Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Honeywell International, a Delaware corporation, and OPTO Electronics, a Japanese company, are competitors in the barcode-scanning equipment market. In May 2019, Honeywell sued OPTO for patent infringement, alleging that OPTO's barcode products infringed on seven of Honeywell's patents. The parties settled in January 2020 with a patent-licensing agreement, allowing OPTO to use Honeywell's patents in exchange for royalty payments. In March 2021, Honeywell audited OPTO and claimed that OPTO had underreported its revenues, leading to a dispute over the definition of "2D Barcode Products." Honeywell then sued OPTO for breach of contract in September 2021, alleging unpaid royalties.The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina handled the case. A jury found that OPTO's laser-scanning barcode readers were "2D Barcode Products" but awarded Honeywell only $859,741. The district court also rejected OPTO's counterclaim of patent misuse, concluding that Honeywell had not engaged in such conduct. Both parties filed post-trial motions, which the district court denied. Honeywell sought attorney's fees, and OPTO moved to set aside the jury verdict, but both requests were denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that it could not reach the merits because the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the appeal due to the patent-related counterclaim asserted by OPTO. The Fourth Circuit dismissed the appeal, allowing the parallel appeal pending in the Federal Circuit to proceed. The main holding was that the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals involving patent claims and counterclaims, even if the primary dispute is over a contract. View "Honeywell International, Inc. v. OPTO Electronics Co., Ltd." on Justia Law

Matthew Moriarty, the defendant, appealed a Superior Court order dismissing his amended counterclaim against Evoqua Water Technologies LLC and Neptune-Benson, LLC. Moriarty's counterclaim sought declaratory relief and tort damages, alleging violations of a non-compete agreement he signed in 2010 while employed by Neptune-Benson, Inc. (NBI). Evoqua acquired Neptune-Benson in 2016 and hired Moriarty in 2017. The plaintiffs sued Moriarty in 2018 for breaching the 2010 agreement, among other claims, and obtained a preliminary injunction in 2019 to enforce the agreement.The Superior Court dismissed Moriarty's counterclaim, citing the litigation privilege for statements made during judicial proceedings. Moriarty's counterclaim included claims for emotional distress, declaratory judgments, constructive discharge, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations, based on alleged false testimony by an Evoqua executive during the preliminary injunction hearing.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the Superior Court's dismissal. The Court held that the litigation privilege protected the executive's testimony, barring Moriarty's claims for emotional distress, misrepresentation, and interference with business relations. The Court also found Moriarty's declaratory judgment claim moot, as the non-compete agreement had expired in 2020, and his constructive discharge claim failed to state a valid cause of action. The Court concluded that Moriarty did not demonstrate that his working conditions were so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign. Thus, the dismissal of Moriarty's amended counterclaim was upheld. View "Evoqua Water Technologies LLC v. Moriarty" on Justia Law

Virgin Valley Water District (the District) entered into a lease agreement with Paradise Canyon, LLC (Paradise Canyon) in 2011 to provide water shares for irrigating a golf course. The lease included a right of first refusal for Paradise Canyon to renew the lease, with the District having sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. In 2019, the District increased the rental rate, leading Paradise Canyon to sue for declaratory relief and damages, alleging bad faith breach of the lease agreement.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment for Paradise Canyon on certain claims and set others for a jury trial. The jury found that the District had breached the lease in bad faith and awarded damages to Paradise Canyon. The District appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the lease agreement unambiguously granted the District sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. The court held that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to interpret this unambiguous provision and in finding that the District breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court also noted several procedural errors, including the trial court's improper judicial notice of its own factfinding, admission of prejudicial evidence, and unfair trial practices that limited the District's ability to present its case.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the portions of the trial court's judgment related to the interpretation of the lease renewal provisions and the jury's verdict on the rental rate and damages. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on beneficial use and other uncontested matters. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "VIRGIN VALLEY WATER DIST. VS. PARADISE CANYON, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Zackary Diamond was injured by a punch from a third party during an altercation in the restricted pit area at Bakersfield Speedway. He alleged that the defendants, Scott Schweitzer, Schweitzer Motorsports Productions, and Christian Schweitzer, were negligent in providing security, responding to the altercation, and undertaking rescue efforts. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Diamond's claims were barred by a release and waiver of liability form he signed to enter the pit area. The trial court granted the motion, finding the release clear, unequivocal, and broad in scope, covering the negligent conduct alleged.The Superior Court of Kern County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the release included risks related to racing activities and that the assault was such a risk. The court interpreted the release as covering the type of event that occurred, thus barring Diamond's negligence claims.On appeal, Diamond contended that the release was unenforceable because the injury-producing act was not reasonably related to the purpose of the release, which he described as observing the race from the pit area. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fifth Appellate District, concluded that the release met the requirements for enforceability: it was clear, unambiguous, and explicit in expressing the intent to release all liability for Diamond's injury; the alleged acts of negligence were reasonably related to the purpose of the release; and the release did not contravene public policy. The court also found that the defendants adequately raised a complete defense based on the signed release and that Diamond failed to rebut this defense. Consequently, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Diamond v. Schweitzer" on Justia Law

