiguity. It determined that the term "track" unambiguously included the track within switches. The court noted that the lease's various references to "track" and "switches" did not imply mutual exclusivity and that interpreting them as such would lead to absurd results. Therefore, the court held that KCSR was entitled to charge for all track within the leased premises, including switches.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "The Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Sasol Chemicals (USA), L.L.C." on Justia Law

In 2017, Riverside Mining Limited (Riverside Mining) leased 73 acres of its property to Quality Aggregates (Quality) for mining. By 2020, disputes arose, leading Quality to sue Riverside Mining in 2021 for breach of contract, trespass, and quiet title. In 2022, Riverside Mining filed an unlawful detainer action to evict Quality for alleged lease breaches. The parties agreed that Quality would deposit monthly rent payments with the court during the litigation. Quality later made a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, which Riverside Mining did not accept. Riverside Mining then dismissed the unlawful detainer action without prejudice.The Superior Court of Riverside County dismissed the unlawful detainer action and later addressed two motions: Quality's motion for attorney fees under section 998 and Riverside Mining's motion to disburse the deposited rent payments. The court denied Quality's motion for attorney fees and granted Riverside Mining's motion for disbursement.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the lower court's decisions. It held that Quality was not entitled to attorney fees under section 998 because Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), precludes awarding attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed. The court also affirmed the disbursement of the deposited funds to Riverside Mining, as Quality had no right to a setoff for attorney fees. The court's main holding was that section 998 does not independently authorize attorney fees without an underlying statutory or contractual right, and Civil Code section 1717, subdivision (b)(2), prevents such an award in cases of voluntary dismissal. View "Riverside Mining Limited v. Quality Aggregates" on Justia Law

Taxinet Corporation sued Santiago Leon, alleging various claims stemming from a joint effort to secure a government concession for a taxi-hailing app in Mexico City. The district court granted summary judgment for Leon on all claims except for a Florida-law unjust enrichment claim, which went to trial along with Leon’s counterclaims for fraudulent and negligent misrepresentation. The jury awarded Taxinet $300 million for unjust enrichment and Leon $15,000 for negligent misrepresentation. However, the district court granted Leon’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law, ruling that the damages award was based on inadmissible hearsay and was speculative.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida initially allowed testimony regarding a $2.4 billion valuation by Goldman Sachs, which was later deemed inadmissible hearsay. The court concluded that without this evidence, there was insufficient support for the jury’s $300 million award. The court also noted that the valuation was speculative and not directly tied to the benefit conferred by Taxinet in 2015.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s Rule 50(b) order, agreeing that the valuation evidence was inadmissible hearsay and that the remaining evidence was insufficient to support the $300 million award. However, the appellate court exercised its discretion to remand for a new trial on the unjust enrichment claim. The court found that Taxinet had presented enough evidence to show that it conferred a benefit on Leon, which he accepted, and that it would be inequitable for him to retain the benefit without payment. The court also noted that Taxinet could potentially present other evidence of damages in a new trial.The appellate court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Taxinet’s other claims, ruling that the alleged joint venture agreement was subject to Florida’s statute of frauds, as it could not be completed within a year. Thus, any claims based on the existence of the joint venture agreement were barred. View "Taxinet Corp. v. Leon" on Justia Law