Justia Contracts Opinion Summaries

This case involved a dispute over the return of earnest money following termination of an agreement to purchase a storage facility between River Range, LLC, (River Range), the buyer, and Citadel Storage, LLC, (Citadel), the seller. Following River Range’s termination of the agreement, River Range demanded the return of its earnest money. Citadel refused, arguing that the deadline for the return of the earnest money had passed. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Citadel. River Range appealed, arguing that the district court erred in holding that: (1) the agreement was unambiguous and an addendum eliminated River Range’s right to have the earnest money refunded after a certain date; (2) River Range waived its right to terminate the agreement when it did not exercise the right to terminate the agreement by the due diligence deadline; and (3) Citadel did not breach the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "River Range v. Citadel Storage" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court was the doctrine of successor liability and its applicability to a business known as “Fatty’s Bar” (“Fatty’s”). Tons of Fun, LLC opened Fatty’s in October 2010 and a short time later its manager, Clay Roman, signed a textile services agreement with Alsco, Inc. The Agreement contained an automatic renewal clause, by which the Agreement would renew automatically for a period of 60 months if neither party terminated it in writing at least 90 days before its initial expiration. Fatty’s fell on difficult financial times, and closed for a period in January 2013. Soon after, Steven and Jennifer Masonheimer created a limited liability company called Fatty’s Bar, LLC, and re-opened Fatty’s in mid-February, 2013, continuing to receive textiles from Alsco. The Agreement automatically renewed in March 2016. In March 2017, Fatty’s Bar, LLC terminated the Agreement, well before the 60-month term was set to expire. Alsco then sued Fatty’s Bar, LLC and Clay Roman, seeking damages based on a liquidated damages provision in the Agreement. After a court trial, the district court held that both Fatty’s Bar, LLC and Roman, were jointly and severally liable to Alsco for damages under a liquidated damages clause that was also in the Agreement. Fatty’s Bar, LLC appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed. View "Alsco v. Fatty's Bar" on Justia Law

Jeff Good and Harry’s Dairy entered into a contract providing that Harry’s Dairy would purchase 3,000 tons of Good’s hay. Harry’s Dairy paid for and hauled approximately 1,000 tons of hay over a period of approximately eight weeks, but did not always pay for the hay before hauling it and at one point went several weeks without hauling hay. After Harry’s Dairy went a month without hauling additional hay, Good demanded that Harry’s Dairy begin paying for and hauling the remaining hay. Harry’s Dairy responded that it had encountered mold in some of the hay, but would be willing to pay for and haul non-moldy hay at the contract price. Good then sold the remaining hay for a substantially lower price than he would have received under the contract and filed a complaint against Harry’s Dairy alleging breach of contract. Harry’s Dairy counterclaimed for violation of implied and express warranties and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Good on all claims, and a jury ultimately awarded Good $144,000 in damages. Harry’s Dairy appealed, arguing that there were several genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, that the jury verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to Good. Finding only that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the implied warranty of merchantability counterclaim, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed as to that issue, affirmed as to all others, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Good v. Harry's Dairy" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Golden Spread and Westport's tort claims against Emerson. The claims arose after Emerson installed a new control system for Golden Spread and the control system's software had been programmed incorrectly.The court held that the economic loss rule, which prevents recovery in tort for purely economic damage unaccompanied by injury to persons or property, is applicable in this case. The court reasoned that the Texas Supreme Court would conclude that the risk suffered here is better addressed in contract than in tort. In this case, the parties are sophisticated, commercial actors that actually did negotiate over the allocation of risk. Furthermore, the parties themselves were in the best position to understand and allocate the risks of their transaction ahead of time to resolve any ambiguities in the application of that rule to their circumstances. View "Golden Spread Electric Cooperative v. Emerson Process Management Power & Water Solutions" on Justia Law

