Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Rosenberg-Wohl had a State Farm homeowners insurance policy, covering her San Francisco home. The policy required lawsuits to be “started within one year after the date of loss or damage.” In late 2018 or early 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl noticed that an elderly neighbor twice stumbled on Rosenberg-Wohl’s outside staircase and learned that the pitch of the stairs had changed. The staircase needed to be replaced. In April 2019, Rosenberg-Wohl authorized the work and contacted State Farm. On August 9, she submitted a claim for the money she had spent. On August 26, State Farm denied the claim. Rosenberg-Wohl’s husband, an attorney, later contacted State Farm “to see if anything could be done.” In August 2020 a State Farm adjuster said it had reopened the claim. Days later, it was denied.In October 2020, Rosenberg-Wohl filed suit, alleging breach of the policy and bad faith. That lawsuit was removed to federal court and was dismissed based on the one-year limitation provision. It is currently on appeal. Another action alleges a violation of California’s unfair competition law. The California court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of that suit, rejecting arguments that the one-year limitation provision does not apply to the unfair competition claim, and that State Farm waived the limitation provision. View "Rosenberg-Wohl v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. Plaintiff alleged he entered into two oral contracts with TFMI for which he has not been paid – one for his management of TFMI farms located in Arizona and New Mexico (out-of-state management services) and the other for consulting services he rendered in connection with the management of TFMI orchards located in California (instate consulting services). The trial court entered judgment in favor of TFMI and against Schmidt.   The Fifth Appellate District reversed the trial court’s judgment dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint alleging seven causes of action against TFMI. The court held that the trial court erred in applying California law instead of Illinois law in determining whether to enforce the forum selection provision. The court held that in the interests of justice, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration of the issue. Moreover, the parties themselves did not apply the correct law in arguing for or against the motion to quash and, thus, may not have submitted evidence they might now consider relevant to the court’s determination. Accordingly, the court explained it believes the trial court should entertain and consider additional briefing and evidence from each of the parties concerning the application of Illinois law to the question of whether the trial court should exercise, or decline to exercise, jurisdiction over claims involving the assigned Summit Gold invoices. View "Schmidt v. Trinut Farm Management" on Justia Law

Ford Motor Company (Ford) appealed from an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiffs’ causes of action for breach of warranty, violations of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (Civ. Code, Section 1790 et seq.; the Song-Beverly Act) and for fraudulent omission arising from alleged defects in a sports utility vehicle Plaintiffs’ purchased from the dealership, AutoNation Ford Valencia (AutoNation). The central question on appeal is whether Ford as the manufacturer of the vehicle, can enforce an arbitration provision in the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation to which Ford was not a party under the doctrine of equitable estoppel or as a third-party beneficiary of the contract.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded Ford cannot enforce the arbitration provision in the sales contract because Plaintiffs’ claims against Ford are founded on Ford’s express warranty for the vehicle, not any obligation imposed on Ford by the sales contract, and thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are not inextricably intertwined with any obligations under the sales contract. Nor was the sales contract between Plaintiffs and AutoNation intended to benefit Ford. View "Montemayor v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

The Monte Vista Villas Project, on the site of the former Leona Quarry, has been in development since the early 2000s. The developers planned to close the 128-acre quarry site, reclaim it, and develop the land into a residential neighborhood with over 400 residential units, a community center, a park, pedestrian trails, and other recreational areas. In 2005, the developers entered into an agreement with Oakland to pay certain fees to cover the costs of its project oversight. The agreement provided that the fees set forth in the agreement satisfied “all of the Developer’s obligations for fees due to the City for the Project.” In 2016, Oakland adopted ordinances that imposed new impact fees on development projects, intended to address the effects of development on affordable housing, transportation, and capital improvements, and assessed the new impact fees on the Project, then more than a decade into development, when the developers sought new building permits.The trial court vacated the imposition of the fees and directed Oakland to refrain from assessing any fee not specified in the agreement. The court of appeal reversed, finding that any provision in, or construction of, the parties’ agreement that prevents Oakland from imposing the impact fees on the instant development project constitutes an impermissible infringement of the city’s police power and is therefore invalid. View "Discovery Builders, Inc. v. City of Oakland" on Justia Law

Bennett, an oral and maxillofacial surgeon, purchased three disability income insurance policies from National in 1984, 1991, and 1995. Under the policies, monthly benefits were payable for life if he was totally disabled due to injury; if due to sickness, benefits would only be paid until the age of 65. National initially approved Bennett’s 2014 claim that he was totally disabled due to an injury sustained when thrown from his horse. In June 2015, National notified him of its determination that his disability was due to sickness, not an injury. National continued to pay disability benefits until September 2018, the policy year Bennett turned 65 years old.Bennett sued. The trial court granted National summary judgment, concluding his claims were barred by the statutes of limitation — four years for breach of contract and two years for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing–both of which accrued when National issued an unconditional denial of liability in June 2015. The court of appeal reversed, agreeing with Bennett that his causes of action did not accrue until all elements — including actual damages — were complete. Bennett suffered no harm as of June 2015, because National continued to pay disability benefits. Only in September 2018 — when National began withholding benefits, and Bennett thereby incurred damages — did his causes of action accrue. View "Bennett v. Ohio National Life Assurance Corp." on Justia Law

