Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Barbara Needham in her capacity as the personal representative of the Estate of Charles Kelly Kluver (Estate) and denying the cross-motion for summary judgment filed by Karson Kluver and Genie Land Company (collectively, Kluver), holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.The Estate filed a complaint for declaratory judgment and for dissolution of Genie against Kluver, alleging declaratory judgment, breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and judicial dissolution of corporation. The Estate filed a petition for partial summary judgment. The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate in Counts I and II and denied Kluver's cross-motion for summary judgment in its entirety. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err in granting partial summary judgment in favor of the Estate. View "Needham v. Kluver" on Justia Law

Antero Resources Company and South Jersey Gas Company entered into an eight-year contract for Antero to deliver natural gas from the Marcellus Shale formation to gas meters located on the Columbia Pipeline in West Virginia. The parties tied gas pricing to the Columbia Appalachia Index.During performance of the contract, the price of natural gas linked to the Index increased. South Jersey contested the higher prices, arguing that modifications to the Index materially changed the pricing methodology, and that the Index should be replaced with one that reflected the original agreement. Antero disagreed. South Jersey then sued Antero in New Jersey state court for failing to negotiate a replacement index, and began paying a lower price based on a different index. Antero then sued South Jersey in federal district court in Colorado, where its principal place of business was located, for breach of contract for its failure to pay the Index price. The lawsuits were consolidated in Colorado and the case proceeded to trial. The jury rejected South Jersey’s claims, finding South Jersey breached the contract and Antero was entitled to $60 million damages. South Jersey argued on appeal the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment in its favor as a matter of law, or, alternatively, that the court erred in instructing the jury. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed, finding a reasonable jury could find South Jersey breached its contract with Antero because the Index was not discontinued nor did it materially change. Furthermore, the Court found no defects in the jury instructions. View "Antero Resources Corp. v. South Jersey Resources Group" on Justia Law

This case arose from the division of a three-member accounting firm, Siddoway, Wadsworth & Reese, PLLC. The three members of the firm were the personal professional corporations solely owned by each accountant. In early 2015, Reese PC signed a purchase agreement to buy a one-half interest in the client base of Siddoway PC for $200,000. This purchase agreement included an arbitration clause. In August of 2015, Siddoway left the accounting firm, taking several employees and the clients’ information with him. Following Siddoway’s departure, the firm (now named Wadsworth Reese, PLLC), along with its remaining members, filed a complaint in the district court against Siddoway and his personal professional corporation and two of the employees who followed him. Siddoway counterclaimed. The parties brought a range of claims. Reese PC and Siddoway PC also went to arbitration for claims related to their purchase agreement, but the arbitrator determined the purchase agreement was void for failure of a condition subsequent. The remaining claims between the parties were tried by the district court. The district court ultimately decided to “leave the parties where it found them.” This included final determinations pertinent to this appeal: (1) dissociation of Siddoway’s personal professional corporation as a firm member; (2) Siddoway and Siddoway PC were not entitled to attorney fees for compelling arbitration; (3) Siddoway PC failed to show unjust enrichment from the void purchase agreement; and (4) the firm could fund Reese’s personal professional corporation’s litigation and arbitration costs because resolving the purchase-agreement dispute served a legitimate business purpose. Siddoway and Siddoway PC appealed. The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment: Siddoway and Siddoway PC were not entitled to attorney fees for compelling arbitration, nor did they show unjust enrichment or breach of membership duties. View "Wadsworth Reese v. Siddoway & Co" on Justia Law

CompoSecure, L.L.C., a manufacturer of metal credit cards, sought to invalidate the Sales Representative Agreement (the “Sales Agreement”) it signed with CardUX, LLC. The Delaware Court of Chancery held in a February 2018 post-trial decision that the Sales Agreement had not been properly approved under CompoSecure’s Amended and Restated Limited Liability Company Agreement, but that CompoSecure had impliedly ratified the Sales Agreement by its conduct. CompoSecure appealed. In a November 2018 opinion, the Delaware Supreme Court agreed with the trial court’s analysis as far as it went, but remanded to the trial court to answer a potentially outcome-determinative question that it had not answered: whether the Sales Agreement was a “Restricted Activity” under the LLC Agreement. If it was a Restricted Activity, the Supreme Court noted that the Sales Agreement would have been void and unenforceable. In its report on remand, the Court of Chancery held that the Sales Agreement was not a Restricted Activity, and thus, the Sales Agreement was not void. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Chancery’s conclusions, and affirmed. View "Composecure, L.L.C. v. Cardux, LLC f/k/a Affluent Card, LLC" on Justia Law