Travelers Property Casualty Company of America (“Travelers”) filed suit against SRM Group, Inc. (“SRM”), seeking to recover unpaid premiums due under a workers’ compensation insurance policy. In response, SRM asserted counterclaims against Travelers for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and attorney fees based on Travelers’ audit of SRM’s employee risk classifications and subsequent refusal to reclassify those employees, which resulted in a substantial retroactive increase in the premium. A jury awarded Travelers damages based on SRM's failure to pay some of the alleged increased premium due under the policy. However, the jury found that Travelers had also breached the contract and acted in bad faith in conducting the audit and failing to reclassify certain SRM employees. The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether a counterclaimant asserting an independent compulsory counterclaim could seek attorney fees and litigation expenses under Georgia case law. The Supreme Court overruled Byers v. McGuire Properties, Inc, 679 SE2d 1 (2009), and Sponsler v. Sponsler, 699 SE2d 22 (2010). "Thus, a plaintiff-in-counterclaim asserting an independent claim may seek, along with that claim, attorney fees and litigation expenses under OCGA 13-6-11, regardless of whether the independent claim is permissive or compulsory." In this case, the Court reversed that part of the Court of Appeals' opinion that followed Byers. View "SRM Group, Inc. v. Travelers Property Cas. Co. of America" on Justia Law

Rembrandt contracted to supply Rexing with 3,240,000 cage-free eggs every week for a year. Eight months later, Rexing claimed that Rembrandt failed to provide eggs that met the specified quality standards. Rexing sought a declaration that it was excused from accepting any more eggs, and incidental and consequential damages. Rembrandt counterclaimed, seeking damages. The trial court determined that Rexing had unilaterally terminated the contract and that the breach was not excused. Rembrandt was awarded $1,522,302.61 in damages.Rexing voluntarily dismissed its subsequent appeal and filed suit in state court, alleging conversion and deception. Rexing claimed that Rembrandt had refused to return reusable shipping materials, the “EggsCargoSystem,” Rexing had provided. In the first suit, Rexing had sought the value of the EggsCargoSystem as part of the start-up costs that it allegedly incurred in reliance on the agreement. Rembrandt removed the second suit to federal court and argued that the claims were barred by claim-preclusion in light of the district court’s grant of summary judgment in the first suit and that Rexing had improperly split its claims between the two cases.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the second suit. Rexing impermissibly split its claims. Both suits centered around the same controversy. Under Indiana’s doctrine prohibiting claim splitting, a plaintiff cannot bring a new lawsuit based upon the same transaction or occurrence that underlies claims brought in another lawsuit. View "Rexing Quality Eggs v. Rembrandt Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether Respondent, the Murkin Group, LLC (Murkin), engaged in the unauthorized practice of law (UPL). In April 2017, the Wando River Grill (Restaurant) became dissatisfied with the service of its linen supplier (Cintas) and Cintas' ability to supply the type of linens Restaurant needed. Restaurant contacted another supplier to secure some or all of its required linens and notified Cintas of its need to suspend at least a portion of Cintas' services. Cintas claimed Restaurant's suspension of service constituted a breach of the parties' contract, invoked a liquidated damages provision in the contract, sought more than $8,000 in damages, and hired Murkin to collect the outstanding debt. Petitioner, a South Carolina attorney, represented Restaurant in the resulting dispute. In April 2018, Murkin sent a demand-for-payment letter to Restaurant. Because a Murkin-prepared reinstatement agreement materially altered the terms of the parties' original contract and imposed new obligations on Restaurant and because the agreement's terms were contrary to discussions Cintas personnel had directly with Restaurant, Restaurant sent the proposed reinstatement agreement to Petitioner. All further communications were handled through Murkin. Ultimately, Restaurant did not sign the reinstatement agreement, and no South Carolina counsel for Murkin or Cintas contacted Petitioner. Further, Murkin threatened litigation of the dispute was not resolved. Petitioner then asked Murkin for the South Carolina Bar numbers of several Murkin employees, but Murkin felt Petitioner's desire to deal with Murkin's local counsel "means nothing, since that is a decision made between our client and our office." Murkin further claimed authority to bind any attorney to whom Murkin referred the matter to settle for no less than Murkin demanded. Petitioner lodged a petition with the Supreme Court, alleging UPL. A special master appointed by the Court determined Murkin went beyond the "mere collection of debt" and crossed into UPL by negotiating the contract dispute; purporting to advise Cintas as to what legal action it should take; advising the parties as to whether to take a settlement offer; and purporting to control whether and when the case would be referred to an attorney. The Supreme Court concurred Murkin's actions constituted UPL. View "Westbrook v. Murkin Group" on Justia Law

