Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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HotChalk, LLC filed a lawsuit against the Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod and 22 other defendants, alleging breach of contract and fraud in relation to the closure of Concordia University - Portland. HotChalk claimed that the Synod orchestrated the university’s closure to financially benefit itself and its affiliates while leaving the university’s creditors out in the cold. During discovery, the Synod sought a protective order to prevent the disclosure of certain documents related to internal religious matters. The trial court granted the protective order, effectively denying a motion to compel discovery of those documents. HotChalk then filed a petition for mandamus.The trial court's decision to grant the protective order was based on an in-camera review of the documents in question. The court equated the Synod's motion to a motion to restrict discovery to protect a party from embarrassment. After completing its final in-camera review, the trial court granted the Synod's motion for a protective order. HotChalk then filed a timely petition for mandamus in the Supreme Court of the State of Oregon.The Supreme Court of the State of Oregon issued an alternative writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to either vacate its order or show cause why it should not do so. The trial court declined to vacate its order, leading to arguments in the Supreme Court. The Synod argued that the writ should be dismissed because HotChalk has a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The Supreme Court agreed with the Synod, stating that HotChalk had not established that the normal appellate process would not constitute a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in this case. Therefore, the Supreme Court dismissed the alternative writ as improvidently allowed. View "Hotchalk, Inc. v. Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between BMC Software, Inc. (BMC) and International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) over a Master Licensing Agreement (MLA) and an Outsourcing Attachment. BMC, a software company, and IBM, an information technology company, directly compete in developing and selling mainframe software. However, IBM also provides necessary outsourcing services to BMC and its customers, including AT&T. In 2008, IBM and BMC entered into an MLA and an Outsourcing Attachment, which were amended in 2013 and 2015. The dispute centers around the 2015 amendment, particularly three provisions that govern IBM's use of BMC's software.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The district court awarded summary judgment to IBM on the claim for breach of Section 1.1 of the 2015 amendment, but denied IBM's motion for summary judgment on BMC’s Section 5.1 breach-of-contract claim. The court concluded that Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment unambiguously prevented IBM from “displacing” BMC products with IBM software. The court granted partial summary judgment to BMC because IBM “displaced BMC Customer Licenses with IBM products when it implemented Project Swallowtail at AT&T.” After a bench trial, the district court awarded BMC approximately $1.6 billion in damages.The case was then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The appellate court disagreed with the district court's interpretation of Section 5.4 of the 2015 amendment. The court held that “other valid business reasons” under Section 5.4 supported IBM’s service in effecting AT&T’s switchover, which partially included IBM software. The court concluded that IBM did not breach Section 5.4 by agreeing to provide IT services to perform this task. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed. View "BMC Software v. IBM" on Justia Law

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A motor vehicle manufacturer, General Motors LLC (GM), sought to terminate its franchise agreement with Mall Chevrolet, Inc., a successful car dealership in New Jersey, after discovering that the dealership had submitted false warranty claims for vehicle repairs. GM also intended to recoup the amounts it paid in disputed warranty claims through a chargeback process. In response, Mall Chevrolet sued GM under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act to prevent the termination of the franchise agreement and the chargebacks. However, the dealership's claims did not survive summary judgment.The District Court found that there was no genuine dispute of material fact – the dealership did submit false claims for warranty repairs – and GM was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on each of the appealed claims. The dealership then appealed the District Court’s summary-judgment rulings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the judgment of the District Court. The court found that GM had good cause to terminate the franchise agreement because Mall Chevrolet had materially breached the contract by submitting false claims for warranty work. The court also found that the dealership's remaining statutory claims were barred by the defense provided in the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act, which allows a franchisor to avoid liability for any claim under the Act if the franchisee has not substantially complied with the franchise agreement. View "Mall Chevrolet Inc v. General Motors LLC" on Justia Law

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The case revolves around a dispute between Private Jet Services Group, LLC (PJS), a private aircraft booking agent, and Tauck, Inc., a provider of domestic and international guided tours. The parties had entered into an "Air Charter Services Blanket Purchase Agreement" (BPA) in January 2018, which established the terms under which Tauck would book and pay for air transportation for the New Zealand portion of its Australia and New Zealand tours. In May 2018, they executed a Statement of Work (SOW) that required Tauck to guarantee a minimum of fifty tours per year and to pay PJS an agreed-upon sum for each "missed" tour. The SOW also included a force majeure clause that protected PJS from delays, losses, or damages caused in whole or in part by force majeure events, including epidemics and acts of civil or military authority.The dispute arose when the COVID-19 pandemic prevented Tauck from conducting tours in New Zealand. After Tauck cancelled its remaining 2020 tours, PJS sued Tauck in the New Hampshire federal court alleging a breach of contract. Tauck responded by invoking the doctrines of impossibility and frustration of purpose to excuse performance of its obligations under the contracts. Both parties moved for summary judgment on the count relating to the 2020 tour season, which the district court denied without prejudice. The district court then certified a question to the Supreme Court of New Hampshire regarding the interpretation of the force majeure clause and its impact on the common law defenses of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of commercial purpose.The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the common law contract defenses of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of commercial purpose are so fundamentally related to contract formation and purpose that they remain viable unless expressly waived. Therefore, a force majeure clause that protects only one party to a contract should not be deemed, in and of itself, a relinquishment of the other party’s right to interpose those common law defenses. The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings. View "Private Jet Services Group, LLC v. Tauck, Inc." on Justia Law