The trial court entered judgment for Respondent in this breach of contract claim. The Second Appellate District affirmed and also imposed sanctions against Appellant's counsel for filing a frivolous appeal.The Second Appellate District explained "An appeal is frivolous only when it is prosecuted for an improper motive – to harass the respondent or delay the effect of an adverse judgment – or when it indisputably has no merit – when any reasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totally and completely without merit." The court held that here, the appeal was frivolous because it "indisputably has no merit." The matter was entirely within the discretion of the trial court, and the fact that Appellant's counsel consulted with two other attorneys who believed the claim had merit did not change the court's opinion. View "Champlin/GEI Wind Holdings, LLC v. Avery" on Justia Law

Ring manufactures and sells home security and smart home devices including video doorbells, security cameras, and alarms. The plaintiffs purchased video doorbell and security camera products from Ring and subsequently filed a class action complaint against Ring asserting claims under the Consumer Legal Remedies Act, false advertising law, and Unfair Competition Law. They sought injunctive relief requiring Ring to prominently disclose to consumers certain information about its products and services.Ring moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration provision in its terms of service. The plaintiffs did not dispute that they agreed to Ring’s terms of service but argued the arbitration provision violates the California Supreme Court’s 2017 “McGill” holding that a pre-dispute arbitration agreement is invalid and unenforceable under state law insofar as it purports to waive a party’s statutory right to seek public injunctive relief.The court of appeal affirmed the denial of Ring's motion to compel arbitration. The parties did not “clearly and unmistakably" delegate to the arbitrator exclusive authority to decide whether the arbitration provision is valid under McGill. The contract language at issue is commonly understood to preclude public injunctive relief in arbitration. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1, does not preempt McGill’s holding. The contract’s severability clause means the plaintiffs’ claims cannot be arbitrated and may be brought in court. View "Jack v. Ring LLC" on Justia Law

The Plan is a nonprofit health care service plan subject to Health & Safety Code 1340, including the Parity Act, under which: “Every health care service plan contract . . . that provides hospital, medical, or surgical coverage shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment of severe mental illness of a person of any age, and of serious emotional disturbances of a child . . . under the same terms and conditions applied to other medical conditions.”Plaintiffs alleged that the Plan violates the Parity Act by “deterring members from obtaining one-on-one mental health therapy without making individualized determinations … encouraging ‘group’ therapy, without making individualized determinations" where similar practices are not followed in the treatment of physical health conditions. An Unruh Civil Rights Act claim alleged that the Plan intentionally discriminated against persons with mental disabilities or conditions. The court granted the Plan summary judgment.The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of one plaintiff’s individual claims; the Plan is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary by whom the plaintiff’s coverage was issued. The court otherwise reversed. On an Unfair Competition Law claim, the court failed to consider how the Plan’s conduct undermines its contractual promises of covered treatment in violation of the Parity Act. On the Unruh claim, triable issues of fact exist as to whether the plaintiffs were denied medically necessary treatment as a result of intentional discrimination. View "Futterman v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2014 the Los Angeles City Council passed a resolution directing various City departments and officials to prepare and execute the necessary approvals and agreements to convey the property to Childhelp in exchange for Childhelp’s agreement to continue using the property to provide services for victims of child abuse. Ultimately, however, the City decided not to transfer the property to Childhelp. Childhelp filed this action against the City for, among other things, declaratory relief, writ of mandate, and promissory estoppel, and the City filed an unlawful detainer action against Childhelp. After the trial court consolidated the two actions, the court granted the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s cause of action for promissory estoppel, sustained without leave to amend the City’s demurrer to Childhelp’s causes of action for declaratory relief and writ of mandate, and granted the City’s motion for summary judgment on its unlawful detainer complaint. Childhelp appealed the ensuing judgment.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Childhelp had occupied the property for almost 30 years and had an expectation it would eventually own the property. The 2014 resolution certainly suggested the City was seriously considering selling the property to Childhelp. But it was undisputed the parties never completed the transaction in accordance with the City Charter. While Childhelp cites cases reciting general principles of promissory estoppel, it does not cite any cases where the plaintiff successfully invoked promissory estoppel against a municipality in these circumstances. The trial court did not err in granting the City’s motion for summary adjudication on Childhelp’s promissory estoppel cause of action. View "Childhelp, Inc. v. City of L.A." on Justia Law

After years of what the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) viewed as unsatisfactory teaching performance by a certificated teacher, LAUSD served the teacher with a Notice of Intent to Dismiss and a Statement of Charges, which included notice that the employee was suspended without pay. The teacher brought and prevailed on a motion for immediate reversal of suspension (MIRS) and thus received pay during the pendency of the dismissal proceedings. LAUSD ultimately prevailed in those proceedings. LAUSD then sought a writ of administrative mandamus in the superior court seeking to set aside the order granting the MIRS and to recoup the salary payments it had made to the teacher during the pendency of the proceedings. The trial court denied the writ, holding that the MIRS order is not reviewable. The court also ruled (1) LAUSD cannot recover the payments to the teacher under its cause of action for money had and received and (2) LAUSD’s cause of action for declaratory judgment is derivative of its other claims. The trial court entered judgment against LAUSD in favor of the teacher.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that LAUSD has failed to show that in adding the MIRS procedure, the Legislature intended school districts to be able to recover payments to subsequently dismissed employees. The court wrote that if LAUSD believed such recovery should be permitted through judicial review of MIRS orders or otherwise, it should address the Legislature. View "L.A. Unified School Dist. v. Office of Admin. Hearings" on Justia Law