Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Business Law
Cellular Telephone Company Litigation cases
Minority partners in various cellular telephone partnerships hired attorney Michael A. Pullara to pursue breach of fiduciary duty claims against the majority partner, AT&T. The client agreements allowed Pullara to hire joint venture counsel, and he retained Ajamie LLP. Both firms agreed to a 50% discount on their hourly rates in exchange for a contingency fee if they prevailed. After lengthy litigation, the minority partners reached a favorable settlement with AT&T. However, a dispute arose between Pullara and Ajamie over the fee division, leading Ajamie to file for a charging lien to secure its fee.The Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware granted a charging lien to preserve Ajamie’s claim against the settlement proceeds. Ajamie then sought to enforce the lien. The court held that the fee-sharing agreement between Pullara and Ajamie was unenforceable under the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct because the clients had not consented to the specific terms of the fee-sharing arrangement. However, the court ruled that Ajamie was still entitled to reasonable compensation under the principle of quantum meruit.The court calculated Ajamie’s lodestar at $13,178,616.78, based on market rates adjusted annually. Considering the Mahani factors, the court found that an upward adjustment was warranted due to the complexity and duration of the litigation, the significant results obtained, and the partially contingent nature of the fee arrangement. The court awarded Ajamie a total fee of $15,814,340.14, including a 20% increase for the contingency risk. After deducting amounts already paid, Ajamie was awarded $13,014,721.87 plus pre- and post-judgment interest. The court ordered the escrow agent to release this amount to Ajamie. View "Cellular Telephone Company Litigation cases" on Justia Law
Hirchak v. Hirchak
Garret Hirchak, Manufacturing Solutions, Inc., and Sunrise Development LLC (plaintiffs) appealed a trial court's order dissociating Garret from Hirchak Brothers LLC and Hirchak Group LLC (defendants) and requiring the LLCs to pay over $900,000 in equity interest, unpaid compensation, and reimbursements. Plaintiffs argued that the trial court erred in not recognizing oppression by the majority members of the LLCs, treating a $300,000 down payment made by Garret as gratuitous, declining to order reimbursements for certain services and cash advances, and refusing to assess prejudgment interest on any of the reimbursements. Defendants cross-appealed, arguing that the court erred in awarding compensation to Garret after he breached his fiduciary duties.The Superior Court, Lamoille Unit, Civil Division, found that Garret had breached his fiduciary duties by failing to make explicit agreements on service rates and withholding financial records. The court ordered Garret's dissociation from the LLCs and required the LLCs to pay Garret $375,000 for his equity interest, $215,430 for cash advances made before March 2020, and $213,591.84 for unpaid compensation from October 2019 to January 2021. The court also ordered reimbursement of $71,537.64 and $50,214.57 for unpaid invoices from MSI and Sunrise, respectively, before March 2020. The court denied prejudgment interest on any reimbursements and rejected Garret's claim for the $300,000 down payment.The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, agreeing that Garret was not entitled to reimbursement for the $300,000 down payment or for cash advances and invoices after March 2020 due to his breach of fiduciary duties. The court also upheld the denial of prejudgment interest, finding it was within the trial court's discretion. However, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's award of compensation to Garret after March 2020, concluding that his breach of fiduciary duties forfeited his right to compensation during that period. The case was remanded for a recalculation of the compensation due to Garret. View "Hirchak v. Hirchak" on Justia Law
WINDY COVE, INC. V. CIRCLE K STORES INC.