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A group of neurosurgeons and their practice group, Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C., sued The Valley Hospital after the hospital granted another group of neurosurgeons exclusive privileges in areas where the plaintiffs had previously held privileges. The plaintiffs claimed that the hospital did not deal with them fairly or act in good faith when it granted these exclusive privileges. The plaintiffs had joined the hospital's medical staff in 2003 and had helped grow the hospital's neurosurgical programs and facilities. They primarily derived their practice from treating "unassigned" ER patients and also received "specialized privileges" to use certain equipment. In 2015, the hospital granted a different group of neurosurgeons exclusive rights to use this equipment and to treat "unassigned" ER patients, thereby revoking the plaintiffs' privileges in those areas.The plaintiffs filed a complaint against the hospital. Following summary judgment motions, two claims reached the jury: a breach of contract claim and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim. The jury found no cause of action on the breach of contract claim but awarded damages based on the breach of implied covenant claim. The hospital appealed, and the Appellate Division affirmed both the denial of summary judgment and the jury’s verdict. The hospital then petitioned for certification.The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the plaintiffs’ good faith and fair dealing claim properly survived summary judgment, but the jury was not correctly charged or asked to rule on that claim. The court found that the trial judge failed to instruct the jury that the only underlying contract to which the implied covenant could attach had to be one beyond the rights afforded by the Bylaws. The court also found that the improper admission into evidence of privileged emails and the improper remarks by plaintiffs’ attorney had the capacity to lead the jury to reach a verdict it would not have otherwise reached and thus deprived the hospital of a fair trial. The court reversed the verdict on the implied covenant claim, vacated it, and remanded the matter for further proceedings. View "Comprehensive Neurosurgical, P.C. v. The Valley Hospital" on Justia Law

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The case involves a dispute between Firexo Group Limited (FGL), a British company that manufactures fire extinguishers, and Firexo, Inc., a Florida-based company that was created to sell FGL's products in the United States. Scot Smith, a resident of Ohio, purchased 70% of Firexo, Inc. from FGL under a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA). The JVA included a forum-selection clause designating England or Wales as the exclusive jurisdiction for any disputes arising from the agreement. Firexo, Inc., which was not a signatory to the JVA, later sued FGL in an Ohio court over issues with the fire extinguishers. FGL sought to dismiss the case based on the forum-selection clause in the JVA.The district court granted FGL's motion to dismiss, applying the "closely related" doctrine. This doctrine allows a non-signatory to a contract to be bound by a forum-selection clause if the non-signatory is sufficiently closely related to the contract. The district court found that Firexo, Inc. was closely related to the JVA and therefore subject to the forum-selection clause. Firexo, Inc. appealed this decision, arguing that the district court applied the wrong law and analytical approach in determining the applicability of the contract.The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed with Firexo, Inc. that the district court had applied the wrong law. The court held that the "closely related" doctrine, a federal common law rule, should not have been used to interpret the JVA's forum-selection clause. Instead, the court should have applied the law specified in the JVA, which was English law. Under English law, contracts do not apply to non-signatories unless certain exceptions apply, none of which were present in this case. Therefore, the forum-selection clause in the JVA did not apply to Firexo, Inc., and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Firexo, Inc. v. Firexo Group Limited" on Justia Law