Jeff Good and Harry’s Dairy entered into a contract providing that Harry’s Dairy would purchase 3,000 tons of Good’s hay. Harry’s Dairy paid for and hauled approximately 1,000 tons of hay over a period of approximately eight weeks, but did not always pay for the hay before hauling it and at one point went several weeks without hauling hay. After Harry’s Dairy went a month without hauling additional hay, Good demanded that Harry’s Dairy begin paying for and hauling the remaining hay. Harry’s Dairy responded that it had encountered mold in some of the hay, but would be willing to pay for and haul non-moldy hay at the contract price. Good then sold the remaining hay for a substantially lower price than he would have received under the contract, and filed a complaint against Harry’s Dairy alleging breach of contract. Harry’s Dairy counterclaimed for violation of implied and express warranties and breach of contract. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Good on all claims, and a jury ultimately awarded Good $144,000 in damages. Harry’s Dairy appealed, arguing that there were several genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment, that the jury verdict was not supported by substantial and competent evidence, and that the district court erred in awarding attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest to Good. The Idaho Supreme Court determined the district court erred only in its decision with respect to Good’s breach of contract claim and Harry’s Dairy’s breach of the implied warranty of merchantability claims. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Good v. Harry's Dairy" on Justia Law

In this action arising out of an alleged breach of a professional services agreement (PSA) between Vizant Technologies, LLC and YRC Worldwide Inc. the Supreme Court concluded that YRC's motion for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part, holding that partial summary judgment should be granted in YRC's favor on the issue of certain damages involving automated clearing house (ACH) batch payments.Vizant sought declaratory and injunctive relief against YRC as well as damages for breach of the PSA, claiming that it was owed outstanding fees for savings that YRC allegedly realized through successful efforts to pay using ACH rather than credit cards. Vizant argued that the PSA required YRC to pay a fee to Vizant because YRC realized savings as a result of the strategies identified by Vizant. YRC, however, argued that it did not owe Vizant a fee because Vizant's suggestions did not actually cause YRC to change business practices and realize savings. The Supreme Court granted in part and denied in part YRC's motion for summary judgment, holding (1) Vizant failed to produce evidence to support its claimed ACH damages; and (2) YRC's summary judgment motion is denied with regard to Vizant's breach of contract claim. View "Vizant Techs., LLC v. YRC Worldwide, Inc" on Justia Law

LED Corporations, Inc. ("LED"), and Anthony Florence petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to direct the Etowah Circuit Court ("the trial court") to vacate its order denying their motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction an action filed against them by SDM Electric, LLC ("SDM"), and to enter an order dismissing the case against them. SDM is an Alabama corporation that served as an electrical subcontractor for a construction project at a high school in Calhoun County, Alabama. LED is a Florida corporation owned by Florence, its sole shareholder. In 2017, SDM contacted LED to solicit a bid for lighting fixtures for use in the construction project. SDM executed and delivered to LED a purchase order for lighting fixtures; SDM paid LED the balance of the purchase order. The fixtures were never shipped, and, in late 2018, SDM sued LED and Florence (among others), for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation and conversion. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, concluding SDM satisfied its burden in opposition to LED's and Florence's motions to dismiss by showing that LED and Florence has sufficient contacts with Alabama to support the exercise of specific personal jurisdiction and that the exercise of jurisdiction over them "complies with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." View "Ex parte LED Corporations, Inc." on Justia Law