Windy Cove, Inc., HB Fuels, Inc., and Staffing and Management Group, Inc. (collectively “Windy Cove”) are gasoline dealers who own Mobil-branded stations in southern California. In 2012, they entered into a 15-year exclusive fuel supply agreement with Circle K Stores Inc. as required by the agreement under which they purchased their gas stations from ExxonMobil. Windy Cove alleged that Circle K did not set gasoline prices in good faith under this exclusive distributorship contract.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Circle K. The court found that the prices charged by Circle K were within the range of those charged by its competitors, including at least one refiner, and thus were set in good faith under California Commercial Code § 2305(2). Windy Cove failed to provide evidence that Circle K's prices were discriminatory or commercially unreasonable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding that Circle K’s prices were presumptively set in good faith because the contract had a “price in effect” term. The court noted that the safe harbor provision under Uniform Commercial Code § 2-305, which is codified as California Commercial Code § 2305(2), presumes good faith if the prices are within the range of those charged by competitors. The court found that Circle K’s prices were lower than at least one refiner, thus falling within the range of prices charged by competitors. Windy Cove’s arguments regarding Circle K’s use of a non-industry-standard pricing formula and higher prices compared to other wholesalers did not rebut the presumption of good faith. The court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate and affirmed the district court’s decision. View "WINDY COVE, INC. V. CIRCLE K STORES INC." on Justia Law
Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. v. Zhang
Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. (Abace) filed a lawsuit against Dr. Chunhong Zhang and MtoZ Biolabs, Inc. (MtoZ) after Dr. Zhang, a former employee, co-founded MtoZ, a company providing similar services to Abace. Abace claimed that Dr. Zhang breached her contract and fiduciary duty, and that MtoZ tortiously interfered with Abace's business. Dr. Zhang had signed several employment-related agreements, including non-compete clauses, while working for Abace. The dispute centered on whether these non-compete agreements were enforceable under Chinese law.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ, concluding that Dr. Zhang did not fall within the categories of employees subject to non-compete agreements under Chinese law. The court found that Dr. Zhang was neither senior management nor senior technical personnel, and did not have access to trade secrets or confidential information that would justify a non-compete restriction.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that under Chinese law, non-compete agreements are enforceable only against senior management, senior technical personnel, or employees with access to trade secrets. The court found no evidence that Dr. Zhang held a senior management or technical role, or that she had access to trade secrets. Consequently, the non-compete agreements were unenforceable, and the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Zhang and MtoZ was upheld. View "Beijing Abace Biology Co., Ltd. v. Zhang" on Justia Law
Falcao v. Richardson
Plaintiff and her partner, owners of Health Hero Farm LLC, sought to buy out a local farming family from their partnership. During this period, they befriended the defendant, a local auto-repair shop owner with a small farm. They discussed forming a partnership with him, and plaintiff represented to the Vermont Land Trust that they were partnering with the defendant to secure approval for the buyout. Plaintiff and defendant agreed to purchase Galloway cattle, with plaintiff advancing the funds. Plaintiff insisted on a written agreement, but defendant preferred a handshake deal. Eventually, defendant signed a promissory note without reading it, which included an attorney’s-fees provision.The Superior Court, Grand Isle Unit, Civil Division, held a bench trial and concluded that the promissory note did not accurately reflect an agreement between the parties. The court found that the note was a contract of adhesion and awarded plaintiff damages and prejudgment interest under a theory of unjust enrichment, rather than enforcing the promissory note.The Vermont Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the promissory note was unambiguous and enforceable according to its terms. The court found that defendant’s failure to read the note before signing it did not constitute a defense to enforcement. The court also determined that the note was not a contract of adhesion and was not unconscionable. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Falcao v. Richardson" on Justia Law
Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC
Two Massachusetts-based Volvo dealers filed a lawsuit against Volvo Car USA, Volvo Car Financial Services, and Fidelity Warranty Services, alleging violations of Massachusetts General Laws Chapter 93B. The dispute centers on Volvo-branded Prepaid Maintenance Program (PPM) contracts, which allow customers to prepay for future maintenance services at a discounted rate. Fidelity administers these contracts, which the dealers sell to their customers. The dealers claimed that the defendants were underpaying them for the parts and labor costs incurred in servicing these PPM contracts.The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts heard cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that entities like Fidelity are not regulated by the relevant provisions of Chapter 93B. The court denied the dealers' motion for summary judgment, leading the dealers to appeal the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision, but for a different reason. The appellate court held that the dealers' sale and service of the Volvo PPM are not franchise obligations under Chapter 93B. The court found that the Retailer Agreement between the dealers and Volvo USA did not obligate the dealers to sell or service the Volvo PPM. The court also noted that the dealers had the discretion to sell various financial products, including the Volvo PPM, and that servicing the PPM was not a material term of the Retailer Agreement. Therefore, Chapter 93B did not require Fidelity to reimburse the dealers at the statutory rates. View "Colony Place South, Inc. v. Volvo Car USA, LLC" on Justia Law
Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership
Northstar Center, LLC filed a lawsuit against Lukenbill Family Partnership, LLLP, and Tundra Properties, LLC, alleging breach of contract and intentional interference with contract. Lukenbill had initially agreed to sell a 120-acre parcel to Templeton Enterprises, LLC, which later assigned its rights to Northstar. However, Lukenbill sold the property to Tundra instead. Northstar claimed Lukenbill breached their agreement, and Tundra intentionally interfered with the contract. Lukenbill sought indemnification from Tundra, and Tundra counterclaimed for breach of warranty deed against Lukenbill.The District Court of Williams County granted summary judgment in favor of Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, and in favor of Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. The court denied Tundra’s summary judgment motion on its breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, concluding Tundra did not adequately brief the issue.The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Northstar on its breach of contract and intentional interference claims, as genuine issues of material fact existed. The court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for Lukenbill on its indemnification claim against Tundra. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tundra’s breach of warranty claim against Lukenbill, as Tundra did not challenge the dismissal on the grounds that it could not maintain the claim without a certificate of authority to transact business in North Dakota.The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Northstar Center v. Lukenbill Family Partnership" on Justia Law
Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc.