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This case involves a dispute among Players Recreation Group, LLC, an Alabama limited-liability company, three of its members, Jason L. McCarty, Felix McCarty, and Doyle Sadler, and S&M Associates, Inc., a company owned by Sadler. The LLC, established in 1999, owns and operates a bowling alley known as 'the Super Bowl.' In 2003, S&M, a company owned by Sadler, loaned the LLC $150,000, which is evidenced by a promissory note. In 2006, the Super Bowl began incurring substantial losses, and the LLC ultimately defaulted on the promissory note payable to S&M. In July 2015, S&M and Sadler sued the LLC and the other members of the LLC, asserting a breach-of-contract claim and a claim seeking an accounting. In August 2015, the LLC, Jason, and Felix filed an answer and a counterclaim, alleging that Sadler had breached his duty of loyalty and his duty of care to the LLC.The case proceeded to a bench trial. The parties initially stipulated that the LLC owed S&M a total of $310,139.66 on the promissory note; the trial court ultimately entered a judgment against the LLC for that amount based on the parties' stipulation. The case was then tried solely on the counterclaims asserted against Sadler by the LLC, Jason, and Felix. The trial court entered a judgment against Sadler on the counterclaims, based on its findings that Sadler had breached not only a duty of loyalty and a duty of care to the LLC, but also the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to the LLC. The trial court assessed damages against Sadler in the amount of $368,167.92.On appeal to the Supreme Court of Alabama, Sadler argued that the trial court erred insofar as it entered a judgment against him on the counterclaims asserted against him by the LLC, Jason, and Felix. The Supreme Court of Alabama agreed and reversed the judgment entered against Sadler on the counterclaims asserted against him because there was no evidence to support findings that Sadler had breached the duty of loyalty and the duty of care owed to the LLC or the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and remanded the case to the trial court for the entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.On remand, S&M and Sadler filed a motion for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The trial court denied the motions for attorney's fees, costs, and expenses. The trial court also found that the LLC had incurred $2,713,230.33 in expenses without contribution by Sadler or Scott Montgomery. That finding was not disturbed on appeal and has become the law of the case. The trial court took judicial notice that Jason and Felix McCarty have perfected, as the remaining members of the LLC, that claim or debt by filing a second mortgage with the Probate Court of Jefferson County, which second mortgage is inferior to the mortgage held by the late Ferris Ritchey’s real estate company, and the perfection of this claim makes it a priority over and superior to the claims of other creditors, including S&M.S&M and Sadler appealed the trial court's order on remand. The Supreme Court of Alabama affirmed the trial court's order on remand insofar as it denied S&M's and Sadler's requests for attorney's fees and costs, reversed the order insofar as it addressed the LLC's mortgage executed in favor of Jason and Felix and its purported priority, and remanded this case with instructions for the trial court to set aside that portion of its order that addressed the LLC's mortgage and its purported priority. View "S&M Associates, Inc. v. Players Recreation Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) initiated an investigation into potentially anti-competitive practices in the real estate industry by the National Association of Realtors (NAR). In November 2020, the DOJ and NAR reached a settlement, and the DOJ sent a letter to NAR stating that it had closed its investigation and that NAR was not required to respond to two outstanding investigative subpoenas. However, in July 2021, the DOJ withdrew the proposed consent judgment, reopened its investigation, and issued a new investigative subpoena. NAR petitioned the district court to set aside the subpoena, arguing that its issuance violated a promise made by the DOJ in the 2020 closing letter. The district court granted NAR’s petition, concluding that the new subpoena was barred by a validly executed settlement agreement.The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit disagreed with the district court's decision. The court held that the plain language of the disputed 2020 letter permits the DOJ to reopen its investigation. The court noted that the closing of an investigation does not guarantee that the investigation would stay closed forever. The court also pointed out that NAR gained several benefits from the closing of the DOJ’s pending investigation in 2020, including relief from its obligation to respond to the two outstanding subpoenas. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court. View "National Association of Realtors v. United States" on Justia Law

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The case involves Century Aluminum Company and its subsidiaries (Century), and Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London (Lloyd's). Century uses river barges to transport alumina ore and other materials for its aluminum smelting operations. In 2017, the Army Corps of Engineers closed key locks on the Ohio River, causing Century to seek alternative transportation. Century filed a claim with Lloyd's, its maritime cargo insurance policy provider, for the unanticipated shipping expenses. While Lloyd's paid $1 million under the policy's Extra Expense Clause, it denied coverage for the rest of the claim.The case was first heard by the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky. Century sought a declaration that its denied claims were covered by the insurance policy and requested damages for Lloyd's alleged breach of contract among other violations of Kentucky insurance law. Lloyd's sought summary judgment, arguing that the policy did not cover the claims. The district court sided with Lloyd's.The appeal was heard before the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Century argued that the policy's All Risks Clause, Risks Covered Clause, Shipping Expenses Clause, and Sue and Labour Clause required Lloyd's to cover the additional shipping expenses. The court rejected these arguments, affirming the district court's ruling. The court held that under the All Risks Clause and Risks Covered Clause, Century's alumina did not suffer any physical loss or damage. As for the Shipping Expenses Clause, it covered the risk of a failed delivery, not an untimely one. Lastly, under the Sue and Labour Clause, Century was required to mitigate Lloyd's exposure under the policy, but it did not obligate Lloyd's to pay anything for reducing losses that fall outside the policy. View "Century Aluminum Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London" on Justia Law

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The case before the Supreme Court of North Carolina involved a dispute between The Society for the Historical Preservation of the Twentysixth North Carolina Troops, Inc. (plaintiff) and the City of Asheville (defendant). The controversy centered around a monument dedicated to Zebulon Vance, a former North Carolina Governor and Confederate Colonel. The plaintiff, a nonprofit historical preservation organization, raised funds to restore the monument and entered into a donation agreement with the City, whereby the monument was restored and then donated to the City. However, the City later decided to remove the monument, citing it as a public safety threat due to vandalism and threats of toppling.In response, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the City, alleging that the City breached the 2015 donation agreement and seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and a declaratory judgment. The plaintiff argued that both parties had entered into a contract with the intent to preserve the monument in perpetuity. The City filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The trial court granted the City's motion, and this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.When the case reached the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the court reversed the Court of Appeals’ determination that the plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed for lack of standing. However, the court noted that the plaintiff had abandoned the merits of its breach of contract claim in its appeal. As such, the court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claims for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory judgment for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiff failed to assert any ground for which it has standing to contest the removal of the monument. View "Soc'y for the Hist. Pres. of the Twenty-sixth N.C. Troops, Inc. v. City of Asheville" on Justia Law