At the times relevant to this litigation, the appellants, Baer Buick GMC and Grata Chevrolet (“Dealers”), and the appellee, General Motors, LLC, were parties to dealer sales and service agreements, per which Dealers sold and serviced vehicles manufactured by General Motors. Under the contractual terms, Dealers committed to performing repairs required by limited warranties extended by General Motors upon sales with no additional charge to customers (albeit that the projected cost of such repairs was factored into the purchase price for new vehicles). General Motors was then required to reimburse Dealers in accordance with a Service Policies and Procedures Manual (the “SPPM”). Through the SPPM, General Motors agreed to pay dealers at large for labor during warranty work under either of two options, denominated “Option A (Retail Rate) and Option C (CPI-based).” Option C, apparently, was the preferred option among dealers for labor reimbursement. General Motors’ standard reimbursement policy for parts installed in connection with warranty repairs was to pay one hundred and forty percent of the dealers’ costs. Apparently, both labor reimbursement alternatives, Options A and C, were initially made available to all dealers regardless of whether they sought reimbursement for parts under the standard contractual methodology or invoked an alternative rate, presumably under a governing regulatory statute. In 2012, however, General Motors instituted a policy effectively rendering any dealer pursuing an alternative reimbursement methodology for calculating warranty parts reimbursement ineligible for contractually-based Option C reimbursement for labor. Dealers, along with several other franchise dealers, lodged a protest with the State Board of Vehicle Manufacturers, Dealers and Salespersons (the “Board”), claiming that General Motors violated Section 9(a)(3) of the Board of Vehicles Act by contractually changing the manner in which it reimbursed dealers for warranty labor, when Dealers had merely exercised their statutory rights concerning reimbursement for warranty parts. They also challenged General Motors’ ability to impose a surcharge on dealers that elect the statutory retail reimbursement rate for warranty parts but not labor. In response, General Motors contended that nothing in the Act guaranteed dealers the right to participate in Option C, which was purely a matter of contract. After review, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Commonwealth Court as it related to Section 9(a), and reversed as concerned Section 9(b.4)(1)(i). View "General Motors, LLC v. St Brd/Vehicle Manufacturer" on Justia Law

KCP, the plaintiff, had hoped to act as a middleman in a potential distribution deal for a novel cleaning product and targeted Henkel, a large consumer products company as a potential distributor. KCP and Henkel entered into a non-disclosure agreement (NDA) to aid in the negotiations of a distribution deal. KCP provided Henkel with confidential information about the product. Following a year of exchanging information and engaging in negotiations, the NDA lapsed, and no deal was consummated. KCP asserts that Henkel’s parent company, Henkel KGaA, used confidential information it acquired through the NDA to develop the product on its own and also interfered with the potential distribution deal. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of KGaA. As to a breach of contract claim, the court found that KGaA was not a party to the NDA and could not be liable for its breach. As to a tortious interference claim, the court found that KGaA is the parent company of Henkel, so the parent-subsidiary privilege immunizes it from a tortious interference claim involving its subsidiary; the court found that the narrow “improper motive” exception to that privilege did not apply. The Sixth Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of KGaA, KCP has not presented sufficient evidence of any improper motive or means to pierce the parent-subsidiary privilege. View "Knight Capital Partners Corp. v. Henkel AG & Co." on Justia Law

The Ninth Circuit certified the following questions to the California Supreme Court: Does section 16600 of the California Business and Professions Code void a contract by which a business is restrained from engaging in a lawful trade or business with another business? Is a plaintiff required to plead an independently wrongful act in order to state a claim for intentional interference with a contract that can be terminated by a party at any time, or does that requirement apply only to at-will employment contracts? View "Ixchel Pharma, LLC v. Biogen, Inc." on Justia Law

The absence of a judgment in the state court litigation does not mean that plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring this suit. Enterprise filed suit against several defendants, alleging a claim under the Missouri Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. The district court dismissed the complaint without prejudice based on the ground that there was no case or controversy because Enterprise lacked Article III standing.The Eighth Circuit reversed and held that Enterprise has alleged facts sufficient to demonstrate the elements of standing. In this case, Enterprise has sufficiently alleged a present injury in fact, fairly traceable to defendants, as the transferees of the funds. Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Enterprise Financial Group Inc. v. Podhorn" on Justia Law

The Court of Chancery granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint brought in an effort to collect on an unpaid judgment, holding that one claim must be dismissed as untimely.JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. sued Data Treasury Corporation (DTC) and obtained a final judgment against DTC for $69 million. JPMorgan bought this action in an effort to collect on its judgment. DTC moved to dismiss all of JPMorgan's claims on a variety of grounds. JPMorgan claimed that DTC's directors should be liable for dividends DTC paid its stockholders after DTC licensed its patents to someone other than JPMorgan in violation of DTC's obligation to tell JPMorgan under a license agreement. JP Morgan also claimed it was entitled to recover the distributions because they were fraudulent transfers. The Court of Chancery held (1) JPMorgan had standing as a creditor of DTC to assert a claim under Section 174 to recover for itself and other creditors of DTC the dividends DTC paid; (2) the six-year limitations period in 8 Del. C. 174 is a statute of repose. The court thus finds that JPMorgan’s Section 174 claim must be dismissed as untimely; and (3) all of JPMorgan’s fraudulent transfer claims were timely filed. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Ballard" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision declining to reconsider its original decision granting the Town's motion to dismiss the amended complaint alleging claims of, inter alia, breach of contract, innocent misrepresentation, and fraud in connection with plaintiff's loan to a licensee of the Town that was allegedly secured by the Town.The court held that PHL's arguments with regard to dismissals of the unjust enrichment and negligent misrepresentation claims were not properly before the court. Even if they were properly before the court, the court would still reject PHL's arguments. The court also held that PHL's amended complaint failed to state a claim on which relief can be granted for breach of contract or equitable relief because it failed to plausibly allege a valid contract; PHL's claims for misrepresentation failed because PHL failed to allege that it reasonably or justifiably relied on the misrepresentation; and there was no merit to PHL's contention that it should have been allowed to file a second amended complaint. View "PHL Variable Insurance Co. v. Town of Oyster Bay" on Justia Law