Major Brands, Inc., a Missouri-licensed liquor distributor, had been the exclusive distributor of Jägermeister in Missouri since the 1970s. In 2018, Mast-Jägermeister US, Inc. (MJUS) terminated this relationship and appointed Southern Glazers Wine and Spirits, LLC (Southern Glazers) as the new distributor. Major Brands sued MJUS and Southern Glazers, alleging wrongful termination under Missouri franchise law, conspiracy to violate Missouri franchise law, and tortious interference with the franchise relationship.The case was initially brought in state court but was removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. After dismissing additional defendants, the case proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded Major Brands $11.75 million, finding in its favor on five counts, including violation of Missouri franchise law and tortious interference. The district court denied the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial and awarded attorney’s fees to Major Brands.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the district court had prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the essential element of a "community of interest" under Missouri franchise law. The appellate court held that the jury instructions failed to require consideration of whether Major Brands made substantial investments that were not recoverable upon termination, which is necessary to establish a community of interest. Consequently, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, vacated the jury’s verdict and the award of attorney’s fees, and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Major Brands, Inc. v. Mast-Jagermeister US, Inc." on Justia Law
Stephensv. Four Thirteen, LLC
In this case, Four Thirteen, LLC filed a complaint against three corporate entities and several individuals, including Joshua Wearmouth, Larry Stephens, Edmond X. Moriniere, Ronald G. Meyers, and David C. Norton. The complaint alleged that Wearmouth and Stephens solicited funds from Four Thirteen for a business venture involving Brazilian carbon credits, which turned out to be fraudulent. Four Thirteen claimed that the corporate entities did not own the carbon credits and that Wearmouth and Stephens made numerous misrepresentations. The complaint included claims of breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and other related allegations.The District Court of Laramie County reviewed the case and rejected the affidavits of non-involvement filed by Moriniere, Meyers, and Norton, who sought dismissal from the suit. The court found that there were factual issues regarding their involvement in the alleged fraud. Additionally, the district court imposed discovery sanctions and entered a default judgment against all defendants, including the individual appellants, for failing to comply with discovery orders.The Wyoming Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision regarding the affidavits of non-involvement. The Supreme Court determined that the district court correctly found that there were factual disputes about the involvement of Moriniere, Meyers, and Norton, which precluded their dismissal from the case.However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court's decision to impose discovery sanctions against the individual appellants. The Supreme Court found that the appellants were not given proper notice that they were subject to sanctions under Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b) and that there was no evidence they violated any prior discovery order. The court held that the sanctions against the individual appellants were not justified and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Stephensv. Four Thirteen, LLC" on Justia Law
VFS Leasing Co. v. Markel Insurance Company
VFS Leasing Co. ("VFS") leased trucks to Time Definite Leasing, LLC ("TDL"), which insured the trucks with Markel American Insurance Company ("Markel American"). Markel American issued joint checks to VFS and TDL for insurance claims, but TDL cashed the checks without VFS's endorsement and kept the proceeds. VFS sued Markel American for breach of contract, claiming it was owed the funds from the joint checks.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of VFS, holding that Markel American breached the insurance contract by failing to ensure VFS received the funds. The court found that under Florida's Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), Markel American's obligation was not discharged because the checks were not properly endorsed by both co-payees.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed whether Markel American's obligation to VFS was discharged when the drawee bank improperly accepted the joint checks. The court concluded that under Florida Statute § 673.4141(3), a drawer's obligation is discharged when a bank accepts a jointly issued check, regardless of whether both co-payees endorsed it. The court noted that while VFS could pursue a conversion claim against the bank, Markel American's obligation was discharged upon the bank's acceptance of the checks.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment in favor of VFS and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "VFS Leasing Co. v. Markel Insurance Company" on Justia Law