8fig, Incorporated, a technology company, entered into agreements with several e-commerce merchants (Defendant-Appellants) to purchase projected revenue in exchange for an up-front payment. 8fig alleged that the Defendant-Appellants failed to remit the agreed payments and instead transferred the funds to a religious movement, World Olivet Assembly, closed their bank accounts, and went out of business. 8fig filed a lawsuit under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964, 1962, and various state and common law claims. The parties filed a Joint Agreed Motion to Administratively Close and Seal Proceedings, which the district court granted, and the case settled quickly.Newsweek Digital, LLC moved to intervene and unseal the judicial record, arguing that the seal hindered its reporting. The district court granted Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal, allowing any party to propose redactions. Certain defendants filed proposed redactions, which the district court granted, and denied a motion to extend filing deadlines. The district court proceeding has been unsealed for over a year, except for documents with redacted versions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Newsweek had standing to intervene, as alleged violations of the public right to access judicial records and gather news are cognizable injuries-in-fact. The court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in unsealing the records, emphasizing the public’s common law right of access to judicial records and the presumption in favor of transparency. The court affirmed the district court’s order granting Newsweek’s motion to intervene and unseal the proceeding. View "8Fig v. Stepup Funny" on Justia Law

Alebia, Inc. (Alebia) is a Rhode Island corporation that owned a property at 284-286 Atwells Avenue, Providence. In September 2005, Carmela Natale and Walter Potenza, purported owners and shareholders of Alebia, executed a promissory note and mortgage in favor of Equity One Mortgage Company. The mortgage lacked a legal description of the property, but the loan proceeds were used to pay off prior mortgages and taxes on the property. The note was intended to be secured by the property, but Natale and Potenza signed the mortgage in their individual capacities instead of as corporate representatives of Alebia.In 2011, Deutsche Bank National Trust Company (Deutsche Bank), the current holder of the note, filed a complaint in Providence County Superior Court against Natale and Potenza for breach of contract and against Alebia seeking reformation of the mortgage. Deutsche Bank obtained a judgment against Natale and Potenza in 2017 but could not proceed against the property. In 2021, Deutsche Bank filed a motion to equitably reform the mortgage against Alebia. The Superior Court held remote evidentiary hearings and granted the motion, reforming the mortgage to reflect that Natale and Potenza signed as corporate representatives of Alebia.The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the case. The court held that the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony and evidence, including the promissory note. The court found sufficient evidence to support the reformation of the mortgage due to mutual mistake. The court also held that the mortgage could be reformed without reforming the note and that the remote hearings did not violate due process, despite the error in holding them remotely without consent. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. View "Deutsche Bank National Trust Company v. Alebia, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2020, Cody Sturzenbecher and his mother, Judy Sturzenbecher, entered into a series of transactions with Sioux County Ranch, LLC (Sioux County) related to the purchase of their family farm from a trust. Judy bought the farm using a loan from Sioux County, then sold the property to Sioux County, which leased it to Cody. The lease included an option for Cody to purchase the property. Cody defaulted on the lease, leading Sioux County to terminate the lease and list the property for sale.The Sturzenbechers sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that Judy’s conveyance of the farm to Sioux County created an equitable mortgage rather than an absolute sale. The Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit in Turner County, South Dakota, granted the Sturzenbechers’ request for a preliminary injunction and denied Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. Sioux County appealed both decisions.The Supreme Court of the State of South Dakota reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court’s decisions. The court concluded that the arrangement between the Sturzenbechers and Sioux County was intended as a financing agreement rather than an absolute sale. The court found that the agreements between the parties were unambiguous but unenforceable as an absolute sale due to public policy favoring a mortgagor’s right of redemption. The court held that the Sturzenbechers were likely to succeed on their equitable mortgage claim and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction. The court also affirmed the denial of Sioux County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the Sturzenbechers had pled sufficient facts to support their claim. View "Sturzenbecher v. Sioux County Ranch" on Justia Law

The defendant, Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP (CHA), agreed to design a new athletic field for the plaintiff, Trustees of Boston University (university). The contract included an express indemnification provision, which required CHA to indemnify the university for any expenses resulting from CHA's negligent design. A defect in CHA's design caused the university to incur expenses to fix the field. The university demanded indemnification from CHA, which CHA refused. More than six years after the field opened, the university sued CHA for breach of the indemnification provision.The Superior Court judge granted summary judgment in favor of CHA, relying on the tort statute of repose, which bars tort actions for damages arising from design defects in real property improvements six years after the improvement's opening. The judge concluded that the university's claim was barred by this statute. The university appealed the decision.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the case. The court held that the tort statute of repose does not apply to the university's contract claim for indemnification. The court emphasized that the claim was based on an express contractual provision, not a tort duty imposed by law. The court distinguished between claims for breach of an implied warranty, which are barred by the statute of repose, and claims for breach of an express warranty or indemnification provision, which are not. The court reversed the Superior Court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trustees of Boston University v. Clough, Harbour & Associates LLP" on Justia Law

NCO Financial Systems, Inc. (NCO) entered into a lease agreement with Montgomery Park, LLC (Montgomery Park) for over 100,000 square feet of office space in Baltimore, Maryland. The lease allowed NCO to terminate early after eight years if certain conditions were met. NCO attempted to terminate early, but Montgomery Park claimed the conditions were not satisfied. NCO vacated the premises and stopped paying rent, leading Montgomery Park to send a default notice. NCO then filed a lawsuit seeking a declaratory judgment that it had properly terminated the lease and that the rent was based on misrepresented square footage.The United States District Court for the District of Maryland found in favor of Montgomery Park after a bench trial, awarding it $9,854,566.95 plus ongoing interest. The court also set a schedule for determining Montgomery Park’s claim for costs, fees, and expenses. Montgomery Park filed a motion seeking approximately $3.8 million for these costs, which NCO opposed on several grounds, including the lack of a proper demand for payment and the inclusion of fees for defending against NCO’s initial suit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that Montgomery Park made a valid demand for payment when it filed its motion for costs, fees, and expenses on August 24, 2022. The court held that default interest should run only from the date of this demand, not from when the costs were incurred, and remanded the case to recalculate the interest. The court affirmed the district court’s award of costs, fees, and expenses, including those incurred in defending against NCO’s claims and expert witness fees, finding no abuse of discretion or error in the district court’s decisions.The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions to recalculate the default interest. View "NCO Financial Systems, Inc. v. Montgomery Park, LLC" on Justia Law

Maria Wilson purchased an insurance policy from Union National Fire Insurance Company (UNFIC) through agent Robin Wilson. The policy covered personal property at 2170A Tillman Chapel Road, which included a house and a travel trailer. Maria, who is illiterate, relied on Robin's verbal description of the policy. After a fire destroyed the house and her personal property, Maria filed a claim, which was denied by UNFIC, citing that she did not live in the house, a purported requirement for coverage.Maria sued UNFIC, Kemper Corporate Services, Robin Wilson, and others in the Circuit Court of Claiborne County, Mississippi, alleging breach of contract, negligence, fraud, and other claims. The defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting diversity jurisdiction and claiming that the non-diverse defendants were improperly joined. The district court agreed, denied Maria's motion to remand, and compelled arbitration based on the policy's arbitration clause. The arbitrator ruled in favor of the defendants, and the district court confirmed the arbitration award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in denying Maria's motion to remand because non-diverse defendant Robin Wilson was properly joined. The court found that the insurance policy did not clearly require Maria to live in the house for her personal property to be covered, thus her negligence claim against Robin Wilson was viable. Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the motion to remand, vacated the order compelling arbitration and the confirmation of the arbitration award, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Wilson v. Kemper Corporate Services" on Justia Law